1981

Volume I.

The problem of perception is the problem of reconciling the phenomena with the

explanation.

That is between what is perceived with the explanation of what is perceived. The explanation is necessarily the unperceived.

Of course a problem arises when you try to tell yourself that what you perceive is unperceived OR that what you perceive is unreal - and what you don't perceive is real

It must be remembered that the whole object of, or desire for explanation, is based on a desire to go beyond -  or need to - distrust - the senses - it is a desire for non-phenomenal knowledge (explanation) of phenomena

So an explanation can never have the same status logically or psychologically as the phenomena - it is - the picture it creates is fundamentally different

an -explanation by it's nature cannot replace a phenomena (it is an explanation not a phenomena) the explanation accounts for the phenomena

the theoretical - non-observational terms - the picture they give is not phenomenal - some think it is super-phenomenal - that it gives us a superior picture to the phenomenal picture. This is a mistake - and the basis of the philosophical problem.

a theoretical entity such as an atom is non-phenomenal/ by it's nature. explanation is a non phenomenal enterprise. (the language is non-phenomenal, non-observational) theoretical terms cannot be reduced to observational

and observational cannot be reduced to, or developed from theoretical

but if there is no connection what does the explanation explain an explanation - a non-observational account of an observation

it is a substitute or alternative - as if transposed onto - and of value, more value than observational language - because of it's predictive power it's fruitfulness

If Thales is the father of western philosophy it is not because he asked the question what is the basic structure of reality,

but because he went further and posed the question, the problem which was to occupy all subsequent philosophy 'is reality material or spiritual?'

Are there not two conflicting theories of the ultimate nature of reality. (1) materialistic (2) spiritual - non materialistic. Why is Thales credited only with having posed the materialistic?

his references to the 'soul' of things suggest to me that his water theory may only have been half the story.

Anaximander. How do the elements separate out? how can a finite thing be extracted -subsistent in infinity? What does A mean by infinity? (Spinoza' chief ancestor)

Anaximes has attempted to explain or solve Anaximander's problem: the relation between infinite and finite. The relation is process

His 'air' theory of creation rests on his view 'it is always in motion'

hence it is the motion of the infinite that separates out the elements

but still the question remains are these elements finite or infinite?

Pythagoras. Why is the idea that all things are numbers at first so strange? Is not Pythagoras saying that the essence, the reality of things is form? Is not mathematics merely the reduction of all to form? Was not Pythagoras the first to do this?

Heraclitus. Is 'logos' here, really, just simply Heraclitus' 'pronouncement' - his 'word'?

- or perhaps 'the truth' the 'law-"

the hidden truth which he suggests is 'one' (123 +50)

he prefers the obvious (55) but an obvious which is based on the logos

Is not his account of the unity of the opposites, his account of - his theory of the logos? some commentators distinguish the two.

fire is an analogy designed to represent the process of the logos

Parmenedies 'for the same things exist for thinking as for being'. How if I say then that the void exists then it does?

Russell's argument only explains how we can make a negative existential statement significant semantically. It does not cope with the philosophical problem of whether or not 'nothing' exists

But at the same time Parmenides' argument creates the 'existential' problem. He confuses the ontological with the epistemological, end in so doing- poses the ontological / epistemological problem.What has to be questioned is Parmenides' theory of knowledge not so much his ontology.

his view of knowledge undermines his theory of ontology in that he acknowledges false knowledge - or knowledge that doesn't exist. how can this be given his theory of ontology

if what is limited IS - does not non-being exist beyond the limit?

the argument for the limit seems to defeat the argument for being. are the two arguments separate i.e., being and limit?

Parmenides' mistake is to go from his statement 'it is' to a statement

of what it is

such a move implies what it is not

his problem is to show how an existential statement in the sense can have any significance - i.e.. the limit exists and the limitless exists

his 'theory of 'the Way of Seeming' shows Parmenides fails to recognize this problem

Parmenides has confused the ontological and the epistemological problem. It seems his problem is epistemological.

if this is so what becomes of the status of ontology?

is ontology a particular starting point for the epistemological

problem

i.e.  is there an ontological problem once negative existential problems can be rendered significant?

perhaps what is left for ontology is what epistemology best acconts for what it is claimed exists? ontology/epistemology - just possible starting points? as has been said a theory of knowledge implies an ontology, and visa versa

Parmenides begins with a statement of what exists, and, from this implies a theory of knowledge, but isn't this his problem? In his theory of ontology his theory of knowledge is a hidden first premise

Zeno.

a dimensionless space is impossible. If we don't distinguish the dimensions (even relativistically) then there is no space

Zeno begins with dimensional space and then in effect argues it out of existence.

In so doing he actually argues against space - not motion.

but this of course defeats motion as

M=S

     T

                                   

but this result is throwing the baby out with the water.

Zeno reduces length to depth. infinity contains depth and vise versa

the two dimensions are essential for the existence of space

depth cannot exist without infinite (width)

was Zeno actually arguing against a finite view of Space?-and not against motion?

he argues motion but believes it is endless motion = space traversed in time

Zeno's argument for motion to exist: space and time must be finite

(Aristotle: it must take an infinite time to cross infinite space)

the problem is to show if space and time are infinite motion is possible

can you cross the infinite?

now if you hold to a dimensional space in what sense does infinity exist?

If we define infinity as dimension less - dimensioned space is not infinite - it is contained: hence real spatial infinity does not exist or we cannot identify space with infinity therefore actual infinity does not exist.

Thus infinity is not a property of space (or maybe it is but it is not space)

space is enclosed infinity (depth)

If infinity is not enclosed space does not exist

and if infinity does not exist neither does depth? hence space ?

Is not Zeno arguing that we don't cross space but go into it?

a distinction between depth and length infinity?

a problem of dimensions - frame of reference?

Zeno is suggesting or rather confusing depth motion with length motion. he thinks that LM is in fact DM - and of course if that were so a thing would not traverse from A to B, but would rather -travel in A. i.e., (a1....a2.....a3.........)

but once this is granted the argument is defeated . space is homogeneous

what if we change perspective and make 'depth'  'length' then there is still motion - motion into

infinity

Zeno's argument against a certain kind of M - L is a matter of perspective

- relativity - to coin a phrase.                  

The Pluralists - Empedoceles.

love and strife - also an attempt to explain process and change i.e.,

homogeneity/heterogeneity

also what is new is that there are two processes

the simple idea of opposition has been replaced here

we are getting a much more complete picture of the world it's elements and processes

love and strife an anthropomorphic view.of nature/reality - the first in western philosophy?

and

one from many, many from one harmony /strife the beginning of a dialectic

Anaxagoras, all things are infinite and separate from the mind

the atomists: Leucipus and Democritus.

'Leucipus and his disciple Democitus hold that the elements are the full and the void! they call them being and not being respectively'

a solution to Parmenedies problem make the void and element.

28/5/81

EUTHYPERO

(63)

Socrates: Tell me then, what do you say holiness is, and what unholiness?

(64)

EUTHYPHRO: Well then, what is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy

Socrates carries on the search for essence which was begun by Thales? his interest though is ethics

the search for essentialist definition

(65)

SOCRATES: Is it not about right and wrong, and noble and disgraceful, and good and bad? Are not these the questions about which you and I and other people become enemies, when we do become enemies because we differ about them and cannot reach satisfactory agreement?

And how about the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree would they not disagree about these questions?

EUTHYPHRO: Necessarily

An argument could be waged here to the efffect, that Socrates sees any genuine disagreement to necessarily be moral - and this suggests that he has a wider view of what is and is not to be included in the moral realm. However at the same time he makes a sharp distinction betveen moral and non-moral

Socrates: And the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, according to this statement

The beginning of ethical relativism

This dialogue is an argument against moral authority (ie. authority of the gods)  and against conventionalism  - that which is accepted (ie., unarguable)

(67)

SOCRATES: We shall soon know more about this my friend. Just

consider this question: IS that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

the objective/subjective problem

This dialogue seems mainly to be concerned with, the problem of meta-ethics the ground of moral reasoning

(68)

SOCRATES: Then one does not see because it is a seen thing, but, on the contrary it is a seen thing because one sees it;

I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming - but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes.........

What Socrates seems to be saying here is that the potential for change, is an inherent characteristic, or potential of a thing

(in moral terms it is the nature of an act, good/bad that determines how it will be regarded. It is not how it is regarded that determines it s essence or nature)

(69)

SOCRATES: .....

.........But you mentioned something that has happened to this holiness, namely, that it is loved by the gods. But you did not tell as yet what it really is.

(72)

SOCRATES:Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?

Is Socrates arguing a consequentialist view of moral acts?

Thales.

with Thales we have the beginning of 'substance' philosophy /cosmology - there is no news in this - but I think we also have the beginning of 'process' cosmology - and this I think has not to this point been realized. the crucial point is that water changes and water is

it is this Thales should be remembered for the problem of -substance vs. process.

This may not be Thales problem, in the sense of the problem he was concerned with ( it could have been) but it is the problem or the dimensions of the problem which he gives to subsequent philosophers

Perhaps the reason he chose 'water' for his 'urstoff' is that there is a sense in which the substance/process problem does not arise water is symbolic of the fundamental unity of the oneness of substance and process. 'theos' means basically force sometimes 'God.

in saying that gods are in everything was Thales attempting to account for process - change - movement of the primary substance water? i.e., water is pervaded by the vehicle for force?

Anaximander.

again, as with Thales there is a distinction drawn between substance and process. For him it seems the infinite is both substance and process.

Pythagoras.

'theory' according to Pythagoras meant 'to watch' - no distinction here between theory and practice., theory and experiment! - either a very primitive account or a very powerful one?

Parmenidies

If 'it is not' is impossible - how is it that the statement can be uttered in the first place?

how can the thought be formed? -.obviously it can't

well how is it that the illusion exists?

for Parmenides process is an illusion reality seems to be the one substance.

(for Heraclitus process is fundamental?)

Zeno

assumes 'nothing'' is equivalent to 'that which does not exist. Why must this be so?

'Nothing'' may well be a form of existence - a state of being - a manifestation of

existences a mode

Socrates

can we say that knowledge consisted for Socrates in the search (for knowledge), and not as such in the end product? (this is because he despaired of ever finding the end product)

and

he considered his role to be that of showing (and this is what Socratic k consists in) showing that no such finality exists?

the process of showing that there is no knowledge is what knowledge is

S is thus the bridge between Plato and Hegel - and a refinement of Heraclitus. Putting it succinctly - Socrates set out to dispose of one view of the nature of knowledge - what was to become the Platonic view - and in so doing laid the basis for the dialectical and transcendental views

Plato

at the top of Plato's class society is the philosopher - he who understands the forms - but surely knowledge of the forms is open to any normal human being? and 'why is it necessary to adopt a certain lifestyle to know the forms - or to base a class structured society on this knowledge. Plato wants to make it look as if his epistemology is the basis for his politics (in order I think to give it some king of legitimization) in fact the two are not connected.

(Republic).Plato has no real explanation for why some have 'best natures' and others do not. We could ask with Socrates if the good is seen known, how is it that people choose not to live in accordance with it - and some of course do?

How are we to interpret the question can virtue be taught.? in light of the Socratic problem)?

In saying  is knowledge was Socrates saying that it can be taught? can be learnt?

Is Plato trying to complete the Socratic program

But if knowledge is intuited as Plato claims - apprehended - not learnt - knowledge is not something acquired it is given

Plato in referring to the Good as knowledge is endorsing Socrates' view that virtue is knowledge  - having knowledge is having virtue  Socrates unlike Plato says if people knew what virtue / knowledge is - they would act in  accordance with it. Plato disagrees

Is not Plato's Good an undefined transcendent? does not Plato define his good analytically - the good is perfection - this is O.K - but the social / political theory that Plato wants us to believe follows from his definition of the good - is not in fact entailed by it

Plato's Good as such tells us nothing about how to live.

According to Plato we intuit the world of ideas. This means an imperfect intuitive faculty (which it must be by definition) enables us to see perfection (to form a concept of it)

How does this occur? There must be a perfect form of intuition of which our form is an imperfect copy - and hence know the truth of Plato's theory?

The subtlety and deviousness of Plato's theory rests on the fact that his account of the nature of knowledge must be one and the same as his account of the way in which we 'know', the process by which knowledge is gained

Aristotle

A refers to the purpose of various things, plants animals etc. but what does he say is the purpose of Nature as a whole a totality?

surely he must have an answer to this? And what can it be?

the purpose of an acorn is to grow into an oak, an embryo to a child - but of nature? to fulfill itself?

Stoics

Cannot Satre's view of freedom and determinism be traced to the stoic view that freedom is determined?

Philosophy is a modal activity - the study of possibilities. It is a reflective activity the elements of experience are non-modal. they are(appear) actual fixed definite (as against modal.)

such (conscious) moments are, exist at the base level of consciousness. They are if you like the starting point of Knowledge.

however consciousness in it's full sense is unfixed it negates the reality of the basic level

when this occurs, philosophical consciousness - the highest form of consciousness - begins the logical result of this is the destruction of the actual.

this though is self negating as consciousness is an actual

at this moment (of awareness) consciousness attempts to actualize - itself - objectify itself - become an object/ definite fixed - deny it's own modality

knowledge (awareness) is the process of conflict - a dialectical process between the actual and the modal levels of consciousness

science is a modality

the point of the modal is the actual (the world)

without the world there would be no point to knowledge

consciousness in it's modal moment attempts to transcend the actual (the given) the world

in it's actual moment it attempts to deny defeat resolve possibilities (the mind)

philosophy is a first order modal activity the study of discovery of - modalities - possibilities

Philosophy lays bear the mind - modalities

the actual is a perceptually fixed, stable modality

Philosophy is modal awareness

Perception

the elimination of secondary qualities is pragmatic

secondary qualities are irrelevant to the problem of physics as Kant pointed out the primary qualities are 'secondary' what we are dealing with is levels of perception and problems of explanation pragmatics

we cannot see beyond our spectacles of perception we can only infer - infer the unknown and really say nothing more about it)

what logical status are we to give the Cogito? Is it analytic/ synthetic or a conflagration of the two?

Phenomenalism and Representationalism are explanations of accounts of realism - not substitutes for it

so the problem of appearance and reality is an illusion which arises as a result of the mistaken belief that an explanation of a phenomenon can be equivalent logically to the phenomenon

we are immediately aware of objects - our awareness of sense data is not as empiricists claim immediate but rather reflective

the problem of perception is the problem of explaining the immediate awareness of objects

veridical perception is a biologically given level of perception - it is not the object - but the level of perception which changes

hence we cannot talk of objects in any absolute sense (absoluteness is the illusion - relativity is the fact)

this is not to cast doubt on the nature of objects - but how we perceive them the appearance of an object is a function of the relationship between the object and the perceiver. The perceiver is relative to the object and visa versa.

freewill

does not the freewill determinism question, rest 'like so ,many others on a phenomenon/explanation.'- process/product confusion

Hobbes

Hobbes' political philosophy rests on the idea of a state of nature - a state of anarchy - a complete lack of order in looking at his view we must first ask, is such state possible In the absolute sense Hobbes imagined?

Cause

if we accept a mind / matter dualism the problem of cause arises

Isn't the idea of cause too primitive?

cause is really an answer to the problem of the relation between events - and a crude answer at that

wouldn't it be more to the point to say events are related in certain ways?

God

the idea of god is an explanation of human limitation. inorder to explain his limitations posses the concept of the limitless - his experience though is of the limited

if we argue that god is limitlessness etc. how do we explain limit - ness?

Berkeley

doesn't seem to have any account of what an idea is - except that it's in the mind. Presumably it's in the mind because it is being perceived - which suggests that it exists independently of the mind - if not then it seems the mind perceives itself

15/10/81

reading Hume's final skepticism - convinced any attempt at a total empiricists analysis is bound to fail.

also the essence of Kant is contained in Hume - a very short step between the two - the difference is that Hume faces and accepts skepticism - a pretty devastating but neverthe less limited skepticism. Kant in some ways is more of a naturalist than Hume - he seems to be consistently interested in explaining the phenomena of experience. and it is because of this that he develops his transcendental rationalism

Hume started out a philosophical scientist - but ended up fair and square a philosopher (I think visa versa is true of Kant

finally convinced that some kind of dialectical metaphysics is the only kind of meta possible and also that a meta is needed a deep psychological sense - (this psychologism does not worry me in the least - I think it's the only possible answer to the problem of logic it is the problem of knowledge)

Hegel's meta was without it's teleolgy, essentialism and sociology spot on - but if you strip Hegel of the above all you have is Heraclitus - not quite true Hegel developed his dialectic beyond Heraclitus

I think that a kind of Heraclitus / Hegel dialectic (minus the a bove elements) would be a formal first order description of reality.

beyond it of course would be skepticism - and it is this fact I think which led Hegel to postulate his absolute -and his teleolgy - the dialectic has to have something to do a Reason and somewhere to go. This doesn't worry me I wanted a place for skepticism anyway - this is a kind of first order cosmological skepticism - the groundlessness of being - dialectics in a void - a pattern emerging in the void - the pattern is dialectic

BACON          6/10/81

is generalization (of the highest kind) some kind of 'ideal' or ' upper' limit of

experience?

Bacon seems not here, to think much of generalization

he says, '(it is the) middle which are the true and solid and living axioms on which depend the affairs of men'

if so does Bacon avoid the problem of induction?

what I'm getting at is does Bacon see generalization as a 'content-less' 'trimming', whose only function is methodological - whose real significance is the production of middle of the road empirical statements?

GALILEO

it seems, first put forward the primary/secondary qualities distinction.

Locke then is no philosophical innovator, but rather an applier of Galileo's philosophy of science an elaborator and explicator where does Locke' originality lie? (only in that his critics pulled the distinction apart)

7/10 /81

Locke's big mistake( and perhaps this applies to most of the history of philosophy)

was to apply a methodological distinction, developed for the particular purpose of the

physical sciences beyond this context. Galileo's primary /secondary qualities was a

fruitful methodological weapon for physics - for the problems of physical sciences

Now Galileo claimed to be, believed he was a realist so he presented his distinction in a realist form, and in doing this he worked it out in terms of perception. But Galileo's realism was not a common sense realism - it was an analytical realism - which was latter adopted or seen to be a common sense realism. Galileo changed our picture of the world - so it is said but in fact what he did was change our conception of the world

alileo's analysis is wrongly presented as a theory of perception .It is a theory of conception.  It is just this mistake that Locke made arguing the primary/secondary distinction as a theory of perception, Locke made a category mistake.

A further, and most important point is that Galileo's theory of conception is not

validly applied beyond his physical science problems.

What I am suggesting is that Galileo's distinction is valid instrumentally, pragmatically within the context of his problem.

This mistake of confusing perception with conception led to an absurd period in

philosophy - culminating with Berkeley's total denial of realism - a theory which apart

from it's ant-realism was incoherent anyway

Our perceptions of the world do not allow us to control the world it's only through our

conceptions that we can do or attempt to do this. Science is a body of conceptual

perceptions which are valid given the problems of science - they make sense in this

context

Our day and age have suffered immeasurably due to the conceptual/ perceptual

confusion

HEGEL'S contradictorines - his dialectic turning on itself really is only finally formulated in the existentialist, tradition - the tradition of the irrational - the logic of the absurd

(in this sense Hegel is, a founding intellectual influence of existentialism)

SKEPTICISM is the foundation (or non-foundation) epistemological - of all liberation

knowledge is the foundation of all control and oppression

oppression is a certain form of control - in the social/ political sense this is

exemplified in the various forms of fascism

the logical socio/political consequence of intellectual skepticism is ANARCHISM

logic does not decide the issue between knowledge and ignorance, social control and

it's absence - this is a moral issue

Morality is the primitive form of, a short hand for psychological imperatives and

possibilities

if we are looking for a logical objective method of determining moral (i.e., psycho-

sociological issues) we will not find any

the issue is factual - there are no other issues - the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy itself.

What is good is what is desired - there are conflicting desires resolution of this

conflict is in any final sense impossible there are no objective standard - the problem

is relativistic, indeterminate - the answer must always be in the final sense - skeptical -

this doesn't lead to paralysis or need not - needs desires dictate action - the conflict of

such - the dialectic of life is constant - moral, social - if peace exists it is a dialectical

moment

belief in the objective moral values - non-natural realms - are I believe explicable in

naturalistic terms - i.e. psychological explanations are possible

the absolute - the essence - is the unknown everything begins proceeds through ends

in the unknown

all that is known is immediate knowledge

reflective/rationalistic/intellectual/conceptual knowledge is not real knowledge - it is speculative not immediate - it's main function is to help us to cope with deal with the elusivedialectical moment. It's value is a function of it's effectiveness in a particular context - it's truth value is thus always tied to the moment - the belief that knowledge transcends the moment, that it is objective, is a result of our desire to control the moment - it invariably fails - but it seems to be necessary, psycho-sociological belief - a stratagem that has evolved PERCEPTION

what we perceive is not an object (as such), or a sense impression (as such) or an idea

(as such) what we'percieve'is a relationship

we do perceive objects - but not objects in themselves what we perceive is objects in

relation to ourselves the qualities of an object primary / secondary are only known relatively the question do we perceive 'objects' as such is insensible perception is a relationship between object and perceiver

we can't sensibly talk about either independently of the other

what I'm getting at is that full blown account of an object perceived, must take into account - is incomplete - without the perceiver

likewise a full blown account must in a relative way do justice to the object of

perception

the distinction between perceiver and object is arbitrary - not in the sense that there

aren't any differences but -rather that we are not dealing with distinct entities/ objects -

what we are dealing with is a simple process, and the products of that process and

their relationship

the perceiver and the perceived are the relata in a simple undifferentiated process. It is

not the object independent of the perceiver or visa versa. It's rather that neither are

independent of the process (perception just a matter of position relative position)

POPPER says no methodology can guarantee any scientific progress - that is no

method a can be used with certainty.

However he has as with all philosophers of science argued that facts can be uncovered

and theories developed -it's just a question of finding which method does the job. All

scientists believe that some how or another science is possible.

Now Hume of course has challenged this - scientific theories formulated as universals -

are never verifiable (finally) Popper has shown that they are not verifiable at all.

He claims nevertheless that they are possible and he further claims to show how -

while at the same time solving Hume's problem

However it seem to me that Hume's problem has been misunderstood by Popper and

perhaps all methodologists

Popper formulates Hume's problem in terms of verifiability, and there are grounds for this

However it seems to me that his real point is with regard to,-causation - that is the real

problem - not the problem of induction

the real problem is how is any knowledge possible or in the scientific context how is

any discovery possible

scientific discovery presupposes some methodology which produces some facts

So what I'm getting at is all scientists assume there is a causal relationship between

their method and the discovery this is not to say there is any certainty - but when a

discovery is made in a standard way - it is assumed that the steps taken - the theories

developed - by the scientist have led to the discovery

But if we accept Hume's skepticism with regard to causation, how is this possible? - it's not

what I'm saying is that scientific discovery presupposes a causal relationship between

method and discovery

now discoveries are made - my point is that finally we can't know how we can't even

say 'anything goes' with any security

8/10/81

now of course no one claims a necessary causal connection between method and discovery

but I'm sure some would think that discovery is a constant conjunct of a successful method and this would seem to be OK by Hume

however there is a problem and the problem arises when two different methodologies (and/or theories.) produce the same result

the problem is not with the discovery, but rather with the question of the heuristics of the method

or on what basis we can say there is a co-relation between the method and the result

(Is Hume's argument about causation just a verbal argument about how we use the term cause ? From this point  of view Hume can be seen to argued against certain uses and their assumptions but nothing more

one of the Christian theist arguments for the existence of God is the faith argument

'why do you believe in God? - because of faith - where does this faith come from? - what is it's basis - God'.

one formulation of this argument suggests that faith is belief in a belief

I think there is a problem here. You can believe in statements ideas, concepts etc., put does it make any sense to say that you b believe in (a) belief?  -Isn't it the content of the belief that you believe in? The idea is that belief must be belief in something - separate from, (facts, e.g.) which give rise to, confirm the belief

belief is looking like an act of acceptance of the truth value of a certain statement. If this is the case we cannot believe in belief - that would be

'an act of acceptance of the truth value of a statement, of an act of acceptance of the truth value of a statement etc.'

Hence this kind of faith is logically absurd.

9/10/81

the only defensible form of anarchism is METHODOLOGICAL ANARCHISM

as far as I know most anarchist theory assumes a utopian state of one kind or another

as possible, along with other extreme idealist conceptions of political reality

now it seems to me that anarchism suffers from such a formulation

UTOPIANISM presupposes that a certain epistemology is defensible

that is that we can know in a final permanent sense that real knowledge is of this kind

this is absurd as Popper for one has demonstrated

what is possible is some kind of non-holistic piecmeal epistemology,

Popper has argued for such and suggested a theory of verisimilitude - approaching

truth - never attaining, finally the ideal - the ideal is just that - an ideal - not real (the

real always fall short the question is how much)

what I'm suggesting is that the anarchist thesis that a non-authoritarian society is possible - is an ideal limit that we can approach (in a relativistic way)

this is not classical liberalism

liberals believe in the legitimacy of a limited state a methodological anarchist - need

not assume this - though he can work beyond  to this and eventually beyond it

what I'm suggesting overall  is that anarchism is a methodology

now some might say aren't you accepting that some kind of authoritarianism is always

necessary - given that your non-authoritarianism is an ideal and authoritarianism is

real?

my answer to this is that to say that authoritarianism is always to be - is going beyond

epistemological limits it is in a sense not unlike anarchist utopianism we cannot know

what will be

on what basis 'do we distinguish the various political philosophies, on what criterion

do we decide the issue" my answer is that an objective solution is not on the answer is

to be found in subjectivity - in psychology the question is what is (or which is)

desirable

like I said there are no objective answers to this one It's subjective/relativistic

(the function of philosophy/philosophers is to explore possibilities - discover different

ways of interpreting the world this is all philosophers can do

those philosophers who cannot accept this - the heuristic nature of philosophy - and

it's relativistic consequences

get off on the idea of providing final solutions, 'real' 'knowledge' - truth and other such

objectivist fictions)

getting back to anarchism and methodological anarchism - such a political theory is

only one of a: number of political (philosophical) possibilities I don't think there are

any 'shoulds' in the issue

whether this, or another political philosophy, is adopted, is really a psycho/socio/

historical issue

(the chances of any one political philosophy holding sway for very long is very remote)

HOBBES pre-empted Hume in stating the problem of induction See THE AGE OF

REASON Hampshire pg. 44

Hampshire (48)

"Hobbes regards all true statements as analytic..... (and) when he considers the statements of science, Hobbes' usual empiricism deserts him"

Hampshire offers no explanation of why this is so

would put forward the conjecture that the reason for this is Hobbes' skepticism with

regard to induction 

If.science is real (i.e., certain etc) it cannot be empicical

11/10/81

DESCARTES' cogito - I think therefore I am

what if someone doesn't think - is incapable due to some brain disfunction

(and it must be pointed out that thinking - is not or cannot be any activity - even any

mental activity)

does this mean that the person does not exist? This is absurd

But Descartes might reply: "well that person is doing something - there is some activity going on - even if it's not what we call thinking"

in it's broadest sense some activity would have to be eventually equated with being

in the end Descartes' principle would look like:

(I am) being

(I am) (being) which is of course analytically true - trivially true 'I think therefore I

know, or believe that I am'

in this sense his 'cogito' is a statement about knowledge - not about being

he might then say 'could a non-existent thing know  -doesn't knowledge presuppose

existence of something that knows?'

this of course is a strong argument - but not a necessary one

in our own time Popper has argued for epistemology without a knowing subject (as

did Plato before him)

psychology implies metaphysics

psychological deliverances are reflections of instantiations of meta conflicts

psychological experiences are direct - but they imply the existence of something

beyond the directness of experience

now this implication does not necessarily lead to (in a logical -sense) - imply an extra-direct reality

some philosophers notably Berkelely have assumed that this psychological imperative

is illusory - if it's assumed that it implies an objective reality. Other philosophers

notably Plato have believed in the objective reality of what is implied

it is questionable whether this dispute is worthwhile one way or the other

in terms of objectivity that is - Plato and Berkeley both manage to account for what is

- and by this I mean that which is directly knowable

however there are certainly differences psychologically - if one holds a subjectivist

view one's psychology will be quite different to one who holds an objectivist view -

that is one's beliefs about one's experience will be quite different

if this is so what is left for philosophers to do - beyond what has been mentioned?

well my answer is not much - but there is something

what is left is the problem of accounting for the difference.That is e.g.  why there is a

mind body problem why there is an appearance/reality problem etc. (I am not here

talking about how to solve such problems)

the why of such an issue could very easily become another partisan issue

e.g. the Marxist will view the problem in terms of social class. alienation etc. - and

there are plenty who want to argue against this such answers just beg the question

what I'm getting at is what I think the Greeks, (some of the pre-socratics) had in mid - e.g., Heraclitus and even the meta(non-ideological) aspects of Hegel - the attempt to construct some 'first order description - that takes into account uses the fundamental conflicts of philosophy as data

what we want is some schemata which is a value free description of - the conflict which exist in all facets of life and which is analyzed most succinctly and eruditely in

philosophical systems

now the interesting question is, is this possible? can such an objective value free meta

be produced? The short answer is 'no' (and you can't get much shorter that )

but nevertheless less we try - and this is what is significant that the search for such

(objectivity) is psychologically unavoidable (and logically unattainable) THE

HUMAN CONDITION (rears it's ugly head again)

the fact is which ever way we go we run into philosophical dispute

e.g., if we side with the skeptics as I have done we have taken a side - if on the other

hand some non-skeptic point of view is adopted, we have likewise made a stand

this constant opposition was what some of the Greeks understood as signifying reality or it's essence

but again this was disputed - ie. Parmenides

the problem is how to formulate this issue

and Wittgenstein for one took the view that it cannot - his answer was silence 'nothing

can 'be said,

(stay tuned)

I am interested though in the fact that whatever is said, an alternative or opposing

point of view can be put and that this process can go on ad infinitum - (when we try

to establish some objective theory fact, reality)

Now if I am right that we are involved in some kind of infinite regress, then it

seems to infer that we can react to this in (wait for it) two ways

(I) we can view the fact of infinite regress as a fact of reality - and hence adopt it as a

kind of meta - a kind of overall picture of reality or

(2) we can see it as pointing to the fact that any attempt to establish a meta - an

objectivity is bound to fail

However, as it happens I think there is a third response to this situation (3) adopt both

(1) and(2)

now by this I mean that any attempt to establish objectivity is bound to lead to an

infinite regress - and to then make the step - that the infinite regress is objectivity -

that is - that such is what objectivity comes to that such is reality in it's objective mode

(this view is by way of a formal characterization not a substantial one - we are not

actually saying e.g. that reality is mind or matter we are providing some grand schema

mathematical like description Wittgenstinian PICTURE)

how we respond to this picture - how we colour it in is a subjective issue - hence (2)

making some stand in the middle of this infinite regress is not a logical issue - it is

rather a pragmatic problem it  is the problem of praxis - developing a theory which

effectively guides practical thinking - and is an issue on which anything goes in an

objective sense

what theories conceptions, standards we adopt (and how we view these) is a matter

on which Meta (as just suggested) can be of no assistance (except maybe in a negative

way)

from the point of view of living infinite regression (skepticism) is of no use whatso

ever - so the practical problem is how to avoid it - or how to face it - which in my

view is finally psychological - or meta psychological issue - it is a problem of

behaviour

Descartes- : 'I think therefore I am is represented as two statements - one implying the other (the 'I think' and the 'I am')

but the fact is there is no real implication here - or to put it logically - no material

implication

this is because the 'I am' is contained in the 'I think' - that is - in order to think one

must be (one must exist)

it's confusing because thinking is an attribute of being (or so Descartes thought)

the 'I am' in the 'I think' is therefore hidden - repressed

what we have is an analytic statement masked as a synthetic/analytic (which of course

is a confusion)

I say synthetic/analytic because Descartes wants us to believe there is a necessary connectionbetween thinking and being - and that one implies the other in a material sense (Descartes logic here as a forerunner of Kant's Synthetic/a priori) now there is no necessary connection between thinking and existence

the fact that we may not be able to imagine a thinking thing which does not exist is

not the issue

thinking is an attribute of certain things of certain existances

it is quite possible that a thing may not posses the attribute of thinking - but exist

what I find difficult to accept is that there is a necessary connection between an

existent, and any one of it's attributes this is the issue the necessary connection

(attributes are not necessary they are accidental)

and in any case the whole concept of necessity in a material (non-verbal synthetic

sense) is quite strange

Descartes trades on the fact that the thinking of human beings is reflexive i.e., we can think about thinking

but as Kant showed this does not have anything to do with existence - the concept

doesn't enter into it

19/10/81

Descartes:

"And I observed that in the words think therefore I am there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this that I see plainly that in order to think it is necessary to exist"

this statement from Descartes makes it clear that Descartes is not attempting to present his conclus-ion (I am) as a synthetic statement (one who's truth depends on the way the world is)-but that it is analytic - that the concept of existence is contained in that of thinking - what Descartes is, doing is showing that existence, the concept of, is contained in that of thinking

what of the logic of this move, what sense does it make to say that one concept is

contained in, or by, another? And further on what basis do we make such a claim?

obviously Descartes would say -'reason' that we can make such a move by

reason - but what does this mean?

what are the dynamics, the workings of reason?

The Cogito is actually a reduction,

- from 'thinking' back to 'existence' - we are reducing one concept (back) to another

induction is inducing one concept from another -it is the attempt to show that one concept leads to (though is not contained in) another

DEDUCTION on this analysis is a myth

deduction is showing- that X comes from - emerges from Y (or this what it is

supposed to be) but such is in fact reduction the emergence only occurs because of a

hidden reduction - No actually reduction must mean that X is actually shown to be a Y

deduction is that X is shown to be separate to, independent of Y, but contained in Y

deduction implies a certain metaphysics it is that there are parts to the whole - and it implies a certain epistemology - that we know the whole through knowledge of the parts

but in what sense can we say that existence is a part of thinking?

Descartes seems not to understand the deduction/reduction distinction

on the one hand he wants to deduce existence from thinking shows that existence is contained in thinking

but his final claim that man is a thinking animal is in fact a reduction - that is he

reduces thinking to existence - and leaves it at that

now two things can be said here

(1) The deduction

on what basis is the deduction made - how in fact do we deduce existence from

thinking - he says we must exist to think - and this is intuitively or psychologically

unassailable - but the must is not-enough - is not reason

(2) The reduction

if we in fact reduce thinking to existence then thinking existence

but once we come to this conclusion - we cannot appeal to the steps of the reduction (I

think / I am) - the steps are no longer significant - the ladder has been thrown away -

and we can still ask how the reduction actually takes place

(3) Induction

Descartes' argument for the existence of God is another matter altogether God is not a

reduction of perfection or a deduction (i.e., contained in) God is induced - the

argument is an induction

22/10/81

Descartes' analysis of the wax is quite interesting

"There certainly remains nothing except something extend flexible and movable. But

what is meant by flexible and movable? Is it that I imagine the piece of wax, being

round, or to be incapable of becoming square or passing from a square to a triangular

shape. Assuredly this is not the case because I can conceive that it admits of an

infinity of similar changes, but I am unable to encompass this infinity by imagination;

consequently this conception- I have of the wax is not the product of the faculty of the

imagination. But what now is this extension? Is it not also unknown? For it becomes

greater when the wax is melting, greater when it is melted....... I must therefore admit

that by imagination I cannot conceive what the piece of wax is, and that it is

the mind alone that conceives it......... But the perception of it is neither an act of sight

nor touch nor of imagination, and never was, though it might formerly seem so, but is

simply an intuition's the mind, which may be imperfect and confused, as it formerly

was, or very clear and distinct as it is at present..........."

Descartes' view that we cannot rely of the sense to give us a true picture - that 'we know' that the wax is the wax throughout all it's changes is due to an intuition - is an interesting elusive, brilliant Cartesian answer

for yes - we do as a matter of fact intuit identify but this is really no explanation of the

phenomenon and what does he mean by intuition anyway

it seems to me that the only really interesting issue here is WHY we have this intuition

of identity - why is it that we don't perceive a series of events - rather than a changing

object this is really a psycho/socio/anthropological issue

but it gets back to my distinction between philosophy and science - philosophy is

modal - interested in exploring possibilities science is interested in the actual world -

what is and why

however scientific explanations invariably involve a shot into the unknown - into the

realm of - possibilities, at the conceptual theoretical level

Descartes' analysis of substance is quite radical perhaps even more radical than he himself understood - at the end of his analysis we are left with nothing in effect - only an intuition, which is no explanation anyway he has just returned us back to the obvious where we started)

In fact Descartes' analysis is one step behind Hume's - it is effectively the same analysis - and further he forests Berkeley

Descartes through his wax analysis begins with the fact(?) of sensual deception - but really why might it not be the mind that deceives - and the senses that tell the truth?

here we get to Descartes' assumptions about his enterprise - what he sees or wants

philosophy to fulfill - what he thinks knowledge should be.

22/10/81

Was Descartes a pragmatist?

"But I had no clear and distinct knowledge of any of those things, and being as yet

ignorant of the rule by which I am assured of the truth of a judgment. I was led to

give ,my assent on grounds which I after wards discovered were less strong than at the

time imagined them to be"

being as yet ignorant of the rule

it is the adoption of the rule (of clear and distinct ideas) which Descartes believe guarantees him of certainty this statement of Descartes contains a lot worth discussing.

to begin with certainty results only form the adoption of the rule

the adoption of the rule is an act which has the effect in Descartes of giving him a feeling of certainty  - this is the realm of psychology

Descartes believes that his logical argument (cogito - clear + distinct ideas - God)

what Descartes is assuming is that logic can - does determine psychology

Descartes though is a victim of psychologism he thinks logic's realm is much broader than formal systems - language use -

he believes logic analyses the structure of reality

logic - meta

what he is saying is that we can find certainty if we adopt this rule - and his view of

the relationship between logic + psychology - this is of course an assumption - or

presupposition on which his logic and meta rests - it is a presupposition he does not

argue for - he simply assumes it to be true - how can this presupposition be viewed as

clear and distinct - it is a speculative, philosophical., matter - as the history of

philosophy before and after Descartes bears testament to.

28/10/81

Descartes' distinction between 'pure intellect' and 'imagination' is a strange one

- he says imagination is not an essential faculty of the mind -without his mind would

still be the same

in fact it is some kind of primitive analytic/synthetic distinction

"so this mode of thinking differs from pure intellect only in this respect, that the mind

in conceiving turns in some way upon itself but in imagination it turns towards the

body, and contemplates it in some object that conforms to the idea which it either

conceived in itself or apprehended by the senses"

Descartes by this distinction is attempting to (1) further argue for the supremacy of pure intellect, i.e., mathematics, and (2) distinguish sensual empirical knowledge from

mathematical, but because he is a deductivist, he must show how empirical concepts

originate in the mind (he won t argue for them in an empiricist/inductivist mode)

but the problem is that (1) and (2) do not fit together easily it's not a happy marriage

the result is (3) if the mind is superior to matter - how is it that it contains this almost

empirical 'contingent' faculty of the imagination.?

not, only does Descartes want to say that mind is superior to matter but he wants to say, that the very, act of mental conception of corporal ideas is inferior to the conceptions of pure intellect

I can't see why this should be so, and furthermore it seems to me to be an overkill on

Descartes' part

"If I find in myself a certain passive faculty of perception that is taking and receiving

knowledge of the ideas of sensible things"

Does Descates have an explanation of the process of perception?

where do these passive ideas or their source I sense data' come from?

one would think the answer should be 'the mind' but what says here makes this

questionable

"But this would be useless to me if there did not exist in me, or in some other thing,

another active faculty capable of forming or producing those ideas. But this active

faculty-- cannot be in me as far as I am but a thinking thing, seeing that it does not

presuppose thought, and also that those ideas are frequently produced in my mind

without my contributing to them in any way, and even frequently contrary to my will.

This faculty must therefore exist in some substance different from me,-in which all the

objective reality of the ideas produced by this faculty is contained formally or

immanently, as I have before remarked: and this substance is either a body, that is to

say 4 corporal nature in which is contained formally all that is objectively and by

representation in those ideas, or it is God himself".

Descartes says the passive faculty would be useless if there did not exist an active faculty - which does not presuppose thought - and is not him  - (a thinking thing) - it is in fact in corporal entities

this seems to me a strange statement from a rationalist

- it really just reflects Descartes anti-matter attitude - and his extreme dualism

he is arguing that matter acts - actively - on the imagination (that faculty of the mind

that deals with corporal substances)

- because - he is referring to those ideas which we don't seem to have any control over

- must be something external to the mind he goes on:

"But as God is no deceiver, it is manifest that he does not of himself and immediately

communicate those ideas to me....

Nevertheless they are not perhaps exactly such as we perceive by the senses, for their

comprehension by the sense is, is in many instances, very obscure and confused; but it

is at least necessary to admit that every thing that 1 clearly and distinctly conceive is

in them, as generally speaking everything contained in the object of speculation

geometry, really exists external to me"

well here we have a primitive primary / secondary qualities distinction

like Locke Descartes thinks the primary qualities illusion but not the secondary

(Berkeley, of course put an end to the objectivity of primary qualities, and Kant

accepted the consequences  -the unknowability of the noumena)

why is it that demons only deceive us about secondary and not primary qualities?, and

really how can we know primary qualities are veridical

finally Descartes is an interactionist - (that is mind and matter the two separate entities,substances, interact - now what this means is a mystery to me. It seems to me that any Genuine interaction must presuppose some common elements and how can this be with two separate entities)

I think an argument can be made here to the effect that Descartes is an epiphenomenalist, or at least partly so

he is saying it is matter which is active - acts on the imagination and creates causes gives rise to ideas 'which we don't seem to have any control over' -

now I think there are good grounds for this epiphenomenalist argument

firstly note that Descartes is at pains to distinguish the imagination from the mind (what this means baffles me - it must be in the mind - but it seems he wants to construe it as some sort of accidental (non-essential) property of the mind - which is in contradiction to his view that the mind is 'pure' substance or so it seems (how can a

pure substance have such an impurity?

- but if it is separate from the mind, then this fits with my partial epiphenomenalist

argument - it suggests that the ideas held by the imagination - and perhaps the

imagination itself - are products of that active corporal substance

Descartes' work in this area is really messy. He wants to say that the imagination 'holds' 'corporal ideas' - but he also maintains that we perceive at the same time the primary qualities of an object

so what is happening is some kind of parallelism between the mind (and it's clear and

distinct ideas of an object) AND - the imagination with it's confused ideas of the

object - and this is happening simultaneously - two faculties are working to give us a

single perception - with two characteristics-clear and confused - I'll settle for confused - Descartes ends up with the problem of dreaming

and his statement on this matter is far from impressive, given the impressive

framework he developed to deal with it

his whole argument rests on the Cogito - it is the thinking nature of man which

Descartes believed would solve the appearance reality problem - and as his final

summing up on dreaming shows it's just not enough.

I am a thinking thing- O.K - but this does nothing to solve the appearance/reality

problem - it just takes it back one step further

when I am asleep and dreaming - I am or can appear to be thinking - how do we distinguish this from the thinking that goes on when I'm awake-?

Descartes' answer is in terms of distinctness - but it doesn't work

we can distinctly perceive the causes of our perceptions awake or dreaming but we are

here siding with awake distinctness what about the distinctness of our dreams

he then suggests that we can distinguish the real from the unreal in terms of holism

well this is in fact what we do but it 's not satisfactory such an argument is really

where the problem begins

Descartes strength lies in his Cogito (though this believe is faulty and brilliantly deceptive)

the I think therefore I am arguments fall flat on their faces - and the cogito and

distinctiveness argument  are of no avail D pushes them but they just don't work

essentially Descartes' fame rests on the brilliant deception (and I think self deception) of thecogito

there is a nagging intrigue with this very simple answer to the problem of? - well it's

hard to say and here lies the intrigue

history embraced Descartes as Descartes seemed to embrace history - a true love affair - the neverending honeymoon

30/10/81

you must not mistake pleasure for happiness

pleasure is a particular experience

happiness is (if it exists) a holistic or universal experience

the desire for happiness is the desire for such an experience

the characteristics of such an experience - i.e. what distinguishes the happiness

experience - a holistic experience - from other holistic experiences - need not concern

us here)

what is important is that it is characteristic of human beings to desire to transcend the

particular

what we are dealing with is the need for transcending experience

(I suspect that k happiness is really the state, or experience of no longer needing to - or

the feeling that - one has transcended the particular - that the experience of the conflict

of the particular and universal has ceased)

this I believe is a psychological fact

most philosophers have assumed that because the need exists so does the fulfillment

of it

I think that this belief in the possibility of holism is an essential irreducible fact of

human psychology - it is a given fact of evolution - perhaps a distinguishing feature of

our species

what we do undeniably experience is the particular

now a Popperian would think that this would be enough to falsify - make us reject the

belief in holism - and the belief of course can go - but the need never does - even

when confronted with it's falsification

now I believe Plato was correct in identifying universals with another plane of existence

that is if such exist they must by definition exist beyond our particular experience

if they existed in experience then they would by definition be particulars not

universals

the desire for universal / holistic experience is by definition necessarily a desire for

transcending experience

and such a transcending experience must think be seen to be if it exists - on another

plane of existence

hence it follows that such an experience is for us (on our particular level of

experience) logically impossible

therefore to seek it out is to attempt to transform existence which though it has a nice

romantic touch is logically absurd but this is in fact where the issue begins not ends

the human condition is just this state, as Camus rightly saw absurd

we do in fact attempt in an infinity of ways to transcend particular experience - and we

are constantly shown by experience that such is impossible - but this though it might

stop belief in the universal does nothing to stop the need for it

the desire is constant the reality constant, the conflict constant

what I've been discussing is usually approached in a more technical way

e.g., we have in our-- vocabulary universal terms such as 'redness' - which on the face

of it does have actual referents and yet they seem meaningful

now one school of thought holds that such terms are meaningful conceptually - that is though redness does not exist actually it does exist conceptually

now such a view must account for the origin of such concepts   

I have attempted to do so by appeal to desire and need but what of the need for redness?

my answer is basically or partially Kantian

we come equipped with such categories or concepts and the reason for this is not as

some philosophers have thought logical - but rather psychological

that is something like this we need such concepts in order to deal with (in a pragmatic

sense) the world of particular experience - to make it intelligible

my point here is that they are methodological not logical

that is in built methodological dictates that make action possible

it is very easy to make the methodological/logical error and assume that because of the

existence of such categories they must have an referent in experience

so I guess what I'm saying is that in order to understand experience, or rather , more

specifically, to cope with it we must- we do by necessity assume that we can/are able

to transcend it

one upshot of this is that the correspondence theory of meaning and truth is not on

instead we have argued for a coherence theory

a term is meaningful if it makes reality coherent for the user

incoherence only arises when we attempt a correspondence analysis

for a correspondence theory assumes that we need exists

the problem of meaning is not what exists - but how to make it coherent

evolution has equipped us with certain strategies/categories which enable us to do this

it is only when we doubt or misunderstand the nature of these that problems arise

SPINOZA

Part 1. Concerning definitions of God.

D.I                  

the ontological argument of a kind AND (the cosmological argument? -the unmoved mover) argument of (from) the first cause

D.II

two substances of different kinds cannot interact (re: Descartes) S's problem then is to show that the argument is ultimately an argument against dualism - he must independently of this argument put up a case for monism - this is not an argument

for monism - it's just a clearing of the way

D.III

here comes the argument for monism - S is defining substance as being by it's nature monistic - by an epistemological argument 'the conception of one thing does not depend on the conception of an other' - but it's up to S to show that our            

conceptions correspond to reality - that is - that it is just not an argument about what we conceive but also an argument. about what is

D.IV

but does this mean that the attribute is of the substance - and not just a perception (real or unreal)of the substance

so far S has defined God as substance, and attribute as essence therefore attribute is substance? (or essence of substance'- and what else can substance be but essence?)

where is this leading - we are getting monism by definition

D.V

(on a liberal reading the mode is something other than the substance a touch of

dualism S's dualism within his monism)

a mode is not a substance but that which the substance is conceived (i.e. a thought maybe?)

but the mode (thought) is of the substance (does this means  from the substance, and for a reflection of the substance

So this is S's account of perception

if we accept this monism - it is the perception of the substance - the dynamics of

substance

VI.

1.         X (which is a kind X) is infinite, i.e. (x1, x2. x3..........)

2.         if we are just talking about X as such we are in a position

            where X is not Y

3.         When Y has an infinity of attributes (y1, y2, y3 .......)

4.         X is therefore limited by being X and by definition -Y

5.         Y's infinity of attributes is denied of X

6.         God is not limited by kind

VII.

X is true if X is not determined by anything other than X

substance is free because it is self determined

determinism is by definition impossible

VIII.

existence is (by def) eternal

eternity cannot be conceived in temporal terms

to say 'eternity is not limited by time' (or some such phrase) is to say 'eternity is not ........'is to limit the concept. that is b saving 'that it is not........' (and what it is not

limits it)

S is here and elsewhere) arguing by implication that true knowledge is only possible if

Language. is destroyed - thought precedes but it is shackled by language.

Axioms

A.I.

again is this an argument S will shoot down - is it just an argument against dualism

I can't quite see what S is trying to do with this one (given that is that he is a monist)

A.II.

same as AI.

A.III.

S I think believes that causation occurs in the world, is not as Kant supposed a

category of the understanding

(are not cause and effect just the perceived different 'ends' of a process)

this is a logical enough - but again given his monism and it's 'sui causa', what is the

point?

what is point/advantage of the notion of cause. S argues against causation between

two different entities - and in so far as his overall position is monistic what is the

point of cause. An infinite substance exists and presumably always has - (the sui causa

argument is pretty weak any way).

A.IV.

same as AIII

A.V.

anti-dualism again

AVI

but S's problem is to show how a false idea is possible

(how can the substance, or a part of it, have a false idea of itself - perceive something

in itself that is not there?)

A.VII.

again how can 'something' (of the substance) be conceived as not existing how can

non-existence be meaningful

is not (as I think S has already indicated) existence (infinity, eternity etc.) limited by the possibility of not existence?

POINTS SO FAR

1.        

S's argument for monism is an argument by definition.

2.        

there seems to be a dualism or polyism within this monism (i.e. modes) - thought of

substance. Just how meaningful is this?

3.        

how can S talk of non-existence or falsity? What is his explanation of error, where does it come from - how does it arise?

4.        

given S's monism - substance (sui causa) - and his definition of freedom (non sui

causa) how is determinism possible?

PROPOSITIONS?

P.I.

are affections attributes?

affections (def.5) 'that which is something- else through which it may be conceived.'

('it', I think. being- substance) the attribute is that which is perceived (the essence)

the question of the relationship between a substance and attribute, requires some-

attention 'Is the substance just the sum of its attributes? What of the essence - it can't

be separate from the attributes, it's in the substance, but somehow in the attributes (in

fact I think S defines substance, and attributes- as essence.) it's pointless talking about

part of an essence.

there is a sense in which a substance has or possesses an essence but this would make

essence a kind of primary attribute

and there is a sense in which a substance has existence without

essence- but the essence is not the substance??????????

what does S mean by attribute? Now presumably colour is an attribute that certain

objects posses, but it is possible for different things to posses the same colour

answer:- an attribute is a perceived essence, - that which is perceived (D.4)

P.II.

Can anything but the essence be perceived on this view? Does the substance consist of

any other attributes beside the essence? Is the substance anything but it's essence?

(this would not accord with the common usage of the term substance)

P.III.

my question is what constitutes an essence? And is this to S asking what makes a substance?

with S it seems that he has taken a concept substance, and that all other terms he uses arise and take their meaning and the concept of substance is made deeper and broader

S has by this concept has created the difference of what is perceived, or the way they are perceived

what are the different ways a thing can be perceived?

the main point about S's method is that it is single concept centered. In a sense the

success or failure of S's philosophy depends on whether he can successfully reduce all

his important meta. terms, in terms of each other, and alternatively, in terms of

substance. (God) whatever.

the perception of plurality can hardly be termed false? but S wants to say that reality is really one. It is a straight T/F situation

my black hole theory is quite the opposite to how rationalists see their method - I'm arguing that they bring concepts into a central concept. They believe the concepts are already there

it is the mind which distinguishes things - (pre-Kantian)

without the mind all is one?

but how does S know this? (as Kant partially realized, and as Descartes realized - is a

problem - )

and more importantly how does this square with def. vi. surely according to def. vi, if we perceive distinct substances that's what exists

P.V

this means a perceived essence cannot belong to two substances, otherwise they

would be one substance

distinct substances are distinguished by their affections (modes) of perception or essence

what is this mode of perception?

How can we leave the affectation  - the way substance may be perceived - out of the question

to what extent does the mode of perception influence the nature of substance?

and to what extent can we talk of the substance as independent- of the mode? Again how can we know such - objectivity is assumed - but how can it be known (directly or indirectly) how can we in S's words consider it 'truly'?

(Spinoza does not fit easily into his slot in the history of philosophy some of his

concepts I think pre-date Descartes  - I suspect are closer to the mediaeval and

Aristotelian periods of philosophy - and yet his single main idea - monism - is a direct

challenge to Descartes - and can be interpreted as going beyond the 17th century as

Hampshire in his book on S picks up on)

P.VI

here S is really arguing against causation in the sense of X causes Y he is arguing for 'sui causa'

isn't cause normally taken to be, by it's nature, 'something', outside of distinct from it's effects - in this case the substance?

self cause seems to me to be an incoherent idea. (for X to be caused by X, it must

exist before it exists, in order for it to exist - whatever this means

P. VII

a substance if it is a substance exists

does this mean that the essence of a substance is existence?

if that was the case X could not exist if X did not exist

S says 'existence pertains to the nature of substance'/ is it meant to 'be something other than the essence?

P.VIII.

why would it have to be the case that if a substance was finite i.e., limited

it would be limited by another substance which would necessarily have to exist?

I don't see how this follows from or is P.7 I

if this premise is granted, the argument follows

this note 1 does not answer the question of the above page

perhaps S means that by finite we mean limited by something else - but why can't it mean limited by itself ?

in this note he defines infinity as existence, and finite as non- existence - an easy way out

surely finite means, 'that which will cease to exist' - not 'that which does not exist?

(if the- essence of substance is existence then all substance is one simply because it

exists - this tells us nothing)

substance = infinity = existence

(black hole- approach to knowledge)

modification - the conception of X is formed from Y (X exists in Y)

therefore true ideas of modifications which do not exist???????

modifications do not exist outside the mind

yet their essence is contained in something else through which they may be conceived

how can their essence be in something and yet they do not exist?

truth of substances does not exist outside the mind?

does not exist in the substance

contrary, to S's argument this seems to suggest we might have a true idea of X, when X does not exist - sounds sensible to me but it doesn't sound sensible to S

'the existence of substance like it's essence.......'

 this suggests existence and essence are separate

if this is true - what is essence

(this argument seems to contradict what has gone before - i.e. the identity of substance, existence and essence)

S I think is wrong in believing that the definition of a triangle is a simple matter - that it involves nothing but 'the simple nature of a triangle'

my def. of a triangle (or for that matter, anything) involves other non- triangle concepts - i.e. straight line., intersection etc.

a more serious problem is the one G.E. Moore addressed in arguing that if simple concepts exist they are indefinable - i.e. goodness - which is strange also - how can we speak intelligibly of X if X is indefinable?

it seems to me that contrary to S and G.E. Moore if we believe in definition - it

follows the world is pluralistic and that monism or holism is created not given

if 20 men exist the reason or cause does not exist in the 20 men, but is external to them. But how can he say it does not exist in human nature?

(if not in human nature how can it be explained?)

what is gained by the use of the concept 'cause' - it only seems to create problems - when it is viewed as a 'thing in itself' - as Kant realized

P.IX.

what sense is there in talk of 'more' reality?

and here things get right out of hand -

an attribute has been defined as a perceived essence

how can a thing have or be perceived as having more essences - more than one that is?

(this may be just what S is getting at - but, if so why PIX?)

P.X.

one answer to my question above, is that we may perceive facets of the essence- not the essence in toto - at once - but that all the facets add up to the essence - not asatisfactory explanation though.

(may be S is saying that a thing - or substance - possesses an infinite number of attributes - and that we can perceive some of them, and that each of these expresses the substance's essence - which is infinity? - but how can we know this unless we

actually perceive an infinite number of attributes?)

S says we cannot perceive that which distinguishes substances because there is only one substance - then all we perceive is the infinite attributes of the substances

- which suggests that substance has an infinite number of essences -

- again the use of the term essence here is difficult

X may be conceived as possessing, an infinite number of essences let us say, but does

this mean X is infinite?

if a triangle exists

the idea may exist but does this mean the idea has a referent in reality

this is not to say that we can conceive things which cannot exist rather that we may

conceive things which do not exist i.e. the atom), and also what we may conceive may

not exist - in reality - reality may only be an approximation to it (i.e., the idea of a

triangle)

what S's argument comes down to is that the concept of causation is absurd - he has seen that X causing Y is ridiculous the X causing X must be O.K - this does not follow

power now is being drawn into the hole

the idea is plausible enough - existence = power

but this is not enough why should, existence have anything to do with 'power'?

either God exists or nothing exists? - what's  wrong with existence and non-existence ('i.e. Democritus against Parmenidies - surely if power exists so does impotence - if not power is impotent

4/11/82

black holism (?)

GOD =            existence = essence = infinity = power = substance = nature

the appeal of this picture is that it is incoherent - it says nothing - says everything

it leaves everything as it is - the perfect philosophy

it's Wittgenstein climbing the ladder and throwing it away

going into the hole and coming out - black

philosophy becomes nothing more than therapy (Wittgenstein again)

P.XI. (Cont.)

more reality applies to the number of attributes a thing possess God is more real , or is he than a man?

(surely even one attribute of an infinite being is itself infinite? it's a problem of

identity - is not an infinite number of attributes just another way of describing infinity)

but how can man be distinguished from God in reality Isn't it all just one - at this point it becomes doubtful whether 'God' can be considered an entity - a substance?

this gets back to the problem of essence and attributes

for S's argument so far it seems attributes cannot be equivalent to essence as such -

attributes must partake of, or express, but not be in toto the essence (or else there would be no sense in talking about attributes (plural)

he is talking here of those things which are produced by external causes - what does this mean?) - surely S himself has argued 'effectively' against 'external' causation

(crit. so far:-

(1) methodology - black, holism

(2) essence /attribute (infinite)

(3) causation

perfection the latest concept to be sucked in

what is the point of imperfection, as it seems it doesn't exist?, and if it doesn't exist

how can perfection be defined?

if God is all - and God is perfection, therefore all is perfection - what is the origin of

imperfection, error etc.?

the black hole approach is not a method of definition in the sense that the meaning of

a term is unleashed or discovered, it is rather destructive of the term - it is in this sense

non or anti-definitive

(infinity

is it not the case the case that S's argument for attributes (infinite) contradicts his

definition of infinity - earlier on that is infinite number of

is not S working with kinds of infinity - when it suits him?

numerical infinity is necessary to account for pluralism  S wants to dissolve this into

monistic infinity see def. II)

XII.

if the difference of attributes is a fact of perfection, their lack of substance's infinite attributes is (in reality) meaning less (unless we take seriously AVI )

to conceive the attribute is to conceive the whole (the essence)

what significance then is S's talk of a number of attributes?

(a single attribute whatever this means - contains the whole)

perception of different attributes must be a fact of perception and not reality . S doesn't understand this distinction.

Essence

the concept of essence like that of causation is more trouble than it is worth - it exists only because of the concept of substance (as does causation) - do away with substance and a lot of problems go - but for S it's the baby out with the water

S's philosophical demonstration - is really an argument - a dialectic in which, at one and the same time he argues for a position and against it's opposition

XIV

following from P.XII , to conceive X is to conceive God - there is in essence no difference (pan-theism)

in conceiving the existence of matter and thought, we conceive two (infinite) attributes - how are the two distinguished except by the mind

- and how can thought conceive extension? - non-thought?????

 (from P.I nts.

an affection is 'that which is something else through which it may be conceived ('it' - I think is substance - and attribute is that which is perceived - and a substance is prior to it's affections. And the proof of P.IV - the intellect cannot distinguish substance, only attributes and affections - this suggests that substance is unknowable in itself - or directly - substance exists as a matter of logic, necessity -

is essence as such, therefore unknowable)

1. God cannot do the logical impossible

2. God is without will or intellect

(in the human sense what does this mean?)

6/11/81

all things perceived from God by necessity not will

S has not really argued against God having intellect - only against a certain view of it - and if God has no intellect, where does intellect come from (on this view it seems intellect does not in fact exist at all - or will for that matter - this is consistent with

determinism but what of thought - is thought something other than intellect? How do we account for thought

the obvious answer to this is that God's intellect cannot be ?- is that it is infinite -

6/11/81

God is not a free cause

- that those things that come from his nature should not come about

- that God could have created a different world to the one we know

- in arguing this S says it is like saying that God could have made it that a triangle is not a triangle - and this is absurd

this whole argument depends on one's view of logical necessity

putting it simply could not God have created a different system of  logical necessity? To say not is to limit God's power by the rules of logical necessity - which if they come from God is to say that God is limited by himself -

S having his cake and eating it?

S's 'toto caelo' argument - that God's intellect and will 'something...for else must be understood than what is commonly understood by man'

is in fact an argument against his free cause argument

man's intellect apprehends logical necessity, but need this be an attribute of God's intellect - is God's intellect bound by this?

if so, the toto caelo argument fails

S is here arguing that truth and the formal essence of things is as it is, (this we can grant), and further, 'it exists so objectively in God's intellect' (this we can grant too) -

but S wants to go further and argue that God's intellect is bound by truth and formal essence

my point is that, such can exist in God's intellect and yet not necessarily bind his

intellect

S confuses the too points

if God's intellect is the cause of things it must be different from these things

if God's intellect is different from man's- then all we canreally say is- that it is different - we cannot it seems know anything substantial about it we must remain silent it is unknowable

P.XVIII

cause????

God is the internal cause of things he is not separate from them

but if this is the case how is God different from what he creates the nature of cause again is a problem

granted there is no sense in talking about a transcendent cause - but what sense an immanent cause ?

P.XX

- black holism again

an analytical truth is one where the predicate is contained in the subject - a synthetic truth is one where the predicate is not contained

it seems to me that we cannot call S's definitions analytic - he wants us to see it that way in the end - but they are not synthetic in the contingent sense - it does seem to me that they are synthetic in an analytic sense ?

PXXI

if this is so wherefore infinity? is it existent in our perceptions of reality'?

but still how is it that we are able to understand the truth of S's argument?

(again the problem of error, infinity, perfection, lack of knowledge)

P.XIII.

modifications if they exist - are also infinite

what is this modification business?-

are not modes faculties of perception?

Is it that we have reality with all it's attributes - and man's perception with all it's limitations?

still the problem of the cause of the limitations

P.XXIV.

only God exists

God's essence involves existence

but

the essence of the things he realizes does not

(this assumes God could create an essence which in some sense did not exist?? - very curious)

the essence of the thing cannot cause it's own existence only God can

but then if God is all that exists the essence of God is existence - and therefore everything (God) causes itself

PXXV

(God causes essence)

and existence

P.XXVI.

PXXVII.

PXXVIII.

but how can Spinoza talk about a finite existent

and, 'so on to infinity'

what is the difference between immediate and proximate causes

(again it is hard to see how S can maintain that cause is a real thing in itself

given his metaphysics is it not just an illusion?)

PXXIX

contingent - non-necessary - undetermined

active nature - that which is conceived through itself those attributes which express eternal/infinite essence

is there any other kind of nature?

'that which is conceived through itself'

how can there be any cause?

passive nature

all that is necessary

any (?) mode of an attribute

which cannot exist or be conceived without (God

attributes are active modes

P.XXY.

how then can the intellect conceive finity, error, imperfection etc.?

P.XXXI.

the intellect is distinct from active and passive nature

therefore the intellect is separate from attributes and modes

this is strange

P.XXXII

 re: S Is argument concerning infinity

the adoption of one kind of infinity limits God is not the same argument applicable with regard to free will?

PXXXIII

necessary - the existence of a thing necessarily follows from it's essence

how does this go with PXXIV - 'the essence of things produced by God doesn't involve existence'?

this suggests a distinction between existence and essence

and that essence does not involve existence

24/1/81

the existentialists are right - there is no meaning in life -

given this then the problem of philosophy is to explain why the search for meaning?

it is I believe the strongest force in man - his most basic need

- a need that will never be fulfilled

this is the ultimate greatest most profound tragedy -

- so it seems to me , if you give up on the search for meaning

- all that is left is - how to explain the situation - the tragedy -

- but this is the same thing all over

'what cannot be said must be passed over in silence'

1/12/81

meaning?

whatever the vehicle, carrier of meaning , is, it seems to me that meaning is something - given to it. It is -not something inherent in it

e.g. we say some sentences are meaningful - some ideas etc. - but not all

meaning it seems is something- which may or may not exist

(so meaning is not a necessary fact about the world, or feature of it - rather it is contingent in some sense?)

it would also seem to follow from an existential point of view - that life is not necessarily meaningful - or for that matter not necessarily meaningless

what it is to be depends on contingencies???

Geometry and Experience

Einstein:

"as far the propositions of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain and as far as they are certain; they do not refer to reality"

this is neat - but entirely unsatisfactory - (the idea of the certainty of mathematics) and (of the application of maths to reality

let me suggest that geometry and mathematics are speculative sciences

what occurs is heuristics

the creative mathematician and geometer - are really examining possible ways of representing reality - possible forms that reality has, could have or never will have

what then is the relation between the mathematical and physical sciences

well an obvious answer to this question is that through observation we can determine the appropriateness of a geometrical or mathematicalformulation

that is a verificationist answer

2/12/81

but this answer is based on Positivist assumptions which are untenable

if we accept the view that observation in the physical sciences is theory laden - we cannot say that we are in a possession of 'sense data' - which confirms or denies the applicability of any system

we have to say that our observation is sense data plus - or something else

now whether the observation (whatever it is confirms or denies the validity of a given system (math) is an interesting question

or is it?

on a macro level observation will confirm Euclidean postulates - but is confirmation the right term?

I believe we have tended to think this way because of Euclidean geometry

it does seem to fit

but as, was it Poincare (and others have argued) this is doubtful - from a physical point of view

it seems to me Poincare's argument can be applied to (in principle) any geometry

now the point is not that geometry is false

but rather 'hat true and false are not concepts which apply to geometry (in a correspondence sense of T and F)

I think the answer in short is like this: mathematicians and geometers put forward their systems, this is happening while physical scientists are putting forward their theories - a successful total system is one in which a physicist finds a mathematician to formulate his physics - or visa versa

put very simply the whole matter is quite PRAGMATIC

20/11/81

getting back to Einstein's statement of the situation

I would in consequence have to reject his formulation of the relationship

physics does not as such refer to reality (this is a naive positivist conception). Physicists in a sense create their own reality - for their own purposes

as to the certainty of mathematics there is a distinctive certainty - a tautological certainty - the significance of which I think has been highly overrated for centuries

it is no more certain than saying certainty means certainty - big deal

- but this is not to explain it I think it is explained ultimately in terms of psychological facts

- the need for belief in certainty

philosophy

again the idea that philosophy is essentially a modal activity - it investigates - discovers possibilities this is all

most philosophers have accepted I think, something like this when discussing

philosophical method

but I don't know of any philosopher who has made the stepfrom method to metaphysics

that is that possibilities are all that really exist

that the world is ultimately possibility

that the actual is just a possibility - and that if seen as being anything else - is an illusion

NB. Liebnitz's view of truth:

'An idea, is true if it represents what is possible ....'

we have two kinds of perception (1) actual (2) possible

2/12/81

Descartes was correct if the 'cogito' is seen to mean that all wedirectly know is consciousness, or more correctly the deliberations of consciousness - (Hume took this one step further and argued that all we know is sense data - and that we can't be sure that there is anything beyond the sense data)

now if all this true how do we account for the common belief that we know much more - i.e. that there is an external world

the point is that we can't directly know such things (Descartes' attempt to show that we can know the external world by reasoning - failed)

so what's left - some empiricists have gone to pains to reduce or build up the external world by inference

but even if this worked (and it hasn't i.e. Carnap) - it wouldn't be good enough

the fact is that perception is not inferential - perception is direct

so even if the attempt to build up the external world from sense data or clear and distinct ideas - worked - it wouldn't really explain perception - it would explain, or more correctly demonstrate an inferential ability - but it would explain perception - what all of us believe provides us with our knowledge- of the external world

basically what I'm getting at is that both the rationalist and empiricist programs are not able, or have not been able (given their approach) to answer the problem - this is because they have misunderstood the problem - the problem is not how

do we infer the external world  - it is how do we perceive the external world

now the point is no one knows

but what I'm getting.- at is that this suggests not skepticism - but rather incompetence (howzat!!)

the real problem is how do we understand perception

what I think the problem is, is that all previous epistemologies - have had an incorrect or more to the point a narrow conception of perception

now one of the things I'm getting at is that the function of philosophy is to explain how we know

(what to many philosophers would be begging the question) - not to undermine it with metaphysical doubt - I say metaphysical doubt to distinguish it from healthy doubt - or

phenomenal doubt - doubt that occurs as a result of genuine problems

now some will say as well as being depressing, meta doubt can be positive - that it has led to innovative conceptions - for those who can no longer believe what they see - well ultimately this is a value issue - but my own feeling is that anything that

takes us away from our common sense, good as it maybe is not good enough - second best - and I would hope unnecessary

(this would be the beginning of how I would explain doubt which I think any adequate theory must do)

if of course we were to explain what we know - the death of philosophy - but this is

not on because of the phenomenon of doubt

all modern philosophy has done (not intentionally) is to account for doubt - or even

create it (perhaps - 'I doubt therefore I am')

that is modern philosophy has fully articulated the ground of doubt

perhaps future, dare I use the term 'positive philosophy' - should begin not with what we don't - doubt - but with doubt itself -          

and perhaps from this 'certainty' - common sense might emerge

in any case my overall point is that the function of philosophy is to explain common sense

perhaps why this has not happened is because it's absurd to begin with - common

sense doesn't need to be explained

which just gets back to the second point  - what needs to be explained is doubt

and modern philosophy has done this very well

the point I'm getting at is that the problem of philosophy is the problem of doubt

most philosophers have seen doubt as a result of their enterprise - not the subject of it

here is the beginning of a completely new interpretation of the history of philosophy

take for example Hume's philosophy - on my view it comes to this:

H is saying according to me "if you doubt, this is what you can believe". (i.e. - the details of his philosophy)

the point is we know that if we doubt - our common sense is destroyed - but what is left - Hume's philosophy is an answer to this

his philosophy then is a tour de doubt - an examination of  - a critique of doubt

(now I'm not suggesting that Hume or for that matter anyone else - except me, that is - would interpret his philosophy in this way - that is again - as primarily an analysis of the nature of doubt)

just getting back to perception for a moment

it does seem to me that it has been conclusively shown (well maybe not) that we don't perceive a 'thing' - the material world directly through sense experience nor can it

be said that inferential knowledge reasoning is a goer

I would like to come up with a new view of perception in order to deal with this problem - as at the moment I'm sticking with common sense

though I do have an idea here

perception is according to common sense what we perceive directly

if this is accepted literally - no explanation of perception so far can explain it (as true)

any explanation must by it's nature be indirect - that is, it must break down immediate - experiences into intermediate indirect -parts

this means that we cannot explain immediate experiences

(perhaps an argument for Gestalt theories of perception)

- this is why all accounts, attempts to explain direct perception fail - direct perception cannot be explained

what characteristically has happened in the empiricist program is that the experience has been reduced to a process, which is of course entirely different from the experience

no wonder the explanation never accounts for the fact.

3/12/83

if we possessed total knowledge we could predict a future event

determinism presupposes epistemological facism

freedom presupposes epistemological anarchism

freedom exists because of ignorance

if this is so then tyranny is a consequence of the growth of knowledge

however the advance of knowledge is actually a farce

there is in fact no knowledge (in the traditional sense)

the strategems we devise theoretical and practicle for survival are attempts at knowledge

knowkedge is an unattainable ideal

the problem of freedom arises when it is assumed that knowledge is a reality - not an ideal

it is the assumption of knowledge which leads to oppression

(it doesn't follow that- our strategems are oppressive - they can be if it is assumed that they are knowledge - but if not they are merely the patterns of, tracks in the, ignorance

a successful strategem is one which has a high survival effect

survival does not imply freedom

just as extinction does not imply oppression

if freedom presupposes epistemological anarchism and knowledge is an illusion

then it follows that we are free

the illusion is determinism

this is not just a psychological theory of  freedom - it is an objective theory

belief in knowledge has led to the development of ideas, institutions controls which have actual existence - but they are entrenched socially/historically

More argued 'goodness' is (1) a simple, and thus indefinable -

(I believe that he was dead right here about 'simples', and that the point can be generalized) ; (2) that 'goodness' -undefinable as it is - is a non-natural 'entity'

(1) follows with considerable force if we accept More's view of language and it's relationship to the world

(he had a common sense view of language - and saw the problem of philosophy to be that of re-establishing the authority of the common sense idiom)

(2) is difficult (i) on the one hand it is true in a trivial sense -there is no 'goodness' as there is 'redness', hardness or loudness etc. - that much is obviously true

however (ii) if goodness is not a natural quality a whole range of embarrassing questions arise - i.e. what is it - where is it - how is it known - how can it be known by natural entities etc.

now as far as I know More never really provided answers to these questions

however what More didn't realize - and this again was the result of his meta outlook - was that his (2) could be interpreted, quite legitimately as a challenge to common sense

what I have in mind is this

goodness must be an actual phenomenon or thing or whatever, the fact that it doesn't resemble such things as redness should only make us question using such (i.e. redness) as paradigms of naturalness

More assumed that goodness was some sort of quality - and this is really the basis of his anti-naturalism - but this is something that needs to be questioned

the problem of the ultimate nature of reality (mind/matter) is really no more than a choice between possible descriptionsof experience, reality - whatever

a description is 'true', is valid, if it, or through it the descirber achieves his ends etc. - needs are satisfied  - or some such measure

the true function of philosophy is to discover and elaborate possible metaphysical systems - possible ways of being

philosophy - the history of philosophy is a resource pool of possibilities ultimate world views

the first philosopher to hit at this - though I'm not sure he would see his achievement as I do - was Spinoza -and the second Liebnitz

both these philosophers were more interested in metaphysics, than method - hence L's monads - S's attributes

but from my point of view such (the meta) are optional extras

though I do think that such a view entails that what is real is possibility and that actuality as such is an illusion

8/12/81

Darwin s view that in nature only the fittest survive is hard to classify logically

is not his idea that what we learn about nature, tells us that only the fittest survive

hence if Sx then Fx by definition - is it an analytical truth?

 if so - and it seems that it must be - then it's not analytic?

I think in order to make sense of the world., or our experience of it, we must assume that as well as immediate knowledge there is non-immediate (perhaps 'inferential' knowledge)

without non-immediate knowledge we have no knowledge of anything beyond particulars - no general knowledge - no universals

now it   is difficult to establish this kind of knowledge in a logical sense - but one thing is clear - it is impossible to imagine human knowledge with out it (whatever it is)

(one argument is that without non-immediate/general knowledge - we would have no concept of particular immediate experience)

my metaphysics is an assertion of the modality of philosophical analysis, and of a real modality

my philosophy is really the working out of one of those modalities (- a grand naturalism)

actuality - veridical perception etc. is a historical/ naturalist actual - which because it is given is so forceful - but it is only contingent - it is not necessary - a sort of Hegelian moment who's persistence/stability is formidable and perhaps

evolutionarily necessary

- and philosophical analysis tells us this

- but this assumes the existence of non-immediate non-given ways of knowing

in relation to the question of non-given knowledge

philosophers must begin with the FACT of it

and then the problem is explanation

which is a functional issue

11/12/81

philosophy is concerned with two matters

(1) the discovery of possible worlds

(2) the articulation of (a) possible(s)

such an activity is pure or formal philosophy

such is meta physics

my own naturalism, pragmatism and descriptivism

are merely possible ways of understanding - a possible way of knowing

- a painting on the canvass of possibility

western philosophers have been obsessed with justification

that is justifying what we believe of don't

all such attempts have failed

however the pursuit of justification has been methodologically productive - it has been of great heuristic value

the problem of philosophy is explanation

explanation of  'phenomena' - including justification (as phenomena)

what we can do is explain the need to justify - explain the problem of justification

one consequence of what I'm saying is that we must view philosophy not as the activity of warring factions, but as a consensus enterprise

philosophy is the sum total of philosophical research

the formal philosopher - the metaphysician is a first order descriptivist

a distinction between meta (pure) philosophy and normative (pragmatic)

- philosophy

1ogic is a tool of metaphysics - primarily, and empirical science can be a tool of normative philosophy

the formal /normative distinction is nothing more than a clarifying idea - it is not a hard sharp distinction

actuality is the normative mode, may well be formal - and visa versa

the point is that the two can be done relatively separately

pure philosophy is a descriptive (logical) enterprise

this is pure empiricism - the only legitimate form of empiricism

the problems of the world are not solved by philosophy

the problems of the world are only described (analyzed) by philosophers

philosophers only analyze the problems and solutions

however the theories (possibilities) articulated by philosophers are the problems and solutions of the world

philosophy is the resource pool of humanity (or maybe the cesspool)

my philosophical outlook begins with skepticism

but it is not a negative skepticism - it is not the skepticism of not knowing. Skepticism is not the end result of philosophical enterprise - but the basis of it - the beginning the starting point - we embrace skepticism as the fact from which all philosophical

investigation addresses itself to

our lack of knowledge is what we explore as philosophers

our philosophical theories are not theories about what we know - they are our tracks

in the unknown - ripples in the pool of ignorance

in this sense philosophy is the sum total of our understanding of the unknown

I say understanding and not knowledge - because knowledge does not exist, but we can understand this fact

our theories -  our accounts of possibility (not of actuality) are our accounts of the unknown - the ways we come to grips with it

the function of philosophy is to develop as many and varied accounts of the unknown as possible

a philosophical theory is a description of the unknown a possible description

in evaluating a theory we are looking at the effectiveness of the theory to enable us to cope with the unknown

this is a normative practical, pragmatic mode of philosophy

(to be distinguished from the formal or pure aspect of philosophy)

once we adopt a modal view of philosophy. The rationalist / empiricist debate fades away

empiricism and rationalism, on this view become just possible analyses which may or may not be useful

theory is explanation of fact

theory hence is necessarily a posteriori to fact of experience

but this view does not exclude or show a priori theories to be groundless

it all depends on how they come about

what I have said is an argument against the view that we can explain phenomena  apriori, before, phenomena

now it may happen that an apriori theory is a good explanation of experience, a good account of how we experience what we experience

but such a view is logically speaking a posteriori

16/12/81

it seems that all we can really say is that philosophy exists, that there is a seemingly infinite array of interpretations of reality - and that the only knowledge that we have is this - the possible interpretations of reality - this to me is both a reasoned and observed fact - and an indisputable fact - the only one

17th century philosophers went a step further - they wanted to say that the fact of methodological possibility - indicated possibility in reality - that the world was somehow thus composed

this is a tempting inference, but as the history of philosophy has shown it is impossible to substantiate in any formal or general sense

fortunately for philosophy pragmatics has allowed us to contain such philosophizing

without some very general form of pragmatism - philosophizing makes no sense - the history of philosophy makes no sense

when some kind of pragmatism is admitted then all normative philosophy proceeds - and essentially nothing is changed - philosophers can get back into their woodwork and bore away

(what I am getting at is that my meta-philosophy makes sense of  what we know exists)

my argument for naturalism and modalism is not of course value free - it is a philosophically loaded formalism - but this is unavoidable - without some grab into the normative bag we cannot formulate the formalism

arguments for these views are unfortunately normative

the dog chasing it's tail

one's meta (formalism) requires one's - implies one's epistemology (normative)

this fact implies that one's philosophy - formal/normative is irreducibly subjective

so any objectivism is baseless in itself

but on my view it is legitimate pragmatically

(still it should be noted my philosophy presupposes objective reality

- an unknowable (in any objectivist sense) objective reality what is objective is the unknown - which is nothing more than that which is the source in a pragmatic sense of knowledge in a subjectivist - naturalist - modal sense)

one could be technical and argue that the unknown - the object of knowledge - is subjective - in that case I would argue for pragmatic reasons that we assume it's objective reality

so argument for the objective status of the unknown is that a subject cannot (by definition) be its own object

at the heart of this is a distinction between two senses of objective (1)objective - as object - i.e. thing - this is the dominant view of what objective knowledge is all about in traditional philosophy  i.e. the sense data and distinct idea etc. - some object - in the 17th century philosophy -substance

this form of objectivism has I believe been totally discredited

however there is a second sense

(2) objective in the sense of not subjective- that (whatever it is doesn't matter really) to which a subject relates

this is my sense of objective

it is a logical - not epistemological or ontological objective

it is at this point that Leibnitz's logic is most valid - his problem was simply that he argued from his logical theoryof subject and predicate to a metaphysics

(actually L'S logic is of doubtful use here)

he believed that the subject contained it's object

I think, I want to say a sentence is meaningful if it's subject relates to an object - an objectless subject is in my view meaningless

and a subjectless object is unknowable epistemologically impossible

another way of putting it is that knowledge must be knowledge of something

all 'knowledge of........' theory of knowledge

most philosophers with the exception of Kant have assumed that therefore we can know the object - but this is not necessarily so

Russell I suppose saw this with his theory of descriptions

he showed that because a subject predicates an object it doesn't follow that it exists

all we really have is a description and the description can make sense without referring to anything

that is all existential references can be eliminated from the description - and it can still be seen to be sensible

what then is it a description of_______? strictly speaking it is not in this sense a description - but rather something like (and nothing more than a ) logical sentence - logical in the sense of well formed

if R's idea is successful then all meta is eliminated even mine - the unknown

on R's view then the world is irrelevant to meaning and rationality

meaning in this sense is a property of language

and reference is non-linguistic or non-logical

reference is meta

if we take this view then we draw a sharp distinction between meta and meaning

one reaction to this was the positivists' view that meta is meaningless and this is quite a legitimate inference

or on the other hand we could just as easily go the other way

meaning is irrelevant to philosophy (i.e. meta) - the reaction of 20th century metaphysicians such as Whitehead and Bergson

my attempt to solve this problem - of accepting Russell's analysis and making some room for a meta, is to say that we cannot know what language refers to - this view attempts to keep the referential function of language - but avoid the problems of

what language refers to

- but the unknown is a reference - a referent - admittedly one that cannot be refereed to in any 'substantial (i.e. substance) way

can the unknown be defined logically i.e. negatively - if so it seems that the problem of reference as Russell formulated it does not or may not exist?

this implies that we cannot know what any meaningful sentence refers to - is not this Russell's conclusion in a sense?

but we can still speak meaningfully(about it) just what I want

this is not saying we speak meaningfully about the unknown it is saying we don't know we speak meaningfully about it

(and it is not even necessary to assume an 'it')

and therefore if language refers to what it refers to we don't know

on this view we still maintain the referential function of language without a referent

this analysis thus calls into question the problem of meaning

what is meaning? can the unknown be a meaningful referent?

if not then we are looking at meaning as consisting in self references - or something else

Wittgenstein's answer was 'use' - and this answer certainly fits with my overall schema

but is it a comprehensive analysis?

can we give a use analysis of self referential statements

use theory is in a sense referential - the referent though is acts - public - consequences of acts

I suppose this theory rests on the idea that language is meaningful if it is useful - used

it is in this sense an instrumentalist /operationalist theory

'significant' use is perhaps better than 'meaningful'

a use theory fits snuggly into my modal view

on this view any term has an infinite number of uses

with key theories or terms etc. - the philosopher's job is to describe important uses

my point is that if language is referential we cannot know what it refers to and so far as it is referential it's referent is the unknown

Montaigne

'if you ask philosophy of what matter is heaven....

'Tis Socrates opinion, and mine too, that it is best judged of heaven not to judge of it at all.

'Let us see if we have more light on the knowledge of human and natural things

'It is not a ridiculous attempt for us to devise for those, to whom by our own confession our knowledge is not able to attain another body, and to lend a false form of our own invention, as is manifest in the notion of the planets, to

which, seeing our wits cannot possibly arrive nor conceive their natural conduct, we lend them material, heavy and substantial springs of our own, by which to move ............... these are all dreams and fantastic follies ........

'Have I not read in Plato this divine saying, that "Nature is nothing is nothing, but an enigmatic poesy .................'

- And certainly philosophy is no other than a sophisticated poesy

as also, in all the rest, philosophy presents us, not that which is or what she really believes, but what she has contrived with the most plausible likelihood and the fairest aspect

'Tis not heaven only that she sends her ropes, engines, and wheels; let us consider a little what she says of ourselves and our conjectures

'To accommodate the motions they see in man, the various functions and faculties that we perceive in ourselves, into how many parts have they divided the soul, into how many orders have they divided..........

20/12/81

Paracelsus

'man and heaven are one and the same, not by way of the earth being in heaven as Copernicus is going to suggest a few years latter, but because it is the same understanding that reveals both to us'

"that it is one firmament one starry nature, and one being present in divided and multiple for form '

'this is for him the principle of medicine: it consists'

"in turning the greater world into the little"

this macro/micro-cosm idea which seems to be characteristic of the Renaissance period must be one of the central meta. notion of western thought

without it or some variation of it, there is no unity in science - nor possibility of science even - such an idea is the forerunner of the concept of induction

inference from particular to general is only possible if it is believed that in some sense there is a relation between the micro (particular) and the general - macro

here of course in this idea of micro/macro is a perfect example of what Popper had in mind when he said that science requires meta. theories.

I think we can go on and say that the distinction between meta and science is not on

all knowledge is meta

empiricism of any form is just another form of meta

what we have in science, is an articulation, speculation, specification - application of a meta framework to particular instances

this is the first stage of scientific analysis

it is no more than the interpretation of phenomena e.g. application of the atomic conception to reality

the next step is the articulation of such a model - the fullexpression of it - a detailed elaboration of the central idea

it is generally at this point that problems, questions etc. arise

it is at this point that phenomena will challenge the adequacy of the model

at this point the model will be, or maybe modified, developed or if the problem is big enough - scraped entirely but this is a very desperate move

one consequence of what I have just suggested is that induction - generalizing from particular to general will only occur within an already established meta model it will occur at the articulation stage

another consequence is that induction is plainly a meta doctrine - aren't they all -

it was Hume's inability to see this which led to his skepticism

Paracelsus

'Nature is complete that she is not to be apprehended idealistically by way of concepts and formal truths but much rather:

'She will help us only if we struggle with her'

It is a great blindness and a great temptation to follow our minds, our plain senses, which are no masters: it is the light of nature which is the master'

it is here we have from  P a philosophical skepticism which is highly potent

in arguing that our theories, concepts, models etc. are finally allirrelevant to truth P is then going on to say that it is in the struggle with these that nature may or may not reveal herself

it is basically a statement of philosophical humility

the struggle is ultimate - no one model can claim ultimate truth

truth for P is a result of a struggle with knowledge

a struggle with no guarantees

another way of putting it is to say that we can't trace the moment of truth to any one set of ideas

the process is not certain - but it may produce the light of truth

it is not the world which gives us hope or in which we

can have faith

our salvation consists in our capacity to look at the world in a number of ways

it is this possibility which generates all growth and all promise

our hope lies in the fact that there is no one way, no answer no final truth - but rather a limitless number of possibilities

what the world offers us is nothing

we create our possibilities

because given nothing anything is possible

in this lies true freedom

Paracelsus:

"thoughts are free and are subject to no rule. 0n them rests the freedom, and they tower above the light of nature. For thoughts give birth to creative force that is neither elemental or sidereal.....thoughts create a new heaven, a new firmament, a new source of energy from which new arts flow.. . . . . . . when a man undertakes to create something, he establishes a new heaven  as it were, and from it the work that he desires to create flows from him..... For such is the immensity of man that he is greater than heaven or earth"

there is a sense in which philosophy never really recovered from the Socratic method and conclusion

S himself was a negative skeptic he failed to see the full power and possibility of his skepticism - he failed to see it's real consequence - and this is because his skepticism

was essentially negative

Positive skepticism in a sense begins with Socrates conclusion - if nothing can be known , then what? - then anything is possible  - this was partially seen by the sophists but was not developed positively - and was certainly not accepted by Greek society in a positive way

the degeneration of western society begins with this fact

western man in his constant search for knowledge (of a positive kind) has always seen skepticism as negative - the reverse is true

our search should be for negative knowledge and our attitude positive

the search for positive knowledge is inseparable from the attempt to control - Bacon saw this and stated it quite clearly

that nature, life, can be should be chained has led to the most complete and total capacity for destruction

creativity exists in possibility - 'Positive Knowledge' is the attempt to control possibility - to destroy it

Kepler:

'book of nature is written in mathematical characters'

'The "light of nature" shines intelligibly on the mathematical plane. There entities are characterized and related universally, mind finds it's bearings and is able to consolidate one discovery after another'

'Geometry for Kepler is not only a logical system and tool it is the "archetype of it the world" and it should shine truth as the light of nature"

'Conventional philosophers had been taught that mathematics concerns what can be more or less"

Boehme

'Real religious experience expresses itself only in symbolic language'

- different languages for different needs

a rational human being must be able to operate on a number of different language levels - with a number of different modes

Boehme with his idea that God is both good and evil is a precursor of Hegel

- a dialectical God!

- the only solution to the problem of evil

24/12/81

mysticism is no more than an embracing of the unknown

skepticism (negative) is really no more than a rejection of  the unknown

knowledge is an attempt to dissolve the unknown

25/12/81

hence religious knowledge is an attempt to describe the unknown

the difference between religious and secular knowledge is (I think) not very great at all

'True' religious knowledge begins with the 'inexpressible' - and tries to explain it - this is theology

now I am in two minds about theology

on the one hand there is a sense in which the great religious writers were attempting through their writings to lead people to the inexpressible

so from a pragmatic point of view religious knowledge is not an end in itself, but a means to that end - and once the end is achieved the knowledge is irrelevant - like capitalism it should wither away

now from my point of view, my epistemological point of view secular knowledge is in many ways similar

factual knowledge begins with the unknown (or the inexpressible)

(traditional philosophers would reject this point of view)

for pragmatic reasons - action reasons - frameworks are developed to describe the unknown

and the one thing we can say is that - there is non finality in this matter - only modality - i.e. possibilities - endless possibilities theories are accepted or rejected possibilities exist or fail to for ultimately pragmatic reasons

but the modality of human knowledge brings us fair and square back to skepticism

this is no problem - it is how it should be

knowledge is a process not a product

but it's not a growth process in the sense of development

it is a cyclical process

and what is contained in, filled out in the unknown is knowledge

contrary to what the positivists and the great majority of theologians have thought there is no difference between religious and secular language in a fundamental sense

both are possible

possible interpretations of the unknown possible universe of discourses

why some people choose one approach and not the other cannot be really finally determined

it's just a fact - a fact which reflects the deeper fact of absence of  a total, final, all embracing actual

all that exists fundamentally is possibility

(Leibnitz saw this clearer than any other western philosopher but failed to follow it through due to his belief in substance)

now if all I have said is true there is some accounting to be done

in so far as most religious claim that their knowledge is factual in some sense - i.e. pertains to the actual - they are right off the mark

their arguments for actuality have not only missed the point of mysticism

(the inexpressible and the possible knowledge forms which lead us to or back to the inexpressible)

but these arguments have been the basis of most human (intellectual/social) tyranny and misery

tyranny of the actual of objectivity in this perverted sense

objectivity as I interpret it is realizing the non-existence of theactual as a fundamental category - and realizing- that reality is inexpressible - unknown - but that we have an infinite array of possible ways of reaching this point-lessness

(just a note on OM

OM as an expression of the inexpressible is absurd

meaningless, contradictory in traditional western logic

this is just what the eastern mystics have been saying for centuries - and what western thinkers have been trying to avoid)

I suppose one thing I'm trying to say is that true mysticism is in fact inexpressible

religions have twisted and perverted this fact

and I think the main reason this has come about is some kind of existential and fundamental - insecurity with the inexpressible

(an insecurity bolstered by bad philosophy)

that insecurity is a real denial of mysticism

but as I have argued negative skepticism is merely one possible response to the inexpressible

a positive skepticism is possible

and I believe obviously far superior (but this is a normative statement -not formal)

what I think I have shown with my normative argument about our attitudes to skepticism is that positive skepticism is possible

this I believe has not been understood or argued for (at least in the western tradition)

now I believe that because such a point of view has not been articulated before - it has been believed that negative skepticism is the only option

this fact is the origin of dangerous philosophy and it's consequences

objectivity/authoritarianism of a religious or secular nature is directly traceable to negative skepticism

put quite simply authoritarian and repressive philosophies are desperate attempts to avoid negative skepticism

libertarian philosophies have developed - but this development has not been securely founded on positive skepticism

rather their development has been in reaction to, in response to the negative skepticism philosophies

and this is I believe why libertarianism as a historical and factual phenomenon has been the exception on the stage of history - rather than the rule

- that is they have not been securely based on a skepticism - a solid, philosophical basis - rather they have been (unfortunately) reactive philosophies - and - have as a result been one step behind the negative authoritarian repressive ways of interpreting

the unknown

such is my account of the failure of human societies to achieve, actually achieve positive ends

what I am saying is that the dialectical pores of history has been the blind reacting to the blind - but that this constant battle between repressive and libertarian

philosophies can be ended if positive skepticism is embraced

27/12/81

an acceptance of the unknown - an embracing of it - that moment when the possibilities of human knowledge core to nothing -that moment when the 'soul' is empty

this state of being is simply that - a state of being

in such a moment we can perhaps more fully say 'I am', than at any other time (though again strictly speaking this state is qualitatively equivalent to modal awareness)

Satre's philosophy hinged ultimately on a distinction between 'being and nothingness' this phrase is important and instructive

but I think he was wrong in drawing such a sharp distinction for Satre there is being AND nothingness

the experience of nothingness is for Satre (or seems to be;contrary to the experience of being or perhaps in some sense the experience of being is the experience of nothingness - and the existential problem is that off reconciling these to accounts of the relationship between being and nothingness - the conflict between the two is what we feel what we live

S like most existentialists and most philosophers of the west and east is a. negative skeptic

on my view this consequence can be avoided if only we see that nothingness is existential space - the ground - not the groundlessness of being

being is nothingness

but this is an affirmation not a denial of being

Thomas Merton in a very simple way has captured the essence of what I've been on abut in saying:

"For language to have meaning, there must be intervals of silence somewhere, to divide word from word an, utterance from utterance"

so far I have concentrated on the 'logic' of reality - I havesaid little concerning how to relate to reality - that is the psychology of being

now some philosophers in fact most, but especially rationalists have taken the view that logic dictates psychology - while I accept this I want to turn back to psychology and say that what we term metaphysics - is in fact meta psychology

that is to say meta analyses are in fact first order descriptions of the relation between the unknown and the known - this I believe can only be interpreted as meaning - they are first order descriptions of the psychological (n a meta sense) reality

when we use the term psychology we normally mean psych. in a normative sense - and it is the normative issue I wish to address at the moment

what I have to say is quite simple

reality is the unknown and the known - human beings do experience continually both modes of existence - this is not a matter of choice but a matter of meta fact

however when we get down to normative facts - it is clear that some human beings are more disposed to one mode than another (hence the secular-mystical distinction)

now it would be tempting to say that a balanced experience is best but what is the standard by which we determine balance?

emphasis is a matter of history, sociology, psychology

and this statement is more important than it may at first appear

really what I'm saying is that why someone behaves the way they do is really a philosophical issue (whether they know it or not) - people inherit - adopt philosophical theories perspectives - and why this is so, is not a logical issue (the logical issue is what philosophical positions - possibilities)it is broadly speaking an empirical issue an issue which the social, biological and even physical science, in the end were designed to serve

if straight empiricism or positivism was true, that is if we could disregard meta, we could have simple, easy, answers to these questions - but this is not on

any form of  knowledge ultimately uncovers possibilities, modalities - which point - to the unknown -

but for practical or reasons we have to make the best of this fact and use whatever we consider the best to guide and determine our actions in the face of the unknown

such is the philosophical basis of true courage

there is a strong tradition in all religions of other worldliness (the secular world)

the theology of this approach to reality began in western phil with Plato but I think it was best discussed by the monastics fathers and the monastic tradition

one of the problems that confronts the mystic is defining what a rejection of worldiness means

perceptive writers in this are realize to say that the monastic tradition organization - and practice cannot be sited as defining a mystical other world approach to reality

the modern 'open' monk is beset by the world as much as (in an existential sense) the man in the 'world

no doubt there are differences - but the differences are not essential

it would be interesting to take a look at the various ways in which rejection of the world is- defined - but in loo of this I would like to suggest something quite radical

as a consequence of my outlook worldliness means - the modal world - the world of possible ways of knowing

possible ways of knowing the unknown - and of course all theology is a perfect example of such an attempt

now what I'm getting at is that any attempt to understand the unknown - to make it the known (including - God forbid - theology) is fundamentally concerned with dealing with and more to the point in the world - it is necessary in order to live in the world to do this - the world in a very real sense demands this of us

rejection of this demand involves fundamentally rejection of knowledge rejection of modality possibilities interpretations of the unknown

true religious experience is acceptance of the unknown as the unknown

now this is I believe quite possible but I would say not in the way the monastics go about it

they want to make a whole life out of it - their ideal is total - and it is this desire for totality (which though understandable) is I believe unrealistic - in a mystical sense

most religious writers have realized this though they would viewit differently to me - the typical response to the intrusion of the world - it's needs,  sins etc. is that the individual who suffers the intrusion has failed spiritually - and a great deal of religious

psychology is used to convince the victim of this fact - and to get him on the right path again

this whole approach to the problem is a result of the belief that mysticism can be total

mysticism is not total - in the sense that we can turn off completely the modal necessities of life

but by the same token the modal experience is not all encompassing, it reaches through the holes in our interpretations of the unknown

but this is not meant as -an argument against the monastic life - it is an attempt to explain needless suffering - experienced by those who have chosen such a way of life

what is a good life? there is no objective answer to this -but there are possible answers - possible ways of understanding - the unknown - it is clear that it is not possible for any human beings to experience all possibilities

but it seems to me to be equally clear that it is not possible for any human being just to exist within any one framework at any one time

the attempt to do this is understandable - but it ultimately it fails

one framework may dominate but that is all - and there is no guarantee of this

I think possibly a simple explanation of a great deal of suffering is that it is often caused by a conflict of possibilities

there is always this conflict - it is unavoidable - but at times it is very intense - an intensity I think that is caused by the failure of the person concerned to accept this conflict as natural

extreme cases of this result in mental illness of one kind or another

hence my view is that such phenomena as repression, depression, psychosis, neurosis, schizophrenia etc. - are varieties of the same problem

(this is not to say that any one of the current explanations of such phenomena are better than each other

modal rejection can be explained in a Freudian, Jungian, Atlerian etc. way

any one of these views may cure modal rejection - or what I think is the other possibility - negative or repressive skepticism)

these are the two causes of mental illness from my meta. point of view

clearly in terms of mental health both these extremes need to be, avoided

in fact as I have argued both these positions (1) negative skepticism (2) non-modalism - are untenable philosophically

which raises an interesting question - how do they come about?

well the simple answer is that they result from illogical thinking

and I don't mean everyone thinks illogically or on a meta level

but we are all the inheritors of brave but failed attempts to understand life - and we all live out these theories and their consequences

( we can I think classify all these theories as being, either one of two types:-

(1 ) negative skepticism

and

(2) non-modalism)

which I believe can be argued against on logical and empirical grounds (i.e.. consequential grounds)

but again one of the main things I am arguing is that such dilemmas as mental illness are first and foremost philosophical problems

once a positive skepticism and modal epistemology is adopted -or at least affected I believe many of life's unnatural traumas will be avoided

I suppose I should add here that as well as (1) PS and (2) ME we need to add pragmatism

without the pragmatic principle (1) and (2) cannot be affected or practiced - and their opposite may result

(3) is normative - it is subjective - it is my own account of how to deal with (1) and (2)

then again I'm not sure of this. Perhaps (3) is of equivalent status to (1) and (2)?

can (3) be derived from (1) and (2)? - I think so???

no I think though (3) is clearly suggested by (2) the relationship is not one of entailment

(3) is an independent principle

as are (1) and (2)

the total package though does fit together very well

(3) is an independent principle but is I think normative that is the only principle I believe that is capable of buffeting the modal principle against the unknown

it is the primary normative principle, as distinct fromsecondary theories, which are it's expression - it' substance it's possibilities

but then again I think it is meta - in the sense that pragmatism is the principle of normativism

Yes!!!

schema:-

meta

positive skepticism

epistemological modalism

norm

pragmatism

so in summary the way my philosophy is shaping up is like this:

(I ) I draw a distinction between meta and normative phil

(II)  my meta doctrines are two - (a) positive skepticism

       (b) modalism

(III) normative phil is pragmatism

my pragmatism would differ from other formulations

when I say normative phil is pragmatic

what I mean is that by normative phil I mean meta pragmatism

and this means that meta pragmatism does not imply pragmatism as we know it

perhaps the third principle would best be called meta normativism ??

and drop the pragmatism altogether???

29/12

once we accept modalism - the next problem is how do we choose between possibilities?

well one response to this is to say there never is any absolute choice - that our thinking is always in some sense modal but given this - it is true that certain perspectives will be more important that others - how do we choose which are to be most important?

my answer is that we do choose - why we choose is the subject of modal analysis - various reasons will be given and these reasons will only be possible choices - possible explanations of the fact

and the same applies to change of perspective

people change and they most often have reasons for their changes - but they must see their reasons as being only possible explanations of the fact. Someone may come and provide a completely different analysis of their change - this is modally valid

if we adopt a positive skepticism and learn to see ourselves fundamentally as modals (not monads but modals) then this state of affairs will be very positive and satisfying - quite liberating

however most of us have been brought up on two philosophical perspectives which make this acceptance difficult -

negative skepticism and actualism

(actual-ism is the view that reality is actual - and all our ideas and efforts are directed to the actual)

negative skepticism is I think an unavoidable consequence of this view)

on this view then reason is a subject of modal inquiry

it is not something we can appeal to - it like all our concepts is an actualization

this outlook is I think the most through going and only positiveskepticism available - and is I think not likely to be comfortable to philosophical weaklings - but like all worthwhile philosophies - it takes and demands a certain courage

but such is of course the reward as well as the price

given my distinction between meta and normative philosophy

what do we make of normative philosophy?

in a pure sense it is the articulation of various possibilities

in a normative sense these possibilities are used acted upon tried and failed

this is clear enough but what of modalism in a meta sense

it seems to me that without resorting to the normative bag it cannot the formulated - because any formulation will involve some characterization - which is thus normative

the meta thesis takes on a kind of mystical status - but this does not worry me in the least - it is quite wonderful

it gives the unknown characterization - and the unknown characterizes it

final - UNITY

there is a sense in which it is obvious that possibility cannot becharacterized - all our conceptual tools - our languageis 'actual' -and thus as the possible is not actual - it

cannot be determined in actual language

but there is a sense in which possibility is just plurality

it is that there is a whole number of ways of characterizingreality or any one aspect of it - this is clear enough no mysticism here

(so long as modalism is kept epistemological then the problem of characterizing it is avoided - it is only when we want to talk about modal realities - ontologies that it becomes - uncharacterziable in a first order sense

it is tempting to go ontological but - that's not on)

29/12/81

Boehme

it seems that B thinks any one thing has inherent in it divers forms - essences - some of which are quite incompatible -and destructive of others

I think this is one of the most innovative and productive ideas to result from the essentialist tradition.

Aristotle's forms were fixed - each individual entity had an essence - very neat - but how do you explain opposite contradictory aspects of any entity, i.e., growth and decay, good and bad, rest and motion?

well B's answer is ingenious in a sense - simple and given essensialism it is quite obvious

as far as I know his idea of many essences and forms - is the first essenialist attempt at dialectic

certainly the sort of stuff Hegel would have got into

'We understand that without nature there is an eternal stillness and rest. viz, the Nothing; and when we understand that an eternal will arises in the nothing, to introduce the nothing into something that the will might find feel and behold itself'

(221)

30/12/81

if modalism is stated purely as a description of what goes on in philosophy - as a statement of simply possible interpretations of reality (the unknown)

then it seems that any interpretation even an objective one is possibly true

that is a possible true account of the unknown

again how we decide whether X is true cannot be decided non-modally

that is there is no definite criterion we can appeal to

all criteria are possible - and why one is adopted instead of others is a subject for modal research

but this is no problem because we get back to the fact that outlooks and criteria are in fact chosen - even negative skepticism is chosen

this is fact

one of the consequences of this view is that - the idea that we must first find a reason before we adopt a view is incorrect (or at least can be - what I'm saying is that it is a possible approach to rationality - not a necessary one)

the thing is that this approach will only reveal modalities anyway - and by that I mean possible interpretations

           

the fact that a theory is revealed by possibilities does not of course mean- therefore it is true or false

how we decide this matter is an undecidable question in any total sense

that we need to decide the matter and that we do is undeniable

which philosophy a person will adopt that is an open matter

basically the answer is that it is unknown (in any final sense) it could be anything,

how liberating!

for understanding modalism it is important to realize that I distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive accounts of the nature of philosophy and philosophizing

my form of modalism depends on descriptivism at a first order level. A philosopher in this sense is a first order empiricist - he simply describes classifies, articulates possibilities - when he acts as a metaphysician

however the prescriptive mode - though it is not 1st order is an important part of the philosophical enterprise

the first order activity serves a purpose - what that is is a subject to dispute

I see it as providing a resource pool for people to draw from and I think the reason people are interested in philosophical theories is that through them they have a better understanding of reality

I think that philosophical theories are useful - are useful and necessary to living a 'rational' life

and so the possibilities articulated by philosophers - become, or are viewed as prescriptions for living

such is the function of philosophical theories

(this is of course only my view - it is not a meta statement)

31/12/81

the line or meta is this - a value free formulation of any first principle - that is a philosophically neutral formulation -is just impossible

we have to accept that any claim to objectivity, universality,neutrality, is irretrievably subjective

once this fact is accepted then everything can proceed as before

what we call objectivity is objectivity, but not in the former sense - it is something different

we do use objective language to formulate or conceptions - but that objective - language has to be understood for what it is  - metaphysically

what we are involved in becomes something like an articulation of our subjectivity - and an examination of it

even this statement is far from objective

we could very easily end up in silence - or mysticism (a silent form

but necessities of living make this impossible

we must therefore behave as if objectivity is real for pragmatic reasons

this cannot be argued or really stated absolutely true

action does speak louder than words

so one way of characterizing this is to say that at the core of any rational account of reality is the irrational

I believe that in adopting a descriptive view of the nature of philosophy this problem is solved

as philosophers we don not say anything about the nature of the world all we do is say how people go about describing the world

that is we categorize the various ways the world is said to be understood - and this involves discovery of outlooks, logicssystems of thought

any 'meta' statement is therefore only a, characterization of second order activity - second order language

'The wisest man who has acquired mental vacuity is not concerned with contemplation or it's absence'

-Thomas Merton

'The Geography ...' 119

(c) greg t. charlton. 2019.