1982

8/1/82

perhaps objectivity is purely linguistic - language structure gives us the illusion of objective knowledge

an illusion which thought and expression constantly destroy

9/1/82

I find it quite interesting that in the Buddhist scripture 'The legend of the Buddha Shakyamni' - Gotama rejects the austerity of the mendicants - for quite sensible reasons - he became quite physically weak

he ascended to Nirvana as a result of his apprehension of sacred knowledge

the author of this tract gives nothing away as regards how sacred knowledge is gained

13/1/82

John Scotus

'We do not know what God is  ... because he is infinite and therefore objectively unknowable. God himself does not know what he is, because he is not anything. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God literally or affirmatively. Literally God is not because he transcends being'

2/2/82

I think that Russell's idea of neutral facts is a concept  which may be just what I want with regard to the problem of formulating modalism - the problem of establishing a value free - normative free formulation of the philosophy of possibilities

what I'm getting at is that reality on this view is neutral - a neutral fact - if you like one that becomes un-neutral - known through (1) perception (2) interpretation

Russell's neutral fact is what I have simply refereed to as theunknown

3/2/82

Brunschvieg

(1869-1944)

'Knowledge is no longer an accident which is added from without to being, without altering... ..Knowledge constitutes a world which is for us the world. Beyond it there is nothing"

- Copelston 173

- or more correctly the unknown

it follows from this view that ontology is not an independent science independent of epistemology - one's epistemology determines one's ontology - and not the other way around - it makes no sense to claim that we can begin with an ontology and determine from this an epistemology

the problem of epistemology is a particular branch of epistemology it is the what do we know, as distinct from the how do we know

( I suppose it is ultimately just a matter of one's starting point would argue for epistemology)

B goes on:

philosophy 'seeks to grab itself in it's moment in it's activity...........intellectual activity coming to consciousness of itself, this is the integral study of knowledge, this is knowledge'

Copelston:

In other words from the point of view of naive common sense the object of knowledge is something external and fixed something which, in itself, lies outside knowledge but which comes to be known. We make the transition to the philosophical point of view

when we see that the distinction between subject and object arises within the sphere of reason, of the minds activity. According to B therefore his own (or contemporary) idealism should not be confused with a subjective idealism which is opposed to meta realism. Critical or rational idealism does not entail a denial of any distinction between subject or object or between man and his environment. What it entails is the assertion that this distinction arises within consciousness and knowledge would be for nothing at all' (173)

'.....Though however B is perfectly well aware of Kant's influence on the development of idealism, he insists that the philosophy which he has in mind does not consist in an a priori deduction of supposedly unchangeable categories he sees the mind

as coming to know itself through reflection on it's activity as manifested historically in, for examples the development of science. And through this reflection the mind sees that it's categories and ways of thought. The Kantian attitude leads to

sterile idealism. Genuine idealism is a doctrine of the living mind.................The mind may aspire to a comprehensive and final analysis; but it cannot attain it for the mind or spirit remains inventive and creates new forms and comes to know itself in and through it's own creations'

it seems to be a result of this view that the mind cannot know itself in any final sense

so self knowledge in any final sense is impossible

what we know ever about ourselves is very limited

but according to B the possibilities are endless

I am wondering if the idea of a neutral fact can apply to the fact which expresses modalism and positive skepticism

- or am I simply involved in describing what philosophers do (1) and (2) offering an explanation

now the question is with regard to (2) what status does (2) have? is my (2) just another instance of (1) - just another instanceof (1) - just another phil

no - it's meta Phil

but the question is how can my theory of modalism and positive skepticism be formulated non- normatively?

it's here that I thought the neutral fact idea might come in handy - but I think not

the best I can claim is that my meta best describes what goes on normatively

now if a value free - a value free philosophical formulation was possible - it would be hard to see how it could be said to be significant

a value free language would be expressionless - non descriptive

I suppose what happens in phil is that theories or elements of theories are taken from the normative bag and made into elevated up to the meta level for explanatory purposes

so that it's possible for a theory to be both normative and meta

i.e. say something about the world

and

say something about how the world is described analyzed, understood

etc.

so that my philosophical  and meta theories, are both my accounts of how the world is and how it is to be understood

it is both ontology and epistemology

one upshot of this is the view that any adequate philosophy must do two things (1) account for reality (2) account for all interpretations of reality

(1) is metaphysics

(2) is metaphilosophy

I must be able to show, as does any other philosopher that (1) derives from (2) and that (2) derives from (1)

In any case there is a direct relation between (1) and (2)

(1) in fact derives from (2)

that is observation of philosophy activity leads to meta

and further my meta entails my normative philosophy

but one of my unresolved issues is to what extent have I, or will I develop a meta

so far I have stuck to representing modalism as a perceptual theory

and have resisted talking about skepticism / possibility and actuality outside of the perceptual context

I suppose in a noumenal sense

possibility / actuality the unknown - in themselves

I think epistemologically such is indefensible

but I think pragmatically it's a kind of optional extra

if I was to develop these notions there would be a problem

the unknown would either be vanished or have to go back a step

there would be no need for the unknown if the basis of the system of thought is possibility as such

the world is unknown the mind is possibility

now when I say the world is unknown I do not mean that we do not know what we experience what we experience

but as soon as we use language to explain describe what is, we are in the realm of possible interpretations of reality and hence on reflection it becomes obvious that 'reality' is not contained by any one theory

in this sense the world is unknown ('knowledge' defies our experience our direct experience actual experience)

'knowledge' - the process of knowing shows or suggests our immediate experience or immediate knowledge is illusory -or perhaps visa versa)

it's starting to appear that the unknown is really the absence of any final complete satisfactory theory - theoretical indeterminacy

which accounts for a lack of knowledge in any determinate sense

this is similar but quite different from the claim that the object of knowledge is the unknown

perhaps the relationship is that the indeterminacy gives rise to the plurality

5/2/82

the creative philosopher's primary object is to develop alternative new and novel interpretations of reality

he may describe his activity as 'the pursuit of truth' etc.- but this is strictly speaking not what a philosopher does -he creates truth or more correctly creates possible truths.

In adding to our knowledge of the world in this way the philosopher is providing us with new worlds or new ways of looking at the world, and thus potentially new ways of acting in the world

in making people aware of the fact that the world is possibility, that there are an infinite number of ways we can perceive reality - the philosopher is confronting man with his frredom

my main point here is that the creation of theories is the main job of the philosopher.

any other aim is secondary to the development of possible theories

thus reality is the sum total of possible interpretations of the unknown

actual reality is the sum total of actual interpretations of the unknown

Spinoza with his monistic dualism was on the right track I see the basic differences between my view and S's to belike this

Spinoza                                   

one substance  

mind                

matter  

Me

absence of knowledge

mind theory

matter theory

essentially my theory is epistemological not ontological

for me the question what is?, as such makes no sense, and this is because it

presupposes a reality - an extra epistemological reality

the real ontological question is what do we know - what we know is what exists in some sense or another

our explanation of how we know - the process and products (of the process) will explain, account for any ontological claim

not at all satisfied with this

6/2/82

have just finished reading a commentary on Bergson and was impressedby his anti-intellectualism - or to be more precise his view of the limitations and functions of the intellect

in my own thinking I have come to a conclusion on the problem of perception. It is that the problem of perception is that of trying to reconcile explanation with experience

I have argued that the reason why none of the accounts of perception are satisfactory is just simply that they are explanations of phenomena - not phenomena and it seems to me that no explanation can 'capture' phenomena

the best we can do is offer as many explanations as possible -develop possible understandings - and the total - all the explanations come as close as possible to the ideal which is the experience itself

now any explanations or any set of explanations will never totally account for the experience

and this is simply because there exists an unbridgable gap between knowledge and experience / reality

to put it another way the intellect strives to encompass experience, and it is this striving which is the pursuit of knowledge and which results in the growth of knowledge - but it is bound to fail in an ideal sense

just simply because the intellect is to put. it crudely a part of experience - and the part cannot contain - subsume the whole

this is not exactly Bergson's point - but is similar - he believes the intellect's main function is the reduction the- breaking up of the whole into it's parts. Consequently it is simply not fitted to the job of  understanding, of apprehending the whole

his argument is that it is the intuition which achieves this understanding -

one could of course get into the issues of just what the intuition is, what the intellect is, what is their relation (i.e., is there any difference?), but overall I like this idea - this view of the issue

however I still favour my own formulation of the issue - perhaps it is ontological - the experience is ontologically different to the explanation - the explanans / explanandum

or another way of putting it is that there is an important difference between direct and indirect knowledge - this is not new but what I think is, is the point that, however comprehensive our indirect knowledge is it will never ascend to the level of direct. knowledge

now why this is, is an interesting question that needs to be lookedinto carefully

8/2/82

was watching a program on St. Teresa the little flower yesterday and was quite interested in her statement that sheneither welcomed or feared death.

one of the things that occurred to me after the program was that there is a sense in which religion and spiritual knowledge is important in the sense that it does provide answers to certain questions, which philosophy and science etc. do not

or perhaps a better way of putting it is to say that it provides a certain kind of answer - which traditional philosophy and science cannot provide

or another way of looking at is to say that religious statements like Teresa's on death satisfy certain needs which rational and scientific thinking are not likely to

Bergson on intuition.

one thing I found most interesting is just how powerful the idea of intuition is - what it allows - what follows from it what can exist once intuitive knowledge is allowed -there is a sense in which anything becomes allowable - and this may be the strongest argument against intuitionism - but I do think that any adequate account of knowledge must make some room for intuition

this has led me to think (in terms of my own outlook) -

that we intuit objectivity but that it is an open objectivity - strictly speaking - unknown

the unknown is objectivity / the objective - that which is beyond - inaccessible to the subject.

our knowledge of this objectivity is subjective - the unknown is filled in - the problem of western philosophy - is that most philosophy - philosophers have tried to make larger claims for objectivity they want to specify it's nature

this I would say can only be done subjectively

I believe that this idea of intuiting objectivity - and making the objective world unknowable - the unknown - really solves in an interesting way the problem of intuition or objectivity

9/2/82

it is a real solution - the unknown is objective - in so far as it is not known - and of course it is not because it is the unknown - if it was the known it would necessarily be the known - it would necessarily be subjective

now I think that our intuition off objectivity is not an intuition of the unknown

immediately or directly

think most would say what they say the objective reality is, is what veridical experience is - what it throws up to us - the world etc.

now no one can argue that this is what is intuited

but this is not what I meant by intuition in the sense I refereed to above: of intuiting the unknown

Copleston Vol.9.II.P.40

Alfred Loisy 1857 -1940 French apologist / modernist -

'he can be said to assume that the human mind cannot attain knowledge of the Transcendent. God as really the unknowable of Spencer, that which transcends the reach of what Kant described as theoretical knowledge. We think off God in terms of symbols and from a practical point of view we are warranted in acting as though there were a personal divine will having a -------or the human will. But in the moral and

religious sense we cannot prove the truth of any belief. In this sphere truth

as related to man's good, is as subject to change as man himself. There are no absolutely true or immutable truths.What is called revelation is man's interpretation of his experience; and both experience and interpretation are subject to change.'

I'm really quite staggered by this statement.

as far as God is concerned - this is basically word for word the view that I have come to

intuition continued

we intuit the world as it appears, but to use a Bergsonian distinction the intellect chops up this picture, and at various times, and for various reasons the intuited world - a given intuited world - given by the mind - is not satisfactory is not useful, does not enable action - even at times prohibits it

And it, is at this point that theoretical, non-immediate, indirect conceptions of reality become necessary - come into play - the certainty of our direct perceptions comes into question - and in so far as 'certainty' is an essential component of directness, the direction of direct perception is questionable

it seems to me there is good reason for continuing to call direct perception 'direct' - but what is apparent from the above is that the directness is perceptual - not

epistemological this distinction obvious as it is important - failure to recognize it has led to some problems.

epistemologically speaking direct perception veridical perception - the truth of it - is challenged by the intellect - theoretical knowledge

now it seems to me that epistemologically speaking there is no reason why we should prefer direct to indirect conceptions on epistemological grounds that is -

there are I believe good pragmatic social 'evolutionary' reasons for why veridical perception is, and is useful

(in fact one could very easily develop an epistemological anthropology - or more correctly an anthropological analysis of epistemology)

my idea would be that what  we call direct knowledge our perceptions of what is - is historically the perceptual possibility which has proven to have the highest survival potential

such 'knowledge' is in this sense superior to theoretical knowledge which though important in a limited and fairly specific contexts cannot have - does not have the validity of direct perception for the majority of human experiences - the generality

of human experience

such a view could have some quite important consequences for life (living it) and science. I think it is an essentially healthy outlook.

just following on with this epistemological anthropology the view that I am taking of evolution is inverse to, opposite to, that advanced by those who believe theoretical knowledge represents the index of intellectual, and evolutionary advancement

theoretical knowledge has emerged to fill in the gaps the holes in given perception

which indicates that our natural - given immediate grasp on the world / reality is anything but complete

now this is of course pure speculation and mere fantasy really - but what if we take this idea to it's logical conclusion?

perhaps I 'evolution' will take us to the point where our natural grasp - direct hold - increases - and the need for stop gap theoretical measures becomes less

as a theory of evolution this theory is touchy

but as a philosophy of culture generally and of modern culture in particular it has a point to make

I thinking here of the modern day comment that western industrial man has lost touch with nature - with himself - is no longer in harmony with his world

getting off the natural / evolutionary band wagon onto an ideological band wagon

it is clear I think  from what -I have said from our epistemological point of view that theoretical knovledge functions - comes about - emerges when, immediate awareness is not capable of dealing with the phenomena / experience presented it - holes emerge in our perceptions

now this suggests that such knowledge is inferior in a sense - or at least a substitute for the lack of immediate knowledge

ideologically - though this outlook has not become adopted by our culture -

in fact quite the opposite has held sway. In our culture - from it's earliest times, and perhaps in all cultures, it has been the case that theoretical  knowledge has been considered superior to - the object of- indeed the pursuit of knowledge

now why this is so how it comes about - would I think be a fascinating study in ideology

it is basically the issue of why so much value has been placed on non-direct understanding - on theoretical knowledge

I am not here arguing that no value be placed on indirect theoretical knowledge, but rather that, in our culture, (and not other cultures) more value is placed on such - than direct knowledge - which I think has a higher 'natural' value?

now why this has come about is really the story of our - culture - our civilization

the causes for the distrusting of our senses (are they all ideological) must be discussed if the excuses which have resulted (as a result of theoretical prejudice) are to be reversed and avoided in the future

anyway overall my point of view is that theoretical knowledge is not as significant as non-theoretical knowledge - or should I say perceptually direct knowledge - or to put it another way theoretical knowledge is a substitute for non-theoretical knowledge

what I intended to comment on here - before the diversions - was intuition and objectivity

the problem of knowledge is - how do we manage to get beyond our subjectivity to an objectivity - now this is not generally a practical problem - but it is a theoretical difficulty.

it seems to me that the only defensible theory of objectivity is the view that I have outlined above - that objectivity is the unknown - great but - how do we then explain that most people should claim that the objective world is the world they know?

my answer is this: we do intuit the objective world - or putting it carefully - we have an intuition of objectivity

so that's the final point however this needs to be elaborated.

in my view there are two kinds of intuition

(1) intuition of content

(2)intuition of form

now when we intuit objectivity we intuit it in both respects - it's content and form

an informal intuition is I suspect invariable

however the conceptual intuition is invariable.

the intellect has shown that how we fill out the formal intuition (which is intuition of the non-subjective - the unknown - in an abstract sense) is not an objective issue - though it may at first appear to be

(at the same time it is not strictly a subjective issue either - it's a modal issue

some possibilities become actualities - some actualities have a long life expectancy

but all actualities are nothing more than perceived .-possibilities and these perceived possibilities - even while they are perceived - and are entrenched (appear to be 'concrete' 'real') can be challenged by the intellect (e.g. atomic theory - will

challenge veridical perception)

now what I want to say is that intellectual epistemological analyses of the content of the objective world will lead to the unknown

and it is in this sense that we 'intuit' the unknown - what I am saying really is that these two facets to intuition of objectivity - a modal and non-modal (the unknown)

no this won't do.

I think it will have to be that we intuit objective form and content - but that our intellect can brake down the content and it is then that the mind's modal activity comes into operation

though some philosophers have questioned objectivity? I refuse to believe that anyone can actually live, or do without this intuition - otherwise there would be no conception of self no principle of individuation

(as I have presented it - it is - almost Aristotelian - with the fixed forms and varying content

overall my picture of objectivity is Kantian

objectivity, is whatever it is, the unknown)

12/2/82

what I'm doing here is working on a normative theory - my philosophy of mind / perception

in particular the issue is the problem of intuition what do we intuit?

what is the relationship between intuition and the intellect (intellectual analysis)?

and what is the relationship between intuition and perception (perceptual knowledge?)

the 'intellect' can cause us to question, doubt the deliverances of our senses - this I think is it's main function.

16/2

Meyerson 1859 -1933

believed science is explanatory and not just descriptive, and believed that the object of scientific explanation was identification - this is  an holistic monistic view of science -

the reduction of an event to cause and effect - is, he thought showing that the event is the cause and effect - we end up with something like what Spinoza envisaged - a one eternal substance

reflecting on this identification idea - it seems to me that an explanation (empirical or not) - is the placing, locating - a particular, fact etc. - in a general, universal context -

it is the establishing of principles which connect and relate disparate instances

these principles are generalities from which the particular facts can be deduced

what of the status of these principles, laws etc.?

obviously they differ from what they explain, in the sense that they are not observable - this has led some philosophers to cast doubt on the laws of science

but this may be mis-reading of the situation

what I'm thinking is that an explanation if it is explanation, is not ontologically equivalent to that which is explained - the phenomena - and hence by logical necessity - is not observable

now if this is so- arguing that an explanation - cannot be confirmed by the facts is missing the point

of course it does not - observations do not bear on explanations, though explanations do bear on observations

it seems to me that at the basis of this kind of objection is I think  the correspondence theory of truth

if we ------ ? that we are left with the problem of whether a fact fits, or how a fact fits in a general outlook

not with whether facts build up to a general framework, and it is here that induction comes into question

what I an suggesting is not a Humean kind of objection to induction

but rather that the inductive inference is not the basis of scientific explanation

from an inductive point of view there is supposed to be a logical - direct relation between fact and theory

one entails the other one induces the other

the point I am, working around is that such a relationship does not exist between the explanans and explanandum

but rather that the logical relationship is deductive

if the relationship is deductive, where does the law - the generalization come from?

Popper's answer to this was quite interesting - it is a free creation - a conjecture (which is not based on the facts - but is designed to order coordinate the deliverances of the senses

(much as I think such a characterization requires quite a bit of filling out and analysis - it is I think essentially correct - at least in certain moments of science)

now P in arguing against induction went so far as to say induction is not used in science

well this I think is factually incorrect

I suspect that scientists make inductive jumps more often than I would admit

I suppose overall explanation is the placement of a fact in some broader context

now we characterize this context, and the fact, is a matter of investigation and imagination, as is the relation between the fact and context

Inductive and deductive models will suggest themselves in certain real situations, as will other models such as Kuhn's paradigms, and Lakatos' research programs-  Feyerabend's anarchy

again my picture of scientific method , of science is modal - what I think, the philosopher primarily does is invent and articulate new possibilities - characterizations of science - and secondly he must acknowledge that a complete picture

is not possible - but that the best available picture is the total modal picture so far

P's rationalism though is very thin

while it may well be correct to say that scientific theories are free creations of the mind - surely this is not enough

we must be careful to see that 'freedom' does become a synonym for 'I don't know'

it seems to me that P estolled the 'freedom.' of the human mind in order to avoid a meta analysis of creativity

Hume's argument against induction highlights not just the problem of induction - but the problem of 'intellectuality'of assuming that the intellect can explain / justify the object of intuition

what I'm suggesting here is that our 'knowledge' of universals, is not analytical knowledge but intuitive

now what is it that we intuit?

well my answer is that I don't know - I don't know if its that we plug into an objective reality or that objectivity is really just the intuition itself - the content of the intuition

- not the object or referent of it

but the point is that however we describe it - we do intuit unity- wholeness - in short universals

perhaps there are different kinds of intuition of this phenomena - ranging from the apparently concrete intuition of e.g., redness - to the very abstract intuition of say monism - or different levels of intuition of the 'whole' - the universal

which I suppose in my terms must be some reflection, tapping into the unknown

on my view the unknown is objective

the mind/brain determines - fills in the picture in I think essentiailly two ways.

there is (1) natural ('evolutionary' - if you like) perception of reality - the given world of common experience/common sense this picture is imposed on reality i.e., the unknown)

- and by unknown - here I mean - that which is beyond outside of what we know

the second way in which the mind deals with, is equipped to deal with the unknown is (2) an intuitive/analytical way - or to put it simply a 'theoretical' way (in a non

observational sense of theoretical)

the two functions of the theoretical mode are:

(1) intuitive

(2) analytical

(I'm not suggesting that such is a complete picture of the mind or it's functions - but I would think that these two modes are basic)

the opposites or 'opposition' which the early Greek philosophers were so clearly aware of and so clearly enthralled by - and the conflict which characterizes their relationship has it's origin I think in the relation and nature of the intuitive and analytical

functions of the theoretical mode

perhaps the most central issue of my philosophy at the moment is still the meta/normative issue

is the above meta or normative philosophy?

discussion of the unknown suggests that it is meta

the outline of the mind that is being attempted suggests a normative theory

the unknown is clearly a meta category - modalism though is not so clear

how can the idea of possibility be given a non-normative characterization

unless it can be the meta/normative distinction seems to collapse

you see even if we talk about possible interpretations - to make any sense of this we need to involve normative theories

well perhaps possible - interpretations will do -

I suppose part of the problem is the status of the unknown

if it is a meta category - but can it also be a normative category?

and another issue is, to what extent does the meta schema imply- have hidden within it - normative presuppositions?

what followed before this discussion must I think be counted as normative

as a possible interpretation of the unknown

considering the view that we in fact perceive universals, and I suppose I would have to argue - idealistically - but that this intuitive knowledge is not confirmed by the intellect - the intellect - perhaps even it's function is to break down the whole of intuitive knowledge - to parts which do not add up to the whole

- or perhaps it is not so much that they do not add up - but rather that analytical perception is logically distinct from intuitive

clearly the relationship between these two modes of understanding is dialectical - not static but fluid

Aristotle's idea of the fusion of universal and particular was I think quite ingenious

a 'common sense reflection' on this problem - seems to make Aristotle's idea most acceptable.

Berkeley's 'esse est percipi est' - was not so much a statement of  'is' - as a formulation of the problem of epistemology and ontology

in his famous statement he was saying ontology is not independent of epistemology- as one would think

how can we say - a thing exists independently of the knowing process

his answer was we can't

what we 'know' - whatever this means is what is

and visa versa, what is - is what is known.

22/2

the objects of the knowing process are not outside of it - as it would appear

therefore knowledge is what exists

now what such analysis needs to show is how knowledge or knowing is a self contained 'process' 'entity' thing'

the way we speak suggests knowledge is knowledge of .....- something independent of knowledge

now the outlook I am suggesting seems logically simpler - but it is conceptually very difficult

the only way I can understand this is to say that he act of knowing is the act of coming into existence

and at this point phenomenalism and idealism - impossible

if we took the alternative and common sense idea of 'knowledge' of something

the something - we assume does exist outside the knowing process the paradox is that we are saying something exists (that we know in some sense) - that something exists without knowing it

or that something could exist (or that we could know it) - counterfactuals

now this is a prime facie absurdity -

how can we know that  X (something that we don't know of at the

moment) can possibly exist

(and if we make X anything - then all we are saying is that something - I don't know about - exists - which is perfectly sensible)

that something can exist without anyone knowing it- that's clear enough until we formulate carefully -

I know something exists which I don't know about at the moment

now clearly the two 'knows' are different

 the interesting question I think concerns the first 'know'

now of course we could say that knowing in the first sense is an illusion -

but this only means that what occurs does not satisfy our definition of knowledge which to my way of thinking is no help or of real interest - (it's hard to see that this is not some kind of 'neutral' argument)

the problem as I see it is how do we explain - the phenomenon of the first know

what is the most plausible account?

now clearly, the traditional empiricist of the reductionist Humean model will have great difficulty

his theory of knowledge only admits particular sense impressions - he will have to invoke some kind of inference from SI (1) at T(1), to S(2) of T(2) if he is going to argue that something exists beyond the moment of experience

how does this occur?

well I suppose an empiricist is going to have to argue that on the basis of sense impressions, inferences are made

memory would play a key part in this

now this is a plausible explanation but it will have to involve inference concerning space, time, contiguity, regularity -

(in either an idealist, realist or representationalist sense)

now the problem with all this is that there is no connection between these concepts and the S(1)analysis

such concepts, it is true, are necessary in order to make sense of the S(1) analysis

- but the problem is that the S(1) analysis cannot make sense of them

a rationalist outlook of one kind or another is I suspect unavoidable

all this is interesting but I'm not sure that it really bears on the problem of whether ontology makes any sense, independently of epistemology

one answer would be to go idealist and view existence as a category of the mind - but the obvious problem here is - we are then talking about a category (of existence) which makes no sense unless it is assumed that something existed (i.e. the mind) before this category

this argument applies to Descartes' cogito

I think

_

am I

- I must exist in order to think

but in order to know that I exist I must think

so in a sense my existence depends on my thinking

but I cannot think unless I exist

?

25/2/82

Satre's idea of being and nothingness is in a sense an attempt to get to this issue

this is an interesting idea especially the way S develops the idea of consciousness - as nothing - as empty - but it is really just another way of stating the problem - how does consciousness (nothing) emerge from being - how does non-being emerge from being?

perhaps the advantage of this view in connection with the issue I'm discussing is that we don't on S's view have to talk about consciousness existing - because by definition it doesn't - it can't it is the absence of being

6/3/82

the problem of the external world arises like this: our immediate experience is of the external world - however when for various reasons we come to reflect on this immediate experience -we find that we cannot go beyond this immediate experience

to that which we believe that it corresponds to/ that is reflection/

reason will not take us beyond.

now this whole problem arises because it is assumed that what we 'know' immediately what is

it relies on a theory of sense perception or intuition - as a means of knowing reality

now what I want to propose is that knowing is not as simple as the rationalist or empiricist would have us believe

what I want to suggest is that 'knowing' is being involved in the dialectics of philosophical investigation - that the philosophical - critical - dialectical activity is real knowledge - or knowing

so that in my view simple sense perception or intuition - is not knowing - or not the kind of knowing which can deal with the issues which philosophers have found stem from these accounts

the next thing I want to say is that I believe the philosophical process - which takes into account all theories of knowledge - inevitably leads to skepticism if it is conducted honestly

and if this is so then I believe we can say that what we 'know' in the true sense of know - about such an issue as the existence of the external world - is that we don't know

and that we should begin with this fact - not end with it

given that what we know is the unknown, we are then faced with explaining- what is taken for knowledge of the external world

I think there are two kinds of knowledge

(1) immediate/given

(2) theoretical

(1) is what we are aware of immediately without reflection - it is the world of common sense

and it is given in a natural sense - nature provides us with this 'level' of perception and for simple purposes this level is sufficient

however it seems to me that man's needs - his deepest needs are not served or satisfied by this level of perception/ existence

now we can say that failure to be satisfied with basic perception is indicative / characteristic of the human species

but what does it tell us - this search for, need for, theoretical knowledge - knowledge - what does it tell us about man and his place in nature?

clearly it tells us man is unhappy / unsatisfied about his place in nature - and that nature has determined him to be so

now it is tempting to assume that there is a purpose behind this - a reason for it

such an assumption has led to the theory of evolution

however any speculation about this 'fact' (and I say 'fact' because it is a theoretical fact itself - really it must be seen finally as pure speculation

what the above has demonstrated is that there is a level of theoretical knowledge - that is theoretical knowledge - the purpose of which is to explain, account for - give reason

for theoretical knowledge

in this sense speculation breads speculation

and the truth of the speculation and successive speculations can only be judged by a cohesive test

but what makes it particularly interesting is that the criterion for such concepts as truth is speculative too

the analysis of any theoretical model is never finished except by a decision to finish

it is this fact which leads some people to skepticism and even despair

but this perhaps a necessary stage in the process of philosophical

enlightenment

skepticism is built into the nature of theoretical knowledge - theoretical knowledge is theoretical because it has no foundation - it arises, has come to be because we experience a need for roots to our immediate knowledge - or perhaps more technically -

perception

I think it is a fact about human beings - the most fundamental fact - that we begin -have a natural - built in desire for, belief in - there being foundations to the immediate experience of everyday life

- but I think it is a fact that once we begin the search for such - it becomes clear that it does not exist

accepting this is tantamount to, necessary in order to- explore the unknown - it's

possibilities - what is possible

once it is realized that this is what theoretical speculation amounts to -

once this fact is looked at positively - knowledge/learning - becomes

a liberating heuristic experience

realizing this, is, I believe achieving a high level of philosophical consciousness

such is the ultimate object of learning - the highest form of knowledge

from whatever point of view you want to begin with (rationalism/ empiricism/ other) it is clear that man's searches for, needs a reality, meaning- etc., beyond his experiences/ intuitive whatever

it is this fact which any philosophy must account for primarily

it is pointless saying what is, just simply, is what is - such is true in a sense - it is science's basis - the starting point of science - but it is only a starting point - when we go beyond this - which I believe we must - it is not a choice or a luxury - rather it is an existential necessity - we are philosophy - philosophy - is essentially about what is beyond - now my view is that what is beyond is the unknown

and my point of view it is this (the unknown) which is reality in it's deepest sense - it is the 'foundation' of what is - science common sense - it is true knowledge,

what I have tried to do - what any philosopher must do is explicate the relation between the known and the unknown

philosophy provides possible solutions to the unknown and this is what explicating the unknown is

a possible account of what the unknown is - or an account of the relationship between the unknown and the known

it is the working out of possible 'fillings'- I guess my own answer as to why the continual search for a reality beyond what we know - is that we keep searching because- whether we are conscious of it not - reality is the unknown - and this is

unsatisfactory unless of course it is realized. that this is all there is

and to accept this - is to achieve a high level of philosophical consciousness - the highest

10/3/82

I accept the metaphysical view that the object of morality is (should be?) the

actualization of the potential of human beings

however I do not see this as being a simple or static matter in fact I consider it to be indeterminate in a final sense

my view is that what is seen to be potential / actual - and what is seen to be the means of translating one to another is not absolute, but is rather relative - context dependent

that is to say we cannot determine this matter a priori, even though we may adopt a priori standards and means and goals - that is we may interpret the normative issue a priori

now this view is quite simply my view - it is not a metaphysical comment - not a formal comment

formally all we can do is describe what has been said on the issue - what is done - formally the issue is descriptive

and even the formal description is going to be, or have normative content - this is unavoidable - but because it is a statement about the statement about.........' - it is less normative and more formal than your straight prescriptive subjective view

so what we are dealing with is degrees of subjectivity, and degrees of formality

the highest, degree of formality is modalism - the description of possibilities - it is clear that this description will have the element of subjectivity - in the sense that how it is described will be a subjective issue

the objective ideal is I think intuited - and in that it is ideal we cannot realistically hope for its realization

it's function is methodological pragmatic in its broadest sense - without this intuition we would not be able to act - it is a necessary condition for all human action

it is in my view, the defining characteristic of our species

it is the capacity to intuit the objective ideal which distinguishes man from the animals

a human incapable of exercising, and I don't just mean unable to - this capacity - would not in my view be human

as to the epistemological status of this ideal - my own view is materialistic - but from a meta point of view the issue is really modal - it is one which like the ideal itself is

indeterminate - from an objective point of view

                                                        *

metaphysicians are descriptivists

-philosophers qua philosophers are presciptivist

-that is your philosopher takes a stand-

your metaphysician describes - articulates the stands that are made - that are made available

descriptivism by it s nature is more objective than descriptivism

hence in so far as we can talk about objectivity we are talking about descriptivism

my view about the objective ideal is a meta- normative statement

what I'm suggesting is this:-

(a)

                                      (meta 

(meta                          prescriptivism

descriptivism)               normative)

(b)

(meta

(meta

prescriptivism

normative)

descriptivism)

what we try to do in philosophy is reason deductively e.g. -

relate key concepts to each other, show hew they emerge, and in what sense they are independent

this approach I think fails

what I'm trying to get at is that our reasoning is two dimensional

but in fact the situation is 3d and not essentially linear but rather circular

now it is only the dialecticians which have realized this

some kind of dialectical logic is the only way to account for the logic of experience / reality

the 3d-ialectic

(God knows what all this was about)

the unknown?

the simplest answer is phenomenalistic -

the unknown is simply that which is not known

it is what is beyond our knowledge

on this view as knowledge grows the unknown diminishes

now this kind of unknown is not really what I'm on about

what I'm on about is the unknowable - and our relation to it

the concept of the unknowable assumes that we can determine the limits of knowledge

and it is here again that the phenomenalists have an answer

but why if we assume the truth of phenomenalism is there any need to postulate the unknown?

the answer is simple.

human behaviour / history - even phenomenalism - cannot be explained unless the beyond is given - it is the beyond -what it is - what is behind it which has been - is - the major philosophical issue of all time

to say the beyond is unnecessary is to commit suicide - with Ockam's

razor

now my answer is the unknown

need to distinguish between two kinds of unknown

(1) the phenomenal unknown

- which is in principle knowable

(2) the non-phenomenal unknown - an unknown with a capital U

now how do theotrectical terms - entities fit  into this picture

theories are explorations into the unknown - but which unknown?

- the second

theories (non-observational hypotheses) are just the attempt to make the unknown

work for us - intelligible and most importantly - toenable us to work with extend the range of what we know

the first kind of unknown - is the unknown fact - which is just an empirical problem i.e. the effect of X on Y

however it is clear that theories, are needed to deal with this kind of problem and it is at this point the unknown realm is explored

by the way when I refer to the phenomenal world I am not intending to suggest that I am a phenomenalist - i.e. Berkeley

phenomenal here is just the name I give to what is directly known how one explains this philosophically is another matter

11/3/82

I think the concept of intuition best describes or comes close to accounting for the immediacy of knowing common 'given' 'experience' - phenomenon - best accounts for what is known - but really it's just a verbal issue - other words could just as well do the job

the fact of the matter is that we can't really say anything about the nature of 'immediate experience' which is not philosophically loaded

we do not posses a value free language - and it is my view that if such existed it would be incomprehensible

the best we can do is adduce reasons for why we adopt one outlook in preference to another

why we choose one set of possibilities over another

the fact that all philosophical statements are philosophically loaded is I think a strong argument against the idea of 'value free objectivity'

and this fact has the consequence of showing us that what we take

to be objectivity - is not immediate experience - is incurably subjective

still, true as - this may be it doesn't really account for our concept of objectivity and I suppose the best we can say is thatobjectivity means perceiving the empty space which we fill up with our subjectivity

again this cannot be stated in a value free way - but perhaps it is perceived in such away

so we are looking at the idea that objectivity cannot be stated though it can be perceived

I think we must accept there are two kinds of knowing

(1) immediate

(2) reflective

immediate knowledge is given - and there are various levels of reflective knowledge which come into play in the attempt to articulate what is given

in this sense (1) might not be called 'knowledge' but rather the object of knowledge

an object which is perceived non-reflectively - but 'known' reflectively -

it is thus proper to call it the unknown (in a strict sense)

it becomes known via reflection

and I don't necessarily mean here abstract reflection

I believe the basic contents of immediate perception - primary and secondary qualities are not immediately perceived

but are in a sense immediately known immediately reflected upon

hence primary and secondary qualities cannot be said to be theobject of knowledge - they are what is known - what we know upon reflection on the object of knowledge

I am not here suggesting that people believe they perceive the unknown - rather that if they reflected carefully on perception they would see that primary /secondary qualities cannot be the object of knowledge and they would realize if they followed the matter through that abstract reflection can never dispel the unknown - in fact it always leads us back to it

Vol. 3. 1982. 12/3/82

philosophical analysis shows us that what we take to be given / certain is on reflection indeterminate even unknowable - by this I mean once we get into the meta realm- _ ______such issues as the objective world, mind , etc. - it becomes clear that (1) there

are an amazing amount of theories that have been put forward to account for the so called obvious - i.e. .ourselves a the external world and our relation to it

the fact that on reflection the obvious is anything but obvious can mean one of two things (a) reflection is a waste of time (b) reflection shows us that our perception of the obvious is not indicative of the true state of affairs. (a) is ruled out on my view just because reflection is .an essential component of the perceptual process

I think it can be shown that all perception is to some extent reflective - that in an ultimate sense nothing is given non-reflectively (although I think one has to be careful to distinguish different senses of - different kinds of reflection - i.e. immediate- non-analytical reflection / non-immediate theoretical reflection etc.)

what this suggests is that there are levels of reflection -and that the deeper one reflects the less obvious a certain common experience - immediate experience

I think that philosophical analysis, the philosophical process  -is the real cleansing process that Descartes and other philosophers saw as a necessary preliminary to constructive philosophical analysis - what I mean is that once it becomes clear that the obvious can be legitimately interpreted / understood in an infinite number of ways (once we take an overview of the scene we are compelled to face the fact that the obvious - immediate experience etc. is 'objectively speaking' unknown - it is neither obvious or certain what we experience

what can be known and what does knowing consist in?

well what I have suggested is that even the obvious - is not known in any obvious or given sense - if that is so we are redefining knowledge in order to account for what we know - we do have knowledge but knowledge of what is the question?

in this sense the object of knowledge - ontology - what is - is a permanent mystery - it is the unknown - even though immediate awareness - 'non-reflective' - or more accurately immediate concrete reflection suggests the obvious

even as soon as we try to account for this strange state of affairs - immediate awareness and the 'knowledge' which leads us to reject it - we are immersed in a philosophical issue which I believe always points to the unknown

so I think there are two phases in philosophical analysis

'obvious' - unknown - 'obvious'

reflection on the obvious leads us to the unknown - and from the unknown we then attempt to reconstruct the obvious - which leads us back to the unknown

15/3 /82

I wish to distinguish between perception and knowledge

'perception' and this is an open concept - is the ground of knowledge

knowledge is reflection (of one kind or another) on the ground of experience

what the ground of perception is, is a matter for reflection

so given this, the content of perception, as it-is, is unknown

but this does not mean that it is nothing - that we don't perceive anything

what it means is that we don't know (in an immediate sense) what we perceive -

we only come to this 'knowledge' on reflection

perception of a sense data i.e. - green, red etc. is for all and purposes 'given' - in a psychological sense - but this is not to say that it is given in a logical sense

the perception of 'sense data' is reflective - in an immediate sense

put quite simply we don't know what we perceive until we are reflectively 'aware' of it

now another point is that we cannot say that what we perceive is or is not the material world in a logical sense

this is a matter of deep reflection - analysis - 'philosophical' analysis

this however is not to deny psychological objectivity - the feeling of objectivity

but the feeling of objectivity must be distinguished from knowledge of it

what this means is/a sharp distinction between feeling / and knowledge

what we feel about ourselves and the world is not what we know

however on my view we cannot know our feelings - except via reflection therefore 'feelings' = knowledge' ? so how can we talk about feeling as distinct from knowledge?

or at least we cannot know our feelings or their content independently

perhaps the situation is something like this

on reflection we distinguish between the intellect and the emotions

and we characterize the emotions / feelings as non-reflective

on my view so far 'perception' is empty - reflection provides perception with content

this suggests that reflection because it is reflection inemptiness - must till that emptiness if it is to be reflection

it suggests that reflection is ontologically creative

that in the reflective process we create our world

this suggests a rather radical situation with reference to the epistemology /ontology issue - the autonomy of ontology -

that there is no difference between the knowing process and what is known esse est precipi / percipi est esse

the claim that ontology is a separate process is bogus

this position still needs to be explicated - clarified

the point is that in my philosophy - the problem of what is  is the problem of what do we know

and what we know is what exists

Berkeley's downfall was that he tried to use his normative theory as his - meta theory

that is he based his metaphysics on a narrow epistemology (an empirical epistemology)

what he didn't realize is that the empiricist account is just oneoption - one possible account - he wanted to say it was the only possible account

but I believe he was correct in identifying epistemology with ontology

knowledge is what is known

what is known is what exists

(as far as we know)

but all knowledge, our modal knowledge presupposes itself - presupposes theoretical possibilities - there is no way of getting out  of this circularity - theoretical circularity is knowledge - the structure of K

it is this fact that traditional epistemologists have attempted to overthrow

that dialecticians have seen and tried to explain

that skeptics have accepted and lamented

the next step in my account is to argue that modal awareness leads automatically back to the unknown

what I'm suggesting is that modal analysis focuses us sharply on the unknown, from which, in relation to which, modalism develops

the unknown is not eradicated by our theories - it is filled in

it is in a sense the form, shape, the spaces in which the theories are placed

the uncertainty is a consequence of the failure of a theory to fit satisfactorily the unknown

it is the tension between the unknown and the theoretical which. leads to the development of new modals - models

and the existence of a multiplicity of theories itself indicates the inadequacy of any one theory

(theories that is which are logically equivalent)

16/3/1982

traditional epistemology has attempted to ground knowledge on ontology

they have failed to see that ontology is what is known

and that knowledge hence is groundless

all knowledge presupposes knowledge

my account does not exclude the possibility of religious knowledge

the existence of so called religious knowledge merely restates the issue

behind religious knowledge is the unknown

what has been called immediate perception, or intuitive understanding is on my view the form of the unknown

even to say this is to say too much - what we perceive immediately is unknown in itself

it is only known by reflection

that is we can talk about it reflectively

but we must distinguish this reflection from more indirect and analytical reflection

to understand this we must understand the process of thought or the process of philosophical revelation

we don not perceive what is given as the unknown - we see what we see

is only on reflection that this becomes what it becomes - an unknown form to the filled - one that is (reflectively) filled with direct experience

but reflection is K

but it might be asked what is the object of reflection?

what is it that is reflected on?

my answer is that the object of reflection is not epistemologically neutral

it is reflection - that is knowledge

(what else can it be?)

it can't be what is unknown (as this by definition is unknowable)

so there are various grades or levels of knowledge

there is basic/immediate knowledge

indirect knowledge of various kinds

- just to give some labels

one might ask, well given all this why the unknown?

well the simple answer is that we are all aware of the limitations of knowledge

to try to go beyond this is conceptually vacuous

if it is the unknown

it is this conceptual vacuosness which we are aware of

and which we contrast with conceptual modalism

a question is then how do we know the unknown?

on the face of it knowing the unknown is contradictory

knowledge as I have defined it is reflective

and reflective of lower level / higher level knowledge

so on this view it must be knowledge

it must be knowledge of the conceptual void

but this is just what is unknown

so we have a problem

the only thing I can think of right off is to distinguish between modal knowledge of knowledge which is reflective, AND knowledge of the unknown

and this is less than satisfactory

but if knowledge of knowledge (modalism) is reflective - then knowledge of not-knowledge - the unknown - must be non-reflective (at least logically)

it would be a neat solution but I can't make head nor tail of it

perhaps my days as a skeptic are over

my earlier solution to this one was to draw a distinction between intuitive and reflective knowledge

and to attempt to explain knowledge of the unknown intuitively?

but that doesn't work or does it?

I think it does

we intuit (the real world / experience etc.) - this is how we fill it in

but in fact what is - is unknown

that's O.K.

but the idea of saying that we intuit the unknown isn't intuitively graceful

so in summary we are talking about two kinds of knowledge

(1)        reflective - modalism

(2)        non-reflective - the unknown

            (intuitive)

I began by distinguishing between perception and knowledge

but it now seems that the distinction was a bit awkward

the point is clear though -

but it's better stated as a distinction between kinds of knowledge

perception - non-reflective - the unknown reflective - reflective modalism

perhaps I want to say that veridical perception is both reflective and non-reflective?

reflection reveals non-reflection

reflection - not-reflection

and visa versa

not-reflection - reflection

are they two processes?

or facets of the one?

22/3/82

there is a sense in which my meta can be interpreted primarily as an ontology - that is a theory about what really exists -

which is (1) the unknown (2) modalism (possible interpretations of the unknown)

now I suppose this statement is a little bold, at least in regard to (2). If (2) is true - then (2) itself implies an ontology -

i.e. . persons with the capacities for knowing (1) and for that matter (2)

but there is a sense in which this is not strictly true

in that what is implied by (2) is not really implied - that there are persons etc. is strictly speaking a normative issue

(1) and (2) in my view really do stand on their own as primary / objective categories of 'what is'

so perhaps it's important to distinguish between meta and normative ontology, in the same way as we do in epistemology

it would be interesting to work out at what time and for what reasons, epistemology and ontology were seen to be distinct problems

one cannot do epistemology without implying an ontology and visa versa

22/3/82

just finished reading Copleston on Pierce. Was surprised  to learn (1) how Pierce pre-empted Popper on every major point of his philosophy and (2) how much of what Pierce had to say I agree with

'We are invited to think of the universe as being originally in a state of pure indetermination a state in which there was no distinct things, no habits, no laws, a state in which absolute chance prevailed. From one point of view this absolute chance

was nullity, the negation of all determination, while from another point of view, considered, that is to say, as real possibility of all determination, it was being'.

normatively I have and still do toy with philosophical evolution

but I think the second part of the statement is interesting in that it is fairly similar to - well some similarity with - my 'unknown and modalism'

I suppose where I differ from Pierce crucially is with regard to ultimate or metaphysical knowledge

I think his meta i.e. his evolutionism is a possibility - is a possibility true - but therefore it is a normative statement not meta

the ultimate essence etc. - is unknowable in itself - i.e. it isnot directly experienced - whatever that means

but it is known in a theoretical sense a speculative sense

now some might ask what is the source of knowledge - contained in these 'speculative ideas'?

my answer is (1) the question of the source of knowledgeis a possible way of analyzing epistemology - and (2) in answer to this question we must (a) look at all possible answers to the question (data provided by meta/pure research) (b) decide

which if any is to serve as the answer

(b) cannot be answered objectively though I do argue on a normative level for a broad pragmatism - or 'action philosophy'

I argue that 'immediate perception' is a reality - it is 'intuitive,' 'understanding' or 'knowledge'

(2) however what is immediately perceived is a theoretical matter - a creative matter - a matter of reflection

hence what is immediately perceived is (on reflection) strictly speaking unknown in itself

(3) there are two kinds of reflection on immediate experience

(a) 'natural' reflection - 'this table is red'

(b) analytical - 'what this table is red' means is.....

(4) analytical reflection is reflection on natural reflection

(5) analytical reflection reveals that natural reflection is epistemologically/ ontologically modal

that is that natural reflection is - strictly speaking an illusion

(6) what is real is the possible interpretations of the natural'reflection

(which is logically unknown in itself)

our natural reflections are what we operate with on a day to day level

24/03/82

our natural perception is given to us by consciousness but it is on reflection - deep reflection - empty - there is thus no content but that given to it by reflection

now this is only to suggest that any knowledge is reflective

natural perception is 'hard' reflective knowledge

perhaps a distinction between primary and secondary reflection.

primary = natural i.e. veridical perception

secondary = analytical 'perception' - theoretical perception

the primary reflection is not creative - it is 'immediately' given

in an evolutionary sense it has stabilized - it has persisted - but it is not total - that is it is not entirely satisfactory for survival purposes - hence the necessity of the secondary

mode

there is also a sense in which the secondary mode is striving for the 'non-creativeness' - the stability - the fixed-ness, the persistence of the primary mode

this is what problem solving really is  - what the search for knowledge in a traditional sense means - the quest for certainty is I think essentially anti-creative, and yet it is understandable / necessary - and unavoidable but it is and this is most important

- unattainable

why?

the simple answer is that it doesn't exist even if the primary or reflex-reflection suggests that it does

philosophical analysis shows us that knowledge is reflective and hence not primary - so if 'knowledge of certainty' could be attained it would be non-reflective (because it is knowledge) - and not certainty

(I have here introduced the idea of 'philosophical evolution' and it must be noted that this has not been worked out in any detail at all - but it is an interesting question)

25/3/82

NB: saying that knowledge is not certainty really means that we cannot knowcertainty, which raises the question what is certainty?

now we know this much - that certainty is not reflective but can we then say it is non- reflective?

there is a problem here

I don't think we can make much sense of certainty - I don't see how; we can even talk about it if it is not knowledge

following on from  the primary /secondary reflection distinction, can we say that certainty is primary reflection?

but I have characterized primary reflection as being non-creative as in a sense 'given' - and certainty doesn't fit this characterization

or does it?

there is a sense in which we are certain of what we see - in a primary sense

that it is only secondary reflection which leads to doubt which destroys certainty

well! the answer is this - certainty is a way of characterizing primary reflection

but there is a sense in which secondary reflection is also positive - or at least attempts to be so -

there is a sense and I haven't succeeded in characterizing it - this whole process - adequately in which ? I think reflection attempts to establish the given - on a secondary level

                       

that is once primary reflection is destroyed by secondary reflection - attempts then are made to establish primary reflection - on a  secondary reflective level - or to put it clearer - foundations are given, or so it is thought  - to secondary reflection  - via

secondary reflection

this is all conventional epistemology - and I think- maybe it doesn't really fit into my outlook - in that for me primary reflection is (in itself) unknown

on reflection it is known in a very tentative way

secondary reflection attempts to establish 'with certainty' that it is underpinning  of

primary reflection

and I think this attempt leads directly to the - unknown

lots of questions remain:

(1) why is , exactly why is secondary reflection necessary why doesn't  primary reflection do ?

(2) relationship between the secondary reflection  and primary reflection processes and 'the unknown? how does secondary reflection lead to the unknown, what does this mean?

(3) the nature of unknown. I have been talking about the unknown in itself what does this mean?

ANSWER ?

is it what is left after reflective knowledge is removed?

if so it is the unknowable

is that the same as the unknown? NO

the unknown, as in, minus reflective knowledge is the unknown

this is O.K.

perhaps this might be quite important it is necessary to distinguish between positive

and negative knowledge

the Unknown (capital U) is negative (i.e. it is what is not knowable)

reflective knowledge is Positive(it is man's response- consciousness -'pictures' of reality- the unknown)

the unknown is the unknowable?

there is a positive unknown - gaps in reflective interpretations

but beyond the reflective knowledge is what cannot be known

my overall feeling is that all deep reflection leads us to theunknown

I have used the distinction primary /secondary reflection

and at the moment I'm toying with a tertiary of reflection

Primary - natural reflection

Secondary - theoretical

Tertiary - meta theoretical

now the tertiary level or process is the meta theoretical dimension

it is the reflection on the secondary level - the attempt to provide foundations for the foundations

now this kind of reflection, when done honestly inevitably leads to skepticism

now the skepticism that is discovered at the tertiary level is transmitted back through the secondary and primary

so the way it's shaping up is that we have two arguments for skepticism for the unknown

(1) the minus reflection argument

(2) the tertiary reflection process- argument

things are shaping up

in asking the question 'what is immediately perceived'  I would have to give two answers -

(1)        content of primary reflection

(2)        the unknown, because the content of immediate reflection is

            'unknown'

now the fact that this is not immediately perceived in an actual sense is not a problem

to say 'I see a red table' is not the issue - this statement tells us nothing in an epistemological sense - both traditional rationalists and empiricists would be open on this point

what is immediately perceived from a rationalist point of view - a clear and distinct idea, from an empiricist point of view, it is a sense datum - now on both theses entities are abstractions from the perceptual process - if this point is not accepted by traditionalists then it should be

my answer to that question, is that on reflection it is clear that what is perceived is the unknown (it is just that at the time of perception this is not immediately known)

but from my point of view, strictly speaking we do not know what we perceive immediately

vol. 4. '82

26/3/82

negative knowledge?

- knowledge of the fact that there is 'something' that is not knowable

what this suggests is that we can know the limits of our knowledge

but is it still a question of knowledge ?

I have suggested that all knowledge - real 'knowledge' - that is - is knowledge of knowledge

now if this is so - can we have knowledge of the impossibility of knowledge the absence of knowledge - knowledge of the unknown?

it could be argued that we have knowledge of the knowledge that we don't know?

I have distinguished between positive and negative knowledge in order to overcome the problem of knowing that we don't know

but does this distinction make sense on it's own?

but in knowing the unknown are we knowing something?

yes in a sense

we have knowledge of the absence of knowledge

but it is still knowledge of ............

the absence of knowledge

I suppose one of the issues this question brings up is what is knowledge - in a substantial sense - as distinct from say - knowing

now in discussing the ontology / epistemology issue

I decided that knowledge is always knowledge of .........something

that we cannot decide ontological questions independently of epistemology

30/3/82

a distinction between intuition and reflection may just solve the realist / idealist dispute

on my view knowledge is to be identified with reflection

non-reflective 'experience' / 'given' experience is, because it is intuited and not reflected  - is not knowledge

now what this means is that I can say that what I intuit is real -but it is only via reflection that it is known

so my analysis is that the real world is unknown in itself - and only known via

reflection

actually my theory doesn't reconcile realism with idealism - it doesn't t even give realism a look in

31/3/82

have often thought with regard to personality that an  individual's character is fixed in a fluid sense

what I'm getting at is that change in an individual is really only the individual, emphasizing /exploring different possibilities which are always in the character, but not always known or actualized

self development is for me just this - the discovery and exploration of personal potential

a fully realized individual is a fully explored individual

by the way this theory does not presuppose or imply an ethics

or does it?

I think it is amoral and this is of course a problem

I guess one way of coping with the problem of exploring destructive or negative capacities would be to say that such are not real potentials - they are anti-potential but I don't really like this solution

and in any case I'm not anti-immorality - I suspect in fact firmly believe that immoral behaviour is necessary for the development - the full development of the individual

of course - where do you draw the line?

and the real issue is development - full self realization - the ultimate 'good' - or even a good

I think it is a good - but not 'the good' - I think it should be balanced off against other goods

but if so how is this done?

perhaps we can say something like this - all ethical theories have something to offer- they each emphasize different points in the moral life - but they are all inadequate

as total accounts of the moral

perhaps the best is to attempt to - as far as possible to combine the best of them all - in some sort of balanced life - a life that is not dominated too much by just one ethic

in fact I think the issue is not quite that simple

I think in fact people operate with a whole range of ethical theories - and to some extent circumstances dictate which ethic is to be followed, employed, rejected, replaced etc.

I think that all philosophers have done - is articulate particular ethical moments - insights etc.

and then attempted to generalize/ objectify

fortunately to not much avail

1/4/82

last month I defined knowledge as reflective analysis - and distinguished this from intuitive understanding

defining intuitive understanding as empty

the first stage of reflection I identified as what goes for veridical perception - our immediate perception of the world

the second stage as reflective on this i.e.. science philosophy

and the third stage as meta philosophy

I now think this needs to be looked at again

especially the first stage - primary reflection

identifying immediate perception as primary reflection doesn't work

immediate perception is immediate when it is happening -it is not reflective in the immediate sense

we can reflect on it - but this what I have called secondary reflection

now I think one thing we can do is draw the distinction between intuition and understanding and reflective knowledge quite sharply

and the first stage of reflection - would then be reflective or immediate experience

it is at this stage that knowledge emerges - e.g. - science

I think too that an overhaul of the second and third levels is necessary also

the second stage would be reflection on reflection - reflection on the knowledge gained by reflecting on immediate experience - this is of course philosophy proper

it is here that modal analysis occurs

but then there is also reflection on this - the tertiary level of reflection - meta-philosophy

now I think that intuitive apprehension (rather than understanding) must be seen for what it is

when I perceive a yellow wall - immediately I perceive the yellow and the wall - and anything that's on it

this is what exists and it exists outside of me

such is realism

now reflection on realism - philosophical reflection - secondary reflection will undermine the basis - strength of intuitive apprehension

it is here that possibilities emerge - that philosophical possibilities come to life

meta philosophy the third level of reflection undermines the second - leads us to skepticism

now in my vie if, the tertiary skeptical level of perception (and I think we can talk about intuitive, primary, secondaryand tertiary perception)

is the highest level of perception

the highest level of philosophical consciousness

and one reason for this is that the tertiary level encompasses all the lower level - they are all contained in it

so I want to say in an ultimate sense we perceive or can perceive the unknown - and know that all is unknown

I think too that distinguishing knowledge from understanding in the way I have is not a good argument

I tend now to think it is best to describe intuitive apprehension as knowledge

so what I distinguish is between intuitive- and reflective knowledge

and I suspect that the existence of reflective knowledge is in fact best explained or could be best explained in an evolutionary way

that is to say that reflective perception emerged from, in response to the inadequacies of immediate knowledge

an evolutionary thesis, however is not an important thesis - it doesn't make any real difference to the epistemological issue

reflection on immediate experience undermines this natural experience

what reflection does however - I now think is not destroy realism the objective world

but rather shows us we can interpret the objective world in anumber of ways

that my perception of yellow is not the only experience possible when I perceive X - (i.e. through a microscope 'it' would be different)

the 'IT' is therefore real (in a realist sense) but also unknow (in a final sense)

previously I slipped into the mistake of thinking that  the possibility of a number interpretations of 'IT' entails idealism - and it is a close shave

but I now think that the possibility of different interpretations is not enough (nor should it be), to shake - make us doubt the reality of our most fundamental convictions

thus I have two arguments for the unknown - for 'positive' skepticism. One at the beginning, the level of primary reflection and the other at the end, at the tertiary reflective level

the idealist mistake is to assume that all knowledge is reflective this is a seductive argument - but one which leads to idealism

realism is dependent on the existence of non-reflective knowledge without this base realism bites the dust

again it needs to be said that philosophy is fundamentally an exploratory activity

idealism and more extreme forms of skepticism have emerged due to the belief that the problem of philosophy is justification. The problem is not 'to justify our beliefs, but rather to explain them in a coherent way

it is part of the function of philosophy to explain skepticism

I maintain that unless immediate apprehension is understood and accepted negative skepticism results

I argue for positive skepticism - a skepticism which I believe is explanatory productive and not destructive of our common sense

what I have argued so far is:-

(a) an outline of the relationship between the known and the unknown

and

(b) an account of the  kinds of knowledge that exist

what really hasn't been addressed head on is the question of what knowledge is - it's ontological status

is reflection, which knowledge is, just a process?

if so how do we characterize this process ontologically

i.e.. is it an ideal or sensual process?

and how important is this kind of question?

also in describing this process it needs to be asked are we dealing with a relation?

the idea of reflection lends itself to this

if knowledge is a relation - a relation of reflection what are the relata - and is this an appropriate question to ask about reflection?

there is still a sense in which the question what is knowledge is unavoidable

this question is I suspect a separates question from the question of the relationship which is (if it is) reflection?

the point is that I have been preoccupied with the question,what is knowing? and now am interested in the question, what is knowledge?

it is just not clear to me how these two questions can be separated - and yet it seems to me we are here dealing, with two distinct if related issues

the question, what is knowledge is the question what sort of thing is knowledge?

2/4/82

the interesting thing is that we can t establish the nature of knowledge independent of an epistemological context

what this means is that we know (if we know) about knowledge via knowledge

we have that is knowledge of 'things', 'the world' and about this knowledge

an argument can I think be made to the effect that we cannot answer the question what is knowledge because all knowledge is dependent on knowledge

but how true is this?

traditional epistemologists have got around this problem by arguing that sense data or intuitions are the objects of knowledge - that is to say these things are not knowledge - but rather what knowledge is based on - the objects of knowledge

a very strange theory - but necessary nevertheless

now I have argued that ultimately the object of knowledge is the unknown

at first this might sound weird, but on second thought it is I believe quite charmingly acceptable

what else could be the object of knowledge - but the unknown?

so far so good but still the question what is knowledge?

knowledge cannot be the unknown obviously

but my overall view is that in a final sense all our knowledge comes back to the unknown

but still! we have knowledge - knowledge of the unknown

knowledge of the fact that there is no knowledge

a strange state of affairs

(and this one is going- to be a tough one to argue for)

and the question what is knowledge is looking more and more mysterious

knowledge is not the unknown - but this is not a great deal of help

knowledge means something like apprehension of the unknown

I think my view is that ultimately reality IS the unknown

if this is so it makes it impossible to argue that an 'object' exists which could be the object of knowledge

so on this slender argument I think we have to give up talk of  the 'object' (in a substantial sense) of knowledge

now if knowing is apprehension of the unknown - what we call  knowledge is better described as a process - a perception rather than an object

hence we can dispense altogether with the term 'knowledge' we can

only sensibly talk about knowing

of course inorder to make this view comprehensive I have to goon and show how the idea that we have knowledge arises - and show conclusively that such an idea is illusory

still too it would be good to have some kind of specific characterization of the process - that is to be able to say something specific about what the process is

e.g. how it differs from other processes - are there any - is it a simple process or a complex one - does this view of knowledge have wider implications in a meta sense?

Moore I think believed that knowledge, like goodness is a simple and hence indefinable

I think this view is really worth looking at seriously - except that I would be talking about the indefinability of knowing

and knowledge of knowledge is still a curly one

if there is knowledge of knowledge does this mean we have a process processing a process

the mind boggles

perhaps this sort of question suggests that the knowing process is itself reflexive complex - not a simple linear process

just the word 'process'  will require very close attention

it seems to me that 'knowing' is not a process

there may well be a process (there is) underlying the 'act' of knowing, but I wouldn't say that we can identify the act of knowing with the process

knowing is in some sense a product of the process - but I don't think it is a product in the object sense of product

perhaps knowing is an event - but definitely an unusual event

not an event with definitive spatio-temporal characteristics

while knowing - does occur within a space and during - time it is I think qualitatively different from physical events

I suppose I have to say that the object of knowledge is the intuition of immediate experience

the intuition while not knowledge - (or is it?) is what knowledge reflective knowledge is based on

that is knowledge is the reflection we make on immediate experience and on our reflections

it sort of looks like I'm back to idealism for all intents and purposes

unlike Moore I fail to see how we can assert with any degree of certainty - reflective / epistemological certainty - that the physical world exists independently of our perceptions

though I do in fact want to say that something exists independently of perception / reflection

my view is that we just know what it is - (and whether of course 'it' is an 'it')

on my view the intuition of the world through reflection pales away to nothing - so that at the end of my analysis the object of knowledge is the unknown - while - initially it seems that it should be something  known

we need now to investigate the nature of reflection

if as I have suggest knowledge is reflection - on thing this means is that there is no direct knowledge of reality

all knowledge is indirect (but I would prefer the term 'reflective')

apprehension is direct but on my analysis it is not knowledge -  it is not knowing

now one thing - that follows from this is that the conviction of the certainty of the existence of the physical world is not an issue for epistemologists qua epistemologists - it is not a problem of knowledge

and putting it more sharply epistemological theories are misused when brought into this context

now there are difficulties with this view, but if it is accepted, it suggests a quite radical criterion of the history of epistemology that most if not all epistemologists have

misunderstood their task

2/4/82

Copleston on Russell

'The antimony can be illustrated in this way. The class of pigs.is evidently not itself a pig. That is to say it is not a member of itself. But consider the notion of the class of all classes which are not members of themselves. Let us call this class X, and ask whether X is a member of itself or not. On the one hand, it seems that it cannot be a member of itself. For if we assume that it is, it follows that X has the defining property of it's members. And this defining property is that any class of which it is

a property is not a member of itself. Hence X cannot be a member of itself. On the other hand it seems X must be a member of itself. For if we begin by assuming that it is not a member of itself, it follows logically that it is not a member of those classes

which are not members of themselves. And to say that is to say X is a member of itself. Hence whether we begin by assuming that X is a member of itself or not, we seem in either case to be involved in a contradiction'  (vol.8.II.189)

- the class of all classes that are not members of themselves

- assume X is not a member -of itself

if it is not a member of itself then it does not posses it's defining characteristic -

which is absurd - so it must be a member of itself

- assume X is a member of itself

- then it does posses it 's defining characteristic

- which is that it is not a member of itself

- which is absurd

- therefore it cannot be a member of itself

'Take another example given by Russell, a club is a class of  individuals. And it can be a member of a class of another type, such as an association of clubs, which would be a class of classes. But neither the class nor the class of classes could possibly be

a member of itself. And if the distinction between types is absurd, the antimony or paradox in the logic of classes does not arise'.

what Russell is trying to show is why a class cannot be a member of itself

in some ways it is obvious that such is the case

a class is not the same sort of entity as it's members

it must be different or else it would be it's own member - - and no class would exist

but how is it different?

we can characterize it negatively and well it can't be it's own member, and this is I think quite O.K.

but we really need a positive characterization

we really need to distinguish between kinds of propositions 'class propositions', and 'meta class propositions'

meta statements are statements about classes - they are not class statements as such

statements about classes, and statements which are statements of classes

I somehow think this doesn't work

perhaps what is, at the bottom of this is the subject / predicate distinction

a subject cannot be a subject of itself and be a meaningful statement

hence a class cannot predicate itself

to try to do this is to go beyond the limits of language

which I think in some sense dictate the limits of logic

hence a subject / predicate statement cannot have the subject hidden in, contained in, the predicate.

over and above this I think - suspect something ontologically strange about the idea of a class - it's an intriguing concept

6/4/82

quite surprise to read of Russell's view, of a hierarchy of languages

surprised because I had arrived at that idea in dealing with the normative / meta problem

pleased because his formulation is clearer - and more general

something I hadn't considered was the - idea of a limit - a downward limit - a

minimum language

hope to investigate this idea - thoroughly wrong - think it points to some major problem in Russell's philosophy of language

Russell's views on the relationship of philosophy to science are I think quite interesting

I don't go for the positivist stuff

but agree wholeheartedly that science deals with what we know and philosophy with what we do not (with qualifications)

but I'm really sick of this glorification of science by philosophers

especially modern philosophers should know better

how anyone can overlook the meta presuppositions of science, and still talk about knowledge - knowledge in some 'positive' sense - I just don't know

the distinction between science and philosophy as drawn by the positivists -and Russell - is I think quite facile

what I'm thinking of is something like the verifiability distinction, or for that matter the falsifiabilty principle

a distinction that is which suggests that science and philosophy are different in kind

my own view is that methodologically there is no distinction

I don't want to go into the issue of what is the method of science and philosophy

I just wish here to make the point that philosophical theories are in fact tested by their proponents -

most philosophers and scientists have the view that a test in science is definition or at least is in principle - and that such is not the case in philosophy

without going into details it seems to me that the view of scientific testing is up the creek - that is it is as spurious as philosophical testing - and by this I mean that process which goes on in any philosophical argument/ decision making

now to convince any one of this view would require quite a lot of argument - much more than I feel up to at the moment

but my over all point is that Russell's view of science is a wank

I am yet to be convinced how it can be assumed with any certainty that there is any 'causal' - or whatever you want to call it - relationship between method and discovery - of course we assume there is - and we cannot say with certainty that there is not

but in reality we don't know

the connection is purely hypothetical and perhaps has a high pragmatic value - but that is all

now if this is so, what of Russell's idea that science comes up with the goods, whereas philosophy is still out on the track?

I think too there is a sense in which science represents / is the very detailed articulation of a certain broad philosophical outlook - an empirical outlook

mathematics can be seen as the precise working out of a rationalist point of view - and empirical science is the other end of this philosophical spectrum - the peak maybe?

7/4/82

the problem with this and similar views such as Russell's is that it implicitly assumes a certain value for western science - which is not in itself improper - but can have the effect of blinding us to the fact that western science is just one perspective on reality - this is not doubting it's legitimacy or potency - only putting it in a broader context

western science is a possible way of dealing with the unknown - one of many possible ways- empirical and non-empirical / rational and irrational etc.

the fact that our culture is so dominated by science - only points to it's pragmatic value  - it's success

we should not let this blind us to the fact that there are an infinite number of possibilities latent - but nevertheless real this is I think originally a Liebnitz / Spinoza discovery which I have taken up and developed

but the sort of thing that occurs to me here is I think a Kantian problem

to date I have been talking rather loosely about possibilities - the concept has been clarified somewhat, but it is still rather open-ended.

now what I wonder is, is there a sense in which the possibilitie or kinds of possibilities can be limited or delineated?

clearly, intuitively it seems there are limits to what the mind can do - within these limits the possibilities might be endless - but the limits must be - must exist

now most immediate thought on this is that we can, if we are interested in this view, suggest possible accounts of the limits- but that is all - as with the rest of human knowledge - finally we have to face the unknown

now this may seem to be a circular argument for my metaphysics just a reassertion of the basic modal analysis - true it is this - but I suggested the Kantian problem inorder to test - or refute my modalism

Wittgenstein took the view that we cannot talk about a languagewithin it

well to lay one of his own points against him

(NB. - the notebook at this point is unintelligible - no doubt a great loss to humanity)

have been thinking lately that my philosophical outlook displays

(1) realism

(2) idealism

(3) skepticism

it begins with realism advances to idealism and finishes withpositive skepticism

now this observation is not unwelcome - in fact I embrace it

it suggests to me that these three theories are in fact stages of philosophical consciousness

but I do not want to ascend to a philosophical nirvana

I don't think the development is a simple progression

in fact my ideal is to show that three levels are fluid and not static

that all three are essential for survival and that too much emphasis on one leads to -. philosophical distortion

it is here that my philosophy of action comes into play

speculative thought and development enables one to choose intelligently the appropriate outlook to guide our action

I'm not suggesting that the world is real AND ideal AND unknowable all at the same time - I am merely saying that realism, idealism and skepticism are the three basic modes - or categories of understanding

skepticism is only the highest form - only in so far as it is the final speculative moment

the problem of action is distinct from the problem of thought

is raised at each of the three stages - the solutions of course are different

at stage one the solution is objective action and by this I mean'object' action - action which is appropriate for objects - action directed at / to objects

at stage two the solution is ideal and this can mean (1) actions which pertains to Ideals or (2) action which focuses on the subjective content of objects - or - looking at objects as subjects - transforming an 'object' to a 'subject'

(this brings out the fact of what I would call, CREATIVE  ONTOLOGY

- the idea that what exists is not given / stable etc. - but rather fluid - changeable

this process is I believe the key to ontology

it is not an entirely new point of view

dialectical philosophers have worked on this idea for quite a while

Marx's theory of labour is based upon it - the transformation of matter into forms that have non-material significance is the essence of Marx's view of what should occur in production. The opposite the transformation of man (the subject into the object is,

the ontological basis of alienation

just by the way my view of the three stages of development would I think be an improvement on the traditional Marxist philosophy

the Marxist anti-idealism is I think narrow minded and dogmatic - but nevertheless to some extent justified

the idealist view of reality as a total account is barren and misplaced

but nevertheless it has a point and a function in the philosophical development of man and society

it is this function which the Marxists have by and large failed to appreciate

in arguing against the validity of Idealism full stop - they have effectively, halted their capacity for philosophical development - but I doubt that, this would concern them as they believe they have halted philosophical development as such)

the third stage of development - of action is no action - the active co-relative of speculative skepticism

all I am suggesting here is that reality demands no action at timesand I believe this realization is not obvious - is very difficult to appreciate in a positive sense - and probably even more difficult  to achieve (in an 'active' sense)

the wisdom of the East has been dedicated almost exclusively to the analysis and implementation of this realization - and is a very valuable source of knowledge in this regard

Copleston:

'Hence philosophy, which is reflection by the human mind, cannot be regarded as absolute thought's reflective awareness of itself unless the human mind is capable of rising to the absolute point of view and becoming the vehicle, as it were, of absolute thought or reasons reflective awareness of it s own activity' (vol.7.1.22)

'Philosophy is thought's reflective awareness of it's own spontaneous activity'

from thinking about these quotes I have began to focus very seriously on the phenomenon of the mind's reflexivity

that is the mind's capacity to know itself

reflexivity rests on a distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowing that you know'

it assumes that it is possible to know but not to be aware of this phenomenon

now we are aware of the unknown - and in my view awareness of the unknown as 'total', is the highest form of philosophical consciousness

but my point here is - how could we be aware of the unknown if we were not aware of knowing

obviously ignorance is not possible if we cannot know what we know

anyway this point is not exactly what I had in mind here

what I thought was important about reflexivity of the mind was that it seems from this fact that the concepts of subject and object emerge

the mind is both subject and object

it is subject in the sense that we think about thoughts

and it is an object in the sense that we think about thoughts

subject and object - the concepts of such can be traced back to the mind

this fact of reflexivity is a very - elusive and strange one - but one which is most important and central to understanding knowledge

vol - 5

10/4/82

in the 1ast note book I outlined an epistemology which presented realism, idealism and skepticism as three phases in the one knowing process

this approach I found quite satisfying  - I  like this theory - and I like the fact that it is quite compatible with a number of the important ideas I have developed

but it is not compatible with the basic model I have been working on which is

unknown - possibilities

now as is clear from the above there are basically only two categories the unknown and the known - but the. known is modal - possible interpretations of the unknown

now this outlook is simple - clear and essentially radical

how for instance does immediate given experience - thereal world of everyday life fit into this picture?

is it the unknown? - but if it is so - how - if it is unknown, what of the things - the world we experience - how can this be called the unknown?

and if it is known, how can it just be a theory a perspective, a possibility? - surely it is given - and in some sense independent of the mind?

well rather than posit a real / independent world -

I have suggested that whatever else our belief in the real /independent world is - it is not knowledge

and so far as that which is beyond our knowledge - be it an independent world or not - we simply do not know

so what I am suggesting is -that what we perceive (pre-critical reflection) is  not known  - and in so far as it is not known it must be the unknown

11/4/82

this may appear to be just a philosopher's trick because effectively I am leaving everything as it is in perception but saying that it is not known

well yes and no

it's not entirely a trick - we do somehow have to distinguish from non-knowledge

as regards what we call experience of immediate perception I favour the 19th century philosopher Fitche's view that our sense of an external world and it's contents is to be properly described as feeling

knowledge is our reflection our constructions on this basis

construction which leads to skepticism, this is clear enough - but can we say that our constructions begin with skepticism? this is really the question

if such an idea - that we percieve the unknown in some sense (perhaps even immediate) cannot be given a solid basis - cannot be made plausible without any tricks - then the three level approach seems preferable - though not as exciting

well it has just occurred to me that at the back of this dispute is the old meta / normative problem

my

unknown

modal

is meta

that is it is a 'picture' of philosophical activity - with a capital P - global philosophizing

to attempt to produce this model on a normative level will not be satisfactory - it is on a normative level too simple

normative philosophy is concerned with the particular of knowing - particular accounts of knowing

the meta model is an account of the general features of all accounts of knowing - that is 'ultimate reality' - which all accounts of knowing reduce to - that is the fundamental ontology of knowing - the basic schema which describes the normative process

but while it is true that we must distinguish the normative and meta levels of philosophical description

I have just realized that the issue on which I begun this discussion is one which I have solved previously

the sense in which the unknown exists prior to, is the object of perception in the

Kantian sense

granted we do perceive the world as it is, if we ask this Kantian question - and I think we must - what is beyond this - what is the ground of this experience - the answer is not as Ant thoughtthe thing in itself - but is the unknown

well this is not just a restatement of the previous 'discovery' there is a point in this analysis which has not been clearly worked out before

I have been trying to operate with a model which sees the real world or experience as superficial, if not non-existent - and of course this does make sense

the immediate object of perception is the real world -

now if we ask what is beyond - the answer is  the unknown

this is quite clear - uncontraversial

and (this is not so obvious) if we ask what is it that we perceive, that is how do we describe - formulate - 'the immediate object of perception - my answer is ultimately we cannot say - we do not know

but though the object is the unknown - this unknown is not arrived at in the same way as the first

the process of knowing involves the formulation of reflective theories explanations of the phenomena

now the first stage of the reflective 'knowing' process is the formulation of theories about the phenomena of experience - or a theory -

now in this stage we are explaining the phenomena of experience

but the philosophical process does not end there

there is a second stage

the question of explaining the phenomena of reflection - that is explaining our

reflective theories

now I'm concerned that at this stage we end in skepticism

as soon as we ask on what basis do we justify - rationalize or account for the phenomena - how do we justify the account - we can only reassert the fundamental presupposition of the theory

which of course is no explanation

in attempting to explain the presupposition we can use other theories to describe the key theory explain it - and this what happens but this is only renewing the original question:-

how do we know the validity of X?

to

how do we know the validity of X'

and X'' etc. - ad infinitum -

now this process is not useless - it is very productive - butultimately it is circular - circles in circles - circles which expand from a common centre

but if this process is stopped it is stopped by the question 'how do you know?'

and as soon as this process is stopped the unknown emerges as the ground of our knowledge

figuratively speaking knowledge is no more than the ripples in the unknown - circles from the centre of the pool of ignorance

getting back to the three stages theory - it is I think quite interesting but - the above theory is I think quite superior

my 'pragmatism' or theory of action really emerges here

given the above picture we can only ask what then is the purpose significance of human knowledge

why do human  beings advance accounts of their experience - why do they attempt to conquer the unknown?

my answer is I think the only really possible one

because such theories are necessary for action

we attempt to know because we must act

concerning reflective skepticism as distinct from transcendent skepticism a further point needs to be added

I would argue that given that X (the theory which accounts for x) cannot survive skepticism, then it follows that, what X explains is likewise unable to survive skepticism -

what this means is that at the conclusion of this process of knowledge we can say that the immediate object of knowledge is the unknown

this is what I wanted

but it must be said that this unknown is not an immediate unknown, but in fact a reflective conclusion

(hope I remember all this the next time the question arises)

another point - the most important that comes from this is that my normative philosophy does reduce to the meta philosophy

if as I have just argued the immediate experience does on reflection become unknown there is a clear sense then in which the schema

unknown

possibilities

is all we have

in fact it goes further - ultimately the possibilities return to the unknown

the unknown from which they came

my skepticism with regard to the immediate object of perceptionis retrospective - and deductive - a deductive consequence of reflective skepticism

so we begin in a sense with the immediate object of perception - the world (beyond which is the unknown out of which - in a sense the world emerges) formulate theories about our perception about the world which turn out to be without foundation - which in a figurative sense returns to the unknown

which are not separate to the unknown but are in fact possible characterizations of it

in a meta sense the unknown exhibits itself in our knowledge

hence any characterization is logically on the same foot-less footing as any other - but it's value lies in it's uniqueness - the uniqueness of its characterization

it is in a sense a unique characterization of the unknown

(I think that metaphysical language is useful not in an epistemological sense - but rather in a figurative - expressive sense - meta language enables us to characterize in an interesting way what would otherwise be quite boring)

hence anyone's beliefs must be appreciated not because they are logically, better than anyone else's but because they are unique responses of and to the unknown

have been reading about Fichte

quite impressed by the thoroughness of his working out of the idealist program - it's really quite brilliant -

have become interested in a casual way in his idea of the Ego

as I understand it the objective Ego is characterized by it's striving - it's striving for self realization and in this process the objective non-ego is posited

what I am interested in is the individual ego

and it's relationship to the objective ego

Fitche sees the objective Ego as realising itself in the finite Ego - becoming aware of itself through the finite Egos

well I can see reason for this view it sort of explain the infinite Ego - and what it does

but my own feeling is quite the opposite way

it seems to me that the individual Ego strives for fulfillment /completion in the infinite Ego - if we can call it that

the striving is life - at least on the individual level - Fitche's observation of this fact is quite astute

And I think he is correct in saying that the ego's fulfillment is in another ego

only I would say the individual ego seeks fulfillment - searches for self realization in the other - and the other is not I think an infinite ego - but another finite ego

but the search is I think is doomed to failure

I think Fitche's positing of an infinite ego is ontologically off the mark - but psychologically spot on - for it does seem to me that an infinite ego a limitless self is what the struggling finite Egos are in fact struggling for

my view as against Fitche's is that such does not exist

that man is tragically flawed - that his, deepest strivings - his most fundamental motivations and dreams are unrealizable

I'm not suggesting that Fitche posited the objective Ego to explain what I'm talking about - in fact I don't think he did - but his philosophy would made more sense to me if he had

what he does though - so it seems is begin with the objective Ego and use the subjective - the limited ego - to explain the infinite ego

if I had been Fitche I would have gone the other way

Fitche has awakened my interest in the idea of the Ego - it's striving and most interestingly it's incompleteness

I am convinced of it's incompleteness but I wonder what it means? why? what's it's  significance

Fichte:

'all knowledge presupposes it's own being'

I get the impression that Fitche's latter philosophy is half- hearted

he seems to be attempting to fit God into his idealism without doing any damage to it

but it does seem that inorder to pacify his critics he went off  the rails a little i.e. the above quote

it seems to me he remained an atheist to the end

but I have a feeling and it is just a feeling that he started to toy with the idea of possible interpretations of reality - this seemed to be how he saw - or how he spoke of religious belief - as a point of view

what I'm suggesting is that such talk may well have been more than just a concession to his religious critics - it may have been the beginning of a modal outlook

but if it was it was only 'a twinkle in the father's eye' - Fitche would not have even begun to formulate it - while he was wedded to his Idealism - and the underlying assumptions concerning the philosophical enterprise which prohibit a modal outlook

at this point it might be worthwhile to rework the bases of modalism

a non-modal view presupposes knowledge is attainable - and as such

presupposes an object of knowledge - object of knowledge which has content

an object which is knowable

such views assume that knowledge is knowledge of something

they presuppose an actual

what I'm trying to get at is that such views presuppose that the object of knowledge is knowable

what I argue - where I begin is with the view that the object of knowledge is knowable

now some would think this absurd but I claim an intuitive - not a reasoned defence of this principle (though of course I would argue for it) - the point is that the object of knowledge must in a clear sense be unknowable - or perhaps more accurately

the unknown

I ask what else could the object of K be but the unknown?

at this point your wiley philosopher might grudgingly consent with a "Ah .... yes - but ....."

and the 'but' is that while the object of knowledge - may in some sense be the unknown - when knowledge occurs - it must be knowledge of something - something knowable - now if it is not knowledge of something knowable, then what is this thing called knowledge?

now my idea is that human beings have the capacity to create in the face of the unknown.

I think there are two kinds of creative activity here

there is the given creation - the world as we see it - this is pure Kantian

reflection on this is theoretical explanation of the given

now how we characterize this 'knowledge'- what we say it is - is a modal question

yes - that is the point

the Kantian stuff is strictly speaking wrong -

and I still haven't got to it yet -

the question is to show how his perception of philosophy emerges -which partly means how - the opposite view falls down - how this is superior

I feel like I have been down this road before but I'm not sure I've got it clear

there's a lot behind my ideas - I just have to dig it out - it's a great adventure - a real

high -

14/4/82.

(just having a rest from this for a moment and back to Fichte)

Fichte says the objective Ego - posits a non-ego i.e. nature as a kind of sounding board - as a means of achieving self realization

the positing of the non-ego - is the positing of the object

now it seems to me that inorder to create the object it is not necessary to posit the non-ego

in the ego itself - we have the concept of object

when I say 'I am', I am in a sense positing myself as an object -

the very existence of consciousness presupposes the ability of the ego to be subject and object

so what I'm getting at is that the objective mode of the ego - of consciousness is the origin of the concept of objectivity but it is not non-ego in the sense I think Fichte was postulating - it seems to be that his non-ego - is a different entity postulated by - created by the ego

we really don't need to go outside the ego to have a concept of objectivity - of outside the ego

what I'm saying is that the concept of objectivity is essentially subjective in origin

(one thought that seems to come from this is that all language is objective

the subject maybe subjective - but is not all language in a sense formulation about something)

that all objectivity derives from self awareness

of the self by the self - the capacity to know and know one knows

it's I suppose the reflexive nature of knowledge (the mind - the knower)

The reflexivity of knowledge is I guess a major epistemological thesis

consciousness is the relation of reflexivity

knowledge is always a formulation

in answer to the original question, what is knowledge?

perhaps all I can say really is  - I don't know -

but perhaps - what I do is say - well this is what it has been said

it is

knowledge i.e. various theories have been put forward - these are some of the possible answers

now we cannot say what knowledge is but we can say what it has been said it is

now there is something right and something wrong here

not happy?

Copleston on Schelling:

'In the first place both systems try to make the transition from the infinite to the finite. But 'philosophy cannot proceed from the infinite to the finite'. We can of course invent reasons why the infinite must manifest itself in the finite, but they are simply

ways of covering up an inability to bridge the gap. It appears, therefore, that we must proceed the other way around. But how is this to be done when the traditional a posteriori demonstrations have been discredited? Obviously what is required is suppression of the problem. That is to say if the infinite can be seen in the finite, and the finite in the infinite, the problem of bridging the gap between them by means of a theoretical argument or demonstration no longer exists.

The need is fulfilled by intellectual intuition, which is an intuition of the identity of the intuiting and the intuited self. But it is interpreted in different ways by dogmatism and criticism. Dogmatism interprets it as an intuition of the self as identical with the absolute. Criticism interprets it as revealing the identity of the self with the absolute subject, as conceived as pure free activity'. (vol. vII. 128-130)

I am I or I am. And from this proposition Schelling proceeds to the positing of the non-ego and argues that ego and non-ego mutually condition one another. There is no subject without an object and no object without a subject. Hence there must be a mediating factor, a common product which links them together; and this is representation (Vorstellung). We can thus have the form of the fundamental triad of all science and knowledge, namely subject object and representation' (Cop. Vol.6,1.127).

16/4/82

okay my line is we can't say what knowledge is

except to say that it is some kind of response to the unknown

this sort of thing can be said

but the real point is that if the object of knowledge is unknown

- then unlike saying that the object is - sense data -we cannot say anything definite about knowledge

if sense data - or intuition are the objects of knowledge then knowledge is either awareness of this - or what has been built upon it - or what follow from it

now on my view the object of knowledge is the unknown

but in saying this I am not delivering the faithful into the skeptic funk hole

what I want to say is that fundamental ignorance is quite liberating - it is a great equalizer and a real source of potential

the object of knowledge is ignorance or the unknown

but what ever way you characterize knowledge or knowing

you have to realize there are a number of attempts to deal with the unknown (in a philosophical sense)

now I call these attempts 'knowledge'

and when asked what knowledge is, all I can really do is point to the various theories and say well this or that has been claimed

I think we can go a little further and say - generalize

- that if anything can be said about knowledge - objectivity - we can say that knowledge is possibility

'You ought to speak to the elms 0 brown-eyed Elaine.

We were bluebells to one another on the river. The

great grey serious river of nothing'.

- Thomas Merton

The Geography of Lograire

Page 55

possible responses to the unknown

so in summary

(1) the object of k is the unknown

(2) knowledge is possible responses to the object of knowledge

modalism is only possible because of positive skepticism

if it was the case that the object of knowledge was a known - then responses to it would be one of two kinds (i) true; (ii) false

the responses would be actual

there is a sense in which the concept of truth only emerges, has significance only given epistemological actualism - that is given a foundational epistemology

or to put it more precisely - the correspondence theory of truth is only possible given that it can be shown that a 'content -full' object of knowledge is - actual - and that

such can be known

truth or the correspondence theory is a relation between what is, and what is claimed to be

if what is claimed corresponds with what is then the relation is truth

now this is a very simple account of what correspondence comes to -too simple - and such an account will ultimately have to abandoned

what I'm interested in with regard to the correspondence theory of truth is the question of how in fact two ontologically distinct entities - i.e. reality and knowledge can be said to correspond

it's exactly the same problem that any dualist will have - it'se.g. Descartes' problem: how can two distinct entities interact - it is in my view a knock down argument against any dualism

I suppose I am then a committed monist

but with regard to the correspondence theory of truth -

I think it does in it's normal characterization presuppose some kind of dualism - a REALIST dualism

so how is it done'

the other point that has occurred to me is, in what sense is truth a realist concept anyway?

that is in what sense is it a property of the real world?

if it is, and it does seem to me that this is what the realist theory of knowledge assumes, how can it be - is it a strange metaphysical entity?

now there are problems for a realist theory of truth

adopting a monistic point of view -

I wonder how truth can be anything more than a relation between sentences

is this to argue for a semantically theory of truth?

is such a meaning theory.?,

well if so, then we need to talk about rules about rules of correspondence

what constitutes correspondence?

we may even be able to settle this question independently of the question of what the correspondents are

i.e.        meanings?

            others?

17/4/82

I don't know much about ethics, but a distinction occurred to me which may be quite original and useful

I have the impression that most philosophers have assumed that the ethics of personal behaviour can automatically be applied to the ethics of public behaviors or the ethics of 'the other'

this is certainly implied by the universality principle of Kant and Hare

however my impression of their formulations is that they argue for the universality principle as a basis for personal ethics -it is used to ground personal ethics

now what I have in mind is the idea that. the realm of personal ethics may be logically quite distinct from the public realm

that is what I consider to be moral for my own life - the principles I would adopt may not be applicable in the public realm - i.e. in relation to others

now there are a number of reasons why this outlook hasn't been considered seriously

the first is that the given opinion is that ethics by it's nature is the science of altruism

that is personal ethics are really issues about how to behave morally in relation to others

such a view would be hostile to any ethical egoism

and the way the debate has gone in the history of ethics - is I think an either / or situation - either egoism or altruism - and the idea has been to show that one view and not the other is correct

what I'm suggesting - is that it may not be an either / or situation

perhaps the two views can and must co-exist

on this view one of the main problems of ethics would be to determine in which realm a moral principle belongs

in practical terms whether the principles one adopts can or should be applied beyond the personal to the public -

or whether a principle is in fact not applicable from a personal point of view, but is in relation to others - that is it may be necessary for me to follow such and such a principle for me to live a good life but such a principle may not be applicable in

connection with my relations with others

it is probably a shaky idea , but if worked through thoroughly it may produce some interesting results

NB:

it wouldn't  necessarily be an argument against the universality principle - but rather a theory about if and when such a principle is applicable.

am considering the line that the 'mental vacuity' of meditation is in fact strictly

speaking an epistemological phenomena

question the whole enterprise of attempting to transform the total experience of reality - in a non-epistemological - perceptual way

do mystics attempt to transform what they actually experience - to actually transform the ontological categories of experience?

or do they merely wish to come to ordinary experience with the mental vacuity of mystical awareness

if the latter then this is possible

but is it desirable?

it seems to me that reality is hostile to such an attempt

and this fact is certainly appreciated by religious writers

and the question then is how desirable is it to defy certain levels of reality?

I personally see mystic awareness as one possible way of understanding reality

and think that a rational man should be able to activate this potential

however see any attempt to hoist this awareness wholesale as extreme and philosophically unacceptable

10/6/82

'But a difficulty at once arises. If the life of the absolute is to be constructed by philosophy, the instrument will be reflection. Left to itself however, reflection tends to function as understanding (Verstand) and thus to posit and to perpetuate oppositions. It must therefore be linked with transcendental intuition, which discovers the interpretation of the ideal and the real  subject and object. Reflection is then varied to the level of reason (Vernunft), and we have a speculative knowledge which 'must be conceived as identity of reflection and intuition'.  - Copleston -203-204 - vol-7 Pt.l.

'The fundamental purpose of philosophy, Hegel maintains, is that of overcoming oppositions and divisions. Division is the source of the need for philosophy' - 203

how-to view Hegel's absolute ?

(1)       

as the totality - in which the dialectic operates?

such a view would leave the absolute rather vacuous

it would in terms of form nothing but a shadow,

(2)       

that to which the absolutes strives or that from which it emerges to return

such is a more dynamic view but lacks some coherence

we still want to know what it is

admittedly such a view gives the dialectic somewhere to go

but there is a sense in which if the absolute is the end of a process - it's not really the absolute - it's just the end of a series

and can we draw a distinction between the absolute and the dialectic?

is the dialectic - the absolute's process, if so there is no distinction

and if you draw a sharp distinction, what is the relation between the two?, how can there be a relation?

the point is that both concepts depend on each other

we can accept the existence of philosophical opposition, i.e.. subject / object, ideal / real - there is a sense in which such are facts

but the resolution of such - the positing of an absolute - while it does resolve in a sense is nevertheless - has the feeling of a construct who's value is more psychological - than real

but I suppose Hegel would say we intuit an underlying unity - and I suppose I would have to agree with this

but I don't know to what extent we can rely on such an intuition

on reflection, philosophical reflection it falls away

22/6/82

Schopenhaur

'The world of experience is the phenomenal world; it is object for subject - it is the world of mental presentations. But no object is presented in a state of complete isolation - all our presentations are related to or connected with other presentations in regular ways. Science or knowledge is precisely knowledge of these regular relations

'Science that is say, signifies a system of objects known not a mere aggregate of presentations'

and Schopenhaur thought that there must be sufficient reason for this relatedness. Thus he thought that the general principle that governs all our knowledge of objects or phenomenon is the principle of sufficient reason'

- from Copleston

26/2/82

Schopenhaur's ultimate concept of Will - his metaphysics of Will makes no sense to me, I can't - or can hardly visualize what he's on about. It strikes me as being an almost pre-philosophical concept - that is within the western philosophical tradition - it makes more sense if you can tune into Schopenhaur's 'eastern-ness' - that is if you interpret him as a philosopher who was primarily on about how one can achieve detachment from the ego or the self

viewed in this way I believe Schopenhaur is greatly underestimated, undervalued as a western philosopher

perhaps his major achievement was not his argument against Hegel - what was the argument anyway?

Hegel was an idealist, Schopenhaur a will-ist - granted we can't automatically equate Idea with Will - but the issue between the two does not appear to me to be that great -

what I'm getting at is that for all intents and purposes Schopenhaur -was an idealist - and his argument against Hegel was really just a family feud

I have a hunch that Schopenhaur's ideas his metaphysics doesn't fit as snugly into his historical setting as some would like it to do - which brings me back to the main point of all this - that Schopenhaur's real achievement is the way in which he showed that Eastern and Western philosophies are not fundamentally different - that there are some very closelink ups

e.g. the detachment that results from philosophical contemplation - is it not the kind of detachment that Eastern Philosophers are preoccupied with

the difference is that Western philosophers have seen philosophical detachment - as a method for arriving at philosophical truth - whereas Eastern philosophers it seems to me have seen detachment as truth itself - and method to be whatever steps are necessary to achieve the truth  - and this comes down to the acceptance of some

philosophical tenets - sacred knowledge - and - ascetic action - that is - living in accordance with these tenets (of the sacred knowledge)

now I think my own theory of detatchemnent is quite unique and interesting       

it arose from the problem of rationality the meta / normative problem

the problem was how can modalism be stated non-normatively?

now this seems straight forward enough but it's not

it's not because the above statement which professes to be a statement about possibility - reality - is itself a statement of possibility

once it is realized that it is a statement of possibility - it becomes difficult to see in what sense it can be a statement about......

now I think the conclusion I reached - at least at one point about this issue - this problem which I think is the single most important issue in philosophy - is- was (or maybe I'm just comingto it now - who knows these things - I like to forget my

philosophical discoveries - I suppose because as far as philosophy is concerned I think spontaneity must be 'preserved' - at any cost)

meanwhile back at the ranch the solution is to distinguish between common descriptive statements (i.e.., the bar room was empty) and meta statements - statements that is which are statements about statements - and not about the world (the statement, 'the bar room was empty' is a false statement)

now clearly this statement can be subject of another statement this means that meta. statements can be themselves meta statements - ad infinitum

at the base of such a potentially heavy theoretical structure is what? - an empiricist basic statement?, a rationalist's clear and distinct idea?

modern philosophy has spent a great deal of time and energy thrashing out this issue - and I think, to no avail - the point is that all such foundations conceal only bottomless pits

the problem is how do we characterize the basic statement well my answer is that the basic statement is uncharacterizable in the sense that has been tried

what I want to say is that the basic statement is empty - in the sense that it cannot be definitively, finally determined

what I'm suggesting is that any apparent inherent meaning in a statement is in fact an illusion.

meaning is given (I think I have an argument for this somewhere)

(what has happened here is what happens to slack philosophers - I have just realized that I am going over old ground in which I have planted new seeds and forgotten to water them)

earlier on I think I came to the conclusion that there are no descriptive statements as such - that any distinction between descriptive - empirical and non-descriptive-theoretical / philosophical is not on - that all statements are philosophical /  theoretical

perhaps what was saying about empty statements can best be put like this

if we take the theoretical content from statements, what we have is a proposition - and empty-expressionless statement - which for all intents and purposes means nothing - such a statement is ideal not real - a mental construct or should I say a mental de-struct

now while I think this general point can be accepted - there is still a sense in which the empirical / theoretical issue is a real one

that is there is a distinction between so called empirical low level theoretical statements and 'theoretical' - by which I mean high level - or non-basic theoretical statements

now I think what I have argued is that there is not a logical distinction - a distinction in kind - the distinction is one of degree but what does this mean?

what I want to say is that the statement, 'the table is red' is not a direct report of sense experience - in an empiricist sense - we don't classify the statement logically this way - the existence of other accounts - other analysises shows I believe the epistemological indeterminacy of such a statement

what we can say is that such a statement is not theoretically obvious - it's theoretical content is not immediately apparent - whereas scientific statements - the theoretical statements of physics are

why is this so? I think only a naturalistic account can answer this question

by this I mean I think we have to look at how language moves from level to level

the growth of knowledge involves the embedding of theoretical structure in language

what was a highly theoretical statement 200 years ago, may well be a common place statement today

I think and I am speaking normatively here that theoretical knowledge is like the sediment in a bottle of wine - it willeventually settle to the bottom and be hard to dislodge and be quite different, to the rarefied levels above

human knowledge works this way

something like this is in my opinion is what happens but this is not a meta analysis it is normative

on a meta level all we can do is say that there are a number of possible interpretations of the relation between empirical and theoretical statements (of which the above is one)

on a meta level we can only talk about language

all meta talk is language about language statements about statements about statements....

now I started off by asking what is at the basis of all this

my answer is that we cannot say - non-normatively - we cannot say objectively - any statement about what is, (as distinct from any statement about a statement of what is)

commits us ontologically

but the commitment is indeterminate

and philosophical analysis shows us this - it shows us that the apparent commitment is - (if we are being rational - and by this I mean modal) - without real logical commitment- - any commitment I think (and here I am invoking - my own normative

view) is best analyzed in a naturalistic fashion - but of course not all philosophers accept this - and when this is taken into account the existence of alternative valid possibilities - we are clearly faced with the phenomenon of objective non-commitment

and if we look at life from this point of view and we can - our perspective is detachment - non-commitment

and it is just this attitude which is comparable to the eastern perspective - and which I think Schopenhaur was getting into

you see I think we can talk confidently about making statements about statements - and this is metaphysics

statements about the world require - presuppose a commitment and once it is realized that such 'commitment' dissolves on close scrutiny - to non-commitment - our basic statements come out as being empty (in themselves) informative only in a normative

sense

'the world' is empty, unknown - it is filled in -

but we can with certainty talk about our talk -

describe our descriptions

and as philosophers we should be investigating the ways this is done - and creating new ways

(by describing our descriptions, I mean we can say what has been said - and what this is said to mean -  that is all - beyond this silence)

what all this amounts too is that we cannot really be committed to 'reality'

that commitment is a constant illusion it is 'maya'

but it is not that simple because we are unable to avoid commitment unable to avoid the imperative to action

man is thus constantly torn between - to be ontologically philosophically committed - and is at the same time the reality of the emptiness of his commitment

life is just the conflict between knowledge and action (the modal and the normative)

the detachment which is achieved- can be achieved at a modal level - is -in reality only a moment (Hegel would like this) the contemplative moment - a moment many have busted their balls to make into a minute, an hour, a day, a week, month - a life time

we are now looking at a fundamental dialectic or conflict

but a dialectic which I think can only be formulated as a description about human responses to reality (the unknown) not as a positive statement about reality as such (Kant would like this)

In effect I suppose I have argued a thesis that combines Hegel Kant but one which sees Kant as primary and Hegel as secondary

but this compatibility thesis is surpassed by my descriptivemodalism- I still think that modalism is fundamental - and that - the Kantian and Hegelian outlooks are only sensible and compatible -given the modal - the over-riding modal

perspective

it's tempting to ask, how does this phenomenon, the dualism between modalism and normativism arises, what is it's origin?

what I think is clear is that we can only formulate an answer to this normatively - any answer involves some king of philosophical commitment some explanation - which once given then dissolves modally

we constantly return to the unstatable -

by this I mean we cannot state possibility - as such or positively - we can only describe it negatively - it is non- modal non-committal - anything beyond this is subjective - normative

I guess what I'm saying, is that modalism is not stable - but is knowable - this knowledge cannot be stated

some philosophers at this point would invoke a theory of intuition - quite sensible but not necessary if we accept meta ignorance - the unknown - the unknowable

so I'm here talking about knowing the unknown

which for me is not a problem because knowledge is just this, 'talking about...... , the subject is always unknown - is for it all epistemological intents and purposes -  irrelevant

in fact I am committed to saying all we really know is the unknown - such is knowledge

response to the stimulus of the unknown

thus anything is knowledge in a concrete sense -

formulation, linguistic formulation, is merely an epistemological mode

or perhaps meta knowledge - the meta mode

which is what philosophers are on about - it is the philosophical mode - the philosophical perspective

investigation of the non-meta - investigations of the normative is the realm of the sciences

a non-reflective approach to life - (this only possible by degree -) is simply ___?___out knowledge - it is simply not seeing - it is simply ___?___ knowledge as distinct from knowing knowledge

(whatever conditions are required to bring about this state of affairs are I think very desirable - I for one would prefer to live in such a way - I tend to think such a way holds more prospect for happiness - but on reflection -)

(I find being a philosopher very strange at times - very alien - I think the more emotionally and socially adjusted I become the more difficult it becomes for me to climb up into the platonic realm - to escape into the unknown- philosophy feeds

on madness)

28/6/82

a note on dialectics

what I have suggested is that the relation between the modal and normative realities is dialectic - but is this just a possible view of the relationship?

could it be that one could in some sense maintain a modal outlook while being normative

I think this is possible

I think that the relationship between the modal and normative is not something which can be settled a priori as it were - rather I think we have to investigate actual relationships and to come to understand possibilities

a dialectic schema is one schema which I am sure as I have characterized it above - is actually possible - but the simultaeneous relationship is I believe just as possible - and hence just as possibly actual

one of the questions that I started off with was to do with the so called 'basic statement'

I briefly indicated that a basic statement is a 'tight' theoretical' statement, a theoretical statement in which the theoretical content - there is no other content - hidden - or should I say not obvious - the basic statement has not been theoretically

loosened up by analysis - this is I think because it's theoretical content has settled - solidified - and how this occurs is a matter for the sociology of language - probably such a statement is one which is highly used in the common, non-critical, non-contentious contexts - such a statement is basic in this sense - only in a relative way - it is conceivable that it may become theoretically potent again - but I suspect that in fact this is highly unlikely - revolutions in thinking conceptual revolutions - I suspect tend to leave such statements much as they are - perhaps the only likely occurrence is that they fall from grace in time or are modified?by changes higher up in the

theoretical structure - they can of course become just dead letter - which are simply used because of habit and tradition

in early and mid-twentieth century philosophy - English philosophy largely due to the work of Russell , there was a great deal of time and energy devoted to defining and analyzing the basic statement. The empiricists were obsessed. with this problem

perhaps the most notable product of this intensive investigation, was the creation of the sense datum fiction

it was assumed that for the basic statements 'this is red', there must be 'a red', to make the statement significant from an empiricist point of view, such a hope is absolutely necessary - the sense datum just simply had to exist - no questions asked. the problem was how, if you were, and are an empiricist - how to convince yourself that you can actually 'see' it or if worse comes to worse - how you can infer it - which is no problem at all - if you assume it must exist inorder to make your basic statement

and hence your whole empiricist program 'meaningful'

and so the question is what is a sense datum - what we can say is that corresponding - to the statement 'this is red' there must exist an entity which is simply red  - it must be an atom a simple

- which is how I would describe this whole program

empiricism presupposes the observable as the basis of knowledge

in postulating the sense datum it seems to me that the empiricists reached into the unobservable bag

it was believed that via analysis reduction of simple propositions to sense datum was possible

how does this occur?

presumably the idea was that we can analytically distinguish - separate something like the property of redness from what exists in - and then be able to talk sensibly about it 'in itself' - that is apart from the 'object' (not that we talk about objects anymore) - such a program has a decided metaphysical ring about it - 'the sense datum in itself' - but how then do we avoid solipsism? (there must be a patch to correspond with

the red sense impression for there to be a red sense impression at all - fair enough)

now all this is very well - but Berkeley killed it centuries ago - why must we assure the existence of anything beyond, underlying the sense impression?

it's a knock down. argument time after time

but what else can be done?

Berkeley's argument is impressive in it's consistency but even it ends up being - leading to incomprehensibility

Locke realized that reason demands analysis of protocol statements

Berkeley's conclusion had the effect of saying- well you just cannot analyze the basic statement - if by analysis is meant provide some explanation - some sufficient reason for it's existence it's meaning

- the sense impression is the basis - the foundation - and the foundation is just that -'if you want to look for a foundation to the foundation you are embarking on a non empiricist journey into the mystic - the meta-mystic

but times change and so do empiricists - the early 20th century saw a big rush into the metaphysics of the sense datum - but it wasn't really realized that this was what was happening - because the empiricists had a vanguard which condemned metaphysics

while the reserves were quietly digging in

now all this occurred and no doubt will re occur - because of a fear of the

philosophical bogey man the creature from the unknown- skepticism

the problem was if don't analyze basic statements if they can't be analyzed - it must be accepted that they are rationally vacuous - empty

now reason is reason - truth is truth - but that's going just a little too far - what would philosophers have to talk about -and who would pay them to talk about it if the word got out that all they had to talk about was nothing - a nothing you can only argue for not against

well at least a dead horse can be flogged - hence the birth of 20th century English philosophy

now I have been arguing - that the loss of nerve - which leads to the revamping, re-flogging of dead horses is due to a negative reaction to skepticism

now I began this discussion of early 20th century empiricism merely to get  to the question, what is a basic statement

well I think we can accept the idea that such a statement is a simple i.e. atomic - not molecular statement, but do we want to say that such statements are basic? - basic in a semantic sense - and basic in a structural sense - we can build up more complex statements from them - but the empiricists were trying to say more than this they want to say that basic statements are epistemologically basic (I think that the semantic basicness of such statements was used to suggest the epistemological business)

I can't see why a semantically basic statement is any more epistemologically basic than a molecular statement.

now I have in effect argued for this point in arguing for the vacuousness of the so called basic statement - it is a vacuosness which characterizes any statement any epistemoloically significant statement

           

is there a need - am I heading for a distinction between, epistemologically significant statements and non-epistemologically significant statements.

I think it must be the case that a non-epistemologically significant statement is not significant in any sense - but this does raise the question, what does epistemological significance rest in?

what does linguistic significance rest in? the question of meaning -

want to get back to the question of the vacuousness of basic statements - the point of this is that any analysis of a statement will be epistemologically loaded - empiricists will analyze it differently to rationalists pragmatists etc.

this fact I think shows that statements - epistemological content (which is content) - is objectively speaking arbitrary - given this in so far as we can talk about a statement's content - the proposition in itself - we are talking about a statement which does not 'give' us meaning we give it meaning - through our various analyses -

this is my general point

the second point is that any specific analysis leads to vacuosness - as I showed above in discussing the empiricist sense data analysis

now some would object to my general analysis on the grounds that I have not taken into account - truth

this is O.K - but it is entirely fanciful - because each analysis defines the idea of truth - that is no objective standard of truth can be established

and the argument reinforces the vacuousness argument

but what I believe is that even if this general point is rejected specific analyses like the above (the empiricist analysis) end up if followed through thoroughly - result in vacuousness

29/6/82

Love

was thinking about  how I see someone I fall in love with or more correctly I was thinking about what I see

now it is clear to me that what I see when 'locking at a loved one' - is nothing in particular

that is the one I love is not loved for any one characteristic - or even the sum total of characteristics

so what do I see when I look at the loved one?

it seems to me that what I see is nothing

the space between, in which, the particulars exist

it is this space, this 'emptiness' which is love

the lover sees the space in his lover - and sees it as a place he can be - it is a space which he as a lover can inhabit - and yet it is not his space - but it is a human space - it is that space which one person sees in another - and feels that he / she can live in be secure in

love is the recognition of such a space in another

I am rather convinced that such is what the lover sees when 'looking at' his / her lover

what interests me now is can this idea of love = nothingness - (or - non-particularness) can be generalized to deal with issues in ontology

what I'm getting at is can we analyze universals as nothing?

could be for example that universals are really 'nothing' more than analytical, intellectual extensions of particulars in non-particular space- - space not occupied by particulars - space that is which is empty - nothingness - the unknown in which the known exists

this means for example that 'redness' is nothing more than the space between red particulars - an emptiness which is coloured in the likeness of the particular

(ontology is not my forte - and I think this theory has potential in the context of my epistemology - but it does need to be developed - however my overall feeling is that it is a washout)

30/6/82

on Marx and Hegel

Copleston talks about Hegel's theory of dialectics (1) the transformation of quantity (2) the mutual penetration of opposites and (3) the negation of the negation

now my question is whether we apply this view of dialectics to history or society or nature - where is the telos - the end - the basis of historical purpose. (2) and (3) separately or together do not imply anything like historical necessity

now the question was Marx as determinist - the answer seems to be - yes he did believe or hope to be uncovering laws of history - and I believe he had a traditional view of scientific law

what I wonder is did Marx make a very basic mistake in this area

did he assume that the existence of historical laws implied historical progress?

what I'm getting at is that we could accept a theory of historical necessity, and yet not be committed to the idea of progress.

why should we assume that history is moving in a progressive way - that it is teleological?

such an assumption it seems was necessary for Marx's idea (although I am sure there are from Marx good arguments for his socialism quite apart from the historical necessity argument) - of the purposiveness of socialism - it really is a Hegelian hangover - and as a theory not very important anyway - but it is a mistake Marx

should have seen

he should have realized  that the inexorable march of history is not really compatible with dialectics - dialectics it seems to me renders such an idea facile

what I' m saying is that (1) (2) and (3) - defeat the notion of progress - progress if it makes any sense at all - must only be a moment - one side in the dialectic

if there is progress from the point of view of dialectics there must be regression

whether or not a dialectical process (simple or complex) is progressive or retrogressive is not an empirical matter - it is an ethical issue. Marx and Engles attempted to reduce value to fact - to treat value as a material phenomenon. (now this I believe can be done but their attitude was unable to achieve this - they merely assumed value can be reduced to fact - they didn't in fact argue for it

'Sometimes you dream, sometimes it seems

there's nothing there at all'        

- Elton John / Bernie Taupin

            'Roy Rogers is riding tonight'

1/7/82

Kierkegaard

'The truth is precisely the venture which chooses an objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite. I contemplate the order of nature in the hope of finding good, and I see omnipotence and wisdom; but I also see much that disturbs my mind, and excites anxiety. The turn of all this is an objective uncertainty. But it is for this very reason that the inwardness becomes as intense as it is, for it embraces this objective uncertaintywith the entire passion of the infinite'

I am quite astonished at how many profound religious thinkers reach the point where they see God as the unknown

for the religious consciousness this does not appear to result in skepticism with  regard to the existence of God - the skepticism it seems becomes a characterization

of their faith - of their view of the divine reality - a definition of their faith. (those thinkers with a distinct philosophical bent see skepticism as an anathema to faith

- at least in regard to God - but they generally have the popular naive conception of God in mind)

what I'm suggesting is that skepticism seems to be the highest wisdom - which is reached by any truly profound thinking about the nature of reality.

different attitudes towards it - is what differentiates philosophers and philosophical systems

and the fact is that skepticism cannot be used as an argument for or against any interpretation -  it is simply the ground a of all 'knowledge' ' - it gives as no hints

as to how it should be interpreted

that it must be /  is - interpreted  is hardly worth stating

Kierkegaard has correctly seen the point I have been arguing for, for the last year or so - that the only objectivity is the unknown - given this the only reality is, beyond this

what we interpret, fill the unknown with

what philosophy should do, more so than any activity is discover, and articulate possible responses to the unknown this is all the philosopher can do

(Kierkegaard is important not so much as a philosopher but as a meta or a religious psychologist - his dialectic - (1) the aesthetic stage (2) ethical stage (3) faith stage, is

quite interesting - and contains great insight into human behaviour - but it is far too dependent on a presupposed religious conception of the nature of man -

to be of wider use

or perhaps this is too harsh - his theory of 'either /or', his anti-intellectualism - and his 'leap of faith' is important - it's unfair to criticize it for a lack

of intellectual basis

perhaps my major criticism of Kierkegaard is that his 'objective uncertainty' argument defeats his faith argument but this is just expressing my own prejudice really

but I think the question I would put to Kierkegaard is, granted it takes courage to make a leap of faith, fair enough - but what of the courage needed to really live

with objective uncertainty to face the anxiety of the unknown to live without faith -

at the very least Kierkegaard should have seen the equality of the opposite - I think this is what I find weak in Kierkegaard why I don't think of him primarily as a

philosopher - being harsh again

in fact I have a great deal of sympathy for his existentialism - his subjectivity his 'modalism' that is - it's his metaphysics I don't like but then I suppose I would have to say the same about any other major philosopher - if I was to be strict

they all missed the point

Is my theory of modalism itself a possible theory? that is,is the theory of what philosophers can / should do, is see that all conceptions of reality are possible interpretationsof the unknown - is this theory a possibility of itself? (it's like asking is the set of natural numbers a subsetof itself?) what I'm asking is, is this meta (descriptive) theory - just one possible way one possible metaphysics

well in a very real sense it is - there do exist other metaphysics- but does this fact limit the truth of modalism? yes and no

I think it is possible to state correctly that modalism is a subject of itself - in the way that Russell did with descriptions - and then of course this subject can be made subject of an identical statement

but still the question remains does this make any sense? - conceptually /

philosophically?

you see is modalism a subject of itself - then so is not-modalism which is contradictory and absurd for arguing against not- modalism  is the whole point

of modalism

I think the answer is this - if we want to make modalism self rational - we must then develop modalism1- and if we want to make modalism1 rational - modalism2, and if

modalism2 is to be made rational - modalism3- ad infinitum

a real but tiresome trick

but I think it would be simpler and more honest to see the whole question of self rationality to not really be significant - except perhaps in mathematical puzzles

to accept and face the fact that any philosophical theory if it is to be at all significant and 'informative'and meaningful must exclude it's opposite - which

in this case is non-modalism - this is I think just good common sense - but it does have a point - thereis a clear sense in which a philosophical theory cannot

contain itself - that such is a conceptually meaningless notion which results from taking ourselves too seriously

4/7/82

vol. 7.

Husserl

very impressed with H's 'bracketing' it's important

I see it as, the first attempt as far as I know - to turn the 'negativeness' of the lack of ontological commitment into a positive fact

what Husserl is saying is that lack of commitment is important - necessary - if we really want to know (almost in an 'essentialist' sense) this is quite radical, most philosophers have shown a great deal of insecurity concerning lack of commitment. Husserl as far as I know is the first to see the real epistemological potential in this kind of skepticism

he has in my terms, reacted positively to skepticism - to the unknown - he has not worried about it - and has used it in a very productive way

what is perhaps most important is that, via his. theory of bracketing, he has recognized that philosophical theories can, in a formal sense, be viewed objectively - can be viewed, outside of themselves - and seen as possible interpretations of 'phenomenon'

where I think Husserl failed, (though I'm not sure - as I haven't read him only commentaries) is that he failed to see that phenomenon of experience is, a characterization of reality - his attempt to get beyond all characterizations of

reality - to some pure basis from which to begin  - is brave exciting but impossible

why is this so?

Descartes wanted to reach a point in his intellectual analysis where he could no longer doubt - where what was intuited, was intuited, and was not questionable? (or more precisely - 'doubtable')

now his idea that he cannot doubt what he is thinking, because the very act of doubting is a kind of thinking and that inorder to think one must exist. 'I' the thinking

thing exist, exist - because if 'I' didn't I couldn't exist

seen this way 'I am', the conclusion, is rather undramatic - it's obviously contained 'in' the 'I think' - in a sense, it is 'ex-duced' from it. Descartes' affirmation of his own

existence is not something which is a clear and distinct idea - it is obvious in an analytical way - but not immediately so -

the certainty of the I cannot doubt that I am thinking - rests in the assumption that doubting is a form of thinking - which rests easily but need not - it is in any case just an analytical argument. I am thinking and I am thinking - it is logically speaking uninformative

7/7/82

what I would suggest is that it is obvious that Descartes' conclusion concerning the

relation between thought and existence, depend for their 'strength' on the truth of rationalist epistemology and method

Descartes' ideas are clear and distinct given his philosophical presuppositions (but only given these presuppositions)

Now what is highly significant about Husserl is that he has realized that the clarity and distinctiveness of Descartes' ideas - is dependent on it's philosophical underpinnings 

AND he has seen, given this Descartes' claim to epistemological purity to be tarnished

now in introducing the bracketing idea Husserl is clearly attempting to circumvent the problem of philosophical presuppositions

what he is saying in effect is:-

(1) philosophical categories, prejudice the attainment of true - ideal knowledge - fundamental knowledge

(and there certainly is a point here - it is too easy to presume that reality is 'realist' that ethics is 'ideal' etc. - it is too easy to think within categories - rather than outside them)

(2) that we can remedy this situation - we can experience think / know, whatever without such categories

now this is a most important - perhaps even from my point of view - the most important claim concerning objectivity that has been made in the history of philosophy

prior to Husserl - the problem of objectivity was effectively the problem of warring philosophical systems - philosophers behaved publicly if not privately as if it was a contest between arguments - who had the better argument

now the big con in this is the idea that objectivity exists over and above the warring positions

philosophers tend to act as if objective reality will in some sense decide the issue

all this is of course fiction

the acceptance of a philosophical point of view is not logically speaking a philosophical issue at all - it is a social issue - logical factors may play a part - but they are only ingredients in the social pudding

as far as the existence of some overriding objectivity is concerned - this too is absurd

the only sense in which there is an overriding objectivity is in the sense that the unknown exists above and beyond all theories of knowledge - such as objectivity - are by their nature 'contentless' -

and of course what has not been appreciated by philosophers is that given this - that the objective is unknown - thus contentless hence silent -

given this there is no real point to the competition between philosophical theories - there is no philosophical criticism in this sense - no final show down no victories there is only possible interpretations of the unknown

the limit of possible interpretations of the unknown is there a limit to possibility?

is there a sense in which an interpretation would be impossible?

how do we decide what is impossible?

'impossibility' on my theory is 'impossibility' -

what I mean here is that from my point of view it is impossible to present an interpretation of the unknown which is final - which makes all other interpretations redundant - which contains all other interpretations - such is the kind of epistemology which rationalists and empiricists alike hoped for - and they believed they developed -

and the basis of this view - is the view that reality can in some sense judge arbitrate, articulate, decide between conflicting theories - but as I have argued this is not

on- reality is silent - the unknown gives nothing away - its deaf to pleas for confirmation or falsification of theories - this fact is of course not easy to see

(philosophically) or accept (psychologically) and due to poor philosophical vision and fear philosophers have continued to search for what does not exist

modern philosophy has been more concerned with the impossible it has missed the possible

so getting back to (2) Husserl has assumed that we can see reality with out philosophical spectacles - this is what suspending judgement on reality comes to. Now the $64 question is, is this possible?

now there is an obvious dense in which objectivity of one kind is not possible. It is not possible for the subject to know, reality 'the object' non-subjectively - that is

it is not possible to step out of reality and still know it

this conception does not make sense

and I don't think it is reasonable to argue that such a concept is objectivity

so what then is objectivity?

does this mean that objectivity is incurably subjective yes in a sense - but I don't know that we would then want to say that objectivity is not possible. Back to the question

clearly Descartes saw objectivity as being incurably subjective - but he believed that the subject could purge itself of impurity - (doubt) and in so doing objectivity -

clarity and distinctness would be achieved

we can say that empiricist objectivity consisted in metaphorically cleansing the mind of all ideas presuppositions - and filling it with pure observation (sense experience

it must be remembered was the real or ultimate source of Cartesian doubt). Objectivity for the empiricist - 'objective knowledge' - or perhaps more aptly genuine

knowledge - is knowledge based on the deliverences of the senses

now what is clear from just this very simple account of empiricism and rationalism is that both programs have seen objectivity as stemming from, being based upon some

clarity or purity of vision

and in seeking this purity, they have assumed that their methodologies are the means by which this is achieved

now as I see it Husserl has seen that philosophical methodwhile achieving this cleansing - has had to pay a heady price for it - and the price is commitment - ontological commitment

and what this means is that the purity is clearly defined

now this is not a matter of concern for traditional epistemologists - it is in fact what they have sought after

Husserl's 'bracketing' has the effect of calling into question this result. He has in effect turned their question on them and said, how can you claim to see clearly if your vision

is determined in one way or another?

what he has said is how can a determined vision be an objective vision. Surely it is prejudiced?

now this point makes sense only if it can be shown that (a) a non committed approach is possible and (b) that it makes sense - is productive

now I don't know enough about Husserl's philosophy to say whether he has shown that such is possible

but I am convinced that this problem, lets call it Husserl'sproblem, is the central problem of philosophy - in fact I would go so far as to say that unless it can be shown

that non- commitment is possible then philosophy has failed - that it is in one sense a pointless exercise

now this is where my philosophy begins with the ashes

I believe that traditional epistemology points to the pointless

and that we must accept this as our base-less foundation

the lesson we learn from traditional epistemologies is that objective knowledge is not possible

we must in a bracketed sense begin with this

traditional accounts lead to skepticism

and this is in a sense nothing more than an affirmation of the truth of our most fundamental suspicions about reality

as I have argued before the New Philosophy must first accept this fact

but what happens if we do? can we go beyond it, or can - must we retreat to the endless cycle of commitment programs which lead to skepticism? (here I am thinking

in a traditional sense - but drawing out the conclusions of doing so)

(one of the reasons Hegel was great was Just that he saw this endless cycle - he tried to use it - to base a metaphysics on it - and unless it can be shown that the

endless cycle cam be broken we must adopt some kind of Hegelian analysis)

I think it can be and I think Husserl saw this - (though I doubt that he was able to achieve it - can't say for sure though)

I believe that the answer begins with assuming that the phenomenon of experience is the unknown . That we do not know, and realising that all metaphysics theory of knowledge etc. leads to this fact

what I have to show is that we can accept doubt - no - certainty about the lack of knowledge - and make this our basis - the cure not the disease

the question then is can anybody - is it possible to not only step back from reality - all philosophers do this - but further to step back from what all philosophers do

to step back from all programs - and in a non-programmatic non-committed sense see reality clearly?

I think this can be done and furthermore I think that it is easy.

we can survey the epistemological scene - any bright philosophical novice does this - he is not committed -but he invariably believes that he should be - he has to

unlearn all his previous knowledge - and few can do this, or want to do this

Husserl did or tried to do this

but I suspect he failed - just simply because he failed to see that in his brackets was

(nothing)

or more precisely

(ignorance)

I say that ignorance is the object

of 'knowledge'

that knowledge is the subject of ignorance

Amen

(objectivity) is ignorance )

)subjectivity( is knowledge

we can know what is possible

anything is possible

nothing is actual

(will leave 'it' as it stands or falls

in faith

           beyond)

objectivity rests in being able to follow through traditional epistemology - commitment epistemology - see that it logically leads to skepticism

and that once we have arrived at this

we step out - and see it as it is

but can we step out?

we do it as students

but we fail to realize that this is the answer

the picture that is emerging - is a theory of enlightened ignorance

what I'm considering here is a global view of philosophy

arguing that traditional epistemology leads to enlightened ignorance - that such is the final stage of philosophical development

this enlightened ignorance is to distinguished from base ignorance

now by 'base ignorance' I mean that ignorance which exists prior to initiation into philosophy - the ignorance of the novice - unenlightened ignorance

philosophical development is a three phase process

base ignorance

knowledge

enlightened ignorance

now what has to be done is to distinguish clearly and characterize sharply base and enlightened ignorance

the first point I want to make is that the two states of ignorance are quite different - but how can there be kinds of ignorance? Isn't ignorance just ignorance?

I think not and I think Socrates proved this

Socrates showed that there is ignorance when you don't know  X

this is common unenlightened ignorance

the kind of ignorance that Socrates discovered is when you know what you don't know (and perhaps) can't know

that is knowing the absence of K

in its extreme form - it is knowing that there is no knowledge

and prime facie a paradox

one way of avoiding the paradox is  by distinguishing quite sharply between knowing and knowledge

now this is I think a radical and perhaps difficult proposal

it is radical because I don't know of anyone who has made this distinction

and I think the reason is that most philosophers would argue that there is no distinction of kind (knowing and the known are process and product)

the distinction is one of mode

this has not been stated very well -

and in fact there is no one answer to the question of epistemological and ontological status or relation between knowing and the known. Each philosophy will have its own answer - the realist view is quite different from the phenomenalist etc.

perhaps this can be said though

there is a sense in which it seems prime facie obvious that if there is knowledge there must also be something known and visa versa - if known - there must be a

knowing process

for some reason the visa versa is more obvious

this is I think a very interesting and complex issue - and one that requires a great deal of attention

the point I'm interested in at this moment is the assumption that if there is knowing there must be the known

now I think there is an argument about this supposed relationship - or at least there can be

can there be skepticism about knowledge without there being skepticism about knowing

what I mean is this

perhaps knowing is a real phenomenon

in the sense that it is a real form of behaviour - people do in fact act in a way we would call knowing

now there is a sense in which this brakes down unless there is something known - unless there is an object of this knowing process - unless there is knowledge

now this is an intuitively commonsensical / forceful argument

but if we take skepticism seriously it is not necessary

let's say for argument's sake there is no knowledge

surely, it will be replied if there is no knowledge there must be no knowing - and that is sensible enough

what I am interested in saying is that - and this is what is radical

there can be knowing without knowledge

and at the moment I don't want to retreat from the above statement by saying that we have to redefine 'knowing' - to not knowing

I want to say that knowing is real but knowledge isn't

(a general point - this position if it is true - suggests that the knower - man is a strange creature - that man is in some fundamental sense failed -by his own nature)

but inorder to explain this we have to (1) explain this sense of knowing

how is it different, from traditional senses of knowing? is it different?

Popper distinguishes between searchlight theories of knowledge and bucket theories

now the searchlight idea might provide a clue

it can be interpreted as defining knowing - (Popper I think wanted it for knowledge - not knowing - though he may have failed to distinguish the two) as contentless

knowing becomes a searching for -a searching for content

now I would argue that the search is as Popper put his own life - an-unended quest

but one which, and Popper would agree with this, always is failed, by the illusion of knowledge

but not entirely - we do end up learning - not something in the sense of content - what we learn is our contentless-ness

so this in my opinion is the only legitimate use of  'knowledge'

it is on this view a negative phenomenon - the illusion is positive knowledge - this I think is a given illusion - what analysis  shows is that 'knowledge' - is relative to the positive illusion - 'not -knowledge - not knowledge is what I have rather paradoxically refereed to as genuine knowledge - it is knowledge which is contentless - it is if you like the awareness of the absence of positive knowledge - all we can say is that, with Socrates we know what we don't know - are aware of the illusion of knowledge

THIS POINT OF VIEW GOES BEYOND Husserl bracketing

we cannot only throw away Wittgenstein's ladder - but we must dispose of Husserl brackets - be content, in a formal sense with awareness of the illusion the Maya -

the reality is negative

reality is what is not (there are very good arguments for not living realistically - but rather being aware of the illusion of living as if

NB: this conclusion leads to a dialectical view of the mind - the basic process is apprehending, the positive (illusion) which merges into becomes the negative (reality)

not quite what Hegel had in mind - closer to Heraclitus constant change between the two poles - with a positive value on the negative side

vol. 8

20/7/82

cannot envisage how an empiricist program could account for self consciousness

Buffon was no buffoon - Feyerabend doesn't seem quite as revolutionary against his philosophy - he is I think the originator of 'anything goes'

believe that detachment is most easily achieved via the philosophical process - the philosopher is or can be seen as a model of detachment - western philosophy

has not played up this fact and the eastern philosophers I suspect do not see detachment as simply being a consequence of the practice (and perhaps living) of a method

true love I think must mean total acceptance - a true lover is one who totally accepts his / her lover - this I think is desired but not realized

love thus becomes the humans most basic response to the unknown - in the eyes of true love there is no certainty

impressed with Liebnitz's question - could God have created a world without the possibility of evil - its the best argument for evil and suffering - apart

from Jacob Baumes - God is both good and evil

21/7/82

in my philosophy there are two unknowns - the unknown - Kant's noumenon - that which cannot be known - and secondly the unknown of the phenomenalist

it seems to me that the unknown is in itself metaphysically very difficult - it's the old substance thing - and it's not as radical or as an exciting as the phenomenalist's unknown

how can you consistently think of an unknown thing?

the idea presupposes its opposite - that is in saying the unknown is a 'thing' - we are presupposing that we know something about the unknown - that it is a thing and this cannot be if the unknown is just that

26/7/82

Kant

Copleston:

'There remains therefore, the second line of argument that from possibility as consequence to the existence of God as it's ground. And it is this line of argument

which Kant proposes as the only possible basis for a demonstration of God's existence. There is he tells us no intrinsic logical contradiction in denying all existence whatsoever. But what we cannot legitimately do is to affirm possibility and at the same time to deny that there is an existent ground of possibility. And Kant proceeds to argue that this being must be one, simple, immutable eternal spiritual and whatever else is included in the meaning of the term 'God' as used in metal

vol. 6 pt 1, 218

this is the most brilliant argument for the existence of God put forward

and why it is most important to me is that it addresses itself to a question I have had in the back of my mind for a long time - one I haven't faced up to yet - it is simply - what is this 'possibility' which is so central to my philosophy

now I can't get out of this one by saying that I don't know - my skepticism is the other half - the other basic category of my outlook -

just a sec - previously I have tried to derive possibility from ignorance i.e. given that we know nothing - anything is possible

this is a phenomenologists answer

still I think Kant's question is real - his question is what is possibility? but does he answer it

doesn't he say possibility must have an existent foundation - a ground

what I'm saying is that possibility is grounded in groundlessness

that is possibility is only possible given ignorance -

knowledge defeats possibility

for knowledge is the consequent of the actual not possible

so I suppose my argument is that possibility by definition is a consequence of ignorance. Kant would say possibility is the ground of knowledge - and hence must be grounded in something - and his argument is sound given his first premise (that knowledge is (actual))

but still the question what is possibility

for me I guess it must be a consequent of groundlessness of ignorance

and this is to argue that possibility is logical - not ontological as Kant would say

but why is this so?

what does it mean to say possibility - is logical

perhaps it means that given the non-existence of the actual - the possible (which if the actual by definition means existent) is non-existent

weird but logically impeccable

the general consequence of my line of thought is that existence is an illusion

and non-existence - or the category of 'it' is real

I believe that philosophical analysis shows us this it is on face value an absurd conclusion

and fortunately nature has equipped us to live as if it was false

this is no argument against its truth - though it is an argument about the strangeness of reality - a strangeness no one who has truly lived can deny or defy

Kant unfortunately had his feet on what he thought was the ground

a good man strong and brilliant he lacked the recklessness of true genius

have decided a philosophical decision which has great personal repercussions - that what is important is not how one should live (i.e. Socrates, Plato - most western

philosophers - including Kant) - but rather the problem is - how to live the way one wants to

which for me has been a greater dilemma than the should problem

should is simple need is hard - need is survival - and granted there are shoulds in survival - but only 'need-shoulds'

that is what we should do inorder to fulfill our needs

'should' ethics - has assumed that ideals do or can determine needs this I believe is wrong - and furthermore dangerous -

I am not suggesting that ideals are not involved in needs - clearly they are - but it is need which is the moral basis of ideals - not visa versa

in a very obvious sense ideals cannot exist, have meaning if needs do not

ideals are particular components of needs

our ideals - are the antithesis of our needs in a sense they are needs conception of its own fulfillment and hence annihilation in a sense

this is a very intriguing issue that really requires a lot of meticulous thinking

needs are not passive

they are not buckets to be filled

they are not hard and given - at all levels the greatest needs are difficult to define and difficult to fulfill -

the conflict between is and ought in needs is the central moral-need issue -

some would see the is /ought problem as being logically and ontologically - pluralistic i.e. there is an 'is' realm and an 'ought 'realm

I would like to argue a thesis that there are two kinds of needs

is-needs and ought-needs

moral dilemmas are just the conflict between the two

a decision to opt for fulfillment of is or ought is the first step to the resolution of moral dilemmas

what needs to be looked into is the logical characteristics of is and ought needs

one thing that we can say is that normal usage the is / need is given, but the ought need is not - it is what is desired

an ought need is what I want to do

an is need is what I do

perhaps a 'do/would do' distinction is helpful

both though are needs

but there is a sense in which need is not contingent it is necessary

what I mean partly is that no one can exist without natural and ideal needs and a conflict between the two (given of course normal basic functioning - that is need is a

natural necessity)

the eastern attempt to overcome needs is an attempt to defy humanity

so what is an immoral act on this view

I think an easy answer is to say that it is a needless act

(sounds neat but it's probably wrong)

moral dilemmas occur with the conflict of different kinds of needs

so what I've established is that there are two kinds of needs

is-needs, and ought-needs -

ought needs require some clarification

there is the ought need to do something - to change some behaviour or attitude - this is an unfulfilled ought need - on the other hand there are fulfilled ought needs - needs

that are fulfilled - ideals which are, at point and time integrated into behaviour

are all ought needs moral needs on my view they must be

but it is still  necessary to distinguish kinds of (moral) ought needs

one obvious distinction is egoistic ought needs and altruistic ought needs

a distinction between what I ought to do for myself, with my self as object and what I ought to do for someone else - where the other is object -

it is clear that there can be and often is a conflict between egoistic and altruistic needs

how is such a conflict resolved - can it be resolved on a needs basis

I think so I believe one might be able to use 'a greater' distinction -

the greater need is the one, one should attempt to fulfill

and there are no a priori principles or reasons which can be called upon - to arbitrate this conflict

such a decision is I think based on considerations which cannot be pre-determined

how though do we decide greater need?

and why should moral need be the greater consideration?

1/8/82

Kant

'the final conclusion of this whole section is therefore that all principles of pure understanding are nothing more than a priori principles of the possibility of 

experience; and to this alone do all synthetic a priori propositions relate'

- Copleston vol. 6 11 61

in one sense Kant's program can be seen as what I call a 'modal' inquiry - that is an inquiry into what is possible

I believe that such is the main task of philosophy - but where I would differ from Kant is in the matter of the nature of possibility - as I have outlined above

for Kant possibility exists - for me the ground of possibility is the unknown

possibility is nothing more than - the totality of responses at all places and times to the unknown

any further characterization of this concept would entail a normative commitment

2/8/82

which brings me to a point concerning the unknown

there is a sense in which it is quite ridiculous to attempt to characterize the unknown - it simply is unknown and we can't really say anything additional to this

now of course there are some interesting accounts of the unknown - phenomenalist - noumenalist etc. -

and any characterization is modal - a possible interpretation of the unknown as the unknown

which of course is different to the 'filling in' - modal activity - but not really -different - not essentially

an important question is how does this filling occur - what is the origin of life content we give the emptiness of the 'unknown space'

but this question maybe misleading

the sort of meta picture I have is one where there is primarily an unknown - which is then filled 'too some extent by human consciousness - i.e. 'along the same lines as Pierce's picture of nullity - out of which emerges determinism

this is O.K., but as Kant points out against Descartes' idealism - its rather artificial - there is a mutual dependence and inter-dependence between the two categories

- and all this I have already gone into - the point I wish to make again - I make it to myself - is that the issue of modalism - how it occurs - what it does etc. - is a modal

issue itself - that is there are a whole number of possibilities - possible accounts of the relation between modal reality - and the unknown

Kant gave an interesting account as did Pierce

I am though not at all interested in the modal issue at the moment

but some comments on Kant's noumenon -

Copleston outlines the difficulties and the criticisms which have been put forward by Kant's critics

I have a general point to make

Kant's problems with this category are fundamentally due to a confusion between formal and modal theories of the unknown

the noumenon, just by the way, is required to do far too much for Kant. i.e.: he wants it to represent

(a) the unknown (in itself)

(b) the limit of experience

(c) the ground of non empirical reality

(d) the ground of phenomenal reality

(e) perhaps more

we relate well to the idea of the unknown (as such) - this is the formal - the unknown

but Kant wants to say something about the unknown -

and in so doing he is committing himself to an account or accounts of its nature

now I haven't given the issue a great deal of thought but I suspect there does exist a tension in Kant's philosophy - because he wants his cake and he wants to eat it again

and again

- now if this is so - its just a simple mater of clarifying the distinctiveness, and relationship between formal and modal 'modes' of knowledge categories

(NB:

on the argument that Kant uses the noumenon as a cause of phenomenon -

there need not be a causal relationship

we can say of a thing

(1) it has two aspects

(a) its appearance

(b) what does not appear

to put it crudely this is not such a strange idea

any object has two perceptual aspects

and there is no causal relation - in fact it seems prime facie absurd to say that the unseen causes the seen -

thinking of how through the ups and downs mainly downs of romantic love / erotic love - something persists - and its certainly not success - and it seems that all can be

said is that it was love - and love it seems is strictly speaking undefinable it is a cluster concept - and thus the term as a 'definite' term is strictly speaking contentless - and it seems that it is sensible to say of love, as many have, that it is all and yet nothing

it occurred to me that all that really persists through such love is the unknown - the unknown in the other - this is all that ultimately persists

romance hinges on the unknown in the other - the unknown in each other is what exists 'after the fire is gone' -and before the fire burns

I believe that the reason that most love dies is because lovers who begin by being enthralled by the unknown in each other end up being afraid of it

a positive attitude to the unknown creates possibilities

a negative attitude destroys possibilities

and of all possibilities in this life love is no option

5/8/82

vol. 9 182 August

if as I have argued the object of Knowledge - the knower's object - is the unknown

it follows that knowledge (perhaps the knower) is the subject of the unknown

I'm not sure exactly what the significance of this is - but it sounds and  feels good

its the sort of statement that has always delighted and intrigued metaphysicians

just on the unknown - want to reaffirm a position I reached in the last vol. - one which I think is quite important - and furthermore I don't want to forget it -

the nature of the unknown is not something that we can specify

in previous discussions I have considered the relative merits of the phenomenal as against the noumenal view of  the unknown and was really quite undecided

the real point is simply that we cannot specify the nature of the unknown - non-modally

it is not - an entity (though it could be represented as one, for certain philosophical - pragmatic reasons) which is characterized in itself

the point is that we cannot speak about the 'unknown' non-modally

but this is not disastrous - it doesn't destroy the unknown - but - merely in a sense defines it as - really indefinable

the unknown is the non-modal

or - what is beyond the modal (the known) any characterization of it is modal

this means it is a possible interpretation which means it

is

- not given

- imposed

- theoretical

- tentative

in summary not actual

so perhaps it would be philosophically simpler to talk of two kinds of categories - the modal and the non-modal

and drop the unknown as a category - yes - but I still like the unknown

6/8/82

what of the limits of knowledge the Kantian problem?

well the simple answer is that the unknown is the limit of knowledge - but how can this be if the unknown is the object of knowledge

can the object of knowledge be the limit of knowledge -

well this doesn't sound as odd as it did at first

knowledge cannot go beyond its object

but can we still say that the limit of knowledge is the unknown

well yes we can

but if we do we get an entirely different answer to the one Kant expected and got

the picture we get is that the limit of knowledge is the limitlessness of its object - the limitlessness of the unknown

this conclusion is for me aesthetically pleasing and it is epistemologically much better than I had expected

one positive result of it is that - it presents non-foundational epistemologies in a positive rather than negative light

you see what puts a lot of thinkers off non-foundational views is the thought that it leads downwards - in a logical sense - endlessly down - the bottomless pit of pure reason

now what I think is perhaps one of my most important discoveries is that, this picture is not only avoidable, and not necessary to foundationalism but that it is not what non-foundationalism is - it is a false picture

my picture is a lateral picture - a spatial picture if you like - the unknown extends - this is the basis of a positive skepticism

what I'm suggesting is that a negative skepticism throws up a depth picture of the foundation-lessness of knowledge

my picture of the unknown is - or has become - I am here offering - a lateral picture of the unknown of non- foundational knowledge

now this I think is quite original - and I think it places skepticism on a strong footing -

what I call positive footing but what must be appreciated is that this lateral view of non-foundationalism is only possible given my conception of the object of knowledge - this is most important

for me the object of knowledge is the unknown and further I see the object as a positive

the bottomless pit theories of non-foundational epistemologies result from 'horizontal' or 'depth' theories of knowledge - non-foundational theories of knowledge

once we have such a perspective - and it is a sacred cow in our culture the assent of knowledge from ignorance to the highest achievement(?) of science -

it is a conception which I think probably began with Aristotle - one which I think was certainly adhered to and fostered by some mediaeval philosophers - and so on - it is a perennial assumption about the nature - direction of knowledge

in our day it is firmly entrenched not only in the upper echelons of 'higher' learning - but it seems to be well and truly entrenched in-non-academic common sense - every day man in the street view of knowledge - certainly it is an attitude which is at the heart of education systems

in its simplest form it is like this - we begin with some basic building blocks of knowledge - the good oil fact usually - and building on these facts - the great edifice

of knowledge is built -

what I'm concerned about here is the directional aspect perspective of the nature of knowledge

(its spin off in ideological terms is the idea scientific = human progress - but even more generally than this is the fact the very idea of progress itself

in fact it is - difficult to think of progress - to define the term in non-upward - vertical terms)

now I think we can explain the social- ideological outlook in terms of epistemology - but an interesting question is why this outlook initially

I am tempted and it is not the first time - to think that some kind of anthropological explanation might be forthcoming

i.e. here's my shot at anthropology - an anthropological explanation of the upward-vertical perception of the nature of knowledge and progress

anyway the sort of idea I have in mind is this -

perhaps because of the fact that ancient man, and for that matter modern man, the heavens, which are above - which were and are a continued source of mystery - with

such magnificent phenomena as the sun, moon and stars - perhaps because the earth - the world we live in is given familiar - man has not only looked up in a physical

way - but because of this he has tended to think upwards in an epistemological sense

the idea is sketchy and is better stated elsewhere

its not important

what is important is the point I have made in a philosophical sense - the distinction between vertical and horizontal thinking

(perhaps Edward de Bono beat me to it - with his lateral thinking -  what I'm on about I suspect is a far deeper conception than de Bono's - perhaps its the kind of

epistemological distinction he would welcome - who knows - I must check him out)

and this distinction as I have suggested is most important with respects to skepticism - this I think on a technical epistemological level is where its greatness lies - it offers an

entirely new picture of the unknown - of ignorance

its an horizon rather than a depth view of the unknown - far more exciting than the bottomless pit stuff -

and it really suggests an heuristic -

it suggests a picture of the mind reaching out - spinning out into the great unknown - the great limitless unknown -

and getting back for a minute to the Kantian question, what are the limits of knowledge - the limit of knowledge is the limitlessness of the unknown

it is this limitlessness which is reflected in Modalism (with a capital M)

its not just a limitlessness in an infinite-spatial sense its also a limitlessness in a spatial sense - (or as Wittgenstein called it logical space)

the forms which will emerge and disappear in the modal exploration of the unknown cannot be specified in advance

'formalism' - the forms of knowledge - are indeterminate

now getting back to the vertical view for a moment

Russell had quite a lot to say about it in connection with the hierarchy of knowledge in language theory

he believed there was no upward limit to language construction

but that there was a downward limit

i.e. - some kind of rock bottom language the concepts of which are irreducible - basic statements - which report - reflect that wonderful entity of modern empiricism - the one and only - the sense datum

what's wrong with this idea of Russell's of a downward limit?

well all that I have read suggests to me that the sense datum is a creation of faith hope and empiricist self charity

it is not a phenomenon of experience or a dictate of reason

not that I believe in such rubbish anyway - but the proponents of such preposterous fictions (good one eh) hold fast to such epistemological ghosts

look it seems to me that Russell's mob - in fact just said - this sense datum just has to exist - and that's that - and this is what it looks like - these are its characteristics

once it admitted - all that great knowledge we love and respect - has a solid foundation

rubbish of course

the fact is that these foundations of knowledge are merely given in a pragmatic way - there are no concrete theoretical foundations -everything goes to the bottom and keeps

going

and given this there is no limit - no downward limit of language - and for that matter there is no upper limit

in fact philosophically up and down are really relative - to a view point - which I have just discredited anyway

vie operate with begin with what our nature has given us but beyond this are fictions - pragmatic fictions

pragmatic fictions which it was thought by Russell to exist on sound logical / epistemological / ontological - bases

but I believe as I have suggested above - that such is not the case - Russell's downward limit is just simply a decision to stop - that's all

what I think I have shown is that there is 'natural' necessity to look at knowledge in this way - that it is possible to conceive the situation in- a horizontal way - and further that if done so there are some fringe benefits

just on the Kantian question - the limits of knowledge

Kant would say the limits are the limits of the mind - that reality's limits are the minds limits

well I suppose I would agree with this normatively that is

where I differ crucially from Kant is in that I have distinguished two levels of

metaphysics (1) normative (2) formal

now in Kant there is no distinction - and it is to his and metaphysic's disadvantage

asked as a formal question - 'what are the limits of knowledge?' I would have to say as usual - here are the possible answers which have been given - here are some possibilities which haven't been explored

Kant believed he had the only sensible answer - far too restrictive for a skeptic like me

the point about Russell is that he knew that without a downward limit the result is skepticism and he wanted to avoid this at all costs

in a sense he was right - given his overall perception of knowledge - beyond the basis of common experience - is skepticism - he was unable to see this as a firm basis - no real argument here - language falls apart at this point - in a rational sense

the indeterminacy of the unknown was something Russell was aware of but couldn't deal with - he was clearly afraid of it

the unknown dimension shows me the baselessness of language - Russell couldn't accept didn't want to accept this conclusion

I in contrast see such as liberating - 'anything goes' at the bottom as at the top

8/8/82

thought today that what I've been trying to achieve with my meta / normative distinction is -exactly what Kant- or perhaps something of what Kant was attempting with his phenomenon / noumenon distinction

my distinction is between different kinds of descriptive explanations - theories - that is - Kant's distintion is between different realities

as commentators have pointed out a distinction between 'realities' is awkward at the very least - surely an object is just what it is - an object - not an entity that exists

in appearance and beyond experience

what I am getting at is not that such a distinction is wrong - between what appears and what doesn't - but rather that such a distinction should be drawn as a theoretical distinction - not a phenomenal or real distinction

a distinction between theories is easier because if falls back on perceptions - different ways of perceiving the object of perception - different ways of perceiving reality

for Kant though this is not really possible - reality is fixed - there are two dimensions to the real world -the world which appears and the world in itself

for me these categories are O.K - sensible enough - and my own philosophy corresponds in spirit - but strictly speaking this view is just a possibility - in my view a very interesting and important possibility but - nevertheless - from a meta point of view just a possible interpretation

the idea of possible interpretations, is only possible if what is interpreted is interpreted as indeterminate - if reality does not in fact dictate to us our view of it

now it seems to me that the modality of knowledge - the fact of theory - meta pluralism is itself a strong argument for indeterminacy.

its not of course in itself conclusive (one could i.e. ask as most philosophers would - 'well yes there is philosophical pluralism - but this only indicates how elusive truth is - the truth is that one account existent or not - must be the one - pluralism - only indicates the inadequacies of the epistemological state of affairs

this is a plausible point of view - let's assume for the moment that it is true - that truth is monistic and attainable - my question is, 'who knows when the truth goes by?'

you see the real problem - and this may seem like a facile thing to say - is that there does not exist a golden bar of truth - against which we can measure our lives - such

simply does not exist - and if it does not exist - the superficial - obvious reason is that human perception is indeterminate on a theoretical level - and this is the level on which the issue of truth arises

the indeterminacy of theoretical perception is worth emphasizing

the point is that if 'truth' - some sort of objective truth did exist - on my view because of our theoretical perceptual indeterminacy we would fail to identify it

in fact truth is just another philosophical concept which has some pragmatic value - some survival value

(the constant search for Ideality - ideal concepts such as truth justice love etc. - is something I would like to give a lot of thought to - would like to come up with some

normative theory - some good explanation)

having been brought up by the empiricists I still tend to think of perception according to the empiricist model

but in fact what I believe is that perception is entirely theoretical - that there are different levels of perception

- putting it simply theoretical - and non-theoretical

(though in an earlier note book I threw around the idea of progression from realism to idealism to skepticism - still interesting - this idea of looking at the panorama of

philosophical theories and then developing theories about e.g. the relationship of the various systems - is a kind of 'sociology' of philosophy - and is the kind of enterprise

which becomes 'philosophical' given my outlook on the nature of philosophy - its the sought of thing Kuhn did with science

in any case perception is a much broader concept phenomenon than most modern philosophers would believe)

- nevertheless it is an argument which has been overlooked by most philosophers

- it is in fact - a fact - a natural fact - which requires only simple observation to discover and appreciate

now it must be pointed out that Kant did not believe that the mind receives the good oil from reality - reality on his view is determined by the mind - objects of perception

conform to the mind not visa versa

but the point is still much the same - on Kant's view, we can discover the basic categories of the mind - and these it seems are fixed (i.e. causality)

now I might not argue with this on a normative level -but I would certainly contend it on a meta. level - a pure level

such a view is a possible interpretation of reality -and is one which I have a great deal of sympathy with - butin the end it is no more than a possible interpretationof the unknown

the essential difference between Kant and myself is that Kant only recognizes one level of philosophizing

I suppose what he would call his critical rationalism

whereas I take the view that there are two levels

the first - the normative - is subjective - it is the philosophers interpretation of his world - this is not to say that any such interpretation does not have inter-subjective 'objective' features - features that is that are common to other attempts to explain the world

one might well call this 'objective' - modern philosophy does

I prefer the subjective label - largely because any such interpretation cannot 'rationalize' itself - cannot explain it own bases - its own presuppositions

as for example with the positivist's verificationist principle - Popper's critisizability principle

the criterion of rationality provided by these theories is not self applicable

the old question is, is self justification of a meta principle possible

suspect I have answered this question elsewhere - many times - and most recently to my satisfaction - but it is the question I see as the fundamental question of philosophy

- it is a question which constantly intrigues me - one that I think I will never

satisfactorily answer - it is in short an obsession

any way once again

any meta principle defines what rationality is

it is a statement of rationality

to ask does this statement refer to itself

apply to itself, is to ask is the statement, 'that rationality consists in X' - an instance of itself

- the answer is 'no'

such is quite an absurd idea

if such were the case

X would be an instance, a subset, etc. - of itself

it seems to me that if X is an instance of X - then X is both equal to and less than itself

or to put it another way

X which defines 'its field of discourse' has itself within that field

- this I think is the sort of consequence which results from the demand that 'meta theories should be self-referential

the question is really can any meaningful / significant statement be self-referential ?

this is really a large question which demands a complete analysis of language and meaning

lets begin at the beginning

in a very obvious perhaps naive sense a meaningful proposition / statement is one which reports reflects - behaviour and I mean behaviour in the broadest sense

what I'm heading to is a distinction between language and action

language in a logical sense is (is what? I really don'tknow) - a peculiar kind of behaviour - which is central to human action, because it is via language that all non-linguistic behaviour is made meaningful - and hence communicated

(this whole question of the nature of language is something which I think is way beyond me at the moment yet it is a fascinating can of worms)

we can as Russell has shown, convert any statement into a description - which means that statement 'a' is made the subject of statement 'b' - that is we can talk about any statement 'a' - can be made the predicate of 'b'

this is not what I'm talking about with regard to self-reference

self reference means that 'a' can be both subject and object

that is it can be an 'objective' statement about something - and at the same time the same time the statement can be its own object

a strange idea - but as the history of the subject shows - a perennial perhaps necessary concept

if as it seems such is absurd - meaningless

what does this tell as about the nature of language

it tells us that lang., inorder to be meaningful must be there's a term if I can think of it

anyway the idea is that a statement does not have meaning - in this sense because of any of its properties - this is the beginning of an argument against the semantic theory

of truth - but really what I'm getting at is that meaning is given to - not given by a statement -

its truth or falsity is not an internal property

truth - on this view becomes a relation (external) of correspondence or a coherence theory

the positivists adopted a correspondence view with regard to non-analytic synthetic statements

but it doesn't help them with regard to non-synthetic - -non-analytic statements - i.e. philosophical statements - - such came off badly - they were by definition meaningless

and this I certainly want to avoid

(there is also a question of syntactic considerations - a statement must conform, it seems to certain syntactic rules inorder to be even considered a candidate for

meaningfulness)

this is in a sense beyond the issue of self reference -though it is all relevant to it - it is an outcome of it

all I have managed to establish is that for a statement to be -

put it differently - self reference is not on a meta level a goer

except of course by definition, which is what happens in set theory - but this is I think conceptually quite dubious

the word I was looking for was extensive as distinct from intensive

extensive meaning is like this:

a statement which is extensively meaningful is one which is meaningful because the terms in the statement correspond to the 'facts'

intensive meaning is like this:

a statement is - intensively meaningful if it is true in virtue of its logical structure - i.e. tautological

it seems to me that the best that we can say about meta statements is that they are extensively meaningful

and this is of course hopelessly inadequate

the point is that meta theories are characterizations of reality - givers of meaning , coherence, rationality etc.

their object is reality but are they not a part of it

this is the trap -

it would seem that they must be - they are not 'unreal' -

but this is not the issue

they must be seen as statements about what is real

in this sense they are meta neutral - they are not their field of discourse - their subject - and at the same time they cannot be said to be negatives, of the same

they are meta neutral

- an idea which fits very well with my view of the skeptical nature of philosophical theories

this idea needs careful working out  - but it is I think the solution. I have been looking for or all these years - and as the killer would say "it's a mother humper all the way"

meta theories are vacuous - open - to ask is such a theory meaningful - rational is to ask an inappropriate question

such a question is I believe one which, if you understand the nature of meta theories - their function is a question - which does not arise

10/9/82

Copleston on Kant:

(1)

We have already seen that the transcendent Ideas of pure reason have no constitutive use. That is they do not give us knowledge of corresponding objects. The schematized

categories of the understanding, applied to the data of sense intuition, 'constitutive' objects and this enables us to know them. But the transcendental Ideas of pure reason are not applicable to the date of sense intuition. Nor are corresponding

objects supplied by a purely intellectual intuition. For we enjoy no such power of intellectual intuition. Hence the transcendental Ideas have no constitutive use and do

not increase our knowledge. If we make use of them to transcend the sphere of experience and to assert the existence of realities not given in experience we inevitably involve ourselves in those fallacies which it is the aim of the

Transcendental dialectic to expose' (94)

(2)

'Now if the transcendental Ideas are natural to reason, this suggests that they have a proper use. 'Thus the transcendental ideas will in all probability, have their proper and

consequently immanent use.' That is to say, they will have a use in relation to experience, though this use will not consist in enabling us to know objects corresponding to the Ideas. For there are no such objects immanent in experience.

And if we give the idea a transcendent use, we are as we have seen, inevitably involved in illusion and fallacy. What then is the proper employment of the ideas? Is it what Kant calls their 'regulative' use?

The special task of reason is to give, systematic arrangement to our cognitions. We can say, therefore, that 'the understanding is an object for reason, as sensibility is for the understanding. To produce a systematic unity in all possible empirical operations

of the understanding is the business of reason, just as the understanding writes the manifold of phenomena by means of concepts and brings them under empirical laws' In this process of systematization the Idea acts as a regulative principle of unity' (95)

'At the same time there is a natural tendency to objectify the Ideas. And then reason seeks to justify this objectification in the various branches of metaphysics. In doing so it oversteps the limits of human knowledge. But this transgression does not alter the fact that the ideas are natural to reason. They are not abstracted from experience; nor are they innate, in the proper sense of innate. But they arise out of reason's very nature. Hence there is nothing to take exception to in the ideas considered simply as such.'

(3)

'....That is to say, speculative metaphysics is supposed to be a science concerning objects corresponding to the transcendental Ideas of pure reason; but there are no such

objects. Hence there can be no science of them. The function of the ideas is not constitutive. Of course, if we mean by 'objects' simply realities, including unknown, and, indeed knowable realities, we are not entitled to say that there are no 'objects' corresponding to the ideas of the permanent simple ego and of God. But the word 'object' should be used as a term correlative to our knowledge. Those things are

possible objects which can be given to us in experience in the absence of any faculty of intellectual intuition. Hence it is perfectly correct to say that there are no objects

corresponding to the ideas. And in this case there obviously cannot be any science of them. Now there are strictly speaking, no objects corresponding to the Transcendental Ideas we can think realities to which the ideas of the soul and of God refer. And even if we do not project the ideas, so to speak into corresponding realities, the ideas have

content. Hence metaphysics is not meaningless. We cannot know by means of the speculative reason that there is a permanent simple soul or that God exists, but the ideas of the soul and God are free from logical contradiction. They are not mere meaningless terms. Alleged meta knowledgeis pseudo knowledge, illusion, not knowledge at all; and all attempts to show that it is knowledge are fallacious. But

metaphysical propositions are not meaningless simply because they are metaphysical' (98)

(4)

'the concepts of reality, substance, causality, and even of necessity in existence loose all meaning and become empty signs of concepts, without any content, if I venture

to employ them outside the field of the senses' (98)

(5)

'The latter are called a priori concepts of the understanding. And in so far as they are concepts, even the schematized categories must have some content. Hence even in their application outside the field of experience they posses at least some meaning. But the pure categories are said to be logical functions of judgements. In this case it seems to follow that they become concepts, as it were, or give rise to concepts only when they are schematized. The schematized categories would have no content in themselves. They would therefore be meaningless if applied outside the field of

experience. Terms such as Ens realissimum and necessary being would be void of content'. (98-99)

(6)

What he did hold, however was that if the categories are applied to God, they are not unable to give knowledge of God but are also of such indeterminate and vague content

that they are simply symbols of the unknown. We can, indeed think God; but we think Him simply by means of symbols. We produce a symbolic conception of the unknown.To think of God in terms of the schematized categories would be equivalent to bringing Him into the sensible world. We therefore try to think away the schematisation, as it were and to apply the term substance, for instance in an analogical sense. But the attempt to eliminate the concepts' reference to the

world of sense leaves us with a mere symbol void of determinate content. Our idea of God is thus symbolical only (99)

Copleston V. 6.11.

11/8/82

the preceding quotes are spot on the problem of the nature and justification of

metaphysics

I was surprised to come across (6). It is right in line with the conclusion I reached on the 8/8 . And I intend to discuss it below.

just a preliminary point, an overview of the above quotes. It strikes me that Kant was not as convinced as he has seemed to some - on the nature and function of transcendental Ideas

I think that his position as stated in (6) can be applied beyond the question of God - to all facets of reality - logically speaking can Kant avoid this? - I would say no - but this needs to argued

his idea that Transcendental Ideals are not constitutive is most interesting from my

point of view

they are regulative - now what can this mean - I think he is right here - but it needs to be looked at

so there are basically two questions to be answered

(1) what does it mean to say that Transcendental Ideas are regulative

(2)

(a) In what sense can it be sail that such ideas are non-constitutive, indeterminate?, symbolic?

(b) and does this mean or can it mean that they are 'empty'

just a couple of points on Kant:

Kant's Transcendental Ideas are in my sense meta - they are not for Kant what I would call normative

but should they be conceived as normative?

I think the overall problem with Kant is that his metaphysics is based too much - has too much faith in - science

and unfortunately for Kant I think he has far too fixed a view of the nature of science

science for him is rock bottom

and his metaphysics is an attempt to underpin this certainty - consequently he does not have any serious doubts about the status of (science based) metaphysics

metaphysics for him is as certain, if not more certain as the structure, which it provides a foundation for - the structure of science

this is where Kant and I disagree crucially

for me the certainty of science is an illusion

it seems to me that there are no epistemological foundations to science

the principles - if we can accurately determine them on which science is based are not epistemologically rooted in the way that rationalists and empiricists believe, or hope

they are in my opinion shots in the dark which for whatever reason have been adopted by practitioners - I think - for - very broadly speaking - pragmatic reasons - but this question, why science,? is a modal question itself - one for which the only adequate non-modal answer is - all answers that have been and can be given -

anyway as against Kant I don't believe that 'dogmatic'science is possible - though I do believe that metaphysics are possible (as distinct from metaphysics - singular) - and this means any metaphysics is possible

though no one meta is possible (in an objective sense)

13/8/82

Kant's categories of understanding or more correctly his Transcendental Idealism - is what he thinks the ground of experience is - that is experience would not be possible

without such regulative ideas

Kant's thing in itself is the ground of objective experience

it seems that for K there is some interaction, almost parallelism between the mind - a pre-established harmony in a sense - between the mind and reality - the thing -

reality in itself

Kant's realism is shaky - clearly we need certain regulative ideas to make experience - knowledge of phenomena - possible

but I sense Kant wants to say that phenomena are possible - exist (but are not known?) independently of the knower -otherwise we don't really have a 'real' world, which -

exists indendantly of the mind -

except of course for the noumenon - which is a meta fiction anyway (useful as it might be)

FOR Kant it seems the noumenon is not just the unknown - in my 'open' sense of unknown - for Kant the noumenon is 'the thing in itself' which by it's nature in unknown

I wonder does Kant realize that there is a sense in which such a definition of the unknown - his definition that is - is far too narrow - it is because - its just that as Kant

defines it - for my mind - we know too much about it - like any closed definition of the unknown - it's not unknown enough - the unknown. Kant didn't realize, could be any thing - not necessarily or even the noumenon

in fact for my money - strictly speaking the two should be separated

the noumenon for Kant may well be unknown - but it shouldn't be identified with the unknown

Kant's restricted view - of the unknown is a consequence of his restricted, limited view of the known (science - Newtonian) it needn't have been - he could have had the unknown - as just the negative of phenomena - but he-wanted it to

function as a substrate - and it's a neat idea but in fact its just too neat

I for one do not see any antimony or paradox resulting from thinking of the unknown in non-noumenal terms - this is where Kantian metaphysics falls down - Kant doesn't

seem to realize that the  categories of his metaphysics - brilliant as they are - are finally only possibilities

Kant falls to appreciate the modal nature of his own conception

I think ultimately because he had such a naive view of the significance of science

I an not denying the value of science as such, but I think Kant was wrong in assuming that what he saw as the certainty of science is the identifying mark off objectivity -

as I see it the main function Kant's meta fulfilled was that of providing a metaphysical foundation to Newtonian science - beyond this of course it has been very significant in a number of ways

what I'm most impressed with Kant is his facing up to the unknown - much as I think his conception of the unknown was inadequate

it was to my knowledge the first attempt to integrate a positive skepticism with knowledge

difficulties emerged - that is true - but it was a magnificent attempt - perhaps even the greatest of all time

Kant was only limited by his conception of science - but even so his achievement is unsurpassable

compare it with the modern 20th century empiricists andsee how inadequate their 'starvation philosophy' is in comparison. to Kant's

I think Kant's problem was that he had too ambitious a view of his metaphysics

the overall problem is not just his - it is the problem of all preceding and following metaphysics-

he sees his metaphysics as formal and not normative -

if he saw his Transcendental metaphysics - as a normative conception its modality would be obvious - but he sees his metaphysics as objective, as all inclusive - and consequently he fails to see that it is just one possible account of the nature of reality

14/8/82

vol. 10.

There is a sense in which Kant is for me the watershed of western philosophical thought

while he had a traditional objective view of his metaphysics (and for that matter, as far as I can work out so do all other philosophers apart from the ol greg.T) - he unlike

any philosopher I can think of, before or since (perhaps except in the present time) has approached modalism with his noumenal conception

what I mean is that he made room - he could see that modalism, was a necessity - and it is just this which his idea that the noumenal realm allows for - it is in this realm that he placed God, freewill, the self, immortality -

his argument can be seen as modal - but in a limited sense - his is a compromise modalism - not the fall blown modalism I argue for

- a full blown modalism, would have to be applied to his own conception of the nature of reality

it is important that Kant realized that the foundation of possibility is the unknown - and this I think is revolutionary though as I have pointed out I believe Kant had too

restrictive a view of the unknown)

believe it is useful to distinguish between ignorance and the unknown

the unknown quite simply is the objective state of ignorance -

ignorance is the subjective condition of the unknown

ignorance is the ground of possibility

ignorance is a normative block

Kant it must be stated nearly made the step from a partial modalism to a full modalism

his view that Trancendental Ideas - I think this is correct - are symbolic - nor-constitutive - contentless - is a point I had reached before reading of his wavering on this issue

I think this view is best described as an insight on his part - an insight he didn't develop because he didn't know how to - it, I suspect struck him with the force of truth - but he suspected that it would undermine his philosophy

my own answer is this -

the unknown is indeterminate - it can only be spoken about modally

this is a subtle but significant change in my position

previously I had viewed the situation in a dualistic way - a sharp dualism - on the one hand there is modality (knowledge) on the other hand the unknown (the ground of

knowledge) - in effect two categories -

my position is more subtle now - far more difficult to categorize

- and to be quite plain my feeling is that it may not be able to be categorized

a dualistic categorization doesn't work

and yet a standard monism is too stuffy

the best I can say is that modalism without the unknown is unthinkable and the unknown without modalism is uncharacterizable

(I think Kant would have understood this)

In that modalism characterizes the unknown it is, any modal theory is, not strictly speaking, as I had thought - a filling up of the unknown - but rather a forming of

the unknown - a moulding - a sculpture - the material (the unknown) is not changed by the process - it is rather shaped by the process

(what do you know? - the beginning of a philosophy of art - an aesthetics of the unknown which sees sculpture as the highest the purest form of art)

now someone might say but isn't the process qualitatively distinct from the product that is processed?

what I'm thinking is that such a distinction is only superficial - apparent - that the process is only distinct from its object in a conceptual sense perhaps - a pragmatic sense

the analogy of the sculptor and the sculpture might make this clearer

the sculptor might have a conception to begin with - and he might be able to form his material in accordance with this conception - if he does - and a good sculptor does - then the finished piece is nothing more than the process substantiated and process is has become the object the substance - at the point of completion or for that matter at any stage - it is not conceptually meaningfulto talk of the process as distinct from the product

16/8/82

Kant's ethic his categorical imperative strikes me as being an ethics of method - the categorical imperative tells us, only about the psychological conditions -

or some of them, necessary for a moral agent to believe his action is moral

if he can satisfy himself that his action should become a law of nature - then (on Kant's view) he should decide to do it - but does this have anything to do with the nature of the act - with good and evil in their traditional sense?

I suspect that Kant's idea of the categorical imperative is in fact adopted by moral agents - and that they feel that in being able to universalize their moral maxims they are in fact doing the right thing

it seems to me that universalization in fact has nothing to with moral worth or virtue in an objective sense (but of course my argument is that such terms are strictly

speaking, 'empty' - of objective or even subjective content - this is my meta moral argument the problem of ethics is in my view not an ought problem rather it is a descriptive- normative problem - normative in my technical sense of the term) - MORALITY - as such is just all the various accounts - solutions to the moral dilemma as moralists we are involved in a two prong program the first and primary concern of the moral philosopher is to detail all the various theories of morality - all the various answers to a particular problem - this is a descriptive problem not a normative one

(normative here in the moral sense). The second task of the moral philosophers is just to apply this information - to show others the possibilities that are available - this is

really no different from the first point really - except that it highlights the fact that philosophers have a practical and social responsibility to others - in these barren times this is a radical argument I'm sure most professional philosophers would want to give a great deal of thought to - what are research grants for? must not get nasty

back to Kant - it may happen that a universalized maxim is moral - is good virtuous - but this I would think has nothing to do with its logical form - which is really all that

universalization is about

the best Kant can say is that he has argued for a certain view of the logical form of ethical statements

and I for one can't see why moral statements should be of this form

in fact it seems to me patently obvious that moral statements do not have universal application

another question - it is assumed by Kant that it is possible to will that a maxim be universally adopted - but what is the significance of this willing?

what I have in mind is that willing is so simple - so inconsequential really - its just not enough to base an ethic on - its not substantial enough to function as a foundation for the categorical imperative

but whether on can will or not seems to me not to be the crucial question in this

context

the real issue is can one know that one's maxim can be universally adopted?

(willing - really is I think an empty at worst and irrelevant at best)

this seems to me to be the problem Kant has to face - if he doesn't then how relevant is his ethics to the real world?

and my main point here is how can we know - how could we possibly know if a moral principle could (should) be adopted universally? We might of course hope that it is - but this is hardly the point

what I'm saying is that Kant's will is weak - and that the issue is knowledge not will

now if it is not possible to know if a principle can be adopted universally - then universality cannot be formulated in anything but a non-trivial sense

Kant's ethics:   

1 duty

2 Categorical Imperative

3 autonomy

I really fail to see how Kant's universality principle is grounded in his view that all rational human beings should be treated as ends in themselves

a fine principle indeed - but I don't see its connection with the principle of universality

that is I don't see how such a principle grounds or provides foundation for universality

in fact the end in itself principle is really no more than an example of a maxim which has been elevated to 'universality'

now this view really leads to the question, what is the status of the universality principle?

it seems to me that Kant wants to say that it is substantial - and not as I have suggested methodological - if that - but certainly logical

again the real problem for Kant stems from his unshakable faith in the scientific model

via the Universality Principle he wanted to find for ethics the same lawlikeness he thought existed in science

'In the critique of pure reason, the principle is expressed thus: 'So act that the maxim of your will could always at the same time be valid as a principle making universal law'

the principle of autonomy of will

the above quote is I think purely pragmatic

Kant is saying that we must act on the assumption that we are free

I think this makes good sense - but beyond pragmatism I can't see what the foundations are

pragmatism is fine as far as I am concerned, but it's not I think Kant's cup of tea

we can assume autonomy of will - but it is metaphysically arbitrary as far as I can see

16/8/82

I have been assuming from the start the necessity of operating on two philosophical levels: the modal level and the normative now I have no reason to doubt this at all

but it has occurred to me that it might be possible to operate exclusively on the modal level 

the real question is could a person actually live modally -

remembering that modalism is the realm of possibility - the perception of possibility as fundamental - all that there is in a logical and epistemological sense

normativism is I think primarily a psychological - or perhaps it would be better termed an 'existential' - necessity that is it is necessary to act - action implies commitment

(in an active - if not theoretical sense) - commitment defines limits - denies possibility in the name of actuality

what I'm wondering is, is this so?

is it possible to act without commitment?

I have two answers to this question - yes and no

first the no - and the no really points to the need for a philosophy of action

my idea is that action is commitment - that to act is todetermine specify commit to carve out a definite path through the maze of possibility

I am not here suggesting that any actor who performs any action is conscious of a philosophical commitment - implied by the act - this is clearly absurd - and not what

I have in mind

what I have assumed all this time is that any act could be analyzed philosophically - that in principle it would be possible to say what the act implied or entailed

but now that I think about it this really conflicts with my modalism - skepticism about commitment in a philosophical sense

this is true - but I still think action entails - by definition - commitment - but it is now clear that commitment is not the same as philosophical or ontological

further I'm not arguing that any action presupposes a decision that is a conscious commitment - some actions do - but -this is not what I mean by commitment

commitment in relation to action has nothing to do with consciousness, decisiveness or philosophical awareness

in fact I am really saying ACTION - COMMITMENT

one problem with this outlook as it is, is that I have a rather traditional view of the nature of action

specifically, I am operating with a thought / action distinction

I am wondering if it might be better to think in terms of kinds of action public and private maybe?

______

this is really a normative issue, when I think it should be a meta - (or meta-norm) issue

what I mean is that in some sense normativism cannot be established normatively

it must be established non-normatively,

that is normativism should have meta foundations- and when it does - normativism follows

the question is can it

and that question comes to can we establish non-modalism from modalism?

the only way I can see is to argue that non-modalism is a modal possibility

but there are logical problems here - and further what I had in mind initially was that non-modalism - normativism is not a possibility in itself

but an imperative a necessity to choose possibilities and there is still a lot in this - but its foundationsare a problem

I keep getting back in my thoughts to the idea that action (whatever, however you want to cash this in) is in itself non-modal - is actual

and that the very existence, actuality - the possibility of action demands commitment, which is, what action is ???

its a big problem

Hegel had an answer to this one - a concept passes into its opposite - i.e. modalism passes into non-modalism and visa versa - I think Hegel was basically right - he had the right feel for the problem anyway -

but there is a problem with this for me -

if I adopted this - a dualistic meta would be fundamental - and I don't really want this

I would like the original schema of modal / non-modal to stand on its own

to ground normativism on necessity is far too 'metaphysical' for me - and yet my instinct tells me that something like this is true - that would I think be a Kantian solution

and in any case such a move really only begs the question - what is necessity founded on - how can necessity be deduced 'come from' possibility

and yet this may in effect be where the whole question begins

and ends -       

two fundamental categories possibility and necessity the conflict of the two the dialect of the two

possibility gives rise to modalism necessity to normativism

he conflict between the two is Life - ?

when either necessity or possibility win the battle of life is over

perhaps the simple solution non-metaphysical is to say

(1) we know human beings act from in accordance with necessity

(2) we know they think in terms of possibility

that thought is possibility

that action is necessity

action is thus the anti-thesis of thought

and thought the anti-thesis of action

(very dualistic - very Cartesian - but I like it)

both thought and action are responses to the unknown.

thought explores the unknown and action defines it

____

the simple observation upon which my outlook is based, is that (a) there are a number of interpretations (valid) of the one reality, and (b) that action, rational action is a choice between alternatives

my philosophy is an attempt to account for both (a) and (b)

so really (b) doesn't deal with action as such but rather 'rational' action (b) is to do with how to choose, how to decide at any point in time what action is 'rational' -

so (b) is really an intellectual problem the problem of rational action. (b) is an attempt to provide a decision procedure - a methodology

I'm not sure that anything more needs be said than this

except that it is starting to look as if (b) is just another facet of (a) - which would be quite a different view to the one I have been putting

up to this point I have proceeded on the assumption that my philosophy comprises two theories, which exist side by side complementary but autonomous - its the autonomy which I think is about to go

the reason is that decision procedure is a modal issue

now what I think has confused me is that I have opted for a pragmatic account of decision making - and attempted toelevate this to the meta level to make it as fundamental or near fundamental as modalism - and this is plainly

not on

still I want to say that we choose from the plethora of possible guides to action -

but what I haven't made clear up to this point - that the reason for this is not cannot be determinate - it is modal - which in simple terms means we don't finally know

- that is we don't know why we do what we do but we can look at the various theories that have been proposed - this is the philosophers task - he must I think consider new

interpretations of the phenomena under investigation and realize that ultimately what we are staring at face to faceis - the unknown

in practical terms philosophy (my philosophy) has a limited function

it provides information it tells anyone who's interested what the possible outlooks on life are - and what the possible ways of deciding between the modalities are

that's all

the point I came to earlier on - that what modalism is (the 'perception' of theoretical multiplicity) is a modal issue - is most important to keep in mind (hope I can)

it is simply to say that my own theory is open to interpretation

this is not to say that there is a value free formulation of modalism

the point is that to begin with modalism must be formulated and this initial formulation is then subject to debate

what I'm saying is that we've got to get the ball rolling and this is not a cop out this is simply just what has to be -

18/8/82

another way to put it is this: if we stripped modalism of all interpretations - what would we have? - we'd have the unknown

what I'm getting at is that modalism can't be formulated as a theory

I think the best way to formulate it is as Wittgenstein did - as an activity (on a meta-level) - meta activity gives rise to what we call theories, outlooks, perspectives

- that is however you want to cash it in, explain your activity (which before you characterize it is an unknown)

I think I may have just come to the end of my odyssey on the modal / normative problem

at least an end

finally it feels right

(knowledge as such cannot be characterized in a self-contained sense

any characterization of meta must be characterized itself

this we cannot avoid - the epistemological infinite regress

because knowledge is not self-reflexive

it is not self-reflexive because knowledge is essentially a relationship between subject/object - subject/predicate

if knowledge was non-relational - it would be useless and unintelligible

this whole point it must' be remembered though is normative)

feel that my achievement over these ten months has been not the formulation and defence of a new account of philosophy - though this I believe has happened

           

what has happened, and this cannot easily be called an achievement - is a self styled -. Wittgensteinian cure - the whole process has been - feels as if it has resulted in a release

I feel as though I can breath easy - a philosophical exorcism

19/8/82

In summary there are two phases in modalism -

(1)        descriptive or classificatory

            - the tabling of possible 'descriptions' of the unknown

(2)        decisive -

            the tabling of possible decision procedures for deciding

            between the meta accounts

all in all philosophy becomes a descriptive 'activity', 'procedure' - nothing more

(on this view prescriptivism is non-philosophical - prescriptive theories are the data of philosophical descriptivism

prescriptivism then becomes a phenomena to be explained interpreted - but essentially - described -)

still not entirely satisfied with this - want some place for prescriptions

back to the

modal - descriptivism

normativism - prescriptivism

modes of philosophizing

                                                          -.-

Kant on freedom and determinism:

'How can a man be called completely free at the same moment, and in regard to the same action, in which he is subject to an inevitable natural necessity?"

'But the very same subject, being on the other hand conscious of himself as a thing in itself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not subject to time considerations

and he regards himself as determinable only through laws which he gives himself through reason' - Cop. v.6 11.127

what Kant is saying from my point of view is that philosophy shows us that the one 'phenomenon' (which I think comes down finally to being the unknown) is indeterminate - and the fact that we can logically - and in fact do interpret it in more

than one way - that there are a number of possible interpretations - limited only by human ingenuity - is not a problem which has to be resolved but rather the modal fact of knowledge a fact which we must accept - for if we don't reality - the unknown makes no sense at all

Kant couldn't quite reach this point of mine because he was convinced that reality is knowable - and not as I believe unknowable

the 'knowability of reality' means that for Kant at the basis of knowledge is a reality - which to some extent determines knowledge

now Kant's main point - his 'Copernican revolution' was just the opposite to this - but his philosophy does really presuppose something which is the object of knowledge

again, the answer I think has to do with the noumena

now I think this is great -

but not great enough - for as I have stated Kant's noumena is to restrictive - too defined and this, in my terms, is the basis of all Kant's problems

I also have doubts about his argument about the relation between the phenomenal world, and the noumenal -

one point is that I cannot understand how in Kant's terms the noumenal is known at all - the phenomenal I can understand - is the noumenal inferred? - it must be in a sense

but my main question is how can the noumenal (the world in itself) serve as a foundation for the phenomenal?

does Kant want it to be a foundation - I think so

yet if this is so, how can it be?

my solution to this problem, and this may be Kant's - is to say reality can be understood in two ways -

but this if it is Kant's solution I don't think it will work

the problem is, what is this reality which can be viewed phenomenally and noumenally

Kant cannot answer this question -

he cannot appeal to the 'thing in itself' to the noumena

because it is what follows from noumenal perception of reality

my own philosophy on this point provides an answer -

reality for me is the unknown

the unknown is not a perspective - it is what all perspectives are addressed to

and for me the relation between perspectives of reality and reality is neat epistemologically and trouble free logically

on my view all perspectives lead to the unknown - it thus cannot be a perspective

it is the ground of all perspectives

20/8/82

yesterday I ended up with the view that philosophy is a descriptive enterprise

the problem with this view is that it is too passive - it doesn't allow for philosophical innovation .

and this the original reason I developed normativism - which is the attempt - any attempt to create a world in the face of the unknown

modal descriptivism is really an account of what has been proposed normatively - on any issue - or on all issues

my use of the term descriptivism  is perhaps misleading or confusing -

usually descriptivism means an account of what is - an account of reality

but on my view reality is fundamentally unknown

so how can we have description of something of which we have no knowledge?

there is no profound metaphysical problem here

the answer is simply that we do - that we must

we do in all our actions 'describe' - interpret define reality

now I simply say that we have to be careful about how we use the term 'know' - I would argue that the common sense view that we 'know' reality is strictly speaking wrong - that when subjected to analysis such a claim is shown to be confused and empty

still the term 'know' has some significance - but what it means is quite different to what most non-philosophers and most philosophers would think

all our knowledge from the simplest to the most complex I believe can be shown to be nothing more than shots into the dark

from a metaphysical point of view nothing much else can be said - except that there are various accounts of what these shots are - and this is what I mean by descriptivism - the best we can do as philosophers is say what has been said or what could be said (this is the creative side of philosophy but I think that is all

25/8/82

again on Kant -

Kant saw that 'reality' can be viewed phenomenally and noumenally

Spinoza before him saw this - but also saw that spiritual and material characteristics of reality - are just two - of a possibly infinite number - but are the two which we

perceive -

Kant assumed with Spinoza that the 'spiritual' and material perceptions of reality - were real - that such characteristics were not as such primarily characteristics of the observer but rather characteristics of the observed

and of course both felt quite justified in making this assumption because both were convinced that reality is knowable - (for Kant this was true even with regard to the

noumenon. - the 'unknown' = (phenomenally speaking) - aspect of reality

both Kant and Spinoza believed they were uncovering, had discovered facets of the world - features of reality

whereas I take the view that they were discovering factsabout knowing (primarily) and reality secondarily

that is they saw, in my terms anyway, that reality can be viewed as a physical material thing and that it can be viewed as a spiritual thing - this is a fact about the knowing process - that it is not simple that it is complex - not monistic - not determinate

now it is very easy to go from this to the idea that we can attribute to reality characteristics of the knowing process

surely if we know reality to be physical to be spiritual - it must be because it is - and hence that we are perceiving objective if multiple features of reality

strictly speaking this inference cannot be established - we really have no way of checking whether it is true or false

and the idealist point of view falls foul of the same problem it cannot checked outside itself

but what I think we can say is that reality whatever it is can be interpreted in a number of ways - this much is clear

to go on from this and characterize reality as material asspiritual - ideal / real - in itself is I think going to far - we can of course do this, but if we do

(a) we cannot provide an independent check

(b) we throw doubt on the knowing process - the modal process - and by implication deny the modality of knowledge - which is denying a plain and obvious fact - for an unobvious dubious fact

the point is simply this - the existence of various interpretations of reality defies the validity of any one interpretation

what we know is that we have a number of possible accounts of the nature of the world

we cannot say what the world is independent of these theories except to say that we do not know - that beyond our theories is the unknown

and the unknown is silent - it does not speak to us about our inventions

25/8/82

if philosophers are interested in the reasons behind various outlooks - they must simply look at why people adopt such outlooks  -

this will always be an open issue in any final sense

and also a creative issue just because it is open

philosophers articulate on a highly theoretical level the phenomenon of belief - it is in this that -the creativity of philosophy rests

the philosopher's creative analysis may correspond with actual reasons - in that sense it is an analysis of such - or it may propose possible 'reasons'

but if vie are interested in what simply is believed, and why it is - the problem is really an 'empirical' problem (and I use the word here in the widest possible sense) - the question simply what is believed and why?

philosophers though, qua philosophers, are generally not interested in this - this sort of answer is really the sort of thing the scientist qua scientist is concerned with -

the philosophers concern is the ground or basis of such

and this is a highly speculative - theoretical - Modal inquiry

(as distinct from the scientist's which is a factual investigation)

Kant and Spinoza believed that they had exhausted possibility by their comprehensive and simple (in the sense of fundamental) interpretations of reality - that they had defined via their interpretations chartered the limits of knowledge of understanding - and no doubt their efforts and results were magnificent

one thing I think needs to be said here first off is that in my opinion this objective - the objective of discovering the boundary between real knowledge and illusory knowledge - is not the problem of knowledge

all that such an enterprise produces is specific delineated possibles - clearly defined epistemological interpretations - which it seems are to stand as much on what they exclude as what they allow

this exclusion- the logical exclusiveness of a theory is merely only a way of characterizing - defining - i.e. saying what it is not - for me has no epistemological

content - it is merely strictly speaking a logical matter

what I'm getting at is that the truth value of theory x does not rest in -x

how to put this?

this has been assumed for centuries that the value or part of the value of a theory consists in what it excludes

I think this is a mistake

I concur with Feyerabend concerning the incommensurability of theories - philosophical as well as scientific

if they are incommensurable - not comparable they cannot be said to be better than one another -

my general idea is that all theories are stabs at the unknown - and their value can only be ascertained in terms of their content - a content primarily of need - which they define

26/8/92

Carnap

'There is no independent interpretation of Lt (the language in terms of which a certain theory, or a certain world view, is formulated) . The system Y (consisting of axioms of the theory, and rules of derivation) is itself an uninterpreted postulate system. It's terms obtain only an indirect and incomplete interpretation by the fact that some of them are connected by C (correspondence rules) with observational terms'

Feyerabend:

'Now if theoretical terms have no 'independent interpretation', then they cannot be used for correcting the interpretation of the observation statements which is the one and onlysource of their meaning. It follows that as described is an impossible doctrine'

Feyerabend: 'Criticism and the growth of knowledge'

pgs: 222 -223

in non-trivial cases competing theories are not competing they are logically speaking as Feyerabend would put it incommensurable

the problematic that T (1) (a simplistic theory) addresses let us call it X , will be quite different from the X of T(2) even though apparently the X of T(2) is the same as

that of T(1) - that is, it is assumed that there is one problem addressed by two theories

Feyerabend puts it better: -

'As an example of two incommensurable theories let us briefly discuss classical mechanics(CM) and the special theory of relativity (S.R) ..........

This is an entirely natural procedure. SE so one would be inclined to say, does not just invite us to rethink unobserved length, masses, duration; it would seem to entail the relational character of all lengths, masses durations, whether observed or unobserved. Now extending the concept of a new theory T to all its consequences, observational reports included, may change the interpretation of these consequences to such an extent that they disappear from the consequence class of earlier theories. These earlier theories will then all become incommensurable with T. The relation between SR

and CR is a case in point. The concept of length as used in SR and the concert of length as presupposed in CR are different concepts. Both are relational concepts, and very complex relational concepts at that ( just consider determination of length in terms of the wave length of a specified spectral line) . But relativistic length (or

relativistic shape) involves an element that is absent from the classical concept and in principle excluded from it. It involves the relation velocity of the object concerned

in some reference system. It  is of course true that the relativistic scheme very often gives us numbers which are practically identical with those numbers we get from CM - but this does not make the concepts more similar. Even the case C - 00 ( v - 00) which gives strictly identical predictions cannot be used as an argument for showing

that the concepts must coincide at least in this case: different magnitudes based on different concepts may give identical values on their respective scales without ceasing to be different magnitudes. (The same remark applies to the attempt to identify classical mass with relative rest mass). This conceptual disparity if taken seriously, infects even the most ordinary situations, the relativistic concept of a certain shape, such as a table, or a certain temporal sequence, such as my saying yes, will differ from the corresponding classical concept also. It is therefore vain to expect that sufficiently long derivations may eventually return us to the old ideas.'

26/8/82

some questions on Feyerabend's incommensurability thesis

Feyerabend wants to say that because SR entails relative velocity with a reference frame, any analysis of length will be from an or point of view incommensurable with C.M, because, naturally enough CM does not have the RV concept

now in a sense this is only trivially true

isn't Feyerabend really only saying that what differentiates SR from CM is RV?

I want to go a bit further than Feyerabend and say that incommensurability has a more powerful epistemological consequence than Feyerabend realizes

the consequence is that length as such in itself - is 'objectively' -speaking conceptually empty or without content - prior that is to theoretical analysis

that what we are dealing with - 'the phenomenon' itself is unknown independently of its interpretation - in the case of length SR or CM

I am not denying that an open minded scientist is actually able to begin his investigation of the concept - that he begins with the assumption that he knows what he is studying - that he is observing a phenomenon

but what I would say is-that the initial stage - the pre-theoretical stage - he cannot really claim to know what he is talking about (in a strict sense of know )

what I am saying is that the scientist qua scientist begins with the unknown - but does not know this - he assumes knowledge - and must assume knowledge

inorder to begin the knowing process - but this at best can only be described as a methodological rule for research - a rule I suspect is best analyzed pragmatically

my general point is that theoretical distinction between meta and empirical is a real obstacle to the analysis of scientific method

even those philosophers who have argued against it have implicitly used it in another form - in arguing that the practice of science is analyzed by methodologists

- that methodology is not actually science

I would want to argue that the philosophical basis of science the underpinnings of a certain theory (say SR or CM.) cannot be separated from the application and

implications of the theory

29/8/82

Vol. 11

'In pure mathematics nothing is said 'of the existence, but only of the possibility of things'

- Copleston on Kant V. 6 ii. 161

this is the sort of point I think Spinoza would make

both Spinoza and Kant thought  that the phenomenal world, the material world - was not just a possibility - it is a given possibility - and hence an actual - it is not pure possibility - unlike the 'realities' of mathematics

now they were right in that something is given - call it what you will

but I think that the skeptics arguments have shown - mine in particular that we cannot know what it is, in the sense that Spinoza and Kant thought that we could

Kant I think was really on about showing us why we believe the things we do

and from my point of view what he did was advance a particular point of view - one of the many possible - as did Spinoza

where I think that mathematics differs from science is that mathematics unlike science does not presuppose knowledge of fact - so the above quote stands

but philosophy shows us that the presupposition of fact / existence is just a possible way of looking at reality - just as possible but only a possible - as not presupposing it

Kant's view was that existence is not an optional presupposition

30/8/82

'Thing in itself is not a real thing; it is not an existing reality but a principle. The principle of the synthetic a priori knowledge of the manifold of the sense - intuition in general and of the law of its co-ordination. And this principle is due to the subject in its construction of experience. The distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself is not a distinction between objects but holds good only for the subject'

Vol. 6. 11

'We enjoy no intuition of God. 'We see him as a mirror;never face to face'. Hence it is impossible to induce God's existence from the Idea of God: this idea is a creation of pure reason, a transcendental ideal. Further though we think of God as infinite substance, he is not and cannot be substance; for he transcends the categories of human understanding. Hence, if we once presuppose this point of view, we cannot sensibly ask whether there is a divine being corresponding to the idea of God at least in so far as the idea involves thinking God in terms of the categories'

(178)

'What follows is that the only access we have to God is through moral consciousness, no theoretical demonstration of God's existence is possible. This is, indeed the doctrine of the doctrine of the critique'  

(179-80)

'It is not that I first have an idea of the divine essence, from which I deduce God's existence. It is rather that through consciousness of the categorical imperative. I rise

to the idea of God as speaking to me through and in the - moral. And to have this idea of God and to believe in him are one and the same thing.'

(180)

But though man posses the dual nature, there is a unity of consciousness. I (the subject) am a person, not merely conscious of myself, but also as object of intuition in

space and time, and so as belonging to the world. I posses the consciousness of my existence in the world in space and time'

(182)

'But given the philosophies of Kant and Hume, it becomes natural to ask weather what we call the world is not a kind of logical construction which lies, as it were, between our minds and reality in itself or things in themselves'.

(228)

1/9/82

Ayer

(The foundations of empirical knowledge)

the problem of illusion is not a dispute of facts - rather a problem of language - different ways of describing the same factual experience

'I may begin by pointing out that if the assertion that the world of sensible phenomena is self contradictory is taken literally, no argument can possibly prove it, for the reason

that the notion of self contradiction is not applicable to the phenomena themselves. It does not make any sense to say of different phenomena either that they do or do not

contradict one another; they simply occur. It is only with regard to the propositions that were to describe the phenomena that the question can legitimately be raised'

(28)

2/9/82

I have quite a lot of sympathy with Ayer's view of different language uses as an explanation of different theoretical conceptions

though I'm interested in the general outlook I don't buy Ayer's particular line

Ayer's problem is this:

he believes that different philosophical theories are different language uses to describe a given phenomenon - i.e. the illusory/ hallucinatory experience

but the problem with this view is that it really does beg the philosophical question

the philosophical question is, what is 'it' that is given?

we begin with an 'un-philosophical' realism - some philosophers turn this into a philosophical doctrine -

this process shows us that 'philosophically' the object of this analysis is philosophically vacuous - unknown

this is not to say that 'un-philosophically' we are without a reality

AND

it means that language use is a function of conceptual perception not the other way around

to those who hold the view that language determines conceptions I argue, I ask - what is the logical basis - the logical origin of the idea of language use - how does it emerge, why does it emerge? - questions like this

to argue that different language use is to be explained by the nature of language is OK until we come to the question of the foundation and nature of language

does language usage answer this?

the real question is this, can different language use account for different language use?

in my view the language argument just puts the problem in another context - the same problem - what we ask is how is it that 'the same experience' can produce different

linguistic responses - different languages?

20/9/82

Berkeley

'All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive by whatever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive ..........so that one idea or object of thought

cannot produce or make any alteration in another'

well how does Berkeley explain new ideas - changes in ideas if the physical world is no more than an idea how could it be said that it causes ideas in the mind? (which is

another thing Berkeley can't explain)

10/10/82

Hobbes

'Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances as we require by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have of their causes or generation. And again, of such causes or generation as may be (had) from knowing, first their effects.'

The philosopher discovers effects from known causes from known effects. And he does so by 'ratiocination'. He is not concerned with simply stating empirical facts, that this or that was a fact, but with the consequences of propositions which are

discovered by observation.'      

 - Copleston v.5 1. 14

I accept a form of the causal theory of philosophy         

I do believe that real philosophy is the study - the development of theoretical constructions from 'experience'

the philosopher must study how the theory construction emerges (and this is the sense in which I use the term 'causal') from life

of course this is the first stage of philosophical investigation

the second stage (and we cannot strictly speaking separate he two stages - the two happen simultaneously) is then the interpretation  - epistemological and ontological of

the initial 'experience' and the analysis of this - the second stage is really all that occurs - but it is important to speak of the first stage inorder to understand what is really happening when stage two - philosophical analysis is occurring

'And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible; and his greatness and power are inconceivable, but that we might honor him'

-reminiscent of Boehme

'For the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is we understand nothing of what he is, but only that he is; and therefore the attributes we give him are not to tell one

another what he is, nor to signify our opinion of his nature, but our desire to honour him with such names as we conceive most honourable amongst ourselves'

'Hobbes makes explicit use of the famous distinction common enough in the Middle Ages, between knowing of God that he is and knowing what he is'

'That is to say, the term 'universal' is predicated of the name, not of the object designated by the name'  

(25)

'The first truths were arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed names upon things, or received then from the imposition of others'

'However even if the statement, that Hobbes is a skeptic constitutes an exaggeration, it remains true that whether we proceed from cause to effect or from effect to cause,

we attain knowledge only of possible effects or possible causes. The only certain knowledge we can acquire is knowledge of the implications of propositions. If A implies B, then if A is true, B is true'

- this marvellous!

what I'm impressed with is Hobbes' realization of the modal nature of knowledge - that our theories are only possibly true

but what is quite interesting is that I had never considered the idea that certainty consists in implication

not a great certainty but better than nothing

'When treating of the intellectual virtues' Hobbes distinguishes between. natural and acquired mental capacity or 'wit'. Some men are naturally quick, others slow. And the principle causes of these differences is the 'difference of men's passions'.

Those for example, who's end is sensual pleasure, are necessarily less delighted with the imaginations which do not conduce to this end, and they pay less attention than

others to this end, and they pay less attention than others to the means of acquiring knowledge. They suffer from dullness of mind, which proceedeth from the appetite of

sensual or bodily delight. And it may well be conjectured, that such passion hath its beginning from grossness and difficulty of the motion of the spirit about the heart'

eternal and crude wisdom

On Hobbes' political theory

if the citizen can establish the commonwealth by a rational decision why then is the dictator necessary, if it the Commonwealth can be established

I for one see this as a fiction. But if it is possible - if rationality is possible initially, why is it not possible to maintain on the terms on which it was first

established?

of course it is not possible initially -

but then the commonwealth cannot be established

13/10/82

the phenomenalist/realist dispute in philosophy (and I am thinking here mainly of the philosophy of science) is in terms of the growth of scientific knowledge - rather

pointless - I mean it doesn't make one bit of difference to the practise of science - but what it does do is shake the foundations of science - and place scientific investigation in a broader 'problem' context

it does I think trouble science

I think it is important to distinguish between scientific ideology - and the practise of science

the distinction of course is not going to be able to be made in any absolute sense

but what I have in mid is something like this:

science occurs: investigations proceed problems are posed theories are advanced, tested - laws emerge

what we say about this is in the broadest sense 'ideology'

i.e., do we say with the positivists that science is hard facts and non-metaphysical - or perhaps with Popper that there are no hard facts and that metaphysics plays an important part in the growth of scientific knowledge

now I am not suggesting that scientists can operate in an ideological vacuum

but I do think that scientific results are properly seen as value free

as discoveries which stand independently of any ideological interpretation

now we cannot talk about this in a value free way

quite simply because any language is content laden - presupposes and prescribes an ontology

the search for value free - and formal languages - context free languages is understandable - but I think impossible

nevertheless the notion of such seems clear enough - until we try to specify - characterize it -

it is the attempt to give the notion of a purely formal language some substance - some context

no wonder it has never succeeded

20/10/82

accept the 'know that / know what' distinction

or rather that we can know that - but not what ('that' is)

this idea seems to me to be quite important

though my own application of it would be somewhat different from its original use and formulation

the 'knowledge that' for me is simply direct knowledge -

I tend to think that knowledge is reflection on / of direct awareness -

that is what knowledge amounts to

this view I am convinced shows that 'what' is reflected on, is at least without foundation, and I would say clearly unknown

or to put it more specifically - it is unknown in a non-modal (actual) sense - but 'knowable' modally

actualism- - non-modalism is relative to modalism an illusion but the opposite is also true

20/10/82

Aquinas' third argument for the existence of God is the argument from the necessity of being. The world and everything in it is contingent; any of these things might not have been. But not everything is contingent, for that which is contingent once did not exist; and everything there is once was not, then there must have been a time when there was nothing; but from nothing nothing can come. (This last step involves the principle of sufficient reason; if there once was nothing then there was no sufficient reason for anything to exist). Therefore, the argument concludes, if anything is to exist, there must be a necessarily existing entity, only in this way can we explain that

anything exists at all'

- fybate lecture notes 114P 24

(1) if this argument is true then we cannot sensibly speak of 'nothing'

if there is a necessary existent - how could nothing emerge - how could the non-existent emerge from it. Such is a contracliction

was it Aquinas' intention to deny the reality of the non-existent - it ends him up in a position similar to Parmenides - which one could argue is an overkill

I find it hard also to see how an extreme monism of the Spinozean type is avoidable - given this argument

without some concession, this kind of argument, interesting as it is - looses its punch

(2) even if a necessary existent is granted - we still have to explain how from a necessary being, a contingent being / existent emerges

(given my above argument (1) - contingent existence seems to be impossible)

what I'm getting at is that the problem of showing how a contingent existent emerges from a necessary non-contingent entity, is a problem for Aquinas given his argument

in fact it's no different from the problem (how can an existent emerge from a non-existent) it is designed to solve

doesn't contingency imply non-existence?

22 /10/82

Berkeley

'The physicist (Berkeley frequently speaks of mathematicians) or natural philosopher may come to think that a term like 'attraction' signifies an essential quality inherent in bodies, which acts as a real cause. But it is no such thing . As a matter of pure empirical fact the observed relations between some bodies are of such a kind that we describe them as cases of natural attraction; but the word attraction does not signify an entity, and  it is idle to suppose that the behaviour of bodies is explained by the use

of such terms. the physicist is concerned with description and with grouping of analogies under general 'laws' with a view to prediction and practical utility; but he is not concerned with cause. And it is a great mistake to suppose that phenomenon a, b,

c, are explained by saying that they are due to P, where P is an abstract term. It does not signify an entity which could be an active efficient cause.'

Copleston Vol. 5. II. 42.

'Some writers speak, for example, of abstract space as though it were something, a distinct entity. But we shall find an analysis 'that nothing else is signified by these words than pure privation or negation, that is mere nothing.'          

(42)

'The mechanician employs certain abstract and general terms, imagining in bodies force, action, attraction........which are which are of great utility for theories and formulations, as also for computations about motion, even if in truth, in bodies actually existing, they would be sought in vain, just like the things which are fictions made by the geometers through mathematical abstraction.'

(43)

'Only by meditation and reasoning can truly active causes be brought out of the darkness with which they are surrounded and be to some extent known. To deal with them pertains to first philosophy or metaphysics.'

'You must know that at bottom the being of God is a point in itself a point of small consequence, and a man may make this concession without yielding much. The great point is in what sense the word God is to be taken in.'

- Lysicles

'The predication of such attributes must be understood in a quite different sense from what they signify in the vulgar acceptation or from anything that we can form a notion of or conceive.'

'Thus they are able to meat objections brought against the predication of such attributes of God by denying that they were predicated in any known sense.'           

(47)

25/10/82

Hume's epistemology is based on the relationship between impressions and ideas. What he argues is that our ideas are faint copies of our impressions

now from a common sense point of view this is fair enough - but I wonder if Berkeley's objection to Locke's representationalism, can be applied to Hume in this connection with the same force

It is true that it seems that what Hume says is right - ideas do stem from impressions - but not meaning to be a pain in the neck - we can ask Hume as Berkeley asked Locke -

how do you know?

Hume's answer would no doubt be that impressions perched ideas -  a case can be made for this - but it is not as simple as it may seem - as, of course the rationalist tradition of innate ideas bears testimony to

still Hume has a point - but only if the distinction between impressions and ideas holds up in a reasonably tight way

how does Hume make this distinction- I think it must be said that he takes experience and through a process of analysis breaks it down to what he takes to be its basic elements

so the account he offers of experience/knowledge is reflective - it derives from reflection or the phenomena of experience and knowing

my question to Hume is, can we know that this distinction between impressions and ideas directly - non-reflexively?

now this might sound like a strange question to put to Hume - I'm not sure it would make much sense to him, and if it did that he'd  know how to answer it

because partly  the answer is - no

non-reflexively experience/knowing - is direct - and direct experience as such is featureless characterless - it is I think by definition unknowable - but here I am suggesting that knowledge is the reflexive process - (and I would suggest that

this is not a simple process - it is I think complex and possibly hierarchical)

so one consequence of this is that I would argue (against Hume and the empiricists) that the search for the pure unadulterated 'atoms' of experience is, given the empiricist's hope - hopeless because in a strict sense to find it is to discover

the featureless base of reflective knowledge - of reflection

to put it another way if immediate experience is the base of knowledge - is based on the unknown

what I started off trying to do here was cast dispersions on the impression/idea distinction as a real or natural (as distinct from a theoretical or artificial) distinction

now what has happened is that somewhere along the line I missed the boat on that one and ended up at (my) more general epistemological thesis

getting back to Hume - he distinguishes impressions and ideas in terms of vividness or forcefulness O.K. - I would think so long as we are talking about veridical perception - but does the distinction stand up in cases of non-veridical - i.e.., hallucinatory perception - no

now of course Hume would say that he is basing his epistemology on common/normal experience

O.K what this amounts to is psychologism (and an inadequate psychologism at that

Hume is really making a psychological point and presenting it as a logical or epistemological one

the fact is that 'vividness' might work as an epistemological distinction (that is it could be represented epistemologically) in normal psychology - but not in abnormal psychology

once it is clear that vividness is really just a function of a certain kind of perceptual experience - it becomes clear that it will not serve as a useful epistemological distinction

the point is that there will be occurrences in which impressions and ideas cannot be distinguished on this basis - and some occurrences in which they will not be distinguishable at all (i.e. hallucinatory experiences)

but the main point is that I think in such experiences it becomes clear that such a distinction is quite unnecessary perhaps even arbitrary

and the more general point I would like to get to is that finally any analysis of experience is ultimately defeatedby 'experience' (whatever it is)

all our knowledge is nothing more than very hopeful attempts to pierce and enlighten some small point of the darkness - the infinite dark space of our ignorance

I believe that ultimately all knowledge is ultimately defeated comes to nothing - that the unknown in fact is never defeated and I would go so far to say that it is never even diminished

I picture the unknown as an epistemological infinity which is infinitely empty

what does any analysis of experience achieve? Why is such undertaken?

28/10/82

I think that Hume's phenomenalist analysis of the concept of spiritual substance is very commendable - all that is left then is ideas and the principle of association which

is really a lame duck

for some reason and I'm not sure why Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative comes off better - essentially it seems to me that Kant is contained in Hume

the essential difference is I think one of starting point

29/10/82

one of Berkeley's most important arguments was that of the relativity of primary qualities - what I wonder is then - how does he distinguish primary and secondary qualities - or does he see any need to - I can't imagine that he would still length is not colour and colour not shape

9/11/82

have come to the view that the only rationally defensible form of political philosophy is ego anarchism

by this I mean that the individual recognizes that - the only authority (moral) is the ego - the self

I don't see this outlook as either left or right wing - it is quite indeterminate on that question - it does in a sense transcend the dichotomy -

what is its basis?

its basis is skepticism - primarily about the possibility of consensus - real consensus between individuals -

my view is that such which is the real basis all political philosophy - is based on a false epistemology

(if such is not possible - in any real sense then there is no real foundation to any theory concerning the possibility of political society)

I believe that knowledge of the other is an illusion -a necessary one albeit - but an illusion nevertheless which has given rise to another illusion - the illusion of consensus - real consensus - which does not it is clear exist on any level of human society

now this patently clear

and it is this fact which is the basis, source, springboard of authoritarianism

given that consensus is not possible but seen to be necessary how is the illusion of it established - only by the imposition of structures - such as parliaments congresses and I would say all other authoritarian structures hidden or obvious which enforce the illusion

9/11/82

Ah,love, let us be true

To one another, for the world which seems

To lie before us like a land of dreams

So various, so beautiful, so new

Hath really niether joy, nor love nor light

Nor certitude, nor pea.ce

Nor help for pain'

Mathew Arnold 1867

(c) greg t. charlton. 2019.