1984

1/2/84.

the idea of a soul is if nothing else very useful, metaphysically speaking.

how do we distinguish man from animal? how do we distinguish man from machine? the issues involved in attempting to answer these questions are complex - to tackle them seriously involves opening a philosophical hornets nest, or being lost in a metaphysical maze.

one thing we do know is that there is an answer - we know this because we can say, man is not an animal, man is not a machine.

by the way in making these statements, I am not implying - suggesting making an answer to the original question

one might want to argue that man is a kind of machine - that is that the difference between the human being and a machine is only one of complexity. one might want to argue the same with regard to animals. Man is just a more highly developed animal.

and of course one might want to claim radical differences. fundamental differences between man, nature and mechanism.

my point at this stage is just that whatever position one takes there are differences (crucial or not, depending on one's view).

now I would say if you take an overview of the debate, there is no one answer or set of answers to this question, which is/are, acceptable by all parties to the dispute. Still all parties recognize some differences even your hard-line mechanists or naturalists -

how we characterize such a difference is of course the question.

it is here that I think the idea of a soul is very useful. Stripping it of its theological connotations we can say that the notion of soul - the Idea of soul - functions as a cut off point.

whatever it is, and the important thing is that it doesn't have to be anything in particular, the important thing is that we can through this distinguish man from animals - man from machine.

so in effect all the idea does, is tell us what we already know.

this particular word 'soul' is on this view without content I would argue it functions best like this - it is a contentless word a contentless word which signifies a difference - a difference which because of philosophical and epistemological problems cannot be positively identified.

such a word and perhaps all theoretical words basically function in this way.

that is they identify what we know - in the sense of that when we cannot know what

and in the confident use of such a word, the word for all intents and purposes has content, and does correspond to 'reality'.

but the fact is that 'it' is reality - the word and the images it brings - fill - the unknown with content. give it character - the unknown then becomes mapped, structured, inhabited

And I think this happens, to make man feel more comfortable.

knowledge is thus a huge security blanket.

personally I think it, the unknown should be left alone.

for one, all our schemes will not diminish it.

but then again human vanity and pride must have some release.

so in summary there are words which express what we know, and those that express that we know. but the second class are empty of content if not meaning. Their content is hypothesized, created but is always theoretical.

of course this raises the larger question, what is it to know that?, as distinct from what it is to know what?

can you know that without knowing what? Yes, this seems clear enough.

so there are what words and that words

the knowing that and knowing what distinctinction, is a forerunner of the rationalist/ empiricist distinction - or if not a forerunner - perhaps a form of it

when we say we know that what we are talking about is non-experiential knowledge - that is either intuitive knowledge - or 'logical' knowledge - knowledge that exists as a result of implication - 'if - then'

experience tells us what, logic tells us that, or intuition tells us that.

now it may not be an infallible guide to that, but given my view about that - that, 'that' is in the realm of non-direct knowledge - it seems there is no direct experiential way of determining that. (and thats that)

I suspect that, 'that' knowledge is of different kinds - or, there are different levels of that.

that there is something changeless behind the constant changing world is I believe a strange 'primal' belief of man.

what it is - what that is, is a matter of speculation - and the speculation can of course become more elaborate.

'that' is often presented as 'what' - but 'that' is all it is

that is the question.

what is the answer!

I like the 'what / that distinction' - I don't really care how we explain knowledge of what or how we explain knowledge of that.

these questions are really in the that realm

the distinction is simple and neat - and is not I think controversial

the main disputes - all petty and empty, come after we accept this view of knowing,

and by the way, the problem of knowledge

and for that matter the problem of reality -

there exist - WHAT and THAT

that is suggested by what

and why is this so, what is it about 'what' that leads to 'that'?

that is, why 'that'?

what's wrong with 'what', that it should need 'that'?

and what is even more interesting is why isn't 'that', 'what'?

that is why isn't all of reality obvious - immutable unquestionable, as we all at one time hope, or believe it should be -

this is to ask, why philosophy, why the problem at all?

why should it be that way?

or as the medieval philosophers,(and Chico), have asked, why is there anything at all?

which is just another way of saying, why is there what there is?

it is important to notice that I have defined what there is, as a particular - (as the ) - philosophical problem. such - independently of how you formulate it - that is how you describe it - what language - concepts etc. you use to describe the philosophical problem (or even that philosophical. problem) - is what is basic

now it might be tempting to talk of what there is - or the philosophical problem as the fundamental ontological problem - either view is unsatisfactory as a view of what is basic - it's the old existence / knowledge dilemma - which ultimately like the issue I began discussing is best and simply described as a philosophical, problem - so what I am here suggesting is what there is is the philosophical issue

that this is the best way of describing what is fundamental. It is better that is than saying as the Greeks first said - what is fundamental is this (water air fire etc.) - this finally to beg the question, and, if you like, it is the question which is fundamental - or to be more precise it is the problem -

and I do not mean this in any symbolic sense - I mean it in a realist sense

that is I want to say there is something more fundamental than matter or spirit - it is the problem of matter and spirit -

now this problem is merely a formulation of the fundamental philosophical problem. the early 6reeks came to understand this

the Greek idea - that what is fundamental is the opposition of opposites - was an attempt to state what the problem is

when I was young I was very concerned with this issue. I came to think of it in a formal mathematical way, and represented it so diagrammatically i.e.:

fig. 1.

fig. 1 represents the fundamental relation. Now I would talk in terms of the fundamental question or problem

and I would say that it can never actually be known formulated

there are if you like reflections of it. i.e., - the problem of matter and spirit - or reason and experience

I believe that in some sense these problems are just reflections if the problem of reality - and that it is 'the' problem of reality which best defines reality

this is of course a very metaphysical outlook

what I am suggesting is that science scientific problems - are really just an offshoot of empiricism which is of course a problematical - science is, and scientific questions are valid questions - but they are not central - fundamental - they are reflections of elaborations, speculations of more general dilemmas - which are themselves reflections of the one 'the' philosophical issue. So metaphysically I am a monist - there is the one, and the one is no thing substance or form it is a problem the fundamental philosophical problem.

this one - does not generate - the many problems - the many are simply reflections of the one - perception perhaps Spinoza might have called them 'modifications' (I prefer reflection)

how do we define the one - problem - dilemma? this is the problem - and

in a sense the solution - the definition.

the ONE problem can only be known through its reflections

the problem of the ONE problem is formulating it

it is an intractable insoluble dilemma

but it is at the CORE of ALL

what I am here proposing is a skeptical metaphysics.

what I am really saying in simple terms is not all that radical - it is that we know that there is this 'riddle of the universe' - the riddle exists - but how we define it - how we approach it is in a sense the question -

how we approach it will determine how we come to solve it - or attempt to do so - which will be how we define reality - such will be our REALITY or more correctly - our reality problems - set of -

given my skeptical outlook - this is the choice - it is a choice of problem perspectives

now in day to day existence it would be difficult to categorize one's problems into a problem set - life and its problems are too turgid for simple classification - but there are lines that can be drawn, however inadequate this is overall

and the fundamental lines are what philosophy is all about.

but there is no fundamental line.

what the skeptic - what the skeptic shows is that not only can't the solution be found to the problem of reality, but more importantly the problem can't be formulated

strangely enough it is at, this point in the meta skeptical argument that Wittgenstein seems relevant.

Wittgenstein asks the question, what is meaning , and he looks at specific problems

of this general, i.e. what does game mean? - what he argues is that if one has a good look at the word 'game', and its various meanings, one discovers that there is no one meaning common to all uses - what we have is inter-connections - one game may have five characteristics and no other have these five - another may have two of them and characteristics not associated with the first game etc.

now this argument of Wittgenstein is often used against essentialism - as an argument against the view that there is an essential meaning that underlies various uses

now I don't think that this argument by itself anyway amounts to that conclusion - what can be deduced from such an argument is that if such an essence exists we can't know it formulate it.

a similar argument can be made with respect to philosophical dilemmas

we can talk about family resemblance's between fundamental philosophical dilemmas

so what are the characteristics of a philosophical dispute?

what distinguishes a philosophical despite from a non- philosophical. problem?

one usual way of answering or addressing this problem is to distinguish philosophical from scientific problems

empirical that is from meta problems

the idea then is that philosophical. problems are not empirical - the idea is that empirical problems can be settled by an appeal to observation and experiment, etc. whereas philosophical. issues cannot be settled by an appeal to observation - I'm yet to be convinced that scientific issues can be dealt with this way - it seems to me to be more intelligent to talk of levels of problems perhaps in the same way or in a similar way to Quine

Quine talks of certain statements being of prime importance for the whole system of knowledge

my perspective is not so such as Quine's - a hierarchy of statements - of ascending and descending importance - it is rather that of problem depth

a simple scientific query is, has the status of a surface problem but it can be shown to be connected to deeper and deeper problems in what is generally thought to be the scientific realm - and to be connected to what is commonly regarded as philosophical

so finally what we are looking at is the various levels of the one problem - modifications as Spinoza would say

Spinoza thought that such connections were logico-deductive - I do not - or to be precise - they need not be - how problems are related is not itself a very interesting question, what we are interested in, primarily is that they are - and that they all can be shown to be outcomes, or reduced to fundamental philosophical dilemmas - and hence to the one philosophical dilemma - which can't itself be specifically formulated. Just as, in the same way for Kant the thing in itself cannot be known

for Kant the noumenon is known via / through the phenomenon is known via/ through the phenomenon - so too I think with the problematic - it is known through the problem - there is though no direct access - yet it is can be shown to be the source the ground of any dilemma be it deep or superficial

but I do not believe the fundamental problem is directly, clearly and distinctly accessible - it is in my view unknown - unknowable - we know of it - that it exists in all its reflections at all levels - but we are unable to uncontraversially characterize it - it in a clear sense cannot be stated.

and it is for this reason that there is growth of knowledge, not because, as most would think because the solution cannot be found, but because the problem cannot be formulated definitively.

the problem is with the problem and not the solution. Perhaps we will be in a position to address ourselves to the solution - the problem of solution - it seems, if we take an evolutionary view, we are not in a position to address ourselves to the solution, to the problem of a solution, but this may be possible.

the interesting question is if this were possible, if that is the riddle of the universe was formulated, could be formulated - and further if the solution could be addressed and resolved - what would man and his world look like?

this is a question of philosophical fiction

but I don't know how one would answer it, given my epistemological outlook.

my overall picture is that there exists the unknown and possible interpretations of it.

problems emerge because the object of knowledge - the unknown is silent with regard to the question of possibility - that is it does not tell us which if any of the possibilities is actual - is true - in fact once this metaphysics is understood - such a problem becomes superficial and naive -

now what I have been going on with, with regard to problems - the problematic - my suggestion that in some sense the object of knowledge is the problematic - is on the face of it a different view to the modal view mentioned above

is the object of knowledge the unknown or is it the problem?

is it the case of one theory or the other, or is it possible that the two views can be reconciled?

the reality of the unknown in a sense generates possibilities - this though is just another way off saying that from the unknown emerges the problematic

the source of the various kinds of problems - is the unknown - in that sense the unknown is the one problem.

but what does this come down to? how can the unknown be a problem? surely the unknown simply is?

of course the problem arises because man pits himself against the unknown but we have to be careful of equating with reality.

reality is I think the unknown and the known -

one cannot exist without the other

I don't mean that ontologically - but it is, the way it is - it is what reality 'as we know it'. as we know it, in a fundamental sense, is.

these two ontological categories the known and the knower - give us the problem of reality

all philosophical, scientific problems, genuine that is, are reflections of this one meta problem - the problem of existence

'But it is worthwhile pointing out here that in each corporeal substance and indeed every mass or aggregate there is according to Leibnitz, an infinite number of monads. In a sense then Leibnitz affirmed the existence of an actual infinite, or rather actual infinities, 'I am so much in favour of the actual infinite, that instead of admitting that nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that it affects everywhere in order better to work the perfections of its author: so I believe there is no part of matter which is not, I do not say divisible; and consequently the least particle must be regarded as a world full of an infinity of different creatures'. But Leibnitz did not actually admit that the conclusion follows that there is actually an infinite number of monads in any aggregate. For there is no infinite number. To say that there is an infinity of monads is to say that there is always more of them than can be assigned.' Not withstanding any infinitisimassal calculus, I admit no true infinite numbers though I confess that the multitude of things surpasses every finite number, or rather every number.' From the statement therefore that in any aggregate there is an infinity of monads one cannot draw the conclusion that every aggregate is equal, on the ground that each is composed of an infinite number of simple substances. For there is no sense in speaking of infinite equal numbers. The aggregate is not an infinite whole made up of an infinite number of parts. There is only one true infinite, and this is the absolute which is anterior to all composition and not formed by addition of parts. And Leibnitz refers to the distinction made by the schools between the syncategorematic infinite and the categorematic infinite. The former is the indefinite not the true infinite. Instead of an infinite number we should say there are more than any number can express.

It should also be noted that substances have the sense of aggregates or monads are for Leibnitz phenomenal. 'For everything except the component monads is added by perception alone, from the very fact of their being simultaneously perceived'. But to say aggregates are phenomena is not to say they are dreams or hallucinations. They are well founded phenomena, their real basis being the coexistence of the monads of which they are aggregates. What is meant is that stones and tables, for example, though they appear to the senses to be unitary things, are really aggregates of simple unextended substances. The world of everyday life, so to speak, the world of sense perception and indeed also of science, is phenomenal: they do not appear for perception, but are known only by a process of philosophical analysis.

Space and time Leibnitz insists are relative. 'As for my opinion, I have said more than once that I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is. I hold it to be an order of co-existences, as time is an order of successions. For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things which exist at the same time, considered as existing together without inquiring into their ways of existing. And when we see various things together, one perceives this order of things among themselves'. Two co-existing things, A and B, stand in a relation of situation, and indeed all co-existing things stand in relations of situations. If we now consider things simply as co-existing, that is, as standing in mutual relations of situations we have the idea of space as the idea of order of co-existence. And if further we do not advert to any actually existing things but conceive simply the order of possible relations of situation we have the abstract idea of space. Abstract space therefore is nothing real, it is simply the idea of a possible relational order. Time is also relational. If two event A and B. are not simultaneous but successive, there is a certain relation between them which we express by saying A is before B and B is after A. And if we conceive the order of possible relations of this kind, we have the idea of abstract time. Abstract time is no more something real than is abstract space. There is no real abstract space in which things are situated, and there is no real abstract and homogeneous time in which successions occur. Both then are ideal. At the same time co-existence and pre and post existence are real. 'Time is neither more or less a being of reason (that is something ideal or mental) than space.' To exist and to pre or post exist are something real. This can be expressed by saying of Space and Time that they are phenomenal, they are nonetheless well grounded phenomena (phenomena bene fundala). The abstract ideas have some objective foundation or basis, namely relations.

Leibnitz does not give any very detailed considerations to Time; but he gives aann account -of how mwn form the idea of Space. First of all they consider that many things exist at once, and they observe in them an order of co-existence. 'This order is their relation of distance'. Now when one of these co-existent things, A, changes its relation to a number of others (B,C. and D) which do not change their mutual relations, and when a new arrival on the scene, X acquires the same relations to B,C and D which A formerly had we say that X has taken the place of A. And in general the 'places' coexistence can have identically the same relations, for a relation presupposes 'accidents' or 'affections' in the related things, and no two things can have the same individual accidents. In strict accuracy, therefore X does not acquire the same relations which A formerly-had, Nevertheless we do consider them the same and speak of X occupying the same 'place' which A formerly had. We thus tend to think of place as being in some sense extrinsic to X and A.

Now, 'Space is that which results from places taken together: it is that whic

comprehends all place, the place, one might say places. Considered in this way, namely as extrinsic to things space is a mental abstraction something existing only in idea. But the relations which form the basis of this mental construction are real.'

- Copleston. 4. 307 -9

1/3 /84

ontology and epistemology

the relationship between the two has been an issue I have discussed for a long time, and one which I have never felt satisfied about.

now though I think there is a solution - and interestingly enough it is one which is generated by my overall outlook - my metaphysics

lets take reality as an undefined primitive

it seems that what philosophy has shown us is that reality can be viewed, that we can talk about reality in two ways - subjective and objective -

this is a dual aspect view derived primarily from Spinoza - (the double aspect that is - not the idea of reality)

we can view reality as it is, independent of us - and this is the ontological perspective - and we can also view it as subjective - this is the epistemological perspective - both perspectives have their uses but more than this it seems that this dualism is in some way fundamental to man.

this is not new.

what I want to reiterate is that philosophical analysis if taken to its finality always levels to a dualism of one (fundamental) kind or another - and this dualism can only be integrated as problematic

it seems to me that this is what happens in philosophical analysis - analysis if done properly always leads to a fundamental opposition - problem

now it seems fair enough to say there are not many fundamental problems - that there is just one - 'but the problem is, how do we characterize this one?

philosophical. analysis does not offer a monistic answer to this - the answer is pluralistic - we can characterize the one problem in many ways and yet still remain in the realm of the fundamental.

what this amounts to is that we cannot know the fundamental problem except in terms of these different (fundamental) characterizations

but this is effectively what I have been saying - except that I an now looking at the unknown from the perspective of the problematic -

the unknown is the problematic in the past I have had different views

(1) at one time I saw it in a sense that was not influenced by the Kantian model - i.e., the unknown as that which underlies the known - the groundlessness of the known and knower

and from this developed the idea that the unknown is the source of knowledge

that all knowledge comes from and returns to the unknown

(2) next I came to consider the unknown itself - and specifically in relation to the problem how can you characterize the unknown? - what can you say about something of which you know nothing?

I decided that what we could s say about the unknown was simply that we know nothing of it - as such - we can attempt various characterizations - none of these can ever be taken too seriously (ie, the Kantian noumenon. - the thing in itself) - though they may help, if it is necessary to attempt to say something about the unknown - the unknown is essentially unchangeable.

it is the ground of possibility - there are no actuals there - actuals are inhabitants the known

but even this of course is a characterization - albeit a characterization which is designed to show that no characterization is on - that the unknown is not characterizable.-

this is as far as we can go - all that we have for want of a better term is an 'intuition of it'

that is we do not know of the unknown - the question of my philosophy is, can we know of anything else?

I have solved this fundamental problem for any skeptical program the problem - how can a skeptic know that his skepticism is true? how can you know that you don't have knowledge - isn't this a contradiction? - I have solved this problem - and I think in an ingenious way - by arguing that the unknown is the object of knowledge

as far as I know no other philosopher has ever argued this

this view faces up to the attack on the rationality of the skeptic - full on

it says, (as the object of knowledge is the unknown) we can only know the unknown

this would be quite difficult for most philosophers to grasp -

what I am here arguing here is that what they would consider to be an enormous problem for skepticism (i.e., how can you make any sense of the claim to know the unknown - surely there is a contradiction in such an assertion - an epistemological paradox which renders such a claim senseless) IS no problem at all

what I an here arguing is that the only way we can speak of knowing is with regard to the unknown - that is of course not what most thinkers think

most want to say that 'the object of knowledge is_______' - whatever - it is something - something known - knowable.

now I believe that it can be shown that this common outlook - common to common sense and the history of epistemology - is false.

so what I'm suggesting is that one needs to completely re-orientate one's outlook on knowledge / epistemology one has to begin by realizing that:

(1) we don't know what we know

and then

(2) that to know is to 'apprehend the unknown'

philosophers, epistemologists; and especially skeptics would have no trouble with (1) - but (2) is entirely new - is completely radical

(2) asserts that knowledge - real knowledge - the only legitimate way we can use the term knowledge - is as follows:

knowledge is the unknown

I would not expect any philosopher I know to understand this, to understand its importance, its uniqueness and its power - the idea would seen absurd to most - but this is I as tempted to think as it should be

this is by far the most radical statement of my philosophy - most radical and important development to date

and I believe it is the most radical statement of skepticism ever made (not bad for a mornings work! think about it darling' - hanging it in -

.

want to quickly get back to the question of the place of the problematic in my metaphysics.

have actually abandoned the idea of equating the problematic with the unknown

what I think you've got in philosophical analysis - that process is essentially dialectic and hence problematic

now some philosophers actually believe that the problems of philosophy can actually be solved - that there can be a logical end to the dialectical process - that the whole notion of a problem entails the idea of a solution -

this is foolishness - foolhardiness

so what is the point of the dialectic -

in short the point is that it leads - shows - us to the unknown

there is no solution - only the unknown - beyond the problem

and what the dialectic also shows us is the possible ways of filling in - characterizing the unknown

so what we have as a result - what we have as a result of the dialectic is:

(1) awareness of the unknown,, as all that is beyond the dialectic

and

(2) the process throws up a whole range of possible responses to the unknown

I'm not happy though with the inclusion of this concept of dialectic into my schema - its an addition and one that I'm not sure is necessary - its actually an extra we can give the chop to - its useful as an account of how we can come to a sharp realization of the

unknown and of the possible responses to it.

but it is in the end just one way of coming to these realizations

the whole spirit of my work is dead against there being any one way of coming to 'know' and this includes the philosophic process.

the world is full of possibilities - no one schema or theory will ever do justice to these possibilities

- so we can give up the task of trying to embrace the untouchable

what we do instead is explore philosophical space

for the truth is to be lost in philosophic space -

it is only in such space that there is any real freedom, any real dignity (or at least the possibility of it)

'When the shadow of the sash appeared on the curtains it was between seven and eight o'clock and then I was in time again, hearing the watch. It was grandfather's and when father gave it to me he said, Quinten I give you the mausoleum of all hope and desire; it is rather excruciatingly apt that you will gain it to use the reductio ad absurdum of all human experience which can fit your individual needs no better than it fitted his or his father's. I give it to you not that you may remember time, but rather that you might forget it now and again for a moment and not spend all your breath trying to conquer it. Because no battle is ever won, he said. They are never fought. The field only reveals to man his own folly and despair, and victory is an illusion of philosophers and fools'.

William Faulkner

('The Sound And The Fury'. pg-76)

19/3/84

Objectivity (objectivity) is a way of viewing reality. Subjectivity (subjectivity) is another way.

the world is neither objective or subjective.

objectivity / subjectivity are two meta ways of viewing the one reality - these are two fundamental possibilities - which are sharply delineated and defined by philosophic analysis.

the world is neither objective or subjective.

this is true of any part of the whole of reality

it is true therefore of man

man is (in himself) neither 'objective' or 'subjective'

in itself reality or any part of it is featureless.

20/3/84

the categories, objectivity subjectivity are not however like glasses we put on and take off.

these are categories or imperatives, as Kant would have put it which determine in a fundamental sense the nature of the reality we know

they are knowledge

they are entrenched stabilized - necessary possibilities

possibilities which we can call actuals

and there is a dynamic a dialectic reality is given in both its objective and subjective modes - fundamental problems are generated when there is a push to reduce one of these modes to the other when there is an attempt to explain philosophy as one mode - reality is at least made up of two.

how can we then talk of reality and not realities?

we can only avoid this problem by adopting broadly speaking a Kantian perspective

have come to a rather important conclusion on this issue.

the Kantian outlook is finally 'subjective' - Spinoza's is clearly objective - at base

both thinkers account for the objective and the subjective, but neither can claim to do this without committing themselves to one or other of the perspectives primarily

it is in terms of his subjectivism that Kant explains the objective

for Spinoza the objective is primary - subjectivism is a response to the objective reality

given this neither can claim to have a value free epistemology / ontology and of course neither of these philosophers have made such a claim - both were attempting the best explanation they could come up with of reality. Both came to fundamentally different stand points - different ends of the same problematic spectrum

now what I want to suggest is that it is just the problematic which is neutral - or can be stated neutrally

it can be stated neutrally just because both fundamental perspectives are stated in it. And it is this stating of opposing positions in stark contrast to each other which gives us the problem

now this is not really saying anything very dramatic - the existence of philosophic problems has never been doubted - our ability to formulate them has never been seriously questioned

what is radical though is the view I wish to take of this fact - the significance I believe should be given to this fact

we are used to what I shall call substance theories of what is fundamental. The idealist will tell us that mind is fundamental. The materialist - matter. Objectivists that the object is primary - subjectivists that it is the subject.

in all these cases we can relate to the views because what they are positing are substance of one kind or another

this is perhaps the most consistent feature of the subject from Thales right through to the present day

Popper I think has to be seen as the first philosopher to challenge this - there is no foundation to knowledge - all that we have is conflicting theories - a critical situation

but Popper was not radical enough - primarily because he believed in true knowledge - that is he was not a skeptic about knowledge

the problem with Popper is that he really does want to have his cake and eat it too. He wants to avoid some classic epistemological positions - foundationalist -'substancialism' - yet still maintain the epistemological status quo

and it can't be done - everything is open to criticism (including this statement) - this as I have shown is not on

but one must not let this blind us to the fact that Popper first began to look at the

possibility of problems being central, being basic rather than as was thought before experience or mind

my innovation is that I have taken the problematic to a higher level. Popper was interested in what we might call second order problems. And he saw philosophical analysis as dealing with second order problems. He really had no account of first order problems.

he like all other epistemologists in the history of the problem believed that philosophical analysis could solve its own (philosophical) problems, as well as second order problems

now I have always thought it curious that philosophers believe that their own philosophical positions can be used to solve the problem that only exists because or partly because of the position they advocate in solution to that problem

most philosophers don't find this curious they see this as the nature of the game - the essence of the enterprise

this would be O.K. except that this view leads directly to the problem of rationality - the problem of self reference - self justification

how can a philosophical solution account for itself? Well of course it can't - and because it can't the problem of rationality remains, is taken back a further step

my view has been that this problem is instructive - that it is good that epistemologists - and their grand theories come to a dead end. Your irrationalist philosopher must then ask, what is left, what is beyond - where can I go from here?

there is only one response to this question one honest simple and truthful response - it is I don't know'.

this is so because at this point our pretensions to knowledge are exhausted - at the bottom of this ethic is ignorance

(and in fact every story in it is a story of ignorance but this is another argument) this is the first and most powerful argument for skepticism

but it is of course a result of the search for knowledge - and is entirely unexpected and one which seems to ridicule the search itself - that grand and impressive search for knowledge

what are we to do when it. seems there is to foundation to the edifice - that we have taken thought as far as it will go - as far as is possible - we have reached the limits of knowledge and found that there is nothing but darkness - knowledge is like a very temporary island in the sea of the unknown. In the total schema of things it has a very brief existence - and does in the end return to the sea of ignorance. (the term ignorance is for me in this context - is a technical term - referring to the reality of the unknown, it is not meant in the usual negative sense)

.

what has been done in the past, mostly is nothing - the impressive edifice has itself been enough to satisfy the ambitious vanity of its creators - so what if the

foundations were not all they should be? in comparison with the edifice such a problem seemed minimal.

of course another response has been to try to solve it

the common solution to this problem in the history of philosophy a solution used by all sides was God. God it appeared was the ultimate backstop in the philosopher's game.

but the God argument much as it appeared final - was a bad argument - it was on logical / rational grounds very shaky - and surprisingly so - one would have expected more from say Descartes

(even though Berkeley's argument for God didn't work - it was at least a brave attempt to directly and inextricably link God with the world epistemologically)

the kinds of questions we would have to ask if we were taking this God as rational ground argument seriously is why - how does God make a foundation for knowledge and truth ?

the problem with this view is that if it is a solution to the problem - the problem of the rationality of our theories of rationality our metaphysics - we can never know that it is

the point is that we don't know what a solution would look like (I think my own epistemology avoids the problem - I am here referring to traditional epistemologies), and hence we can't say if the God argument works. Again this is because we have no real idea of the form of the solution.

of course this is just why God has been used - he has functioned in the history of philosophy as a too hard box - a place to dump the difficult - the apparently too difficult dilemmas,

the points I used to make in this connection are that meta problems are the ''facts' of philosophy

the term 'facts' does not fit well with 'problem'. We naturally think of a 'fact' as unproblematic - this though is our illusion - on reflection though it is quite real phenomenally

we can go further and say that the real facts of reality are problematic -

that the object of knowledge is meta problems

that the attempt to find an unproblematic fact as the basis of reality is misconceived

what I am suggesting is that the philosophical problem is the ground of knowledge - not any particular so called solution to it

now by the problematic - the philosophic problem I mean any fundamental philosophic dispute

the question is how many are there?

and if there are many, how can they all be fundamental?

does 'fundamental' imply 'one' problem?

.

I believe it does make sense to speak of the philosophical problem

but I don't think we can come up with a definitive statement of it

what goes for philosophical problems are reflections /shadows of it (how platonic of me) - the one

the philosophic problem cannot thus be directly known

what this means of course is that my skepticism is thourough going

it is not just - the solution which is not known - a knowable - but the problem itself

this though, lack of direct knowledge of the philosophical problem - is not a problem

the reflections of the philosophical problem all have certain identifiable characteristics - that is which identify them as philosophical - as distinct from pseudo or scientific problems.

but before we get to this of how I see the relationship between philosophical and scientific problems.

I don't buy all the modern baloney about sharp distinctions one way or the other

scientific problems are philosophical problems

they are philosophical problems which have been made testable - empirical

how is a philosophical dilemma made testable?

.

just had a thought that it might be more accurate to say that your scientific dilemma, problem is not so much - a testable philosophical problem, but is rather a problem within one side of a philosophical dilemma.

I think before we take on this issue we need to have a characterization of philosophical disputes first.

.

one thing that we can say about philosophical problems is that they are not soluble

now are they reducible? i.e. the mind / matter controversy is fundamental - mind and matter

this is to say that the terms in a philosophical dispute - the key terms are primitives

now I do think that philosophical disputes generate scientific problems

but the scientific problem unlike the philosophical problem is testable (and in this sense soluble)

are their terms primitive?

some are some are not

obviously a scientific theory is one which is capable of being tested

what does being capable of being tested mean?

.

in any scientific problem there are levels - problematic levels

the empirical content of any problem is the tip of the ice berg

when we look below- the waterline - we are going beyond veridical experience - into the theoretical depths

as we go down the problems become more difficult because they are progressively more theoretical - there is in this realm no point in trying to test empirically -

at this point the dimension of the problem is philosophic

the empirical scientific realm is the tip of the iceberg - it is what is obvious - in a sense superficial

a scientific revolution occurs when the iceberg melts - that is when scientists can no longer accept the presuppositions which support the empirical tip

now all this requires much more detailed and careful analysis than I want to give it at the moment

all that I want to point out is that essentially I believe see scientific problems as frozen philosophic dilemmas

in many ways this is close to Quine's view of the nature of knowledge except my perspective is problems - his is important statements

anyway one upshot of this cursory analysis is that we now have a different approach to the problem of demarcation

my general point is that any statement has an empirical and a philosophic dimension

we can choose to separate the two and deal with them separately

this is essentially a double aspect theory?

there are problems with this - what is the empirical aspect of a mathematical or logical statement - these would be called purely theoretical

in any case is the relationship more incestuous? hybrid?

.

the main point of the foregoing discussion was to do with the status of the philosophical problem

what I argued is that the philosophical problem is common ground - the only possible common ground - possible in any philosophical dispute

now this fact is far more important than has been previously realized

no doubt philosophers have realized that their starting point is the problem, but they have not realized the epistemological / ontological significance of this

and the reason for this is of course that most philosophers are more interested in solutions than problems

so it does have to do with one's outlook - with one's epistemological perspective, even temperament - to begin with - but in any case the neutrality of problems is a fact which once recognized becomes important - to the very mature of the enterprise

without some neutral starting point there can be no beginning

and the beauty of viewing problems this way is that all philosophers of all persuasions could accept some version of this view

one need not be a skeptic to realize that there are problems. this is where we begin and end

.

this idea of neutral problems is similar to Russell's idea of neutral facts - only its better what is ontologically prior facts or problems?

26/3/84

Socrates on Immortality (Phaedo)

(1) the opposites argument

(2) recollection / equality recover through use of senses after birth

(3) can a person who knows a subject thoroughly explain what he knows?' - could before birth independent of bodies

(4) argument from forms.

28/3/84

Quine on truth

'We could not say decisively that any single sentence S is true if it or a translation of it belongs to O. for there is in general no sense in equating a sentence of a theory O with a sentence given apart from O. Unless pretty firmly and directly conditioned to sensory stimulation a sentence S is meaningless except in relation to its own theory: meaningless inter-theoretically.'

Word and Object 24

'To say that the statement 'Brutus killed Caesar' is true, or that 'The atomic weight of sodium is 231 is true, is in effect simply to say that Brutus killed Caesar, or that the atomic weight off sodium is 23. (Tarski)'

Quine: Word and Object 24.

30/ 3/84

problems and facts

I like the idea of 'facts', and of facts as being basic and I think Russell was on the right track when he posited neutral facts

in my terminology such would be empty facts

it is a 'neat' notion it does co-relate with our perception - we do perceive particulars

it seems that through language we tie knowledge to perception - in the limited empiricist sense the object of knowledge will be some particular thing - some sort of fact

the problems approach, on the other hand has some attractive features - once we go beyond immediately perceived experience - veridical experience - what we face is problems and it is those problems which occupy us in everyday, scientific, philosophic life.

now this view of the matter clearly depends on a different view of perception - in fact an 'open' view of perception.

we perceive problems - and to be honest it doesn't seem to matter what this perception amounts to - largely because no one has any doubt about the reality of problems

another thing that can be stated is that the 'facts' view is tied to a particular kind of epistemology - the problem approach isn't - and this a major consideration in its favour

if we are interested in establishing an 'objective base' and this is at the heart of the enterprise - then the problem view is the one

nevertheless I don't think this means that the 'facts' view has no significance - it clearly does at a non-problematic level

in modern epistemology 20th century epistemology - facts have been overdone - philosophers from Russell onwards have tried to transform particular veridical perception - these facts - from the level of primary perception to the meta level.

the fact about facts is that they are problematic - philosophical disputes illustrate this -

what we can say is that facts point to problems

and what of problems - what does the problem lead to?

the problem leads - if one gets or wants to go beyond it - to the unknown

problems provide us with 'knowledge' - with what knowledge there is at all of the unknown

and here we must say such knowledge is 'formal', 'logical', or 'structural'

problems do not give content to the unknown - they structure it for us

and it is this structure which enables us to deal with it - relate to it - 'define' it

'Socrates had listened with his head turned to the speaker. "It was brave of you to refresh my memory", he said, "but you don't realize the difference between what we were saying then and what we are saying now. Then we were saying that opposite things come from opposite things; now we are saying the opposite itself can never become opposite to itself - neither the opposite which is in us nor the opposite which is in the real world. Then my friend we were speaking about the qualities themselves from whose presence in them the objects which are called after then derive, their names. We maintain that the opposites themselves would absolutely refuse to tolerate coming into being from one another". As he spoke he looked at Cebes, "I suppose that nothing in what he said worried you too Cebes?"

"No, not this time", he said, "though I don't deny that a good many things do."

"So we are agreed upon this as a general principle: that an opposition can never be opposite to itself."

"Absolutely."

"Then you consider this point too, and see whether you agree about it too. Do you admit that there are such things as heat and cold?"

"Yes, I do".

"Do you still think they are the same as snow and fire?"

"Certainly not."

"Heat is quite distinct from fire."

"Yes."

"But I suppose you agree in the light of what we said before, that snow, being what it is, can never admit heat and remain snow, just as it was before only with the addition of heat. It must either withdraw at the approach of heat or cease to exist."

"Again, fire must either retire or cease to exist at the approach of cold. It will never have the courage to admit cold and still remain fire, just as it was only with the addition of cold."

"That is true."

"So we find in certain cases like this that the name of the form is eternally applicable not only to the form itself but also to something else, which is not the form but inevitably possesses its distinguishing characteristic. But perhaps another example will make my meaning clearer, Oddness must always be entitled to this name by which I am calling it, isn't that so?

"Certainly."

"This is the question: is it unique in this respect, or is there something else not identical with oddness, to which we are bound to apply not only its own name but that of odd as well because of its very nature it never looses its oddness? What I mean is illustrated by the case of the number three, Don't you think it must always be described by its own name, but by that of odd, although odd and three are not the same thing? It is the very nature of three and five and all alternate integers that every one of them is invariably odd, although it is not identical with oddness. Similarly two and four and all the rest of these series are not identical with even, but each one of then always is even. Do you admit this or not?

"Of course I do."

"Well then pay careful attention to the point I want to make, which is this. It seems clear that the opposites themselves do not admit each other; but it also looks as though any thing which though not themselves opposites always have opposites in them, similarly do not admit the opposite form to that which is in them. But on the approach either seem to exist or retire before it. Surely we must assert that three will sooner cease to exist or suffer any other fate than submit to become even while it is still three?"

"Certainly", said Cebes.

"And yet two and three are not opposites."

"No they are not."

"So it is only the opposite forms that cannot face another's approach. There are other things too which cannot face the approach of opposites."

"That is quite true."

"Shall we try if we can, to define what sort of things these are?"

"By all means."

"Well them Cebes would this describe then - that they are things which are compelled by some form which takes possession of them to assume not only its own form but invariably also that of some other form which is an opposite?"

"What do you mean?"

"Just what we were saying a minute ago. You realize I suppose that when the Form of these takes possession of any group of objects it compels them to be odd as well as three"

"Certainly".

"Then I maintain that into such a group the opposite Form to the one which has this effect can never enter."

"No it, cannot."

"And it was the Form of odd which had this effect?".

"Yes".

"So the Form of even will never enter into three."

"No, never."

"In other words, three is incompatible with evenness."

"Quite.".

"So the number three is uneven."

"I proposed just now to define what sort of things are they which although they are not themselves directly opposed to a given opposite, nevertheless do not admit it; as in the present example, three although not the opposite of even, nevertheless does not admit

it, because three is always accompanied by the opposite of even, and similarly with

two or odd, or fire or cold and hosts of others. Well see whether you accept this definition: not only does an opposite not admit its opposite, but if anything is

accompanied by a Form which has an opposite and meets that opposite then the thing

which is accompanied never admits the opposite of the Form by which it is accompanied. Let me refresh your memory there is no harm in hearing a thing several times. Five will not admit the Form of even, nor will ten, which is double five admit the form of odd. Double has an opposite of its own, but at the same time it will not

admit the Form of odd. Nor will one and a half, or other fractions such as half or three quarters and so on, admit the Form of whole. I assume you follow me and agree."

"I follow you and agree perfectly, said Cebes".

"Then run over the same ground with me from the beginning and don't answer in the exact terms of the question, but follow a example. I say this because the 'safe answer' that I described at first, as the result of the discussion I now see another means of safely. Suppose, for example that you ask me what must be present in body to make it hot, I shall not return the safe but ingenious answer that it is heat, but a more sophisticated answer based on the results of our discussion - namely that it is fire. And if you ask what must be present in a body to make it diseased, I shall not say disease but fever. Similarly if you ask what must be present in a number to make it odd, I shall not say oddness, but unity and so on. See whether you have a sufficient grasp now of what I want from you."

"Quite sufficient."

"Tell me what must be present in a body to make it alive?"

"Soul."

"Is this always so."

"Of course."

"So whenever a soul takes possession of a body it always brings life with it."

"Of course."

"Is there an opposite to life or not?"

"Yes there is."

"What?"

"Death."

"Does it follow from our earlier argument, that soul will never, admit the opposite of that which accompanies it?'

"Most definitely", said Cebes.

"Well now what name did we apply just now to that which does not admit the form of even?"

"Uneven."

"And what did we call that which does not admit death?"

"Immortal"

"And does not admit death?"

"No".

"So soul is immortal."

Well said Socrates, "can we say that has been proved."

"Most completely, Socrates."

(Phaedo 163 -173 - Penguin)

'Actualities seen to float in a wider sea of possibilities from out of which they were chosen; and somewhere indeterminism says possibilities exist and form part of the truth.'

William James.

(from 'Minds I' pg. 42.)

vol.2. 1984.April-June 21/4/84.

problems and mysteries.

Jacques Maritain the French Thomist in his essay on 'Being', draws a distinction between the problem of being and the mystery of being

'Making use of the terminology borrowed from contemporary French philosopher Gabriel Marcel though I am employing it in a completely different sense, we may say that every scientific problem presents double aspect, the one a mystery, the other a problem . It is mystery and at the same time a problem, a mystery in regard to the thing, the object as it exists outside the mind, a problem in regard to our formulae.'

this distinction is similar to my distinction of the problem of reality, and the unknown. I would prefer the term 'the unknown' (an objective unknown) to that of mystery - 'mystery' is as Maritain points out to some degree intelligible, and its clear from his analysis, that it is not philosophically neutral, nor does he mean it to be - the unknown is, or can very easily be made to be.

still he is right in viewing the mystery (the unknown) of reality as primitive, and hence as being ontologically prior to the problem

this view of 'problem' though is I believe inadequate - 'Where then shall we discover the pure type of what I call the problem ? In a crossword puzzle or in an anagram?'.

at this extreme there is no ontological content. 'There is an intellectual difficulty with no being behind it. There is a logical difficulty a tangle of concepts, twisted by a mind which another mind seeks to unravel'.

This is not a realist view of the problem - it is a nominalist view.

and it is far too unrealistic. It suggests that the problem(s) of existence can be reduced to conceptual entanglement. I do not doubt that such is involved in the problem of existence. But I wish to argue that it - the problem of reality is real - exists - that is independently of conceptual confusion - the problem would be there even if the confusion was not

conceptual entanglement is simply the formulation the statement of the problem - or should I say the introduction to the problem.

philosophical analysis goes beyond initial puzzlement and confusion to a 'dialectic' - which can only be stated when initial confusion is overcome

philosophical analysis presents us with different fundamental, meta views of the problem and its solution. That is basic positions in any philosophical controversy can be stated, precisely and clearly.

and while it is true that the crossword presents us with a problem - such a problem is surely not what we are talking about when we address the problem of existence

but this brings us to the crux of Maritain's argument - being is in his view fundamental - it is the most basic meta. concept.

but what can Jacques Maritain say if we put this question to him. what is beyond being?

he is not likely to answer as Satre did - nothingness - in fact the question makes no real sense to him

there is only the problem of being and the mystery of being -

and further being for him does not seem to be related to existence in any concrete way.

it would be correct to say that for the existentialist the problem is not being but rather existence

and existence cannot really be seen as 'mysterious' - existence is problematic and the problematic is life - and life how it is lived - there is no mystery about it.

Maritain has his view of 'problems'. because of his view of being' - what is being - that is a mystery no doubt - an intellectual mystery - but the problem of existence is practical - is real - life and death - a mystery to reflect on but a problem to live.

I have criticized Maritain's view of the problem, what then is my view of it?

for me the problem of existence is the problem of knowledge

in the problem of knowledge we are investigating what can be said to exist

existence is the subject of knowledge

in the brackets of knowledge is what exists

it is true to say that knowledge is of something

what that something is, is existence - that is given

the problem is can we state what is - this is the problem of knowledge - can we know what is

it may well be that we cannot (and this in fact is my conclusion)

existence is, but there is forever 'the cloud of unknowing'

my philosophy is a response to this fact - what do we do given it? how do we, can we proceed -

we cannot so long as we hope to go beyond our ignorance

what we can do is face it - and thus see it as the only possible 'object' of our endeavors.

it is the 'touchstone' of 'our' existence - the alpha and omega -it is what we can say really exists - we are its subjects is our object

it is that from which we come and that to which we return

knowledge is life - process and struggle it is all that we have to deal with - this reality

it is our play on the stage of unknowing

each act is life - each life an act of unknowing

9/5/84

on Russell

Ayer: 'What Russell and Whitehead achieved, in accordance with their conception of number as essentially applicable to classes. was both to give a purely logical account of what it is for a class to have a particular number, and by a method of, corelating the numbers of classes, to capture the notion of cardinal number in a general definition'.

Russell: Two equally numerous collections appear to have something in common: this something is supposed to be their cardinal number. But so long as the cardinal number is inferred from the collections, not constructed in terms of them, its existence must remain in doubt, unless in view of a metaphysical postulate ad hoc, by defining the cardinal number of a given collection, as the class of all equally numerous collections we avoid the necessity of the metaphysical principle, and there by remove a needless doubt from the philosophy of arithmetic'.

Russell here wants to define numbers in terms of classes - to show that from classes - numbers emerge? - that class is primitive - number derivative

but my question is, isn't the notion of number presupposed in the idea of class?

i.e. a class is a collection of whatever - individuals. By classifying individuals, we individuate the class

isn't this just what number is - individuation?

and in any case the idea of class makes no sense without the idea of number, and numbers of course are individuals - numbers

still it can be said that the notion of number only makes sense given that of class -there is a sense, depending on how you look at it, in which classes are primary - this was Ruasell's perspective

overall we have a chicken and egg situation - and in the case of mathematics we have the further dilemma of determining which is the chicken and which is to be taken as the egg.

such a state of affairs suggests that the question of foundations is itself meaningless in this context.

this might not be such a difficult pill to swallow if the idea of truth didn't seem to be substantial

to question the truth of mathematics it has been assumed is to call for underpinnings - foundations

but perhaps, as Quine suggests truth is predicated really only as a devise - to affirm the connection of mathematical propositions to objective reality

seen like this it is only a short step to the idea that truth is only required in an aesthetic sense - as a trapping which completes the picture

I prefer to see mathematics instrumentally and not 'existentially'

it is a tool - no more, and as such it doesn't make any sense to question its existence or its truth

the propositions of mathematics are not descriptive - in fact we could easily give up talk of propositions here - and talk purely about operations and results.

and if mathematics, has an instrumental status, what sense is there in talking about foundations?

surely the closest thing we can get is a kind of pragmatism. i.e. there is a need for the instrument

one might still question the reality of the instrument, and there would be a point here if we wanted to talk about the instrument as operation independent

the question is do we consider number independent of the operations we perform with them? - the answer is yes, but the next question is, is there any sense in this?

obviously, it is necessary for operations that we refer to our instruments, in a way that distinguishes them from operations - this is necessary to perform the tasks of mathematics - that is we give our instruments an independence, but is it not just a conceptual independence?

number theory has developed as a useful tool, and we talk about that tool - when we involve ourselves in a discussion like Russell's are we doing anything more than looking at the finer internal workings of the tool, and perhaps as a result expanding its range, depth, applicability - as a result of the nature of the tool itself?

perhaps we need to focus on the idea of mathematics as essentially a language?

still I want to argue an operational theory

if we take the view that numbers are names, we cannot hold I think that such is the name of a thing - an entity - to which the name corresponds

what it is the name of though is an operation

what we might call a primary or base operation

the operation of differentiation / division gives us units which we call numbers - which we name

is it the units or the operation which we name?

what I think we do is objectify the operation of differentiating units

that is by naming the numbers we give the operations of mathematics an objective co-relate - not a real - but an objective reference only

a nominal one

why?

I think for convenience - it is more convenient to talk about numbers given our object language - than it is to talk about operations

this is just a linguistic economy measure.

Davidson:

Davidson's argument re: mind is that because there are psyho-physical laws, we are justified in identifying the mental with the physical - which is governed by laws (physical)

this could well be the most barren unimaginative argument advanced in this subject to date. (And the esteem in which Davidson's philosophy is currently held in this area is sad testament to the state of modern philosophy of mind - this sort of argument would

never have made the grade even in the so called dark ages of post -Aristotelean - mediaeval philosophy- and they talk about angels on pin heads!)

for a start its premise is faulty - whether or not an event, mental or physical is cause or effect - is seen to be law like or not - bears not at all on the ontological status of the event

and of course the question really is whether everything is physical or mental - to assume physical laws to be the only real laws governing what is - is to beg the question.

what if we were to argue from the mentalist view -an indeterminist thesis?

10/5/84

on Moore

in what sense is goodness a property? A property of what?

on the face of it an act is not good or bad - it is not of the nature of an act - to say that would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy - the question still remains, what has such a property?

if I was to say 'x' has property 'y' I would be defining 'y' in terms of 'x' - the definition would not necessarily be exhaustive, but clearly in common sense we don't conceive of properties independently of their beavers - it makes no sense to.

what I am suggesting is that it is necessary to the understanding of any property that we show, can show its bearer, and its relationship to the bearer, that is we must define a property in terms of its bearer

now Moore wants to insist that goodness is an unalyzable property

what I am here arguing is that if good is unanalyzable it cannot be a property

that by its very nature a property must be analyzable - and by this I mean it must be shown to be a 'part' of a whole - it makes no sense to refer to a property - goodness or any other as a whole in itself

what this amounts to is that if Moore wants to maintain his kind of anti-naturalism, he cannot maintain his view of goodness as an unanalyzable quality - but if he wants to maintain this thesis, he must give up his view of the naturalistic fallacy

Moore's two basic moral theses are not consistent - in fact they are contradictory - his moral theory contains an internal contradiction.

11/5/84

realism and explanation

I think, and have thought for a while, (I think since I began this journal), that a fundamental mistake made by philosophers, discussing the problem of perception, is that of confusing reality with explanation of reality.

my argument is amazingly simple. It is this: we can never hope to discover an explanation of reality that is reality.

strange? - most philosophers would say of course, what a silly thing to suggest.

and yet I think this is what is unconsciously behind any attempt, or most attempts to 'explain' the real world.

it is a difficult point to make clear, but what I am suggesting I have previously stated in the following way: what would a true account of reality look like. It wouldn't just look like reality - it would be reality - which of course makes the idea of an explanation of reality absurd - that is of course if we expect a 'total' complete explanation of reality

well this might not upset too many philosophers they would say 'who's after a total explanation?' but the point can be made against piecemeal explanations

what I an getting at is that reality is one thing explanation another - that the two are fundamentally different that they cannot intersect

so even a piecemeal explanation cannot be satisfactory, because reality remains as it is - and inaccessible

what we perceive is what we perceive - as soon as we talk about it we explain it - abstract it - deny it.

our explanations may well be ingenious, and certainly are necessary for our dealings with reality, but nevertheless they do not penetrate their object - they merely enable if they are successful, its subjects to organize, and operate within it.

another way of looking at it is to say that to explain reality is to underpin it

what then is the relationship between the underpinning and reality?

12/5/84

realism

realism, let's say with regard to physical objects is not an explanation of the real world - it is the putting of the thesis - is a staunch determination that what is perceived is real - it is an argument that there is no difference between the 'concept' of the real and the real itself.

non-realist accounts amount to the view that reality is not directly knowable - so what we directly perceive cannot be confused with what is real - it is the view that we can know the real but only indirectly, and only through analysis of one kind or another.

a representationalist view is that what is immediately perceived is not in fact what appears to be immediately perceived - what is immediately perceived is a sense data, sensibilia, sense qualia etc.

if this view is really that such is what is immediately perceived, then I think it is

plainly wrong - such entities, realities are analytical entities - analytical realities theoretical constructions

the same can be said for the phenomenalist case

the sense data is an abstraction from the realist conception - perception.

now such entities have been posited because it is believed that, when looked at this way the problem of illusion can be solved.

and it is thought that this is more important than insisting on, realism - realism is sacrificed to rationality

the upshot of this is that the real is redefined - what is real is our explanation of appearances.

this is different from saying that sense data are real, (in a realist sense) - we can argue that such is not what is immediately perceived, but that such is what is

this is the only defensible form of a non-realist account.

that is, what is real is what is abstract - because when we abstract we explain

an explanation though cannot be equivalent to what is explained from an ontological point of view - it would not be an explanation if it was - its terms must be different.

what I am here arguing is that reduction is not on

it is possible to infer the explanation of appearances from reality - this is what any reductionist does - but he ends up with something entirely different from realism

now I think the realist argument is just simply that what he ends up with is not real

it is not an argument against particular explanations - it is an argument against explanation

it is not to argue that there is nothing to explain - there is - but as soon as we attempt such we end up with a denial of the reality - of certain features of the real world, and this is the explanation and is any explanation worth this price?

this is to say that there are features of the real world which are not explainable - and that this is just what the real amounts to

if it was 'explainable' then the real world of the realists would 'look' like the 'reduced' world of the phenomenalists and representationalists - or the world of the physicist - but it doesn't and this is the main argument of the realist.

what is real is self explanatory - and I think any realist who argues that it is -is mistaken - is barking up the wrong tree - if one is fundamentally interested in explaining reality - one cannot expect one's explanation to end up a mirror image of reality

nevertheless reality remains whatever we do with it philosophically

it is in this sense the basis of our explanations or, it is what the explainers must return to - or if nothing else and this may be more difficult - live with it - indeed in it

science has shown that our explanations enable us to do certain things with reality - this is the real function of explanation

reality is not thus underpinned - we do not in our explanations discover what is real - what is real is not the constructions of philosophy - but rather the world as it is - all our explanations are merely attempts to use (not understand) the real - to utilize it - survival as well as greed and the lust for power demand such a response to the real - but let's not mistake our tools for our a material

.

it is when we do just this that we embark on the road to skepticism

the fact is that human beings are not going to be contented with the real

the search for something beyond is as human as it is to err

what your realist says is that any such search will not result in a better world

and what I say is that any such search will end in ignorance - an enlightened ignorance perhaps - but there is no knowledge at the end of the road

"The way is dark the night is long I don't care if I

never get home , I'm standing at the end of the road."

- Jerry lee lewis

and it is just this that non-realist philosophers have banked on as a consolation prize - if we can't have reality - lets get the next best thing in fact what might be better - knowledge

24/5/84

in a broader sense reality is not just what is actual - reality is what is possible - we can however safely call what is actual what is real

of course beyond what is possible is what is unknown - and in fact I would argue such is true of what is actual

any formulation of the actual is subjective and contingent and will, under analysis prove to be conceptual - that is concept impregnated

so it cannot in any sense be a direct, immediate report of what is 'given'.

what I am getting at is that the actual appears known - but analysis shows us this cannot be

if we are able or happy to stay naive and this I think would be, if it was possible a delightful possibility

the real problem is that reality is not self-explanatory

human beings look for explanation - and in so doing we are able to conceive of alternative possible worlds

I suppose then the real question is, do our explanations explain phenomena -

I think finally the answer is 'no'

reality finally defies all our attempts to define it to explain it - hence the plethora of explanations - and the 'growth' of knowledge

it simply is, and that's all there is to it

I have my doubts about whether any satisfactory description of reality or any part of it is forthcoming

even at this level we are involved in philosophic dilemmas - if we want to be

there is a sense too in which descriptions are tied to explanation

that is I doubt the possibility of an objective description of any object

one is fooled by the need to explain one thinks that in finding an explanation for x, one truly knows x

well we can define knowledge this way - we can say this is what knowing x is, or is supposed to be, if one is a skeptic that is

that to know is to explain

how then to account for accounts of veridical experience? Do I know that the table I am sitting on exists? My answer is 'no' (unless 'by 'exist' we are said to be explaining 'table') because we are not offering an explanation of the table - we are simply giving a sense report - 'I see the table', 'I feel the table' - such statements do not imply knowledge

an epyistemic statement about such an experience would involve some attempt to explain, or underpin it - that's knowledge

on this view of course an atom, an electron is not sensed - as it is an explanation of what is - it is therefore not a 'real' entity but an underpinning of one - an attempt to account for the what is given

in science of course we get explanations of explanations

if the best science is this: then science is primarily ideal

I don't think that we can strictly speaking talk about - reality - as it is - this really makes no sense, if it is assumed that such can be known

such is beyond knowledge it is the unknown

and of course about the unknown anything can be said!

25/5/84

Collingwood's presuppositions

'A presupposition we are next told, is either relative or absolute. A relative

presupposition is said to be 'one which stands relative to one question as its presupposition and relatively to another as its answer....'. An absolute presupposition on the other hand, is one which stands relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a proposition never as an answer: Collingwood's example is the assumption no longer made in all branches of science, but still he thinks in medicine that every event has a cause'.

Ayer continues:

'Since absolute presuppositions are never answers to questions, it follows in Collingwood's view that they are not presuppositions, from which in turn it follows that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to them. This goes beyond them not having truth values. Their being absolutely presupposed is taken to imply their not being asserted. Consequently it is nonsense to ask whether they are true, whether they can be demonstrated, or even what evidence there is in their favour..,,,, A metaphysician who deserves the name will not make the senseless attempt to validate or invalidate absolute presuppositions. He will content himself with trying to answer the historical question what absolute presuppositions in the various branches of science and at, the successive stages of their development have actually been made.

As an historical science metaphysics has its own presuppositions. They appear to consist in the principles which govern the assessment of historical evidence. In particular metaphysicians, are required to answer questions of the form, 'Why did such and such people at such and such a time make such and such a presuppositions' and their answer must take the form, 'Because they or their predecessors from whom they inherited their civilization had previously made such and such a different set of absolute presuppositions, and because such and such a process of change converted one into the other? The presuppositions form a constellation but not a hierarchy so that metaphysics is not a deductive science'

- Ayer 198-99

Collingwood says of his absolute presupposition that it is absolute because it stands relatively to all questions as a presupposition never as an answer. His example: every event has a cause. Clearly we could ask the question: why does everything happen the way it does?, and answer, everything happens the way it does because everything has a cause? I don't see any problem here.

a presupposition could certainly be an answer to a question, i.e., the question about presuppositions - but would it then be or function as a presupposition?

my suggestion is that a statement is a presupposition not because of any inherent characteristic, but rather because of its place in a system of thought - that is its logical place

(there may be a linguistic characteristic of presuppositions, i.e., they may all be universal statements - or something like this - if we are talking about metaphysics or science this would need to be looked at)

so what this amounts to is that a statement is a presupposition because of the way its holder relates to it. This is essential a behavioural criterion.

so I would say that a presupposition can be held as, Collingwood suggests - but I don't think this is necessary

Collingwood may well be right in suggesting that history shows that presuppositions are held in the way he suggests. But recent developments in the philosophy of science - scientific methodology would contradict this as a factual claim - so I think we can distinguish logical and behavioural issues.

I believe Colligwood is on the right track if his thesis is interpreted as an account of the logical function of the presupposition in general, and there may well be a large degree of co-relation behaviorally, as far as the history of thought goes - but there are important exceptions to this.

the significance of this distinction is that it maintains Collingwood's point about the way presuppositions have been held, but also keeps the issue of the logic of presuppositions alive.

it should also be mentioned that Collingwood's view could be in principle extended to include new developments in the function of presuppositions

By logic I mean just that I don't see how a presupposition could be logically anything but basic - fundamental - in some sense even if relatively

how such presuppositions are held 'behaved towards' is another question Collingwood seems to think this is the only issue.

Why I am interested in Collingwood is because of his open interest in presuppositions. I have been concerned with this issue since I first began philosophy. Second, it is quite exciting to find that there is another philosopher who has 'solved' the problem in the way I have. This needs some explanation and I will elaborate in what follows. But perhaps the most satisfying aspect of discovering Collingwood is that I believe I have a better account.

Firstly Collingwood and I have a similar view of the nature of philosophy. I think it can be said that in arguing for the view that thought - the history of thought is the primary function of philosophy, Collingwood is putting forward a view that philosophy is a descriptive enterprise. His approach is historical.

now Collingwood is on the right track here - but not in equating descriptivism with historicism - this is far too narrow

we can describe a theory's origin and development - its history - but this does not exhaust the possibilities of description.

I believe and this I think is a radical theory, that, we can also describe a theories possibilities. This is creative descriptivism. It is to be distinguished from passive decriptivism - which is what Collingwood was on about. (I don't mean to suggest that passive descriptivism doesn't have any creative aspects to it. It will be interpretive and perhaps this term is better)

we need to distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive theories of philosophy.

I should explain this distinction, I think there are some philosophers, possibly most who believe that what a philosopher does is prescribe . That is just put forward theories about the nature of reality, and Collingwood and some others dissent from this. I believe that philosophy is, has to be, fundamentally a descriptive enterprise. That means that the primary function of philosophy is descriptive. But of course your philosopher must have something to describe. So the subject of descriptive philosophy, must be put at some time or another. That is theories, concepts, disputes, arguments must be advanced if there is to be any philosophy at all.

the question which is of prime importance is, how does one assess philosophical data?

The presciptivist will prescribe an account of evaluation and assessment. His criterion will be consistent epistemologically and ontologically with his philosophy - his general philosophical prescriptions. In fact it will probably form the core of his philosophy. It will be the touchstone. A good example of this is the positivist theory of verifiability, or the Popperian falsifiability criterion. While these theories. apply primarily to assessment of science - they define what is 'meaningful' what is 'scientific' and as well these theories are posited to account for meaningless non-scientific theories and philosophical theories.

(I should note that I have never been convinced that the positivists were able to get around the conclusion that their own prescriptions were meaningless. Popper avoided this problem, and advanced a criterion of general rationality his critisizability criterion - which though it doesn't work was a good try)

The point is that assessment of a prescriptivist philosophy will be internal to that philosophy. In that sense there is no such thing as philosophical objectivity'. I am quite sure of this, and I think that it can be shown to be the case with every philosophical system that has been advanced. The proponents of the systems have generally not been concerned by this problem either because it hasn't seemed to be of intrinsic interest, hasn't seemed important, or because its just too hard to solve.

One could accept the fact of internality of philosophical criterion. Wittgenstein worked with language and his theory of life / language forms takes this view. These theories are philosophical theories, not though theories of philosophy. Still the notions could be applied in this area.

This comes at a price. We must give up any notion of objectivity and any notion of rationality in a universal sense. This suits me fine, but few philosophers would be prepared to accept this conclusion. Now I think this conclusion is right, and that it fits well with descriptivism. In fact descriptivism is I think an outcome of philosophical subjectivism,

(The reason is this: if I believe that a philosophical presupposition is true - objectively true - then I am not just saying that such and such a theory has had such and such a history. This would be quite and involved statement and one which branched off in many directions but not a statement that committed the speaker to any commitment about 'the way the world is'. All we are doing is as Collingwood suggests is relating the history of the idea, the theory the problem

Philosophically this is all we can do - we can describe the theory - its changes - and describe the ideas that led to these changes etc. - but we cannot then switch to a discussion of the truth value of the statement - if by truth we mean something which is context independent - theory independent - non-subjective. All we are talking about with truth anyway is a criterion for a decision procedure.

The point might be better put this way. For a theory to be a subject to a truth test, the terms of the criterion of the test (the decision procedure) must be consistent with the terms of the theory to be tested. There must be an epistemological compatibility between the terms of the theory and the terms of the test.

That is to say, the epistemological foundation of the theory to be tested and the epistemological foundations of the test must be identical otherwise the test could not 'test' the theory - the test could not apply to the theory

An uncontraversial case of what I have in mind is attempting to test a mathematical proposition experimentally. The reason this sort of test is not on is because of the different epistemological foundations of the subject and the testing. This is in a sense a trivial example but it gives us some important lessons.

Clearly there is no certainty about the epistemological basis either of a theory to be tested or the test itself. As an example consider Quine's argument against the analytic / synthetic. If that was accepted generally then my above argument would not follow and the example would have to be reinterpreted to the opposite conclusion

It should also be pointed out that scientists are unlikely in practice to examine the epistemological foundations of theory or test. This situation could change if there was a greater awareness among scientists but I doubt that this would be crucial for any scientific practice

What has to be shown in order to put this view on a strong footing is that epistemological mistakes have resulted in scientific blockages, stalemates, dead ends. That is that such has occurred because either the theory was epistemologically incompatible with the test or visa versa.

To what extent do epistemological views have any impact on the practice of science? This is not to say that such issues do not impregnate scientific issues. But do epistemological issues have any immediate even observable impact on the practice of science?

The situation seems to be that scientists assume that their own methods of theory construction and experiment will win through they are reluctant to switch fundamental frames of reference to take from the philosophical resource pool - but it does happen - quantum physics is a case in point. The uncertainty principle is a statement of what is humanly, scientifically, experimentally possible - and an account of why this is so in physical terms.

Epistemology I think is rather unnecessary to the physical case. One can underpin the theory of quanta with an appropriate epistemology (although whatever this was it would be controversial), but this would be I think like wrapping a package up with ribbons and bows. It's like putting the final touches on something, It's all very well, it completes the picture, but it doesn't add to it or alter it in anyway - it is essentially irrelevant.

Retrospectively we could perhaps argue that an epistemological issue - an issue that is, of how to interpret some knowledge data, was a factor in either theory or test - and that it was there relevant to whatever the outcome was to be.

But in practice, is theory interpretation of theory, experiment, interpretation of experiment, data, interpretation of data, clearly distinguishable?

This way of looking at it suggests that in science, (and in life), what we have is a philosophical, epistemological pool into which all else is dipped or dropped.

This is not a trapping and extra - it is essential for science to be.

What I an getting at here is that epistemology is the context of science.

It is a context which a scientist may attempt to avoid, or believe he is avoiding but this cannot be for too long as reflective questions of necessity are asked.

Thus it really makes no difference to distinguish scientific and philosophical issues at all. Any so called scientific / empirical is only a kind of philosophical issue.

Observable experiment cannot in any sense be called non-theoretical. Any theory is observational in the sense that it makes empirical projections.

1/6/84

Morality

what is the source the foundation of morality?

the only thing I can say in answer to this is that I am constantly faced with the problem of morality. The question of what is right, what is wrong? This is all we can say about the moral problem - that we are faced with it

we can if we like try to explain this, but any explanation will be an explanation of the problem. It, whatever the explanation is cannot become the problem. The explanation cannot be stated, or presented as the problem.

no doubt this will not stop people from attempting to explain the moral dilemma.

and this is just natural because the moral dilemma is a question, and the question naturally calls for an answer

the fact is thought the posing of the question does not give the kind of answer that the question suggests is possible.

any answer to such a question will only lead to much more questions - but with each level of inquiry, the expectation of a real answer decreases

skepticism becomes the only answer in the sense that it is skepticism that we move to and effectively have to be contented with. This is I think an honest account of any inquiry into the moral problem.

now as I have stated in connection with epistemology we need to distinguish between positive and negative skepticism; the same point holds with 'moral knowledge',

the main point I want to get across here is that we are always presented with the moral question and this is all.

we are not presented with its basis or its resolution

any account of either is no more than an excursion into philosophical space - into the unknown

as moral agents all that we have is these excursions - our own and those of others - into the unknown

there is no foundation, design or reason but that which we want or make

4/6/84

the moral problem

I believe the moral question presupposes the moral answer

I am not meaning that the question presupposes that there is an answer. or at least an answer of the kind expected.

It is rather that a genuine problem, if it is genuine reveals as insoluble

There is needless confusion because of the general connotation of 'problem'. I define a problem as insoluble - in this sense it is an unanswerable question. So we can say generally that a problem is a question with no answer, as distinct from a puzzle, which is a question that is answerable.

The essential difference between these two concepts is that a puzzle (unlike a problem) is a question, and it is known how to answer it at least in principle. The question is how to complete it. The question is reasonable we can see how it is answered and furthermore if it is a proper puzzle it can be answered can be solved - i.e., the pieces are there.

A problem on the other hand is like being confronted with some jig-saw question, but not being in possession of the jig-saw board or all the pieces.

Moral questions are such questions.

Is this possible though, how can a problem even be stated, could we that is pose a jig-saw problem without a board or pieces? how would it be stated unless at least the ideas of a jig saw, pieces and puzzle could be stated? We could that is pose the jig-saw question but would it make any sense at all if no such thing as a jig-saw puzzle and instructions for using it existed at some time? I think not.

As I have defined the moral question so far, it is a problem in my technical sense. I.e., it can't be solved in the way that a puzzle can. It is thus negatively defined as a puzzle that is unable to be solved.

But again just pushing on with the puzzle analogy. We can understand a jig saw puzzle that cannot be played, or a jig-saw problem which cannot be worked out just because we do know how such a puzzle does work. And because of this we can imagine being presented with a jig-saw puzzle that cannot be completed - that cannot be played.

How does this fit with moral problems? Is there anyone who believes that what is good, evil right or wrong is in fact a soluble puzzle?

This is a subjective way of putting it, but if this is the easiest then it should be possible to extract some methodology from the moral practice.

And this may be the answer - detailed empirical research into the way people solve their problems - their methods, concepts etc. And with a large enough sample patterns may emerge.

Just by the by this is what I believe is the way to go about philosophy - or 'solving' philosophical issues - including of course moral issues.

But this is going beyond the issue in point. The problem about 'Problems'.

And what then of the moral question? Is it a genuine question? What is a genuine question? Does a genuine question have an answer?

If we were to be faced with an experimental problem we could identify it as a genuine problem not because of its similarity to other genuine problems (or not). We would that is identify a token of the empirical kind of problem.

Most problems / questions seem to be different in kind in that what is and is not genuine is not at all clear. (It may not be as clear in science as some would have us believe - but this is not the same issue).

Of course there may be some query on this matter in science - what is and is not a genuine scientific problem - but at least in science it seems that such a question is answerable in principle.

I'm not even sure that the question of authenticity makes any sense in morality. That is, the question, what is a genuine moral problem?

(I can't imagine what a non-genuine moral problem would look like, how it could be stated).

perhaps all that distinguishes genuine from non-genuine moral problems is that with the former a solution is possible in principle if not in practice - that we know in theory, or in broad outline how to solve a genuine moral problem. In the case of non-genuine moral problems the opposite holds.

The progress to this point amounts to this: if moral problems exist they are insoluble a so called insoluble problem is not a genuine problem therefore: there is no such thing as a genuine moral problem.

This conclusion is not inconsistent with what I alluded to earlier on, and that is that all we can do in morality is describe various past present and possible solutions to moral problems.

This does not mean that what we are dealing with is genuine solutions to genuine problems.

I began this discussion with the statement that the moral question presupposes the moral answer.

I am now inclined to the opposite view that the moral answer presupposes the question .

And by this, one's moral answer, in effect in itself implicitly defines the problem, or can be shown to.

This is not to suggest that the moral agent is aware of this - or that any such definition will be trouble free.

5/6/84

What is important from the above discussion is the idea that we are presented with what I call the moral question (whether we are dealing with in fact, a question is a minor point).

How we explain this is a theoretical problem - a question of meta ethics my feeling is that it can't be explained.

I should also say that I don't believe that we are 'presented' in the way we are presented with sense data, or even physical objects.

I have I suppose some sort of Kantian view on this issue. But this really only begs the question. How do we explain the relationship between morality - the moral reality and the non-moral reality? What is the essential difference?

5/6/84

One thing that is clear about the problem of moral knowledge is this: we are not presented with an object in the same way as we are in the non-moral realm. We may and do use object language, i.e., what is good., what is evil, but this can easily be shown to be language without reference.

I do not think it makes much sense to talk of an object morality.

8/6/84

Have been thinking on the idea that we are constantly 'presented' with the moral question. Now there is something right here - but are we dealing with a question?

Not really. I think we are dealing with a reality - but this too doesn't quite work. We can think of reality as non-moral a physical impersonal world.

We can even imagine a world - a human world without morality - is this so?

I think not - really - what distinguishes human beings from other species and from nature - is our moral sense - our moral reality.

How to define this (in all but non-behavioural terms) is hard, why is this so?

10/6/84

'Gruesome' reflections

Goodman's thesis:

(1) All emeralds are green. (2) All emeralds are grue. Instances of one can be shown to be instances of another.

All we really have here is different statements referring to the same phenomena.

If this is the case, that (1) and (2) are referentially equivalent - then support for (1) will be support for (2).

The point is though they are not.

As Goodman latter argues grue and green have different histories,

And if we take a wholistic or comprehensive view of the meaning of the term - then grue does overall have different meanings.

At a particular point in time (1) and (2 ) have equivalent reference.

If one goes beyond this i.e. talk about 'recent history' of the terms, are we not dealing with different references?

Perhaps what happens in language - is we have a series of attempts to 'fix' reference.

This is the problem of reference.

How do we refer to x?

A common sense attitude to begin with.

Its like -- what?

Does x determine its own reference - does x fix itself?

It's a silly question.

We can't talk of x independent of the mind.

But still I don't want to equate objects (physical objects) of reference with mental acts.

I don't think it is necessary to go this far - (hard not to on logical grounds).

Can we talk of physical objects as affected by the mind in a relationship with, and yet autonomous.

Anyway the point I want to make is that x cannot fix x - reference is 'a placing of x' and for this to happen a mind is necessary.

Do we want to say that the object of reference is the mind itself?

this could be true.

13/6/84

Ryle

what is the logical status of 'twinge' in 'twinge of pain'?

we can use the phrase 'twinge of pain' to refer to and describe what? - a twinge of pain - O.K.

but if we want to explain this referential description we might say a 'sensation' - but this would not be enough - 'a sensation' is general - its not specific enough - it doesn't tell us what kind of sensation it is.

we could go on and talk about types of sensation etc.

there is a couple of issues I want to look into here - one is the relation of reference to description - the other is the logical status of references /descriptions

first we can refer without describing or can we?

in a sense no, if a phrase makes sense it describes what it refers to.

the phrase a twinge of pain, or even 'pain' refers to - what (the 'to what' will be left for the moment) - let's just say to a sensation - the phrase 'a pain' - or the name refers to and identifies (to some degree) the sensation

the point seem to be that the distinction between name and description is not one of kind, but rather one of type - that is to say that a name is a kind of description - a singular description

Russell distinguished between names and descriptions as a basis of his 'metaphysics' - in his argument for why, "what can be said to exist doesn't actually exist".

Russell realized that language is underdetermined by reality, that is we can use language to go beyond the facts (of what exists) - we can thus refer to 'things' that do not exist like 'round square capolas'

either language is underdetermined or we end up having to grant existence to 'things' that cannot be, have never been or will never be.

this underdetermination is strange - why is it so? why is it that we have the capacity to 'refer' beyond the facts - why is it that language doesn't fit reality or why doesn't reality fit language?

now a lot of philosophers want to argue that language determines reality - reality is not the object of language as such - what we call 'reality' is a function of language

now this view doesn't make any sense to me at all language is referential - it makes no sense to think of a language that does not refer (what language refers to, how this occurs, with all kinds of language natural and artificial - is a fascinating problem

but we do not achieve any solutions here by claiming that language does not refer beyond itself)

Russell was right in showing that when language refers to itself paradoxes result - and in showing this he took a stand for reality,

language refers to a non-linguistic reality

but the fact is that we need language to make this claim - but so long as we acknowledge as a basic principle that the object of language is non-linguistic then there are no real problems

this is just to say that language is extensional - if we take the view that it is intensional we create problems - the main problem is that language itself makes no sense - so what do we say about the extension - how do we characterize it?

let's take the reference, 'a twinge of pain' this phrase is referential - what it refers to is a non-linguistic reality - but it makes no sense to say that we can 'refer' to this reality non-linguistically - reference just simply is linguistic

pain is a name we give a certain sensation

we could ask what is 'sensation' the name of?

and we could give an answer to this - any number of answers,

what we must remember is that a name cannot be the name of another name - if we start thinking like this we end up not getting out of the net of language - we never get to reality.

if we want to know what our name names we cannot assume that it is another name - we cannot assume that the end of this process, of what names name is some feature - non-linguistic - reality

how then do we get to a non-linguistic end?

only I think by a decision - a convention

that is we get to a point where we decide that this name names, not another name but reality

that we make a decision to accept that such and such a name doesn't refer to a name but to what it refers to - reality

.

I'm not happy with this - I don't see that we get out of the web of language names by a decision why should we decide - how can we decide?

Russell's argument only shows how we can get rid of names through descriptions - but then there's this problem of names and description, what is the difference? And how is reference related?

first I suppose we need to understand what description is.

Russell implicitly defined description negatively, A description for him was a well formed sentence without names

a sentence that is that has reference without names.

so reference is the bottom line for description

for a sentence to be a description it must have reference - a sentence which does not refer does not describe

this distinction enables us to distinguish genuine from apparent description

a genuine description does refer

what then is a genuine reference -

how do we know when reference connects with reality?

we have to set up criteria, and this entails general epistemological criteria

this is the answer but it is no answer

the point is that we have different ways of referring but to what?

well up to this point I have resisted invoking my own view, my skepticism

my picture is that of language at the centre of reality - at the centre of the unknown that is - through language we reach out to the unknown.

we refer - that is what reaching out is all about - we name / describe the unknown - but the unknown is silent it tells us nothing about the result - the success of failure of our reaching out

we decide for whatever reasons we have that such and such a name doe does refer - this is all

it is a complex matter and all we as philosophers do is further describe our

descriptions.

this view is a solution to the problem of reference -

in language - names refer to names that is so - but the whole point - the reason for this is the unknown

we don't know what we refer to and that is the point - that is what it is all about - the unknown is our reference.

the fact is though - there are different levels of reference - there are particular and specific references and general - abstract references - different orders of reference - this is a fact about language - not about the world - there are reasons for this, but we will never know what they are

.

I often have dreams that are dreams within dreams - I will try to wake from my dream only to find I am in another - this process can go on through a number of dreams - in anyone of these dreams I will believe I am awake - and then come to the realization that I am not - I will then attempt to 'get woke', and will believe that I am when there is a change of dream - like a move from one room to another - or from one world to another

the philosophical problem of reference is like this - continually attempting to crack through to reality - believing for a while that you have - realizing again that you haven't - changing views beginning again, and so on

we do wake from our natural sleep do we ever wake from our philosophical dreams?

14/6/84

solipsism and self-knowledge

strictly speaking the self is a hypothesis which must be 'framed' posited if knowledge is to be possible,

as Locke Berkeley and Hume argued the 'ideas' on which knowledge is founded are elemental and particular - there is no idea - element in experience that is the self - as Kant showed we therefore have to see such an 'idea' as a ground, for experience - i.e.. we would not have experience if we did not have a self -

now what I think is that the self is necessary for knowledge - it is a necessary explanation - without it how could knowledge be possible - but I don't think we can go so far as to say 'it' is a thing, substance etc. Kant was right in this regard.

now the argument for solipsism is that the immediate object of knowledge, is, (whatever it is, however we characterize it) - private - rationalists and empiricists alike have taken the view that if this is so, we cannot rationally go beyond this - they have argued that the immediate object of knowledge is all that can be said to exist and given that the immediate object is private, all that can be said to exist is the private world of the knower - and this means my world.

now we have already seen that for knowledge to be possible - not only must we have an object of knowledge, but also a knower of that object

now on strict solipsistic grounds the self cannot be said to be known - the self is not an object of knowledge -

so solipsism is self defeating

we end up rather with skepticism - and unmitigated mystery

more interestingly it seems to me we cannot talk about self knowledge if we take either the hard empiricist or Kantian view

Kant avoids the total skepticism of empiricism but in so doing makes self knowledge logically absurd

the self for Kant is the 'ground' of knowledge, not an object of knowledge, Kant's self makes knowledge possible, but as a result there cannot be any knowledge of the self

15/6/84

Frege and me and Bertrand Russell

Frege held that all descriptions were names and Russell that all names could be rendered descriptions - I'm moving to a third view that all names are descriptions

my view on reference is that all descriptions refer, but that one cannot conclude that all have references in Russell or Frege's sense

that is the act of referring does not entail reference (necessarily), in an objective sense

what can be said, (not a Russellian logical 'can') to exist, does not necessarily exist

language is underdetermined by the world

the act of referring is an attempt to make reference stick - to make the world - to determine it

ultimately all we can refer to is our previous descriptions

our descriptions of the world is all that is the case, or is everything that is the case

the unknown is all that exists objectively beyond our descriptions

'the unknown' is not a description - the unknown is a non-description logically speaking

the world thus in itself is non-describable - indescribable

but this means that our descriptions are of the unknown and that the world is just what we describe it to be

our descriptions are all that is the case and the object of all referring is the unknown

our descriptions do refer - to the unknown and the unknown is just what we say it is

it is necessary that the unknown be kept otherwise language makes no sense

language must refer to something - what that something is is the unknown - we can say the unknown

thus I an a holist - our particular descriptions make sense only in relation to each other - but the whole makes sense in relation to the unknown

the unknown is the world

15/6/84

Frege and me and Bertrand Russell

Frege held that all descriptions were names and Russell that all names could be rendered descriptions - I'm moving to a third view that all names are descriptions

my view on reference is that all descriptions refer, but that one cannot conclude that all have references in Russell or Frege's sense

that is the act of referring does not entail reference (necessarily), in an objective sense

what can be said, (not a Russellian logical 'can') to exist, does not necessarily exist

language is underdetermined by the world

the act of referring is an attempt to make reference stick - to make the world - to determine it

ultimately all we can refer to is our previous descriptions

our descriptions of the world is all that is the case, or is everything that is the case

the unknown is all that exists objectively beyond our descriptions

'the unknown' is not a description - the unknown is a non-description logically speaking

the world thus in itself is non-describable - indescribable

but this means that our descriptions are of the unknown and that the world is just what we describe it to be

our descriptions are all that is the case and the object of all referring is the unknown

our descriptions do refer - to the unknown and the unknown is just what we say it is

it is necessary that the unknown be kept otherwise language makes no sense

language must refer to something - what that something is is the unknown - we can say the unknown

thus I an a holist - our particular descriptions make sense only in relation to each other - but the whole makes sense in relation to the unknown

the unknown is the world

16/6/84

you see what it is that language describes can only be described in language

language is not its own object (of reference) but what this object is (apart from what can be said of it, apart from its description) is not known and I mean by this that it is unknown - and thus we are led to the view that the object of knowledge is the unknown

it therefore makes no sense to ask, 'does this description refer to a real feature of reality?' if we are assuming in this question, that we can know reality or any feature of it, prior to, independent of the description

reality is not known, a given, that we check our descriptions against

reality is the objective unknown and hope and try as we will the unknown will not throw up answers to our questions - it remains silent - it can be no other way.

Frege was right in saying a proposition has sense and reference

to suggest otherwise, is to argue against sense, as Russell does, and is to fly in the face of the indeterminacy of language (that is, that the world is over-determined by

language)

Russell of course knew this but he couldn't accept it - it was too messy for him and of course he saw it as the source of paradox.

another point is this - propositions must have sense otherwise the question of reference would not arise - the question of a proposition's truth would not come up.

that is we subject it to the test only on the assumption that it has sense - otherwise it would make no sense to ask if it was true or false

17/6/84

morality and facts

I don't believe that moral issues can be settled by an appeal to facts

a moral problem is the problem of value - which facts do we value?

the fact is, that the world of facts is not all it is cracked up to be

facts conflict with facts there is no arbitration here

I think it is quite difficult to avoid emotivism - why is it that we value one act above another - one state of affairs and not another it seems nothing more than an 'emotional' preference

yet in the natural history of ethics this view is a late arrival and one which has not been adopted, by the majority of people

I think that the various cultural, philosophical, religious attempts to ground morality and give it legislative force, have really been a response to emotivism (from a logical point of view),

it is clear that unless there is some external force, coercion in a social, cultural sense, then clearly individual's moral views, attitudes, preferences, inclinations will change with the wind

(I think that the individual's experience defines a core of more or less stable moral principles and actions - as we move from the core there is less stability, more controversy, more obvious emotivism)

objectivism and moral legalism are responses to the ground of ethic - essentially a fearful response - but possibly socially speaking a necessary one

17/6/84

sense and reference

if we take Russell's view (and I think Wittgenstein's) then a sentence only has sense if it has reference (presumably this means has, and not just 'has' in a weaker sense of 'potentiality')

the problem with this view is that it cannot cope with new and radical theories, conceptions or world views

it also assumes that the methodology for testing is changeless - that whatever theory we come up with, we are going to know how to evaluate it - it will just be a matter of subjecting the new theory to same tired and true tests - whatever they are

this view is fanciful - the history of science for one shows that as well as changing theories of nature, there have been, and of necessity are changes in evaluation procedures

the point is that the newest theory of science may not be testable at T(1) simply because it is not known how to test it, or due to technological problems it is not known how to test it - whatever - we are going to say that it has no meaning until it is tested - clearly this is absurd - before truth a proposition must have sense

19/6/84

Wittgenstein, reference, pictures.

if I am right about reference - that we can only refer to descriptions then traditional epistemologists (of the non-skeptic variety) have a major crucial problem - the dilemma is how do we refer to the world?

on the face of it we can't at least directly - we can only refer to other references - to descriptions

where is the world in all this?

obviously we do refer to the world - but how do we do this, how do we explain this?

my own answer is that:

(a) particular descriptions refer to other particular expressions the full body of descriptions the whole that is, does refer

(b) by the world I mean the unknown - the point is that we know the world through our descriptions - for all intents and purposes - are the world - our descriptions, define, give sense to the world - to the unknown

'our culture' consists of the various descriptions that have been made of the unknown. - there are I think innumerable levels, layers of descriptions - that is 'buried worlds' of descriptions - what we have is worlds on worlds, and worlds within worlds - the space all this exists in is the unknown - that content is the world and the world is all that is known - the world is unknown

(c) my own answer to the problem of the world is that the descriptive whole refers to the unknown, and that the unknown is a non-reference - this last point is crucial and controversial

I see it as a means o f breaking out of the dream world of language - if the unknown is a non-reference - a non reference which can be referred to, then even if we can't break out of the dream, we can know, that there exists a world beyond it, a world that is, that exists for our dream-language world.

the unknown thus functions as a 'sufficient reason'. in the Leibnitzian sense, for the world of language

just a couple of points:

particular references refer to other references, particular and general - that is quite clear (even if some philosophers have not seen it, or admitted to having seen it), but the really interesting question is, what does the whole - the descriptive whole refer to?

well I think it is equally clear that we cannot say, 'a description' for this really just begs the question - the question is, what do all descriptions refer to?

I think this is just where the point about the unknown emerges

one way of putting it is to say the question - cannot technically speaking be answered - that is we cannot say - for to say, would be to utter a description.

but the point is that any answer will be a description and therefore not an answer

so the reference of the descriptive whole is either (1) unspeakable, or (2) a non-descriptive speakable.

either answer suits me, and I think (2) is possible - I think we can say that the name, the phrase, the unknown is non-descriptive

(4) we could end up here taking the view 'the unknown' is a name and if this - then I think - the only name

that is the name to which all descriptions refer

on this view 'the unknown' is the name of the object of all descriptions - the reference of all description

20/6/84

names and descriptions

the above work raises the question of the relation between names and descriptions

earlier on I argued we should see all names as descriptions

what I'm getting at is the act of referring - in that act we are describing (in the case of names 'minimally')

there is though a problem here. Is a name really a description, doesn't a description predicate of a name, that is say something about the name, describe the name

to name something is more to refer to it than describe it

to name is to refer - the act of naming is the act of referring.

to describe too, is to refer - but it is not primarily to refer - it is to elucidate, expand, explain, develop the name to fill it in

'the name' functions as a point of reference

the description (and here I borrow from Wittgenstein) is an arrow -

the arrow when it hits the point - target - extends the name

it is I think correct to say that a description refers to a name (and not as some would say 'the world')

what though does the name refer to?

any answer to this question - if we are talking of a specific name will be a description of the name (or perhaps if you like, of that named)

the situation seems to be this:

any name, when we ask, what does it refer to?, will have to either refer to another name, that is 'a' is the name of 'b' - and then we would understand 'a' or 'b', or 'a' as both 'a' and 'b' - or perhaps even eventually 'c'

or when a name does not exist - a description is offered.

clearly though, name answers and descriptive answers, are not answers, always, to the same question.

a 'name' answer is usually a response to an 'objective' question, i.e., 'what is that?'

a descriptive answer is usually a response to what I shall call a 'subjective' question, 'what does it do, how does it function?'

these are, that is questions to do with a things 'disposition', function, behaviour etc. - of what is named.

(and that which is named / described is can only be known through its name

description)

21/6/84

to describe something is to presuppose reference

to name is to make reference

to describe is to make reference - but logically it presupposes reference has been made (even if in fact it hasn't)

.

what I have been thinking recently is that to refer is rightly seen as an act

in saying e.g. 'that is a cat' - we are describing the reference -

describing the act

it seems then we are talking about speech acts

thus we can talk about naming acts and describing acts

23/6/84

what I think, and this is radical and controversial

'reference' is an act. That is we are making a certain kind of act in referring

but what does it mean to say we 'refer to'

what is it that is referred t?

my answer is 'descriptions'

that is in referring we act with language

in asking what we refer to, we are asking for a description of the reference - that is the original description

it might be objected - what we are referring to is 'the world'.

my point is that, in making that claim we are making a description i.e., 'the world'.

I am not hereby denying a non-linguistic reality - what is usually meant by the world - without '________'

what I am saying is that we relate to this via language

language is the means by which we 'know'

knowledge is the product of this relation

that knowledge - if it is knowledge, only has life in language

language is then not only the means but it is the end of knowledge - it is knowledge - that is

thus language is an answer to two questions

(1) how do we know?

(2) what do we know?

and we can only know about it, being in it - through it

once the relationship between the knower and the world has been established, it makes no sense to think of either

we can only think in language and thus of language

the knower and the known are then the two fundamental categories of language

it is a very simple mistake which has led to the view that language has significance outside of itself

to anyone who thinks this I say what does language refer to?

if an answer is given I say what does that answer refer to?

any answer will be in language will be language

again I say the non-linguistic reality can only be approached, only when we ask the question, what does language as such, the whole that is, refer to?

of course we have words to answer this question, but we can discount them, they are part of the whole

we must I think realize that an answer, linguistic cannot be given

and the word I think best appropriates this fact is unknown

logically speaking this must be viewed as a non-answer as a non-description

it is a description which means there is no description

an empty name

23/6/84

perhaps it is just that we do learn language ostensively, and this makes us think that meaning consists in the correct naming of an object

28/6/84

meaning is not an experience - directly knowable in the way that I know the object in front of me is red

I think meaning is not a relationship between language and the world

language is not something that relates to something else

language is self sufficient

meaning I suspect is a logical property of language

it is a matter of logic that a sentence is meaningful

my feeling is that language is meaningful - that meaningfulness is an essential feature of language not an accidental property - one that it may or may not posses

29/6/84

skepticism is the resting place of explanations and explainers

we come to skepticism when language/explanation is exhausted

when there is nothing more to say

skepticism is epistemological space

we fill this space with 'knowledge'

we are that is always working in ignorance but with knowledge

ignorance / skepticism is not a discovery at the end of the line, at the end of the search - it is the philosophical air we breathe.

it is there - without it there would be no knowledge - no reason for knowledge - no (metaphysical) life

yet we rarely have need to think of it to focus it - we are usually too preoccupied with what we are doing in this space to think about it

yet we can exhaust our knowledge - through our thinking / explaining

we can and do come to that point where we can go no further - we cannot explain our explanation any further - even though there is still a need to

the decision to stop to be content, or discontent with what it, is rightly seen, should be seen as epistemological humility

as a surrender to (enlightened) ignorance

it is free falling in epistemological space

it is the ultimate freedom, the final peace

.

language is the principle tool by which we give character to the unknown

the unknown is the metaphysical screen onto which we project our 'pictures'

language is the most primitive kind of picture (metaphysically) speaking

this use of 'pictures' should not be confused with Wittgenstein's

for Wittgenstein what is pictured is - prior to picturing

for me reality is fundamentally empty - featureless characterless

my 'pictures' are projected on to this screen of metaphysical ignorance

my pictures are pictures are pictures on reality

Wittgenstein's propositions are pictures of

what may we ask are the pictures of?

well I have to say the unknown

but the unknown is featureless where do the pictures come from?

I say in all philosophical honesty I don't know

- and that is my final offer

though I am interested in any offers above this reserve

I will entertain them - I find them entertaining - these unknown, unknowing, responses to the unknown

our pictures are pictures but they are primitive - they cannot be added to - analyzed

any analysis no matter how ingenious is a fantasy - to keep us philosophically entertained.

30/6/84

one gets to the point where nothing can be said, and yet it is just at this point that

everything must be said

this is the philosopher's paradox

philosophy may resolve all other paradoxes, but this remains

it is the parameters of the world of knowledge

the ultimate confusion and the ultimate clarity all is contained therein

Philosophical Journal 1984

Special Study (1)

Appendix (1)

May '84

Philosophical Logic

Quine begins his book by challenging the idea of a proposition - that is what a sentence expresses - a proposition is thus an abstract entity

one obvious problem is how to express, state a proposition?

if what a proposition is what a sentence expresses - how can it be stated except in the 'form' of the sentence - how can we talk about Propositions?

if we state a proposition, are we not making a sentence? - in such a case we have a proposition in a sentence

now what sense can we make of this? there are a lot of problems

our sentence S(2) which expresses the proposition S(1) is itself a sentence

now if we believe that a sentence's sense lies in the proposition that it expresses - S(2) in order to be significant itself must express an S(2) proposition. S(2)p

put simply S(2)p makes sense of S(1) - it explains S(1)

but the same question that was asked of S(1) which led to S(2) can and might be asked of S(2)

we would then have to make S(3) which expresses S(2)p

clearly we are involved in an infinite regress - this is even before we have looked at the ontological status of the proposition

and before we have explicated the relation between sentences and propositions

.

now I think seen this way the notion of proposition is absurd

but getting back to the question of expressing propositions -

to begin with - proponents of the idea must be able to distinguish a proposition from a statement - a sentence

now on the level of ordinary language S(2) is a sentence that might express S(1)p but this begs the question

the only way out of this is to have a second order language - a propositional language - a language which expresses the propositions of the first order language

O.K. what is gained by saying that S(2) is a sentence of L(2)?

where does L(2) get its meaning?

logically speaking we are again looking at an infinite regress - an infinity of higher order languages

for practical purposes this is not a problem but logically it is not a solution to the problem

let's assume that propositions are strange non-linguistic entities which language expresses

the problem is we can never state what they are - for to do so is to make a sentence and one which begs the question it is supposed to be answering

that is I don't see how we can individuate sentences and propositions

and even if we could I don't see how the question - what is a proposition? can be addressed

this leaves us in a curious position with regard to meaning

the idea that a sentence has meaning - if by this we mean that meaning is an entity distinct from sentences - but an entity that a sentence possesses - the idea does not make much sense

meaning as an entity can be disposed of

and what's the alternative?

basically a behavioural analysis

S(1) is meaningful to X if X displays behaviour which endorses S(1) either confirmatory or refutatory - this is something we can see

when we ask why X's behaviour? - we may explain it by reference to language - its rules, syntax, grammar - but this is reconstruction of X's behaviour - a theoretical analysis which need not be, (even though it is), why X responds to S(1).

that is I don't see that 'meaning' necessarily is connected to language structure - we can have good reasons for assuming that it is - but such is only an explanation of the fact of meaning behaviour - it is not to be confused with it - as a philosopher who holds to the idea of meaning in a non-behavioural sense might do

to put it another way language is not what gives behaviour meaning - it is behaviour which gives language meaning.

.

a consequence of this view seems to be that we cannot talk about language - that we cannot make language a subject of itself - that a sentence S(2) cannot be used to say anything about S(1).

in fact thought we do talk about language - language - a sentence is made the object of another sentence - all the above statements are clear examples of this fact.

so a sentence in L(1) can be the subject of another sentence in L - this happens - but what does it mean?

what it means is that a key characteristic of language is that it is reflexive - self referential

the fact of self reference in a language - is a fact of language - this is all we need to know - it is not a problem - until we start predicating meaning and truth and trying to explicate these notions philosophically - what I'm really talking about here is normal usage! - for example -"He said, '____' " - this is uncontraversial. (ex.1)

the problem arises when self reference becomes paradoxical - that is when we are dealing with truth

the Cretan said, "all Cretans are liars" - such a sentence is both true and false - that is if it is false it is true - if it is true it is false

the problem in the liar paradox is when the sentence spoken about, i.e. "all Cretans are liars" - refers to the sentence of which it is a part - if it is true - then that sentence is false etc.

the fact is that such a sentence cannot be true or false

it is therefore meaningless

the fact of paradox is not meaningless - and any reader can understand this - that is why the sentence seems significant - that is the two parts of the sentence separately, non-interrelated, make sense - and of course we understand what a paradox is - and what we end up understanding is, why the sentence makes no sense

in a sense we have to make the point that a sentence cannot refer to itself as false, if it is true, and visa versa - this is to legislate against paradox - it is to say, this should not occur, cannot occur if sense is to be maintained

Passmore in his article on self reference says that a sentence must be seen as true - a declarative sentence - I can see this as a result of what I have said above

the sentence under question is 'true', the problem is that it refers to itself as false

this all tells us that while sentences may well be self-referential 'truth is not'

to say that a sentence is true is to describe it - it is to say something about the status of the sentence, and perhaps this means, the way it is held - it is not I think just a statement about its (the sentence's) assertion, or that it is asserted. If this were the case saying S is true - is to state a fact about S that it is asserted - and this in itself is a rather irrelevant fact but perhaps that is all truth amounts to - a statement of fact about another statement, or a statement 'of the fact of that statement!

but what does it mean then to say a sentence is false? is it to make a statement (s(2)) of the non-fact of (S(l)) the statement

problem here, what is a non-fact of a statement?

(this by the way is not to be confused with 'denying a fact expressed in a sentence')

what I was getting at before was something, ontological I suppose about the sentence itself

but this would mean that to say S is true is equivalent to S exists

I don't think we want to equate truth with existence

but then this may not be what a statement of the fact of a sentence is equivalent to

I think it is.

unless of course we want to say that to talk about the 'existence of sentences' is to talk about truth

that is that the term truth is appropriate ontologically in reference to sentences

that is to say we might refer to the existence of chairs - 'existence' here is the appropriate ontological referent.

but the existence of sentences'?

- not really - at least as far as common usage goes

the truth of a sentence? - obviously 'truth' here is not commonly meant to be synonymous with existence - but I am suggesting philosophically this may be the correct usage - meaning

O.K. so far

but there is still the problem of saying S(2) is false

it still does not sit easy this idea that to say S(1) is false is to say that it doesn't exist

but on the other hand - this may be a very clear idea of falsehood - such and such a sentence does not exist (with space and time qualities)

not overly happy with this result - it seems to radical - and it is paradoxical

it really only shifts the issue of self reference to a new level

i.e. how can we assert a statement that doesn't exist in any normal sense of 'exist' - doesn't exist - if we can assert it.

what I find mainly interesting about all this is that it calls into question the notion of content - a of a sentence's content. As Quine has argued the attempt to make sense of this idea through the idea of a proposition - doesn't work - the idea of a proposition doesn't itself make any sense

what I'm thinking is that it doesn't make much sense to talk about the content of language

language - a sentence in a language is

there may be some value in discussing language in terms of some category like form / / content - but what I want to say is that such a description would be artificial not real - that is the distinction would not correspond with real features of language

the sentence's content is the sentence

statements that have equivalent content are simply synonymous statements

and yet still we think of the sentence as the vehicle - the means of imparting information.

yet even here the idea of content is not that strong - the information conveyed - ?

we can understand someone having information - but what is the objective sense of information?

in what sense is information independent of the informer and the informee -

in what sense can we say that a sentence has or contains information

can we conceive of language objectively - as, that is, subject independent

is there such a thing as a language which has no subject - i.e. no users - past or present or future

does such as an idea make any sense?

the public status of language does not entail objectivity - objectivity should not be confused with publicity

language has non-subjective - objective words, but does this mean that language is itself objective - not necessarily so

what we are really talking about is inter-subjectivity, which is what has become accepted as objectivity

a true objective reality of any kind is that which exists independently of a subject, a knower - its existence, that is, is not dependent on the existence of the subject

language is not such an entity - the existence of a language presupposes the existence of a user

what I'm interested in is the idea that truth is a description of a sentence

that is to say a sentence is true, is to describe it - that is to say something about it - but this is the question - what are we saying when we say S(1) is true - or for that matter that S(2) is false? what are we saying about S(1)?

first are we talking about S(1) or the user - the way it is held - are we that is saying something about the sentence - or the behaviour of S(1)

are we saying something about the world in saying S(1) is true

what this is, is saying something about the sentence - from which we can draw a conclusion about the relation of the sentence to the world

now the temptation has been to say therefore S(1) corresponds to the world, but S(1) is not true because of this (supposed ) relation

S(1) is true I suggest irrespective of the relationship between S(1) and reality - that is another matter

this is the proposal.

Tarski says:

'Snow is white', is true if and only if snow is white

Quine says:

'The truth predicate is a reminder that, that despite a technical assent to talk of sentences, our eye is on the world. The cancellatory force of the truth predicate is explicate in Tarsk's paradigm'.

and he goes on to say:

Tarski's paradigm cannot be generalized to read:

'P' is true if and only if P

this is a clear statement of the situation of Tarski's theory.

the point is that the 'if and only if snow is white', is not an explication of "'Snow is white" is true'. That is it doesn't tell us what it means to say 'snow is white' is true.

thus T's paradigm is not an account of the meaning of 'true'. It doesn't tell us what 'true' means

Quine says:

'The quotation is the name of a sentence that contains a name, namely 'snow', of snow. By calling the sentence true we call snow white.'

Quine means that the quotation around the word 'snow' names snow. And saying 'snow is white' is saying snow is white - and this is simply to say, 'snow is white is true'

the sentence named (snow is white) has a name 'snow'

'snow' is a name of snow '

'snow is white' is the name of a sentence

we have two kinds of names.

(1) the name, that is a sentence

(2) the name of a thing.

the name of the thing is 'snow', and to use the sentence, 'snow is white' is to say, snow is white - that is to assert snow is white, and to say this is to say, 'snow is white' is true

it is name something and that is that snow is white.

'snow is white' is the name of snow is white.

to say 'P' is to declare P

to declare P is to say P is true

thus 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white

truth is thus tied up with naming on Tarski's view.

Tarski's theory is telling us what the significance of the naming act is

in naming P we are thus asserting truth

we can explain naming by saying that when we name P whatever P is, we are saying P is true

this is what naming is -to assert truth.

when we have the statement P is true - we have a relationship between language and the world

the relation says Tarski is naming, naming is the relation of truth

so truth on this view is a relationship between language and the world

this is what I think Tarski's paradigm asserts

what makes P true is another question

that is the question of when the (naming) relation holds. Tarski conquered!

(for the moment)

Given this view how does Quine's description of T's theory stand?

Quine says that 'the truth predicate is a reminder that despite a technical assent to talk of sentences, our eye is on the world'

I may be splitting hairs here but my conclusion above is that Tarski is doing more than this - I think he is making a statement about the relationship (or a) between language and the world - it is a statement that is, of the logic of the connection between language and the world - a relationship that depends on the concept of naming - which if true means that Tarski's logic depends on the metaphysics of naming. - now Tarski does not enter into this issue - the issue of naming - he uses it and in a way that is epistemologically neutral - whatever naming is - whatever it amounts to epistemologically ? - Tarski's theory stands -that is given the fact of naming - which seems uncontraversial - what Tarski says is true

however to say that Tarski's asserting a fundamental relationship between language and the world is to go further than to say Tarski had his eye on the world

I wonder if Tarski realized this?!

this point though does not have any immediate metaphysical significance - that is it leaves Tarski just where he is- and this of course is testimony to Tarski's genius

if I am right though my view extends the power of Tarski's view, in a way that I'm not sure would be agreed to by Quine

Quine asks the question:

'What then are the places where though still concerned with unlinguistic reality we are moved to proceed indirectly and talk of sentences. The important places of this kind are places where we are seeking generality, and seeking it along certain oblique planes that we cannot sweep out by generalizing over objects.

We can generalize on, 'Tom is mortal......to all men are mortal'. When on the other hand we want to generalize on 'Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal' .... we ascend to talk of truth and sentences, saying 'Every sentence of the form 'p or not p' is true'. What prompts this semantic assent is not that 'Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal', is somehow about the sentences, 'while Tom is mortal' and 'Tom is Tom' are about Tom. All three are about Tom. We only ascend because of the oblique way in which the instances over which we are generalizing are related to one another.

We are able to phrase our generalization, 'Everything is itself' without such assent just because the changes that were rung in passing from instance to instance, 'Tom Is Tom'. 'Dick is Dick', '0 is 0', were changes in names.

Similarly for 'All men are mortal'. This generalization may be read, 'x is mortal for all men x' - all things x of the sort that Tom is the name of. But what would be a parallel reading of the generalization of 'Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal'? It would read 'p or not p' for all things p of the sort that sentences are the names of. But sentences are not names, and this reading is simply incoherent; it uses p both in positions that call for sentence classes and in position that calls for a noun substantive. So to gain our desired generality, we go up one step and talk about sentences, 'Every sentence of the form p or -p is true.

The incoherent alternative reading might of course be expressly accorded meaning, if there were anything to be gained by doing so. One could cause sentences to double as names, by specifying what they are to be names of. One might declare them to be names of propositions. In earlier pages when propositions were still under advisement, I represented propositions as the meaning of sentences rather than things named by sentences; still we would declare them to be named by sentences, and some there are who have done so. Until such a line is adopted the letter p is no variable ranging over objects; it is only a schematic letter for sentences, only a dummy to mark a position appropriate to a component sentence in some logical or grammatical construction. Once the letters are taken as names of propositions on the other hand, the letter 'p' comes to double as a variable ranging over objects which are propositions.

However this more or less has the drawback of reinstating propositions which we saw reason not to welcome. Moreover the move brings no visible benefit; for we already saw how to express generalizations of the desired sort without appeal to

propositions, by just going one step further and attributing truth to sentences. This assent to the linguistic plane of reference is only a momentary retreat from the world for the utility of the truth predicate is precisely the connection of linguistic reference. The truth predicate is a reminder that despite a technical assent to talk of sentences, our eye is on the world.'

Quine:- 'the truth predicate is a devise of disquotation. We may affirm the single sentence by just uttering it, unaided by quotation or by the truth predicate; but if we want to affirm some infinite lot of sentences, then the truth predicate has its use. We need it to restore the effect of objective reference when for the sake of some generalization we have restored to semantic assent'.

The idea being, when we are talking about sentences affirming sentences, - an infinite lot of sentences - the truth predicate, it is claimed, restores the effect of objective reference.

what I am interested in is why this effect is restored by the truth predicate.

is it just a psychological effect which results simply because of established use of the word 'truth' - truth has the effect of suggesting objective reference

this is plausible and even suggested by Quine's account above

but if this is true - then there is a problem - the truth predicate would not be stable - i.e., one could imagine the sense of the word. changing for a language group.

and in any case what all this hinges on is meaning - and this is not what Tarski is on about

so we have a question to do with Quine's :- 'the effect of objective reference'

I really have my doubts about Quine here - what is this effect of objective reference? if there is no objective reference how is there an effect?

perhaps 'truth' is such a strange word - unlike all others which have objective reference, it has the effect of objective reference?

(Unless of course we are involved in a full blown philosophical issue about whether a term has any meaning at all

for instance we could ask what is the objective reference of 'spirit' soul etc. - and argue one way or another - that is argue for or against objective reference. If we argued against objective reference, we could then reinterpret the word, or say it has no meaning. Such is the issue if objectivity.

We can say that is, that people who use the term 'spirit' i.e.. are mistaken in their belief that it has objective reference. There may be such a word - it may have this meaning - in its normal usage - but for philosophical reasons we would not say the term, actually has an objective reference. This is not what is meant by 'effect of objective reference'

Quine's idea is that the word points us to objectivity, points us to the world

it is in a sense an 'ostensive' word

the claim just might be that such a term functions, in this context, as a pointer to reality

but this is quite different from saying that its meaning is what it refers to

even if this was what was being suggested it would be incoherent

the term 'truth' cannot be meant to refer to reality.

i.e. truth means (refers to) reality.

I don' t see any way in which we can equate truth with reality.

so we are still left with the idea of a word ('truth') as a pointer to reality

of course we could decree that the word functions this way, by fiat but then why that word and not another?

and in any case why should 'truth' here have the effect of objective reference

for it to, it would have to be defined

and it is not, in this context.

overall I think it really has to be said that this 'effect of objective reference' view of 'truth' is vague and metaphysical

it might be an elegant way of dealing with truth, but it is hardly rigorous

one could still argue that it is necessary.

snow is white

if we don't say:

snow is white is true

can't we, aren't we forced to say, well so what?

isn't the effect of the 'is' in the above statement existential?

that is doesn't it connect language to the world?

to predicate 'is true' makes, I don't think it is believed, - makes the connection more empirical.

but does it really?

if it does, I don't see on logical grounds why it does

if anything the truth predicate turns attention to language statement - and away from the world

Quine would argue that for technical reasons this is necessary but that the effect the predicate has is objective reference

this is really a case of having your cake and eating it too

either the truth predicate refers to objective reality - and I think there are reasons to question this seriously - or it refers to the sentence - and if this is the case then truth must have some meaning - it must be a word which is informative (in some sense of this word) that is it must tell us something about the sentence.

and whatever this is, I don't believe it is the content that it refers to (even that is if content of a sentence made any sense at all)

it must I think refer to the status, the logical status of the sentence

I think that to say S is true, is not to say anything about the world - nor is it to say anything about language -

so what is it all about? the idea I advanced earlier on is that what its all about is relations

truth is a relation

a fundamental if not the fundamental relation between language and the world

the question I am interested in then is how do we describe this relation?

.

earlier on I argued that Tarski can be interpreted as saying that (1) to name is to assert truth, and (2) that truth is a primary relation between a sentence and the world

another way of putting it is that we are not, in using the truth predicate asserting truth values but rather we are asserting a relation - that is truth is a relational predicate (to assert S is false is to assert that there is no such relationship between S and the world).

this view is I think an advance on Quine's

firstly the idea of the 'effect of objective reference' is vague, and it is difficult to determine what exactly it means. Is such an effect dipositional?, is this what is meant? Such seems to be a fair reading of 'effect' in this context, and yet it is asserted that to say 'snow is white' is true is to make a point about language. How can 'true' refer to (a) the sentence and (b) the world - unless that is, we view it as a term that relates the two - that such is the function of the term (we can avoid meaning altogether on this view ? - I'm not sure we can on Quine's view)

this point can remain separate from the issue of naming. Before I interpreted. Before I interpreted Tarski's view as suggesting that to name something is to assert truth.

there is a point in this of course, if I say 'S is T' is equivalent to asserting 'S', and there are reasons for doing this. i.e. it defines truth for us. Also I think it makes Tarski as presented intelligible.

But nevertheless I'm not at all happy with this view. To name something it seems to me is simply to name. The same applies to sentences. I don't see why truth need be involved in order to make sense of naming

and at this stage I don't see why it is necessary to involve naming in order to make sense of truth

naming, that is, is a distinct issue, in asserting that a name is T what we are doing is saying that the sentence S is T is saying that there is a necessary relationship between S (which contains a name) and the world

such a view preserves Quine's point, but it defines it with some rigor. the relationship view preserves the 'natural intuition' of the significance of truth.

still the question remains what is this 'relationship' that exists between S and the world, which prompts the asserting S is true.

what is being asserted, questioned here is not meaning, that is it is not being claimed that the relationship is one of meaning.

if such was the case we could say S means what? the world - this obviously makes little sense. The opposite is the same: the world means S. what can this mean?

clearly, here we have to say something about the nature of the concept - this concept 'relationship'.

what is a relationship? what is it for one thing to be related to another?

we could begin by saying that two things which are related, are so because they have been shown to have something in common

this we would call a homogeneous relationship. We further call such a relationship a natural relationship. i.e. a father and a daughter are related through ancestors - common biology

there are also 'non-natural' relationships. That is heterogeneous relationships. In such a relationship different things are related. what does this mean?

how does this occur? that is can a relationship between different kinds of things be established?

a full blown answer to this would have to determine what sort of things there are. what the basic ontological categories are, what kinds of things exist - let us assume as Descartes thought that there are two basic kinds of things- two kinds of substances - matter and spirit - thought and extension.

how could such things be related? The relationship would at least be like this: 'for all x and for all y. x does not equal y, and y does not equal x' - an asymmetrical relationship?

this is to suggest that x is related to y, by not being y and that y is related to x by not being x

hmm!

but the point I'm trying to make here is, if we assume that there are entities which are essentially different - ontologically different - how can they be related - well it seems to me that in such a case, we can say that the two entities are related by not being each other

both these kings of relationships are essentialist relationships that is to do with the essence of the things concerned

as well we would have to mention temporal and spatial relationships - i.e. empirical relationships.

these are perhaps better classified further into types of relationships

so far we have discerned two types of relationship

(1) metaphysical relations

(2) empirical relations

what we really need though, to be able to talk about such relations is a logic of relations.

that is what are the logical possibilities for relations?

.

the truth predicate establishes a relation between the sentence and the world

that is it tells us that the sentence (and for that matter language) is related to the world

that is all - it doesn't tell us that the relationship is meaningful - it doesn't tell us anything about it except that it is - that such a relationship exists

nor does it tell us anything about the significance of the sentence - it doesn't tell us that it is meaningful - and it doesn't tell us anything about the world - it is not defined philosophically.

the sentence has to be meaningful for the relationship to hold - the meaning of the sentence is like the world - assumed (from a logical point of view) - for the relationship to hold at all the sentence must be meaningful - meaning in this sense is established prior to the relationship - and the relationship does depend on the sentence being meaningful but it is not one way - we are here dealing with a relationship - the , sentence would not have any sense if it was not related to the world

I don't think the relationship gives the sentence meaning but without the relationship the sentence has no meaning - or more accurately I think - no sense.

here of course I am drawing a distinction between a sentence's sense and its meaning

I don't want to suggest that a sentence can have meaning and no sense or visa versa.

what I want to say is something like this: meaning and sense go together but I want to suggest that the two are distinct or that it is necessary to see them so

what it's looking like is that sense is relational, and that meaning is a property of language

S only has sense or can have sense if it is meaningful, and S can only have meaning if it is sensible

.

the relationship which is set up between S and the world is logical

that is it is not a 'language' relationship or an 'object'-ive relationship

that is the use of the truth predicate does not tell us that the sentence, because it is meaningful is related to the world - and it doesn't tell us that the world gives language - the sentence objective validity

what I am suggesting is that 'true' is a purely logical word - its use sets up a relationship - not semantical or epistemological this is a very radical interpretation of the truth predicate and what is the basis of this logical relationship?

well in one sense it is contingent and conventional - by convention, decision we give 'true' this status

but then in another sense such a relationship is necessary - that is it is necessary that such a relationship exists if there is to be any rationality at all.

.

strictly speaking we are dealing not with meaning or the world

the real value of the truth predicate is that it appears to have dual reference

a true statement is in a sense semantically true, and objectively true

the philosophical problem of truth, is, has historically been that of determining whether the truth predicate applies to language, or whether it has its force, significance because of reference - the world - this is the guts of the philosophical debate.

what I argue is a third view - I think the truth predicate is best seen as a logical connective - it connects language and the world - this is not a semantical or objective connection - it is rather a logical one

and as it turns out the term true fits the bill very well because it has both a semantic and objective connotation.

this logically speaking is irrelevant - but in terms of understanding it is a happy co-incidence

and I think we could argue that the term has historically developed its dual connotation because of the logical function of the term

so what I'm saying is that truth- the truth predicate functions as a connective - and that this is the source of the philosophical ambiguity

it is in this sense that we can say that it establishes a relationship between language and the world -this is its function

'A word will never be able to comprehend the voice that utters it'

- Thomas Merton

(Furlong. 150)

July- Sept 1984.

18/7/84

description and reference

what I think we have is different kinds of description - different levels of description

and this is because of different purposes different needs

the point of this in a metaphysical sense is that no description is 'objective', in the sense that it, and only it applies to the object

the search for such is bound to fail not because of the nature of external 'objective' reality - but because of the nature of the observer

we are not 'determined' subjects

that is, there is no one fixed position (meta) from which we can or should view reality

the existence of the different positions (meta., spatial whatever) means that the object can be referred to definitively

that is I can specify in a referential act - that object

the referential act is determinate - and I do mean act - what we are doing here is referring - which is an act of a special kind - a fundamental act which is sensationally empty - it is the act itself - the primitive act of reference which gives the metaphysical nail on which we can hang our descriptions

the act of reference usually occurs in a description of a feature of reality - however the act of reference and the description are logically distinct

there is a sense then in which it makes sense to say that the world or a feature of it is 'posited' by the observer

posited in the sense of positioned in a logical sense

the world does exist prior to such positing, but we cannot know it 'say anything about it' 'describe it' before we refer to it

once reference is made we can describe the 'point' -the logical point

referred to

26/7/84

skepticism revisited

Wittgenstein on doubt:

(1) doubt needs grounds

(2) doubt must amount to something more than a verbal utterance of doubt

(3) doubt presupposes the mastery of a language game

(4) doubt outside a language game, or about a whole language game is not on

(5) doubt presupposes certainty.

(1) doubt needs grounds.

in a sense in arguing this Wittgenstein is pulling the rug from under doubt, isn't

grounds just what is doubted?

in any case I will refer to this kind of doubt about grounds of belief as genuine doubt

so in genuine doubt we are doubting the grounds of our beliefs

do we need grounds to do this? grounds of some sort?

there is I think something strange about this

grounds for doubt

where this idea comes from is:

doubt is in a sense the antithesis of grounds though this is not putting it correctly

to say there must be grounds for doubt - is to say doubt must be well grounded

otherwise it would be groundless or baseless doubt - doubt for no reason the interesting question is how plausible is this?

does it make any sense to speak of baseless doubt - doubt for no reason doubt that is not based on anything?

I believe that it does

I think we can only really begin to understand the true nature of doubt when it is seen this way

that is when we see doubt not as an aberration, denial or perversion, but rather as a primitive and fundamental attitude which when approached 'positively' can lead to enlightenment

30/7/84

Wittgenstein on the nature of philosophy

'In philosophy there are no deductions: it is purely descriptive. The word 'philosophy' ought always to denote something over or under, but not beside the natural sciences. Philosophy gives no picture of reality, and can neither confirm or confute scientific investigations. It consists of logic and metaphysics, the former its basis. Epistemology is the philosophy of psychology. Distrust of grammar is the first requisite of philosophizing. Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical form of scientific propositions (not primitive propositions only). A correct explanation of the logical propositions must give then a unique position against all other propositions.'

-Wittgenstein.

- Kenny 229.

31/7/84

Moral problems - the questions, the issues are abstractions of psychological dilemmas

what psychological soundness is - is itself a philosophical problem

but the point is that the moral problem is pathological - a result of psychological mental 'imbalance'

the problem of value does not arise independently of the 'empirical' problem of behaviour moral solutions are meta psychological solutions

1/8/84

I really have my doubts about the power of moral arguments, and their actual significance in moral life

the point of moral theory is that it assists in dealing with psychological behavioural problems on a meta level - that is a highly general abstract level

now I'm not denying that someone could come to a conclusion in this realm and that, the conclusion would directly influence a change of behaviour

this is in a sense 'the philosophers' view of how moral problems are addressed and dealt with

now my own hunch is that this kind of process this methodology is more than anything a prescription for how moral dilemmas should be dealt with rather than how they are

it may turn out, I'm sure that it would be the case, that such a method is used but I don't believe it is the only method or that it is commonly used

but in any case, and this is the main point, I don't believe that such a method in fact (that is even when it is used) really responsible for the decisions that are made

I believe it is possible to proceed in such a way but I think in practice people rarely do

I think that describing how people do deal with their moral problems and describing how people may or can deal with their problems, is all that the philosopher can (or should) do - as a moralist

this is a meta theory and an outcome of my epistemology - and I think it is true and very useful in the moral arena

however the main point I wish to make is that the philosopher's view of how to proceed i.e.. the establishment of general moral principles - and the decisions to adhere to them, is just one of a number of possible approaches to the moral problem and one that I think is not very common or useful in practice

8/8/84

what I have been discussing is how to solve moral or more correctly how to go about solving moral - problems does it make any difference?

in practice I think no - if a solution is reached. It really doesn't matter which road you take, so long as you get there

but this is the problem with morality - it is the problem with all knowledge - but it is more obvious with morality - just how do you know when you get it right?

well in a sense what moral philosophers have said is, how you go about solving your problem is what is important - if you proceed this way you will get it right - or you can

I suppose the best example of this would be utilitarianism -the supposed advantage of this creed is that it provides the moral agent with a calculus - or method - a method which if adhered resolves the moral problem - and be quasi-scientific into the bargain.

intuitionists of course have claimed similar points in favour of their method

so you can see that it is not so much what is decided in moral issues, which has been seen to be the issue for moral philosophers, but rather how it is decided

(this is largely because there is on a large range of moral issues agreement about what is right and wrong - or there appears to be some agreement - what I have in mind here is what Huxley called the 'perennial philosophy')

10/8/84

the problem of morality is the problem of knowledge - how do we know what is right what is wrong

we can for the arguments sake assume that we know action x is right, action y is wrong

the question is not, in this case that we do know the moral status of x and y? it is how do we know?

now this is one kind of moral problem - the other - a less, I think, difficult issue is what is right and wrong - is this a separate issue?

it is no problem, the question of what is right or wrong, when there is no disagreement and on certain issues, in certain moral communities at certain times, there is just this sort of agreement

now then the question is, how does disagreement arise - the short answer is that disagreement is usually - is - in fact over knowledge

in the case of a genuine moral disagreement the dispute will go like this - O.K. you believe x is right - I think it is wrong - how then do you know you are right?

a serious answer to this question must involve an appeal to ethical theory - meta-ethical theory - that is some fundamental view about what is right or wrong - what makes an act (or whatever) right or wrong

now such a theory is a theory about moral knowledge what it is to know, what is right what is wrong - so the question of 'what' collapses into that of 'how'

I think in practice though that the issue of how - is not that important. I do think it is the moral problem but in practice doubt its importance

what we are doing with 'how' is accounting for, justifying a view or action - which in most circumstances is the theoretical icing on the case - but is it always?

above I suggested that 'what' collapses into 'how' - but does it always? i.e. in the common practice of the moral agent - only I think if he is challenged - and the question of how, to your philosophically inclined may not make much sense or difference to the moral facts

(I'm not at all sure this discussion has any value I think what is at the bottom of this is a suspicion about the way moral philosophers' have approached ethics - and it is to do with the nature of moral knowledge - or methodology).

maybe the issue is this:

some would argue that any moral theory is a prescription a moral prescription - that is a statement of how to proceed - although this has to be looked at carefully

what I'm wondering is, is moral theory - really a post-description of 'moral facts'

13/884

skepticism

Augustine's argument against skepticism

this argument is against what I call naive negative skepticism

such a view is that we do not know per se - an extreme version of this theory would be that I do not know that I exist

now I think historically there have been two theories advanced here in the guise of one

the first is the obvious that one simply does not know that one exists

the second is the claim that one can believe that one exists but not know it

the second view implies a sharp distinction between belief and knowledge - in its most radical form it is that belief is not knowledge, not even a species of

this second view is a more sophisticated form of skepticism - it characteristically relies on a view that knowledge is a form of justified belief of one kind or another

your sophisticated skeptic will question the view that belief can be justified at all - justifications of course are given, but they all fail on this view.

firstly radical naive skepticism makes no sense at all, as Augustine points out he uses a form of the cogito argument to show this

but Augustine seems to think that once he has shown that naive skepticism is absurd, he can prove his case against skepticism this is not so

he must then argue against sophisticated skepticism the view that 'yes' we know (in the sense of believe) but that such knowledge does not have any certain foundations

this is the modern skeptics argument, and the source of all fruitful skepticism I don't believe that it is a view that has been refuted

it is a view that has been heuristically very powerful in modern philosophy - it has led to discoveries of new and interesting philosophical theories

I think though that the real issue of skepticism has not really been understood even by sophisticated skeptics

if we take sophisticated skepticism to its logical conclusion we end up with what I think is best termed a philosophical skepticism - a skepticism that is about philosophical theories - theories of justification / explanation of the facts

that is to say we ask ourselves how do we know that philosophical theory per se is true?

there have been some very laborious attempts to give an answer to this question - still though the question can be asked: why accept these answers?

now it might be objected that such a process, such an 'infinite regress' is self-defeating - it makes a mockery out of philosophizing - what is the point it might be asked, why bother if there is no satisfactory way of resolving the issue?

what this question is really asking is, what is the function of philosophical theory? what is its purpose what is its place in knowledge?

the point I am making is, if philosophical theories don't justify, give (real) foundations to knowledge, what is it that they do do?

it seems to me that any thorough going skepticism must come up with an answer to this question

that is if the skeptic is going to say that there is no final justification / foundation - one consequence is - if he is understood to be right is quite simply that philosophical theories do not fulfill this function what then is the purpose of philosophy?

the negative skeptic says that philosophy shows that there is no foundation - and that hence the whole philosophical pursuit is pointless - he just claims that whole process can be shown to be self-defeating

this is O.K. in my view so far as it goes - but what is necessary really - what the skeptical tradition has always lacked is a positive perspective - a positive thesis

what then from the point of view of the positive skeptic is the function of philosophy

(I should mention that I do not think the above view of the negative skeptic is good enough - that is it is intellectually and culturally preferable in every way to its opposite - that is any foundationalist justificationalist outlook)

what I'm interested in is the possibility of going beyond negative skepticism - of seeing negative skepticism as the first stage in the development of enlightened ignorance

which reminds me of Nicholas Cursa his view that 'God is nothing'. this was the first statement of positive skepticism

the whole issue largely has to do with where you start epistemologically

any discussion of knowledge begins at the beginning - begins with knowledge or some simple problem - like the problem of illusion

where one starts is important - it is natural to begin with knowledge, however I do not think this is the logical start - I think the idea that we start with knowledge is actually an illusion

what we start with quite simply is what we don't know - otherwise why would we start?

this is a very simple point one which has eluded most of the 'giants' of philosophy in the past and to this day - what we actually start with is the unknown

but this is not simple - not that pure - we don't actually start with nothing (I believe we end up with this but we don't begin there) what we get is a taste - before the meal

the unknown and the known do not present themselves as separate acts on the one stage

the relationship is one of dependence - the known makes no sense without - out of the context of the unknown

my view is that we only understand the known through an understanding of the unknown

we can only understand the known - its place and depth and significance in the context of the unknown - the unknown defines the limits of knowledge

14/8

illusory perception is relative to our veridical beliefs anomalous

the fact is there are permanent anomalies - this is what creates the problem - it is the problem of anomalous perception (I think this description is preferable to 'problem of illusion)

what this means is that our perceptual beliefs are not 100 per cent homogeneous

that there is a class of perceptual beliefs which conflict with the whole picture - a picture which is highly confirmed

and further that the conflict is not strictly speaking 'anomalous' - rather it is a feature perhaps defining, of our perceptual range and depth

now this view renders naive realism false -

but it does not finish off realism

what it amounts to is that what is required is a sophisticated realism

a realism that is which accounts for anomalous perception in immediate perception

the argument from illusion has been used as a basis for sense data empiricism

it is argued that given illusion we cannot say that we directly perceive the object - what we perceive is a sense impression of the object - but we never actually perceive the object (directly) we have the impression of

underlying this view is a whole metaphysics - though in this context - philosophy of perception it is rarely acknowledged

it is the view that reality (or any object of reality - perceived) is philosophically homogeneous, but with certain anomalies.

an analogous view in science is that nature is uniform

that is if you accept the sense data theory you can maintain this meta presupposition -

because this theory offers an explanation of how reality is homogeneous yet perceived not to be - i.e. the argument from illusion

but we can ask the empiricist how he can justify holding this presupposition

does the sense impression justify it - support it - such is supposedly the empiricist's basis for knowledge?

but of course this question, doesn't really make sense, how can the sense data theory support or justify the presupposition on which it is based?

to suggest this - and I can't see how any actual argument could be made anyway - would be to involve oneself in a very obviously circular and epistemologically vicious argument

the sense data theory removes the issue from the subject to the object - it subjectivizes epistemology - once we accept this move - the sense data move - we are dealing with the problem of perception - not the problem of what is perceived - the object of perception

though it is curious that when this issue is subjectivized it creates its own object (subjective) - or attempts to - the sense data is this (immediate) object of perception.

perception has become its own object - it can be no other way as we have in making this move begun with a subjective epistemology which entails of necessity that there is no direct access to the world

this is in fact no different from Kant's position - except that Kant realized that we have to account for what is beyond - and he did so with his noumenal hypothesis - but a precondition of this was pure empiricism

what I'm suggesting is a position similar to Kant's - Kant saw the dilemma of pure empiricism - and argued the positive thesis that for empiricism to be possible we must postulate ideal imperatives

this is not what I am at present arguing - rather I say that empiricists must accept that their perception - their theory of knowledge - has as its preconditions certain meta presuppositions

what I think is interesting about the problem of illusion is that it really challenges this view - these presuppositions - and this I think is not something which has been understood by thinkers in this area

'experience' shows us that we perceive, (and for the moment we can assume that what we are talking about is what common sense tells us - the world) is not meta homogeneous

what I'm suggesting is that before we begin discussing the epistemological issues, we must first uncover the meta substructure that exists pre-epistemology

to be fair to the realist we must question the argument from illusion - we must to begin with consider the possibility that we have direct access to reality - but that this reality - is not homogeneous, but rather anomalous

that is to say to consider the possibility that there are no illusions only anomalies

now the argument against this anomalous features of reality argument would be one from common sense - we resist the idea that the stick in the water is actually bent - we want to say it appears so - that what is anomalous is 'that' particular experience

the argument for this is a holistic one - the anomalous experience just doesn't fit with the overall experience

but why should we assume that this is a perceptual and not objective fact?

6/9/84

skepticism and induction

while reading about Newton's view of scientific method, and specifically his view on the place of induction in the sciences a new - positive theory occurred to me - a view that might best be described as inductive skepticism

what I have in mind is this: we view universal generalizations as statements of ignorance

statements of ignorance - that is that they are primarily statements about what we don't know

and if we take Hume seriously - the fact is we can't know a universal statement to be true or (and here I argue against Popper) - false - and further that we can't know in the sense of certain knowledge (now I don't believe in certain knowledge of course, but I'm not sure anyway if we really get around Hume's dilemma with regard to induction by going for fallible knowledge. I think Hume's point is valid independently of this more general point)

on this view the universal statement is an account of our ignorance - a projection of the range of our ignorance the wider the generalization - the greater the ignorance

in taking this view I an taking Hume's point but revamping it rehabilitating it from a negative to a positive skepticism

if we take the traditional view of scientific laws, we see them as having significance in terms of their truth content - their informative content - what they tell us about the world

laws in this sense are either containers of knowledge (highly confirmed) or candidates for this

what of your empty hypothesis?

presumably such is one which has no support - there are no instances which confirm the hypothesis - your traditional empiricists would say it doesn't really make sense to talk about such hypotheses being proposed - for there would be on their view no reason for them being proposed

a Popperian would take another view, on this view of the nature of theories, we judge competing theories in terms of truth content - informative content - the theory with the greatest truth content is to be preferred to one with less (when all else is equal)

now if my proposal concerning universal statements is true, then this analysis of the evaluation of scientific theories will need to be reviewed.

what I'm suggesting is that what is important about scientific theories - is not the empirical content - the informative content

what is important rather is, what the theory tells us we don't know

what we are talking about is not non-content - I think rather negative content

this is quite simply what the theory tells us we don't know - that we need to know

it is thus a theoretic measure of ignorance

that is it tells us scientifically what is not known, relative to the positive statement of the law - it tells us i.e. that we don't know that all swans are black

we know what we know prior to the positing of the law

we know e.g. that some swans are black - this is particular information

to go beyond this is to map out plot the range of our ignorance with regard to the particular subject we are investigating i.e. swans - their colour

if this is the case how then are we to refer to such universal statements as scientific laws?

that is, should we adopt the view that all statements such as 'all swans are black' are properly refereed to as 'not all swans are black'?

that is reject the former statement - the positive formulation is as Hume showed logically and epistemologically inadequate -and instead adopt the rule that all our generalizations should be stated in the negative mode?

10/9/84

it seems that there are two kinds of generalizations

there is what I think might best be described as quantitative 'all statements' - i.e.. all x are y - that all things / events that are x are y

- this is the sort of generalization Hume's logic challenged

there is though another kind of generalization - a qualitative all statement.

E.g., 'all x are y' - that is to say all x are really y - where y is an explanation - a 'reduction' / analysis of x. E.g. we would want to say, following modern science, all material objects are really atomic entities.

such a generalization does not require for its truth that we have 'observed' all material objects

it amounts to the claim that if x is a material object then x is a y ('is' in the sense of can be reduced to, can be analyzed, can be shown to be etc. a y)

two points.

this sort of generalization does not seem to be subject to Hume's criticism

such a generalization does not depend on observation because the 'observation' is qualitative - not numerative or quantitative

that is it is an 'observation' of the quality of x - and strictly speaking it is an hypothesis - a conjecture of this nature - a projection

Hume's argument against induction is an argument against quantitative numerative generalization

it is an argument against induction - and it shows that the problem of generalization is tied directly to induction

if you can separate induction from generalization science can proceed

now the question which will be asked is, what place does induction play in qualitative generalization?

how do we come to the idea that x are y? Does induction play any part in qualitative analysis? - in the formation of qualitative generalizations / laws?

given what has preceded we can ask, does quantitative generalization figure in qualitative analysis?

if not how are such generalizations formed, what is the method, the process which leads to qualitative discoveries?

I think we can easily say that quantitative and qualitative analyses are logically distinct kinds of analyses

that considerations that apply to one need not apply to the other

all this leaves the question, how to characterize the process, the method by which we come to qualitative conclusions and discoveries? let's consider the question of how to characterize matter? how do we come to conclusion that i.e., matter is an atomic structure?

in a sense what is being done here is simply defining the term 'matter' - characterizing it in terms which we can view as real or useful

one might be tempted to say that it is simply, at bottom a verbal issue

that is that we are not really involved in a qualitative analysis, but rather linguistic analysis

this issue between realism, instrumentalism and verbalism, is the issue of what is the significance of 'qualitative' analysis in the broader philosophical context

what I am concerned with is how such an analysis proceeds - the logic of the procedure - regardless of what conclusions one reaches on the above matters

it seems to me that we cannot say that the proposing of a qualitative theory is not inductive - cannot be inductive

to put it starkly - normal observation of phenomena will not lead to a qualitative account of that phenomena

the sort of question I have in mind is, what is the real nature of x?

at this stage the qualitative issue is an open one, but real nevertheless

what then is the origin of such a question, of such an issue? that is why is such a question asked in the first place?

one answer is that experience is anomalous in the sense that what is observed at T(1) and p, is not what is observed at T(1) and p(2) even though the object or event appears to be qualitatively the same on both occasions

strict identity is not of course what is being suggested - x has between T(1) and T(2) undergone some change - not an essential change (for then we would not speak of x at T(1) and T(2)

the kind of change I am thinking of, maybe a change of surface qualities (colour, shape etc.), or a change of behavioural characteristics - a dispositional change

we can say generally that the behaviour of x is not homogeneous

then the question is why is this so? - such a question requires an explanation - is a call for one

such a question calls for an account of x which solves the problem of x - renders the behaviour of x consistent

this is a 'natural question' in the sense of a question about the 'nature of x' (i.e. what really us x?)

now I don't think observation of the behaviour of x can settle the issue, for it is the observation which has raised the issue in the first place - what we are dealing with is not an observational issue - it is a theoretical issue - or a natural issue in the sense defined above

what we need is an account of x which renders the apparent anomalous behaviour (and I mean here the 'unexplained heterogeneous behaviour) of heterogeneous x

it is difficult to discuss these issues in abstract. one really needs fairly detailed knowledge of a science or major scientific episode to really come to grips with the issues

however the main issue can be discussed.

let's leave the question, the most interesting question of how new theories about the nature of a natural event / object come about, and turn to the question of how such questions are tested

might I suggest that fundamental theories are proposed to solve specific problems or sets of problems - these are generally crucial fundamental, foundational

when such a theory is proposed the question is does it render anomalous behaviour intelligible - theoretically consistent?

assuming such a question is really theoretical - I mean we can say this - but what is really required for conclusiveness here is a close study of some important case histories

e.g., the case of the wave vs. the corpuscular theories of light - without knowing the details of the debate we can say what is needed to resolve the problem is a theory of light which says that light is 'in itself' neither fundamentally a wave or a corpuscle

that is these are not the real characterizations of the phenomena rather they are appearances of a nature which is more fundamental

or another way of putting it is that they are not final characterizations -characterizations of the phenomena's behaviour

such behaviour is accidental not essential

now whatever is proposed must account for the apparent qualitative change and show us that the real quality of the phenomena is not so variable

I believe quantum physics can be represented as consistent with this demand - what happens there is that the uncertainty principle becomes a characterization of the nature of the phenomena

what is interesting about the case of quantum physics is that distinction between epistemological methodological and conventional issues on the one hand and physical issues on the other are seen to be not tenable in the way they have been drawn in the past

that is what was seen to be a characteristic of the observer is shown to be a characteristic of the phenomenon

and consequently the distinction between the observer and the observed is no longer sharp - or possibly of any use at all

what I am quite sure about generally is that theoretical explanations are not based on observation in the sense that traditional empiricists have argued

- theoretical explanations are attempts to base experience

and such explanations characterize phenomena, experience, in such a way as to render them (phenomena) intelligible

the really interesting question though is how does this happen?

what is the connection between theoretical terms and observational terms, what is the relation?

how can we describe theoretical terms and entities? how do we best characterize them?

I think we can refer to such entities as explanatory

but what does this mean? what does it mean to explain anything?

it is to say why an entity exists and behaves as it does

but again what does this mean?

it is I think to place phenomena in a larger context - to show a phenomenon's relation to other phenomena

to place it in a general context - to provide a unified rather than piecemeal picture of the phenomenal world

fine - what place do theoretical entities have in this picture?

what really is a theoretical entity - what do theoretical terms denote?

going on what has preceded, a theoretical term places phenomena in a broader context

thus the first thing that can be said is that such terms are not particular - they are universal

e.g. the notion 'force' - it doesn't make any real sense to speak of a force - if by this is meant a particular occurrence - 'force' is a universal term

to refer to the action of forces - is to place in a single context a number of particular events

it is to locate such events in a general context (it may be to do more than this but it is to do at least this) - it is to serialize events

it is to find a way of presenting, or viewing then in such a way that they can be shown to have a common nature -

this is to say that the term theoretical conatates commonality

is this a definition? - what is common to observed events is what is theoretical - that is, this is what 'theoretical' means

a commonality may be what is posited by theoretical explanations, but is such exclusively theoretical?

yes, I think it is in all cases

there are of course levels of commonality - levels of universality - and the clear aim of science is to achieve greater and greater levels of generality - commonality

what this amounts to is: particular observations are empirical. universal notions are theoretical

this is to effectively define empirical and theoretical in ontological terms - and it is to suggest a relationship between the two

the theoretical is the general context into which particular events may be placed - a successful placement is one in which features of x are shown e.g. to be common to y and z. OK - this is straight forward enough, but what does it mean to say such features are common

what features of an object are singled out by philosophers because of their

commonality?

what are the characteristics or properties of an object which can be universalized?

I suspect that this is not an issue that can be settled in an a priori way

I think, that is, that qualitative issues are context dependent (unlike quantitative issues)

Locke i.e. distinguished between primary and secondary qualities - Kant argued for certain categories and regulative principles - these epistemological theories are responses to the question, and as such they show that philosophy is not just a means of clarifying scientific issues - such theories show that meta theories are essential to science, and determine the nature of the enterprise

what philosophical views one should hold, is not a question which can be settled independently of the context of science

an appropriate scientific theory is one which will provide the foundation for a scientific theory - a foundation which will allow it to be progressive - that is one which will provide it with conceptual apparatus at a fundamental level

I don't think we can have an overview on this issue - I think it is an issue which one can only deal with in context

what that context is, or should be is a conceptual problem itself

philosophical objectivity is not a real possibility

but there are methodological reasons for why philosophers will tackle their problems in a context independent way - it is necessary from the point of view of procedure to separate issues (philosophical, scientific for practical reasons)

philosophical success I think ultimately rests on insight and that of course cannot be predicted or chartered.

13/9/84

mathematics / logic and the unknown

the traditional empiricist view of non-empirical knowledge is that it is non-informative - it tells us nothing about the way the world is.

Ayer's view is that analytic statements are true in virtue of the way the terms are defined - so that the truth of such statements rests with conventions of language - Ayer takes the view that in mathematics all we are in fact doing is explicating conventions of language - and given this view analytic statements are strictly speaking empty

if we take this view seriously, to its logical conclusion it seems that mathematics and logic are subjects of the unknown - the point being that if such 'knowledge' is really not knowledge in an empirical sense, then it is really not knowledge

I don't see how we can say that mathematics tells us nothing about the world and still call it 'knowledge'

even to take the conventionalist view doesn't seem to help - even on this view we can't say that mathematical knowledge is knowledge about language use - for in such propositions we are not saying that language is used in this way - what we are doing is actually using language this way - mathematic propositions do not tell us to use language this way - or that we can use language this way - mathematics depends on this use - on this knowledge and such knowledge is itself non-empirical

what I am getting at is that there is a crucial difference between saying (a) mathematic propositions are based on linguistic conventions and (b) mathematical propositions express linguistic expressions -

it seems to me that Ayer begins with (a) and ends with (b)

to hold both views simultaneously is to say p expresses what it is based on

it is to say that p expresses the principle of all such propositions

an analogy: to say the same thing about empirical sciences would be to say that the content of any empirical proposition is not what it is held to express e.g. 'copper bends at a such and such a temperature' but rather that 'all empirical knowledge is based on experience', or some such formulation of the empirical principle

lets have a closer look at what Ayer has said about this - the important parts of his statement are:

'they call attention to linguistic uses......'

'they simply record our determination to use words in a certain way. We cannot deny then without infringing the conventions which are presupposed by our denial and so falling into self contradiction'.

what is it to call attention to linguistic usage?

if Ayer means that analytic propositions show themselves in an obvious straight up way - that they are just a certain kind of convention - then he is blatantly wrong

the history of the philosophy of mathematics shows that this is not so - such a view is not obvious and few concerned with the issues have seen it in this way but the real issue is how do you call attention to linguistic usage?

I think this can only be by a process of abstraction - we look at language - language usage, certain logico-grammatical constants - if these are general enough we classify - and from this we formulate principles - principles of usages

now when Ayer says logico-mathematical propositions call attention to grammatical usage - does he mean the principles that guide grammatical usage - or some other feature characteristic of usage - clearly it must be the principles and by the principles Ayer has in mind here the principle of analyticity

one can ask here, is this principle, or for that matter any principle of grammatical usage the sort of thing that usage itself calls attention to?

clearly not - usage may suggest questions about particular or general issues of usage - if usage is analyzed or reflected on - and this is primarily a philosophical - reflective matter - not a usage issue

what we are looking at is the philosophical analysis of usage - and in this case Ayer's view of that

given this it seems that Ayer is saying that mathematic-logico propositions call attention to his philosophy of them - and that this is what gives them significance

be that as it may I don't think this is what happens anyway

I don't think that we can say that the significance of mathematical propositions is that they call attention to the principles that regulate their construction and their use

it is tantamount to suggesting that the use of mathematical -logical propositions is that of showing on what their usefulness is based, or more accurately a theory of such

this is to say that the usefulness, significance of a sentence formed from a principle is that it points to the principle

this does not explain the significance of mathematics let alone its usefulness

I doubt that it would register with practicing mathematicians

it is a theory that confuses practice with principle - it is really a claim that the principle of mathematics is really the practice of mathematics

this is to confuse analysis with its subject

the real problem with Ayer's view is that it tells us nothing - we know that mathematical and logical propositions are linguistic usages - and a certain class of linguistic usage

now if we take it that such propositions are correctly viewed as analytic - the question that follows is - is this what their significance lies in - and if so what is this analytic truth - what does this truth consist in?

now just saying that such propositions are examples of a certain kind of linguistic usage does not face up to this question - it doesn't even look like answering it

the question we must ask, given the analytic view is, why is it that certainty seems the result - is it just to do with the way words are used - the rules of language as such?

and are we dealing just with conventions of use - what is a convention of usage - in fact in this case a universal usage? what is conventional about this?

more to the point, are we prepared to say that what language primarily expresses is its own essence, basis, principle - this is to say language is not informative

now perhaps this is just what Ayer wants - it's a questionable conclusion - but what I've been looking at is how it was arrived at

to say that language expresses its own principles, even if we are talking about mathematics - is really to say that language is language - it is to say nothing more

15/9/84

even if we accept this view about what mathematics is really about this does not

support Ayer's view about analyticity- his argument that is about the nature of analytic

truth

my point is simple and I think elegantly so - and one which I don't think has been seen

by anyone else - it is that if mathematics points to facts about language - these are

facts - facts which exist in the world and facts which indirectly tell us about the world

we live in - via knowledge of the language we use - its characteristics

but what kind of knowledge is this? Ayer says it is not genuine knowledge because it

is knowledge that we already know in an unconscious sense - such is a view that is

vaguely Platonic in the sense of Plato's view that all knowledge is recollection and

such a theory quite clearly suggests rationalism and idealism

but I don't think we need to go as far as Plato did and argue that such knowledge is

rightly categorized as non-empirical

if we do come to know principles of usage from analytic usage we only come to such

knowledge through experience - through usage - and this usage is factual and hence

the subject of empirical investigation

what this point really calls into question is the nature or range of empirical knowledge

Ayer describes empirical knowledge as new knowledge - empirical knowledge he says

adds to our existing stock of knowledge

the first thing is that knowledge of language usage is until it becomes accepted new

knowledge - new knowledge about a natural phenomenon

the second thing is that existing knowledge (which was once new) forms a basis on

which new knowledge is built.

mathematical and logical principles on which the 'phenomenon' of logic and

mathematics is 'based' may be secure - in the sense of entrenched - but why this is so

is an empirical question - the answers to which increase our knowledge of the natural

world - the point is that there are two levels of theoreticity

mathematics may function as a theory of physics - that is we can represent physics in

mathematics

and logic it may be argued is reducible to mathematics - Russell took this view

and we can try to explain this by another even more fundamental theory

what has to be recognized though is that these theories become phenomena - and

phenomena is the subject of explanation - and I don't see why we can't describe this

phenomena 'theoretically' - and its products - as empirical - empirical in the sense of

'explanations' of the phenomena in question

to put the issue crucially how are we do define observation?

what I have said suggests a distinction between kinds of experience

there is immediate experience of the sensual kind - this is the paradigm of knowledge

for empiricists like Ayer

this kind of knowledge Ayer would maintain is the basis of more indirect knowledge -

knowledge that is of the entities which explain the immediate given experience - such

as atoms, molecules etc. Scientists would classify such entities as empirical as

'observational' - in an indirect sense

what is this 'indirect' sense an observation has? indirect if it is theoretical - that is if it

is an account of the phenomena - if it functions as an explanation

it is interesting that the empirical sciences have accepted - have viewed such theory -

explanatory entities as empirical - observational in no obvious sense

what I am pointing to is that the terms observational and empirical are not

interchangeable - empirical covers a much larger area than observational - it includes

what is usually contrasted with observational - the theoretical

is there a genuine distinction to be drawn between observational and theoretical ?

explanations of course are not observable in the same way as that which is being

explained - nevertheless we are not here referring to ghostly entities

Wittgenstein might have thought of them as a kind of picture - and this is a useful

notion - for though it cannot be said that atoms exist physically (or so I think at the

moment) we do have 'pictures' of them models of their function and effect

also of course we 'observe' theoretical behavior most obviously via language - the

phenomenon of language

it is through theoretical terms that we come to form theoretical pictures - and some

have come to think that they reveal more than this - that they exist in their own right

can an explanation exist in a physical sense? - only in the sense that language exists

physically - in marks and sounds

the point is that such theories are empirical in that they attempt to explain what is

observed directly or indirectly

it is this which I think fundamentally marks an empirical theory - empirical that is

because it is an attempt to explain phenomena

now this view would I think be rejected by most philosophers of science because it

allows for too much. Is any theory which purports to explain phenomena - empirical?

what about verification - falsification - the whole issue of the demarcation of science

and pseudo-science?

well the truth is I don't see how, or really why the adoption of a certain

methodological principle should really settle the issue this issue anyway

what I have in mind is that we talk about testable empirical theories and non-testable

empirical theories

which theories are and which theories are not, will not always be easy to establish - it

may well be just a matter of scientific fashion

so I am allowing for non-testable empirical theories - theories that is which are

explanations of phenomena, but which cannot be tested for truth

this is not really as radical as it seems - the very principle of empiricism is not itself

testable - but it is necessary as a foundation for science

it is, that is, the final and first principle of science - one which is not testable in the

way that it prescribes for 'scientific' theories

most if not all of 20th century philosophers have seen this is a fundamental problem

the positivists had no real answer to it at all - and this I think led to their demise

the Popperian tradition maintained the positivist insistence on testability, but

resurrected metaphysics - and in such a way as to offer a solution to this dilemma

the complete circle is turned with Feyerabend - he argues that the empirical principle

is on an equal footing with any competing fundamental position - given this - anything

goes.

empiricists must recognize that empiricism cannot be defined a priori

what I am getting at is that the term experience can be used to apply to everything - to

reality

is it experience that we know or is it through experience that we know - is experience

the end or the means to the end?

that is, is experience how we know, the way we know, rather than what we know?

for philosophical empiricists there is not I think a dispute here

experience is what we know (i.e. sense datum) and it is how we know (observation)

I think though it still makes sense to draw a distinction between how and what

I think that the what is broader than experience (it is the objective world) but it is

through experience - perception - observation that we come to a knowledge of it

our experience is what illuminates the objective - it is in this sense how we come to

know, to understand - what reality is

reality is never just our experience - but it is what our experience tells us what it is - at

least - we may not come to the complete picture but we have some good clues - clues

we recognize as reliable

18/9/84

anyway what I'm getting at really is that what 'experience' amounts to is not something that we can 'fix' independently of experience

how we define experience is something only 'experience' can do

so when we use the word we recognize a variability, an indeterminacy in its content

we cannot that is specify its content in a determinate way.

what we can say is that the term has this content at place and time for person and

purposes - this is all

but when we use the term in an objective mode - we recognize that its content is best

described as empty or if not that - potential - not though in a futuristic sense of

potential - but rather in the sense of non-actual

19/9/84

emotivism

there is a fundamental problem with the emotivist thesis.

the emotivist view of ethical statements is that they are in fact expressions of feeling

it is an argument against the view that ethical statements express genuine/significant

propositions.

instead of this we have expressions of emotions in the form of propositions and

statements-

the real issue is not at this stage of the argument

the real issue comes when and if we accept this thesis.

the question we are faced with then is, how do we distinguish moral from non-moral

feelings - moral from non-moral expressions of feeling

the emotivist thesis presupposes a dualism

it presupposes that emotion, feeling is a divided camp. that there are two kinds of

feeling - moral feelings and non-moral feelings

the alternative - the only alternative is to argue that all feeling is by its nature moral

that is to say that it doesn't make any sense to talk of non-moral feeling - feeling thus

is by its nature moral - we are when we refer to someone's emotions referring to their

morality - this is to argue for a full blown moral sense theory - even a moral faculty

theory - and an extreme version of either or both.

neither of these theories - the monist or the dualist theories of the emotions are

satisfactory as moral theories (let alone as accounts of the emotions)

and the reason is that they are not -an answer to the question - what is morality - what

is good - what is right - they merely compound the question - the problem.

the point is that we are still faced with the question, what is morality, only this time

we have a denser more difficult issue

it is, how do we make sense of the notion of moral emotions - what distinguishes

moral from non-moral expressions of feeling?

what this means is that even if we accept emotivism we have no answer in emotivism

to the moral question - emotivism just provides a context for it

the emotivist can only respond by arguing that feelings of approval or disapproval are

in fact moral feelings.

this argument will only stand up if it can be shown that all kinds of feelings of

approval and disapproval are in fact moral - that is it must be shown that there is no

such thing as non-moral approval

the emotivist must show that in all cases of approval moral issues are at stake, that is

that we are always when approving talking about what, is morally acceptable or not

so at the very least morality must still be defined - that is even given the emotivist

thesis.

e.g. if I approve of my restaurant meal am I making a moral claim? - that is am I

saying that my meal is morally good, or that it was the right one to choose?

clearly this is not on - but it seems given the emotivist view that such a claim is in the

same category - as the claim that nuclear war is morally pernicious - or that brotherly

love is morally good.

the point is that the act of approval does not necessarily have anything to do with

morality

morality is what is approved of - the morally good that is - approval is the appropriate

response to the morally good, even though it is just as much the appropriate response

to the non-morally good

20/9/84

where the emotivists made their mistake was in identifying the object of morality

there is a sens-e in which you can say as a consequence of their radical subjectivism that they took the view that there is no object of morality at all - only a subject

but it is not necessary to being an a subjectivist to hold that the concept of an object of morality makes no sense

we can say the emotivists have confused the object with the subject .of morality

in fact in the case of the emotivists they have conflated the two dissolved the object into the subject.

21/9/84

to say that I could have lived otherwise, that could have chosen a different path - what difference does that make? I have lived as I have lived.

to say that I was unable to do other than I have done, or to be other than I am, that I was unable to choose a different path - what is the import of such an assertion?

what difference does that make to the fact and facts of my life? free or determined I am what I am.

I see no addition to or subtraction from my life as lived given either hypothesis

the facts are solid the facts are all that this life amounts to. it is to these that we must turn for understanding, knowledge and wisdom

how these facts are explained is of no consequence - makes no difference -

to past present or future

21/9/84

what sort of a word is 'should'?

'should' in a moral context usually occurs in a question form 'what should I do'? how does such a question differ from 'what will I do'? 'will' is a straightforward query about the future.

I think that 'should' too has this dimension - it is at the very least a question, a verb to do with the future. we can at least begin with this point

the difference between a question about what will be the case and what should be the case is that the will question is an existential question

by this I mean it is a question about future facts. facts here in the naturalistic sense. should is not a question about future existential facts it is a question that asks what is the ideal state of the future? but what does ideal here mean? we have already decided that it cannot be a factual existential notion. is 'ideal' what is desired? the problem here is that the should is what is desired thus desire does not explicate should

or to put it another way we should it seems desire what is moral that is we should desire what should be.

21/9/84

I can't seem to get beyond Moore's conclusion that should is ideal and not explicable in naturalistic terms.

that to understand it we need to postulate an alternative ontology and thus operate with a non-naturalistic language.

there seems no way to avoid this

the point is that in asking 'should', we are asking what sort of state of affairs should the facts, the natural world confirm to?

it is interesting that there is, that there seems no way of stating the definition of should without using 'should' in that definition

the point is that this word is inexplicable - primitive - simple and unanalysable.

we cannot explain it yet we understand it - such it seems is morality

morality it seems is grounded in skepticism, but it is not defeated by, it

seen thus the problem of morality is the problem of acting without foundation - any support or guarantee

we come to this realization very quickly and it is this which distinguishes the search for moral knowledge from the search for natural knowledge

the problem of natural knowledge at least holds out the hope of resolution

in the problem of morality we must begin without this hope

thus the problem of natural knowledge and the problem of moral knowledge are the two ends of the human spectrum.

it is understandable that philosophers have attempted to reduce the problem of morality to the problem of nature - for if such were successful there would seem to be a starting point with some promise - but such an attempt is epistemologically ill-founded

it flies in the face of epistemological facts - that is what we know about knowing - the basis or foundation of knowing

we can't it seems begin to apply the term or begin to apply the term 'knowledge' to the moral realm

but we can know this much we can know about knowledge we can know that there is none

we have to settle for something less than knowledge with morality

perhaps belief is the only term - that fits the bill.

22/9/ 84

I think that the 'ideal' in the sense I have been talking about it is a natural phenomenon

that is I do not follow Moore or Plato in saying that it is a supra-natural - extra-natural phenomenon - that it is a product of a different ontological realm.

it may be possible to show that thought processes that are about the ideal are of a particular sensation type..

however if this is so I suspect that such a sensation will stand out from other sensations and other, the other? – sensation types.

now what this means in empirical terms I cannot say - the whole area of brain sensation is embryonic in detail – claims about this realm must necessarily remain hypothetical

however we can say that if the naturalistic fallacy is real and not just useful to a philosopher's argument then the distinction between is and ought must have a corollary in fact - and in this case I am assuming the fact is the brain identity thesis.

that is, I am suggesting that the naturalistic fallacy points to a sensation distinction, one which we cannot specify at present, but one which must be real if naturalism and here we mean sensationalism is real.

what this suggests generally is that philosophical theories are (if. they are true) very good guesses about aspects of the real world, which are not as yet accessible to observation and experimentation

and another point - a controversial point I would wish to draw from this is that testable empirical theories are not the only kind of empirical theory

that a theory is not testable is not reason for believing that it is not empirical

what I have hinted at above, if true, shows that we do via philosophical theories deal with aspects and realms of the empirical world which we cannot get to with observation and tests

this does not mean that we are not dealing with the empirical, what it means is that we are dealing with those dimensions of the empirical of which it can be said we have no direct knowledge - and that means for all intents and purposes - no real knowledge

we are - that is - dealing with the unknown of the empirical - the hard unknown - the unknown that we know exists beyond the present, and conceivably possible frontiers of knowledge

it is to suggest that at the heart of the empiricist world is the unknown - a hard unknown and I don't think that will change

but this is not an extra- empirical hypothesis it is a full empirical hypothesis - one that goes beyond the narrow restrictive notions of the positivists and methodologists of the 20th century.

my own view is that we can describe knowledge and the world in purely skeptical terms and I do not see any real reason for retaining the idea of empiricism

however I think my analysis would be of value to a free thinking empiricist - one who is not neurotic about the unknown and who rather appreciates and understands it.

23/9/84

to say that morality is a radically different kind of natural phenomenon to science is not to say that it is not a natural phenomenon

the fact that we cannot test moral statements in the way we can physical statements is what distinguishes them from science - but does science have a monopoly on natural phenomena does it mean that statements that are non physical are non-natural?

23/9/84

if what I have suggested about morality and sensation is true, still Hume's problem remains - moral statements are not testable.

we might have shown that they have some co-relation with basic processes but this does not make moral problems accessible soluble, in the way that empirical problems are

now my approach is to argue that this fact does not justify us in claiming that such are not empirical - all it should do - for the committed empiricist is challenge his view of empiricism

(what I have suggested is that testability is not the criterion - the demarcation criterion of empirical-ness - and that science can only deal with a limited kind of empiricism –

so what kind of empirical statement is a moral statement?

we can start by saying that it is a non-testable kind (in this sense it is closer to a logical mathematical statement - however it is quite different from these - it is not analytic)

we have also said that it is an ideal statement and this cannot be analysed in the same way as say the statements of science - it is non-natural in this limited sense,

moral statements are model statements in that they deal with possibility - possible states of affairs

‘I should do x’- entails (a) x is possible (i.e. it can be brought about) and (b) x is preferable (to whatever the existing state of affairs is)

but preferable is really just to say x is 'moral'

I think that one thing that is clear is that notions like justification and proof do not apply to morality

24/9/84

maybe moral statements in their pure form are 'could' statements - i.e. x is what could exist

how could the moral 'could' differ from the empirical could? the ideal element is what is missing - and this of course what is moral

my conclusion so far are (1) that moral statements are ideal statements (2) ideal statements cannot be explained. they are as Moore has said ‘simple’ and (3) notions such as proof, truth, justification, do not .apply - such statements are not testable

in the moral world it is true 'only the blind can see'

granted that we cannot explicate the moral imperative - that is we can only refer to its ideality - and here only intuitively - we have to never the less say something about the relationship between the ideal and the natural (as in non-ideal)

the ideal is a projection on to the natural

it is an attempt to specify how the natural should be (and here I can't do better than should)

it is to suggest that the natural could be otherwise other than what? other, I think it must be, other than natural - otherwise it seems we are simply making an empirical projection

morality here is then a challenge to the very nature of the natural world

it is to say not anything about the way the natural world is or could be it is to suggest an alternative reality

this is the point of morality - it is to posit an alternative reality a non-natural reality - obviously - and this does not come easy for me we are looking at a spiritual reality

taken to its logical conclusion this is what is posited by the moral imperative

the moral imperative point s to the non-natural spiritual reality

so to get back to the original point - what is the relationship - the relationship is I suppose best described as parallelist - it is not on this view an interactionist view - and of course it is not naturalist

still this is not satisfactory - parallelist?

the real point I think of the moral imperative is that a non-natural world - reality is to replace the natural

now I think there is sense, truth in this, what it is - what it could possibly mean - in a coherent, rational sense I can't imagine

I think what it really points to is that morality makes no sense

the moral imperative makes no sense

in order to make sense of it we need to postulate realities which we cannot relate to

morality is something I think we need to abolish - the problem is that this is easier said than done

I think that thus we must see moral theories as not just non-natural - but rather as anti-natural

still how are we to respond to this? is it necessary to go and postulate a non-natural realm and phenomena. I don't see any necessity here though clearly there is a case for it

I think it is important to see that the moral imperative is anti-nature - it implies a reality - above and beyond the natural reality (not necessarily spiritual) which either defies the natural - in its most radical form, or supplements it - implies that nature does not posses the categories that are moral and a necessary part of human nature

again the contrast between the moral and the natural - morality and nature does not imply that the moral imperative is non-natural - so long as we do not restrict this definition of nature to 'nature' in the sense of the physical scientists - that is the non-natural human world

but to avoid this we must be prepared to account for human nature as 'natural' - but a special case of the natural

it is not as the subjectivist would argue simply the means by which we 'see' the objective - our nature is an objective reality in itself.

there are problems here but the fact remains

it is only once this is appreciated that anti-natural conclusions conceptions of morality can be dispensed with

and it is only then that the naturalistic fallacy can be resolved - done away with

put simply, given what I have said we can conclude that the 'ought' is an 'is' - a special kind of 'is' - but one nevertheless

I did at the beginning of this discussion put forward a view that would render 'ought' statements 'natural' - and shows how such a view requires a re-thinking of knowledge - our conception of knowledge - altogether

I want now to approach this problem in another way

‘ought' statements are natural statements but not of the same kind as scientific empirical statements.

these we might term first order natural statements

moral statements are of a different order - because of two things (1) their nature - they are not descriptive , they are rather prescriptive and, (2) the assessment procedure relevant to them. 'empirical' verification is not appropriate to them - such a method is only appropriate to first order/ descriptive statements

what though is the method appropriate to moral statements, and is it correct to identify these statements as prescriptive - I think normative a better term, but what does this mean?

we still have the problem of correctly identifying moral statements their nature – and in particular we need to explain in what sense it can be said that they are natural

in this argument we need to show what it is that these two kinds of statements have in common. what is it to be natural?

I have already suggested that the mode of verification is not the answer

this fails to recognize that we are dealing with two kinds of natural statements - two distinct kinds

how else do we characterize statements if not by our mode of verification

it should also be pointed out that the argument of the mode of verification really in a sense begs the question

we answer that verification is the appropriate mode because the statement under consideration is empirical

that is we must know that the statement is empirical before we address the question of verification

this is a general issue and a complex one, but the relevant point here is that we cannot exclude moral statements as natural, because they cannot be, are not verifiable.

25/9/84

so what we are dealing with is a class of natural statements (not empirical). they cannot be tested.

all that we can do then is try to ascertain their function. That is what do they do, and what is their relationship to testable (empirical) natural statements? that is how do the two relate to each other?

it doesn't help us to go subjectivist - to say that statements of morality are statements about the moral agent. if they were they would be testable or it would seem that they should be

26/9/84

when I decide to act in such a way that I think is moral, I am giving myself direction

and this is necessary because the natural world does not give any necessary direction - it doesn't say that his is the best way to behave

I have behavioural options and the world does not decide for me which option I should take. it is silent on this issue.

so we are positing morality to account for choice

in the natural non-human world there is no choice. but for human beings choice cannot be avoided

the fact of choice is I think determined - this doesn't mean however that a choice is - or at least can be seen to be

our freedom to choose may be a natural fact - a fact of our nature - a, strange fact in the whole scheme of things - but an indisputable one nevertheless

morality - the adoption of a morality is in this sense - our way of determining the indeterminate

the problem of choice though is never settled - there is always the problem of choice of moralities

but by making any choice the human being is by that choice attempting to be one with the natural world it is human nature's attempt to deny its own nature

for 'its own nature' is flawed with the problem of freedom - a problem which the rest of the natural world does not know.

in postulating the 'good' man is compensating for his flaw or if you like his 'triumph over nature’

whatever the case morality is an attempt to return to nature - to be one with the natural world.

'Perhaps I may add that I am getting the impression that I have been tending more and more to take refuge in the unknown and the unknowable in a way which I maintain is right, but which still is not what I quite like.’

F.H. Bradley

(letter to Russell autobiography 236)

(1984 appendix II)

30/8/84

there is a sense in which ethical theory is the problem of meta ethics is - just the problem of properly locating moral knowledge. that is it is about telling us what kind of knowledge moral knowledge is. i.e., is it 'natural' knowledge - to be seen as stemming from the naturalist theory of knowledge - or is it not knowledge that can be thus located - founded? is it rather non-natural? what this means is that an ethical concept like 'goodness’ is properly seen as non-natural. The problem of meta ethics is to decide this sort of issue.

given this perspective normative ethics is correctly seen as ethical theory. that is the theory about what is right, what is good, what is responsibility is etc.

given that these issues can be decided we can then if we wish to, go on to talk about what kind of knowledge this moral knowledge is, it may turn out that moral knowledge is different to natural knowledge. this seems to be the point of the so called naturalistic fallacy - that an ought cannot be derived from an is. This view leads or can 1eadin its most radical form to an epistemological dualism – i.e., that there

are two kinds of knowledge - natural and non-natural (i.e. ethical). few philosophers I think would be satisfied with this dualism. that is I think most would find it intellectually unacceptable that there are two kind a of knowledge - but such is an option.

what I an saying generally is that meta ethics is the epistemology of morality. that is from a meta-ethical point of view we are not discussing what is good, moral responsible as such - these matters are normative – what we are discussing on this level is the epistemological status of our normative claims.

now this view of ethics - this view of ethical theory - that there are two components to it - normative and meta - and that the two deal with'- different issues is clear enough until you get to G.E. Moore

Moore reversed the procedure. He in effect began with the meta ethical question, that is in claiming that goodness in a non-natural property or quality - he is not saying anything about what in fact a good action is - or what makes an action good. He is telling us what kind of an epistemological statement, a statement about goodness is. It is a statement about a non-natural quality. It is therefore a statement that cannot

be explained in 'natural' terms.

what this amounts to though is that the normative issue cannot be addressed. It is a consequence of Moore’s meta analysis that we cannot say what a good act is. Good on his analysis cannot be defined (in natural terms) That is we cannot say that a good act is one which promotes happiness (a natural thing) gives pleasure etc.

in effect we cat know a good act but we cannot know what it consists in

now what I'm interested in is that such a view in effect obliterates the distinction between meta and normative ethics, in fact it obliterates normative ethics as such.

this I think amounts to an argument against Moor

on this view Moore has offered a theory about moral knowledge, without a theory of moral knowledge - this is what has happened - it has happened because his theory about moral knowledge amounts to the thesis that we cannot answer the questions of morality - we cannot offer a theory of morality

what we've got here is a case of the cart being put before the horse - when there is no horse to begin with

and what this amounts to is a question about procedure in ethics, and ultimately to a question about the status of ethical theory - the status that is of normative theory, meta theory and the relationship between the two.

Moore begins with the question what is goodness. This question appears to be normative. But it becomes clear that we are not dealing with a normative question - rather the issue is meta, or is it that simple? is this in fact what is going on? or is it rather that Moore confuses the issues?

what Moore is (it seems finally) asking is what kind of knowledge is knowledge of goodness?

but what is interesting is that he sees his answer to this question as, also being an answer to the (normative) question what in goodness?

now what is deceptive about all this is that his answer is that there is no such answer

so a follower of G.E. Moore might argue that I am wrong in suggesting that his meta analysis provides an answer to the normative question

but in fact Moore’s ‘no answer' - is in fact an answer. It may not be what one would expect - and I think not what anyone but your moral skeptic would want - but nevertheless it is an answer ( a negative answer - one just the same)

so I think we can fairly say that Moore’s meta ethic functions as a normative answer

(now in saying this I an not saying something uncontroversial - what this amounts to is an interpretation - a new interpretation of Moore's ethics - what I an saying - what I believe is that Moore was a skeptic - though I don't think Moore would agree to this)

it seems to me that on Moore view you can say I know what is good - or perhaps that such an action is good, but I cannot say what goodness is.

this amounts to circumventing the traditional normative question. his meta views leave normative ethics untouched

but there are two ways you can do this. you can do it by arguing for a certain model of morality - as I did at the beginning, that is that there really are two questions - normative and meta.

what I am arguing here is that Moore may have appeared to have done this, but he has not. he could be looked at this way - but I don't believe this is an accurate interpretation (even if it was what he intended)

Moore has through his meta ethic made a statement about normative issues i.e. they cannot 'be answered*

what we have then to ask ourselves is, what is the value of this?

unless you are a moral skeptic in the complete sense it amounts to the claim that what is really understood as ethical problems are not the sort o f issues anything substantial can be said about.

it might be said that what Moore is really on about is the naturalism vs. idealism thesis. and this is true. but it is not all the truth.

Moore’s argument about goodness is an argument against any 'natural' interpretation. this is straightforward. it is when we get to the positive thesis that the real nature of his argument becomes manifest.

on the face of it there are two stages to his positive thesis. the first is that goodness is ideal. the second is that this cannot be defined, not just in natural terms, but per se goodness is simple and thus indefinable

the difficulty I have been pointing to is to be found here. the second stage of his 'meta’ argument is in fact a normative claim.

or to put it more accurately- it is stated in meta language - but what it comes to is that the basic moral question, what is goodness cannot be answered.

being a skeptic I am quite happy to see this result.

however I have my doubts about the way it is arrived at.

it seems that Moore’s result has a lot to do with his methodology - his approach to ethics.

now I think that what Moore attempts to do is answer normative questions, via, through meta analysis.

put simply I think he sees the question what is goodness is a meta question.

I think it can be argued that this is a mistake. the view that I'm putting is that such a question, is normative - the corresponding meta question, is what is the foundation of goodness, or o what kind of knowledge is knowledge of goodness, is moral knowledge?

what I'm saying is that at the beginning of analysis is this fundamental mistake - a confusion between the meta and the normative

its a crucial mistake because the result is that the traditional ethical question, normative question cannot as a matter of logic be answered

this is in fact beyond skepticism - the skeptic at least begins with the view that the moral - question can be answered - he concludes that no answer is forthcoming - not even the skeptic can begin with the view - there would be nothing as such to begin with.

above and beyond this argument - it seems that the idea that goodness cannot be defined is 'morally unacceptable' - it is at least irrelevant to the moral lives of all who actually live.

Vol. IV Sept - Nov

28/9/84

to ask the moral question is to require a prescription, to answer it is to give one. such is a fair enough description of this kind of moral behaviour,

that is prescriptivism is at least in this limited case - an accurate description of moral behaviour –

as am account of a kind of moral utterance this is O.K.

but it really doesn't adress the issue of what is moral i.e. what is goodness . etc.

it is purely to do with the function of moral utterance - it is a characteristic of language.

it doesn't address the natural/ideal issue

is what is prescribed ideal in its mature or is it natural?

in some ways this is an advantage of Hare's view, if we accept tkat the ideal natural controversy is pointless

Hare's view accounts for prescriptive moral discourse but it doesn't address object -moral discourse i.e. what is goodness

and also in connection with prescriptivism – I ‘should' is left as it is

and it is assumed by Hare that there is always an answer to such a question

that each a question can be answered

Hare has correctly seen that the moral problem is a problem of action, What should I do?

where I think he is misdirected is in identifying this, the problem of moral action with the problem of morality

what I mean is that the problem of morality is primarily a problem of knowledge

it is only once the issue of what is good, and how we know sack is solved that the issue of action can be settled

in fact I think there could well be an argument to the effect that - the idea that the problem of morality is a problem of action - is in fact a misstatement of the issue - and a misunderstanding

there is a sense in which morality has as much and no more to do with action, as the non-moral

the point is we are not dealing with action - the problem of action - what we are dealing with - the problem of morality - is the problem of knowledge –

how do we know what is - in this case moral - what is good

such is an 'is' question but not one which can be settled like the empirical 'is' ques. - by observation – experiment

but is this in fact, in practise what is expected?

I don't think anyone expects to see 'goodness' in the same way they expect to see redness

what then is seen or expected when an act is identified as good?

now this seems to be a question to which there should be an answer

this seems to be the only way we can approach the moral problem and make the question what is good, manageable?

however before we address ourselves to this question, we must dispose once and for all of the question what is good, or what is the good, what is a good action, belief etc.

all these ques. presuppose that in referring to good - we are referring to am object - that is that there a is an object or property which the word ‘good’ can be applied to

now clearly there is not - the best analysis of this expression, G.E Moore's analysis makes this clear - Moore though still thinks suck a question. makes sense, that we are still dealing with a significant expression

but Moore's own analysis of it is an argument to the effect that it is not. he argues that it is an indefinable proposition

it is really only his insistence that it is significant - that gives the impression that such am analysts is significant. As well as his tenacity in his idealism - but in claiming an ideal status for the good he is doing no more than making a doctrine out of his in definability argument. Idealism ought to be definable if it is significant - and of

course the classical idealists did not shy away from this

It is important to realise that the question what is the good, even on M's analysis is an incomplete question

coupled to this question. is always the meta question, "what does the expression, 'what is the good’ mean"

what I an saying is that the question what is the good, is not in fact a question that we do understand intuitively - we always qualify suck a question with a query about the question

this tells us that the moral problem is, even in its most simplest and most direct statement an analytical question - a question that is, which does not call for a simple answer - or a simple non answer as Moore suggests

we cannot that is ask the question in the way the intuitionist suggests we can

or to put it-another wav to get the kind of answer that the intuitionists come up with, we would have to ask another question

and of course the question is what kind of question would we have to ask to get the intuitionist answer?

this question calls for a more detailed analysis of the moral question what kind of question is it?

1/10/84

Moore argues that the question what is good?', is a question that can only be answered - 'good is good' - what else says Moore can you say to such a question?

is it not like asking the question, 'what is yellow?', and is not the answer to such a question, 'yellow is yellow'.

I don't believe that it is so.

at the very least when one asks, what is yellow?, and asks it as a genuine question - one that is to which one does net already have an answer -.that is one does not know what yellow is - at the very least one would expect the answer 'yellow is a colour’.

the questioner may not be satisfied with this as an answer ani further inquire, what is a colour or what is it that makes yellow a colour etc

M's view of the question, 'what is good', can only be entertained if the questioner

(a) already knows what good is - and is not thus asking a genuine question or

(b) does not require a definition of some kind, of 'good' (i.e., 'good is a simple, ideal - moral quality....’ or 'good is ….etc) - and again is not asking a genuine question

Moore seems to think that in asking the question we are in fact revealing something of the answer to it

in fact at times it seems that Moore - for Moore there is nothing to the issue, but the asking of the question - we cannot get beyond this and the question shows as that

if that is so, we are not dealing with a genuine question, regardless of how it is asked

it is as if Moore thinks that in morality we are asking something like an analytic question

that though we do not have analytic answers we do have analytic questions.

to ask what is good or what is yellow?, questions of this form - is to ask what appears to be genuine question

but as soon as we ask then it becomes clear that they are not genuine questions - because we must always supplement them with clarification. we invariably complete suck question by asking instead 'what does good mean?'

that is we transform the object question - into a question of meaning - a question about language - suck a move sakes the question accessible

or if net this we ask a meta question. - 'what does the question what is good mean'

these supplementary qua are necessary because the original question is not genuine - not complete in what way is it incomplete

we need to look at the structure and the grammar of the moral question, however it will be clear that the structure of the moral question - is primarily a grammatical structure - its structure is a structure that is properly seen as linguistic - a structure that is not special to the moral question but one which governs any question of the form, ‘what is____________’

there is no great mystery here

as I have already pointed out to ask, 'what ______’ is not a genuine question

if I was to ask 'what is x doing?’ 'what is x like in y conditions' etc I am asking a genuine question

I am in such questions inquiring into the behaviour or nature or structure

of the subject - the object in question

we might generalize by saying that any genuine question of an object always involves a qu of that object's properties or relations

a question which merely refers to the object as such is not a genuine question (unless of course it is, in so doing understood to be so referring)

that is any question - that merely refers to or puts in issue the object itself without specifying why it is in issue (i.e. its properties or relations) is not asking a genuine question of the object, is not making a genuine query about it

if we are to see the problem of morality as imply the question 'what is good' we will not get an answer (except perhaps Moore’s ‘good is good') - only because a genuine question has not been asked in the first place

there is really no mystery here - and certainly no necessity to go looking for ideal entities

to account for the non answer to the non question.

2/10 /84

if the question, what is good? is translated into a declarative sentence, what do we get?

what we get is an incomplete sentence. it is as follows: ‘good is ____’.

what is immediately obvious is that the declarative sentence is incomplete, an this is because it does not posses a predicate

if we transfer the ‘what’ of the question into the declarative sentence what do we get?

we get ‘good is what’

when what is transferred in this way it functions as an incomplete predicate

‘good is what ….’

how do we complete this phrase?

the answer is obvious

it is: ‘good is what it is’

now what you have here is a curious grammatical situation

‘what’ looks like it is going to function as a predicate – in fact – given a natural reading it becomes clear that it functions as a restatement of the subject

this restatement though is not explicit it is hidden

it is clear that ‘what’ can function in this way – can be made to function in this way

it is not I think necessary that it does

and I wonder if such is really a legitimate usage anyway

what is clear is that it is not the only way the word can be used

it can I suggest be used in a predicative context – and this I think is its correct usage

now what I wish to now argue is that a confusion - through between a legitimate and illegitimate use of ‘what’ – or should I say the normal – proper – or should I say the clandestine or underhanded usages has led to logical and metaphysical error – an error which has ramifications directly for the field of ethics

putting it sharply the question ‘what is good’ ? is not a genuine question – not, when you get into s declarative mode – a genuine statement – a genuine proposition

it may appear to be all there but it is not one of them

it is not genuine because ‘what ‘ is not denotative – it does not denote anything – except in – this context – the subject itself

it functions – its real function is self referential

it enables you to refer to the subject – but not in a substantial way – we do not through this world say anything about the subject –we refer to it through ‘what’ – what is thus referential but not constitutive

once this becomes clear we can correctly write the moral question like this:

‘good is what it it is’(?)

the ‘what’ refers to the ‘it’ – which is the ‘good’, and says of it – the ‘good’ – that it is

what we have then is a purely existential statement – when the moral question is correctly analysed –

‘good’

this is not to be seen as statement that goodness exist – it is rather to be seen as an incomplete sentence and as such without significance

Moore’s trick is to take the subject ‘good’ and make it its own object

and in so doing appear to make a genuine sentence – to make ‘good’ its own predicate

all we really have as a result of such a move is a verbal statement – it is strictly speaking a meta statement, that is a statement about language

is that so or is it just verbalism?

or simply a statement of the law of identity: x is x?

3/10/84

it is in one sense verbalism

but the statement ‘good is good’ is as Moore uses it a meta statement

it is a statement about the nature of good

the moral question according to Moore – when stated seriously – necessarily leads to this conclusion

I think that the work above shows that to a large extent Moore’s conclusion is reached as a result of bad grammar

but it is not that simple – his argument is not just that if you ask the question, ‘what is good?’, you can only answer that question with ‘good is good’

I think that Moore begins with idealism – that is he assumes idealism and the ideality of good in order to make the question / answer work

(this gets back to the criticism I made earlier of Moore that he conflates meta and normative issues.

the result of which is that immediately normative ethics goes – we can’t say ‘what is good’ – we can only ask the question, and this is a meta activity – as it turns out because in so doing we are saying something of the nature good).

5/10/84

my point so far is that Moore’s answer to his question ‘What is good’ (good is good) is no answer

if we translate the question into a declarative form, what we get is ‘good is good’

so in giving that as the answer all we are doing is restating the question in another.

one way of putting it is to say that in giving the answer we are not adding to the proposition we begin with – (what is good or good is good) we are simply restating it. Specifically the subject of the question becomes the answer, the object – that is the subject become sits object.

what we have then from Moore is just an analytic statement: ‘good is good’

the statement is equivalent to any other non-informative statement.

how can it thus be considered moral?

it may be said that it is moral because – because its subject is moral – good is term – hence the subject – is moral – and the sentence is moral

we can of course classify this way but it means nothing

does Moore mean by his argument against naturalism that we cannot make a synthetic moral statement –

that any statement about good resolves itself into verbalism

Moore of course would rather idealism to verbalism – but I don’t see how idealism could really be outcome of his analysis of the question

what does this mean generally?

what Moore claims is the outcome is that goodness is simple and indefinable

now I question that these conclusions can be drawn – but even if so – wither idealism?

we could conclude that idealism is simple, that it is indefinable –

these are statements about the epistemological limits, and the ontological structure of the concept

such are relational and ontological theories about goodness and goodness’ relation to other entities – i.e. it is simple

still such views tell us nothing about the content of goodness – nothing about the kind of thing it is

still Moore will say that the simplicity and indefinability of good, makes content analysis impossible

what I say is Moore cannot have it both ways

either he maintains the simplicity / indefinability argument or his idealism. he cannot hold both

now what I’m getting at is that idealism is a theory of content. we can accept Moore’s point that good is simple and cannot thus be defined

but then how can any theory about the nature of good be introduced?

if good is indefinable, and it is ideal then the ideal nature of good is indefinable

but this cannot be, the fact is we can state and define idealism in this context. if only negatively we can say what idealism is not. but there is a whole body of thought on how idealism can be defined.

so what this amounts to is that Moore’s initial analysis of good is correct – his idealism cannot be ventured, for his indefinability criterion forbids it

what this point to though is that Moore’s view of definition is not up to scratch

6/10/84

Moore’s view of definition amounts to the claim that x is definable if x is complex

if we accept this there are definite limits on what can be defined – only simple thins cannot be defined

but there is a difficulty with. what is to count as complex, what is to count as simple?

that itself has to be defined

now is that issue definable? and what are we now talking about? we are not talking about a thing we are talking about a definition itself

does it make sense to say that a definition is, can be, the subject, itself of definition?

clearly we cannot avoid this issue

we are ultimately dealing with ontology at this level. we are defining the world as being composed of simple and complex things, concepts, whatever

now this here is a definition of the world, not anything in it

it is on the bas is of this that we can then go on to define what is in the world as either simple or complex

the point I am making here is that the notion of definition is not as simple as Moore would have us believe. it is certainly not as narrow.

in fact this kind of discussion brings into question the notion of definition itself

what is it to define?

Moore has answered this question by saying that it is to reduce a complex to its parts

now granted that this is a kind of definition – but is it the only kind?

what we are faced with on this view is the indefinability of simples, and how realistic is this?

granted we can say a simple is not a complex, but does this mean we can say no more?

to define an expression is to distinguish those characteristics of the term which distinguish it from others?

the big question is are we doing anything more than, in so doing, referring to usage – common or idiosyncratic?

part of the idea behind Moore’s ‘good’ is that it is not to defined in terms of language use, in terms of language

‘good’ and for that matter I would think any other word is to be defined in terms of what it denotes – the object that is that corresponds to it

the real problem with this view is that it assumes that something does correspond to the phrase that is to be defined

this is a prejudicial assumption – and one that is not necessary for the notion of definition to work – to be valid

8/10/84

Moore’s simple / complex view of definition is OK so long as we are prepared to carry the meta baggage. (the view that the world is composed of simple and complex ‘things’).

even so it is not straightforward what is to count as simple – and what is to count as complex.

I don’t think we can determine this independently of a metaphysical theory

now given this Moore’s view that good is a simple is not so simple.

is Moore prepared to say that the man in the street who uses the term ‘good’, is in so doing, implicitly accepting the above metaphysics

does he have to accept this metaphysics – for ‘good’ to have meaning for him – for it to be significant?

Moore I think – and I think any other objectivist is forced to such a conclusion

and in the case of ‘good’ ( as against ‘yellow’ i.e. – such is not plausible)

with yellow because it is ‘experienced’, because it is observed, we can significantly say what someone means when they use the term – at least we can make tests

this we cannot do with good – so we cannot determine its correct usage

so we must accept the naturalistic fallacy – the ideality of ‘good’ – how can we on Moore’s theory (simplicity / indefinability) say anything ‘positive’ about it? surely all we can say is that it is not natural – and not a simple – but Moore doesn’t seem to think so – he thinks he can at least refer to it as a quality.

why a ‘quality’ – why not a kind of ‘object’ – an ideal object?

my point is that, there is sense in which to refer to it at all is to define it – in some primitive sense

but to refer to as a quality is to go beyond the basic sense of definition – it is to make a definitive claim about the nature of the entity – a definitive ontological – philosophical point about the nature of good

I think Moore simply assumes that we must see ‘good’ as a quality (why not a property?)

now if it is a quality it is a very strange quality

firstly, the idea of a quality – whatever the kind of quality (essential, accidental) – it is something to be distinguished from the object –

the object is something that has properties. properties are what makes the object what it is. we distinguish objects from each other by distinguishing and classify qualities.

on thing is clear is that a property, a quality, is a kind of thing.

whatever it is, it is a part, not a whole – the whole is the object – the parts its qualities, it properties

however to reify the distinction is another thing – that is to mistake analysis for reality – for the object of analysis. it is this mistake which leads to an ontology that has floating qualities – dispossessed entities.

it makes no sense to speak of qualities or properties as really being distinct from the entities they identify and characterize.

this is a general thesis. it applies independently of our ontology of qualities and properties. however it has particular relevance to Moore’s ethical theory.

this mistaken view of properties and philosophical analysis is one of Moore’s idealist springboards.

it follows that if we can in fact talk of floating properties we are talking about entities that in some radical way be separate from what they attach themselves to. And if what they attach themselves to is natural entities – then they must be, or at least there is reason for saying that they are non-natural things.

however even if we were to accept Moore’s view of properties the worst is yet to come.

we have a major problem in showing how this ideal quality of goodness relates, can relate to the natural world

in this sense Moore’s philosophy is not so much a solution to the naturalistic fallacy, but is rather a profound identification of it

we can in a sense accept his solution to the naturalistic fallacy, but in so doing we come face to face with the naturalistic problem

his philosophy is an acute statement of the problem of how the non-natural relates to, has anything to do with the natural –

maybe we do identify the good in the way that he says – but what bearing does this have on the affairs of men?

this is the naturalistic problem – as distinct from the naturalistic fallacy –

we could even go so far as to say that to claim it does is to commit the naturalistic fallacy

and surely Moore must claim it does.

seen in this way Moore’s ethic really doesn’t advance beyond its own problem. and seen thus the problem is self-defeating. we can make no progress in ethics in approaching it in this way – there is nothing in the end to gained.

11/10/84

two points emerge from my analysis of Moore so far

(1) the question, ‘what is good?’, is not a genuine question.

(2) Moore’s argument is a statement of the naturalistic problem, not a solution to it.

we can I think recognise that Moore’s question is not the moral question – ethics is not concerned with Moore’s question ‘what is good?’

this much I think we can say with confidence.

Moore’s argument that good is a non-natural quality – is an argument that comes from a faulty analysis of the question. B=but even if we were to accept non-natural qualities we would still have the problem of showing how they relate – interact with the natural

my knowledge of Moore so far suggests that he has no answer to this. his view that good is simple and indefinable suggests that we cannot say how it it relates to anything else – it is a whole – it cannot be shown to be part of the natural world.

in taking this view that good is simple and indefinable admittedly Moore does not attempt to reduce good to anything else – but in so doing he also says nothing about its relationship to anything else

and in so far as we do want to know why, or if, an act is good – that is, what the relationship between ‘goodness’ and ‘action’ is – or what makes an act moral.

Moore has not addressed the problem of morality

what I am saying is that the problem of morality is starting from Moore – the problem of the relationship between our notions of morality and the natural world (of which of course we are a part)

what I am suggesting is that the problem of morality is the naturalistic problem – the problem of determining the relationship between the moral and the natural.

one view – if this is the moral problem, then even though Moore has inadvertently stated it – he has failed to realize that it is the moral problem

in fact his analysis of this issue is, or can be seen to be an attempt to eradicate, terminate the moral problem – to show that it doesn’t make sense

which is plainly of no use to anyone

effectively Moore criticizes others for attempting to answer the moral question

he was unable to get away with it because of his misunderstanding / incorrect analysis of the moral question.

the real question is not what is good, it is what is the relationship between the moral and the natural?

now admittedly, this question may not be all there is to morality – but without doubt it is a central question

if we accept my point about Moore’s analysis of the moral question – what is left of idealism? how does it come into the picture?

also what does a naturalistic analysis come to? does it mean that moral problems, are same kind as all others – as natural problems?

yes it does, but it does seem that we have to in any analysis show how, though they may be of the same kind, they are different, shall we say in type?

in asking moral questions we are not asking for observational confirmation of the relationship between morality and the natural. we do not expect to see good in the way we expect to se yellow

so anyone who argues that this is what a naturalistic thesis has to show is mistaken

the moral response is a natural phenomena in that it occurs in the natural world. this is not an argument, it is more a declaration of naturalism. nevertheless I think such must be seen as the bottom line – the fundamental insight of the naturalist.

also what is the relationship between science and the world of nature?

one view, a popular view is that science is the method by which we come to know and control the natural world. the knowledge that is gained is said to be secure and general.

it would offend the committed empiricist to say that the method of science is not adequate to the task of dealing with the problem of morality

it is I think this, which led Moore to idealism

but perhaps I think this is not the only way

such a view identifies naturalism with empiricism and this I think is highly questionable

certainly I think an ethical naturalist has to show that what is natural, is not necessarily what is observable – that is what is natural is not necessarily empirical, or accessible to empirical investigation

what I have argued is that Moore has only really stated the naturalist problem, and I have further suggested that the naturalistic problem is the problem of explaining the relationship between morality (‘the good’) and nature (action)

now it seems to me that this is the best that can be said about Moore’s argument with respect to the naturalist fallacy. my argument about the naturalistic problem could be an attempt to rescue Moore’s efforts

now this seems to me the best that can be said about Moore’s attempts to state the problem.

of course beyond this, when we look to his solution to the dilemma, we find of course that he takes the view that there is no relation – or if not this, that nothing can be said about the relationship

this having been said I think we must question this idea I have been arguing for, that the problem of morality is the problem of the relationship between the natural and the moral.

one problem is that to set it up this way is already to presuppose too much

i.e. it is to presuppose (at least for the argument’s sake) a dichotomy between nature and morality (whatever it is).

which is just what the intuitionists spent years and volumes trying to show

thus to say, that the question of the relationship between morality and nature is the fundamental question of morality, could be so – but it is not the first – the basic moral question. to get to the above question would require a great deal of argument.

I suppose this the point of Moore’s question, ‘what is the good?’ – it does seem primary – it does seem basic – it does seem we can start – and start without presuppositions – to investigate the problem of morality

unfortunately, this most basic question – is not as it turns out a question – a genuine question at all

but all this leads to the question, is there a fundamental moral question?

or to put it another way can we start the study of morality without presuppositions – can we begin with a clean slate?

the alternative seems to be to start with some presuppositions and work through them to the basic moral question – some clear and distinct idea – moral idea

but this I think is vain hope

it is because such a question is itself – is in a sense the fundamental question of the moral sciences

it is not a question we can separate off as extra moral – or pre-moral

on the other hand we can not begin with the assumption that an objectivity – an objective star t – is not possible

with the problem of morality we end (if we end) where we would begin (if we begin)

16/10/84

what I want to suggest is that the doing of meta ethics is a descriptive activity

that the doing of normative ethics is a prescriptive activity

that is to suggest that the meta question is really an ‘is’ issue. not an ‘is’ question in the sense that it is tied to any specific ‘empirical; theory of is. what we have here is a meta ‘is’.

I am not suggesting that the term ‘factual’ applies here

I want to just make the point the ought question does not arise at this level.

we are not asking what we ought to do, or what we should do –

we are asking what is the basis of such questions, statements, moralities

but it is clear that we cannot say that the basis of ethical questions – ethical statements is – this – in the same way as we can say that the basis of matter is this

it is true to say that such a view – a very naïve naturalism – is not on

but it is wrong to expect that it should be

still, nevertheless if we say that the basis of moral judgment is subjective or objective – we are making some kind of claim – how are we to describe, analyse – this – what kind of claim is it

we could say well it’s a philosophical claim – a metaphysical claim

but again what does this mean?

the way it works is in asking what is the basis of morality – what does ‘should’ mean – ‘ought’ ‘good’ ‘right’ – we are asking such a philosophical question

in answering the question we give a philosophical answer – of some kind – to this question.

so what we get is a reduction of the normative to the meta claim

we should if this proves successful to be able to say what ‘should’ amounts to

it is really just an ‘is’, or is it non-natural?

is the reduction complete, that is do the normative questions disappear if answers are given?

obviously not

what the meta answer does is give – a method – and philosophical signposts is the answering of the question – it enables us to go about and answer our question

so we could say that the meta answers – issues give substance – significance to the normative issues

the meta answer tells us the form of the normative answer – it tells us where and how we will find – or if we have already found it – tells us what we have found and how

but there is a question here

two utilitarians who came to the same decision – could give entirely different meta explanations for their decisions

so how can we say that that the meta answer has any real bearing on the normative issue?

in what sense can a meta conclusion bear on a normative problem?

16/10/84

what I am interested in at this point is not the status of normative statements, but rather the status of meta statements

for two reasons, one just the quesions of the status of meta statements is of interest in itself, but I think a clear understanding of this issue, may throw up some interesting questions, for the question of the relationship between normative and meta.

16/10/84

I think it still makes sense to say that the meta conclusions, give the normative statements a ‘logical’ – metaphysical setting

the meta question is then which setting is appropriate – is true

we can ask how are we to decide this issue

how are we decide, that is between different settings

this is not a moral specific issue – it is the general question of how to decide philosophical issues.

16/10/84

what I have been trying to get at – get to is a notion I have – and I even have a name for it – meta- descriptivism

the idea is that the problem of morality is really a descriptive problem

it is that in making meta comments we are describing the philosophical setting of our normative theories

but how does this notion of descriptivism relate to the normative area?

 

can we say that is saying ‘x is good’ we are describing?

if so what is it that we are describing?

16/10/84

now if we answer this question by putting one of the meta theories, by putting a naturalist or an idealist position, what then are we describing?

there is a problem – an idealist will give an idealist answer – a naturalist – a naturalistic answer

(neither of them might accept the label ‘descriptivism” – this is just my term)

that is we will get an epistemologically value loaded answer

and such an answer really only begs the question

but I think there needs to be some clarification here about just what the meta question is

I think it is something like what is the basis of the various meta postions

now some would say the issue is, what is the basis of the normative positions

but each meta theory gives an answer to this

and once this is given our question is then what is the basis of meta philosophizing of any kind?

can we give an answer to this question which is not value bound – (philosophical values here) – which is not, that is, tied to a specific meta- ethical position?

I think we can and our answer is not going to be staggering – it is amazingly simple

it is to step out of the dispute and describe it

what we can say about though is not very much

but some would say how can we say anything at all?

can we say something about a philosophical issue that is not philosophical?

I think we can describe the positions people hold –

it is just what philosophers do anyway before they come to their conclusions

so I think it is possible to say that we can describe what happens at a met level

 

 

what I am suggesting is that meta philosophers can behave or do their work in one or two ways

we can act as committed to a particular position – and in so doing justify – argue our positions

but in doing so the meta philosopher must know the whole game – and all options

or we can step back from the game and describe it

philosophers do both

 

so what is the significance of this – how does this fact have any significance in relation to our view of what moral philosophy is about?

it is to say this is what meta-philosophy is all about, but what dose this mean?

it is at least to suggest an attitude about philosophy

or if nothing else, to state clearly not only what philosophers claim to do, but how this claim is best seen

 

18/ 10 /84

what I want to suggest about the word ‘good’ is that it is a philosophical word

if we assume that it is a natural word, we naturally look for a natural quality to which it should or does apply. The reason that there is no natural quality corresponding to good in the way that ‘yellow’ correspondence to the property of yellowness is that it is misunderstood to be a natural word.

now can we get around this by pointing to ‘good’ behaviour?

the same problem arises and it is the problem for every person who claims ‘x’ is good, there will be another we can insist with as much force that ‘x’ is not good

the point is that ‘good’ unlike other important terms is nakedly philosophical

there are of course a whole range of contentious issues to do with all our terms – what I have in mind is that ‘good’ is primarily contentious and only secondarily non-contentious

most words in our language are generally stable, and only questionable upon reflection

unlike Moore, I do not think that, in answering the question ‘what is ‘good’?’ – one can only, indeed – one ever gets the reply, ‘good is good’

the question ‘what is ‘good’?’, if it is a genuine question, calls for a philosophical answer – that is the kind of answer G. E. More might give, or Stevenson, Hare, - or you know who –

 

the idea of ‘good’ being a philosophical word needs to be studied

but I want to suggest that moral philosophy – is a response to the indeterminacy of ‘good’, and the indeterminacy of other moral terms

‘good’, seen in this way, is in fact an empty or open word – semantically open

it is not one which has a given meaning in an immediate sense – ‘good’ is an incurably contentious word –

and we might ask why?

and we might expect an immediate / direct answer to this – but this is not on

our answer – any answer will be philosophical – will be contentious

that is it will be indeterminate

(this is to define philosophical words in terms of indeterminacy and there is a clear sense in which this true. A word has philosophical dimensions to the extent that it is indeterminate)

the point of philosophy is to fix a word

this though never happens

what we get with genuine philosophical issues is option

equal but opposite options

options which cannot be settled – in any non-controversial way

the problem with language is that words are physically determinate – they are that is, determinate marks on a page – they occupy a determinate space – they have a determinate shape and can exist in that mode for a determinate time

the same can be said for the non-written word

it is his physical determinacy which suggests to us that there should be a corresponding semantical determinacy

here is in fact no semantic determinacy in the way that that there is physical determination

and yet we do not want to say that we are dealing with an entirely undetermined phenomenon in semantics – clearly there is some determination – or attempt at it – which reveals a degree of indeterminacy

now in discussing the determinacy and indeterminacy of language – I am not really concerned about use – use shows us indeterminacy, and the variety of uses of a particular term expresses, demonstrates indeterminacy – but the origin of this indeterminacy is not the use itself – the point has to do with language – with semantics, semantics, itself -  the point being that meaning is indeterminate

 

19/ 10 /84

 

if nothing else, one result of yesterday’s work is that ‘good’ is best seen as an indeterminate word – it is philosophically indeterminate

in saying this I am not arguing against any particular theory of ‘good’ – one could hold with Moore or Stevenson – on my view – and still accept the indeterminacy of ‘good’

but is this to say anything that we don’t already know?

it is not just to sat that there is a philosophical problem about ‘good’ – just as there is about ‘knowledge’, ‘mind’, ‘matter’ etc.

does the fact that such are philosophical and controversial mean that they are indeterminate?

indeterminate in what sense?

what I have in mind is that in philosophy generally – and in this case (morality) in specific – it is the total philosophical process which gives key philosophical terms their significance – that what we can say about a term like ‘good’ is just what exists in the discussion – in the philosophical community

 

for Moore ‘good’ is simple and indefinable

does it make sense to speak of indefinable words?

I don’t think so. even so we make the proviso that we are speaking here in a technical philosophical sense

(it makes sense to speak of meaningless words – but does it make sense to speak of indefinable words?)

I think not

if a word cannot be defined how can it be said to be?)

definability?

 

in arguing that ‘good’ is a word that denotes a simple – because of his definition of ‘simple’ Moore can say that ‘good’ is indefinable. so we can say nothing about ‘good’ – it’s almost mystic

this is fine – except that Moore goes on to say something about ‘good’ – he says it is an ideal

we understand ‘ideal’ because we can contrast it with – ‘natural’ – we can say what it is not – this in a negative sense is how we define ‘good’

and this is only possible because of the place of philosophy in the issue – philosophy is not just a set of skills –

our meta theories give meaning to certain ‘philosophical’ words – like ‘good’

philosophy is not just a means of investigating an already given phenomenon

it is through such that we give meaning to certain expressions

now what kind of expressions are these?

and what is it to give meaning?

it is to show not the relationship of simple to complex – but more like part to whole

by substituting a (philosophical) term under a meta – or in a meta theory – we show its relationship to more primitive concepts

in so doing we are involved in meta or philosophical reflection

this is just what we do- whatever one’s primitive philosophical theory – this is what is done

 

I am suggesting that philosophical analysis can create its own object – its own content for those terms it has discovered as empty

 

I am arguing for a new way of looking at philosophical analysis – a view that recognizes the constitutive role of analysis in the problem of meaning

the meaning of a term is relative to the process of analysis – however superficial or deep that may be

in philosophical analysis we are not just investigating ‘use’ – but also – and this is what it comes to – the philosophical investigations of use – or more correctly the possible assumption

this allows for divergent meta theories

we may begin with a problem of meaning – ‘what does ‘good’ mean’? – but inevitably we end up with far more complex problems – problems of epistemology / ontology

so after such analysis, any conclusion – about the initial issue – will have to be seen as being constituted by that process – our conclusion will thus imply both epistemological and ontological conclusions – higher order conclusions – which it is clear are necessary in order to deal with the initial issue

 

25/10/84

philosophical analysis is not just heuristic, it is (through the heuristic process) constitutive

the empiricist tradition has resisted this view – it has put the view that language / experience is – as it is – complete

analysis of language / experience reports – does not add anything to the analysis

 

part of what we are doing when we query the meaning of a term is to ask for its connection with other terms

its logical – and then epistemological and ontological connections

to ask for meaning is thus to ask for relations

when Moore asks ‘what is ‘good’?’ – he is queering the relation of ‘good’ to other terms – terms that ‘good’ is often associated with – like ‘pleasure’, ‘self-fulfillment’

the question being asked is, is ‘good’ that kind of word – is it the same kind as ‘pleasure’, ‘self-fulfillment’?

such a question is the question of the relation, the logical relation, the logical – and of course it comes to the epistemological – connections

it ought to be clear from this that we cannot view – cannot argue a sharp distinction between philosophy and its object

philosophical objects are constituted by philosophical hypotheses

relations between words in this sense are philosophical relations

 

28/10/84

the general point is that the concept of meaning is not distinct from

epistemological and ontological issues

some philosophers behave as if epistemology and ontology are no ore than tools for explicating a concept of meaning

my point is that epistemology and ontology issues are finally what any concept of meaning comes down to

meaning is in this sense a secondary philosophical issue

it is a subject of epistemology / ontology – a puzzle – that if solved leads to a clearer understanding of these primary concerns

language is the context in which the problem of meaning emerges –

but the problem of meaning is not a problem of language – it is a problem of the theory of knowledge and existence

those philosophers who have argued that epistemology and ontology are problems of meaning have mistaken the problem of meaning for the theory of meaning – or the problem area with the solution area

however it might be suggested that the problem of meaning arises because of epistemology

i.e. – an empirical account of meaning may render certain statement – certain kinds of statements meaningless

even in this case it is a mistake to see the primary epistemological dispute as the problem of meaning –

it is such a dispute that leads to – ‘entails’ the problem of meaning

again the problem of meaning becomes a focus for the primary epistemological issue.

 

29/10/84

there is a sense in which the problem of what is right or wrong, what is good – what is bad – is not the most difficult problem of ethics

there is a problem here – a genuine problem of ethics is how to bring about the good

I think we do intuit the good – we do not however intuit what the good consists in – or for that matter – how to bring it about – if we have decided what is good –

what I am suggesting is that the real problem is how to bring the ideal into reality

and this unfortunately is not a matter we can legislate on – in any objective sense

we cannot make any generalizations in this respect

and this fact tells us a great deal about morality – the problem of the good – and the nature of man

the best that is possible is to be aware of the ethical options – and further to create new possibilities – in the face of objective uncertainty

it is an objective uncertainty about how – not about what – although ‘what’ is unavoidably trapped in the how – in so far as what is real and not ideal

 

1/11/84

it has been said that some virtues are ends in themselves

that is they are worth pursuing for themselves – regardless of any consequence that may result in so pursuing – consequences that is that are not rightly seen as being the attainment – or the attainment of the end

such a view is to be distinguished from a utilitarian ethic which holds that an act is moral or not depending solely on the consequence

we cannot – and this is important – determine what these consequences are – such is a matter of fact to be determined by experience – and then to be evaluated by some ethical calculus – standard

so – consequences are not in any sense moral in themselves- moral as such

an act may produce a consequence which is pleasure / happiness etc – but we need some theory about such consequences – or perhaps to be more precise- - about such descriptions of consequences

when we say such and such is immoral – we are referring to a certain description – a moral description of the act / consequence – whatever

what description we further describe as moral – we contrast that description with other kinds of descriptions – we might say ‘non-moral descriptions’

the point about means and ends is that such are possible descriptions of how we should go about describing what is moral = that is what principles – methods best enable us to define moral – to come to grips with what is moral – ends and means are thus only ways of approaching the moral

the moral is given but undefined – not as Moore thought – undefinable

we can and do define it – but our definitions are not final – real – they are merely indicators that enable us to work with the given unknown

the moral – though it exists as an unknown – exists prior to the unknown (as a thing in itself)

the moral problem points to – leads to the unknown – and is in that sense shown to be unknown

 

02/11/84

 

the direction to go in arguing with and against Moore – is to argue a skepticism with regard to ‘good’ – this would be a more general argument than his indefinability – that is to say that ‘good’ is unknown in an epistemological sense – that it is ‘empty’ – rather than indefinable – that is we do and must define it – and that any definition will be ‘provisional’ and seen as such – is a consequence of its (the good’s – the moral’s) epistemological status – its skeptical nature

 

the concept of the moral is not defined in experience – is it defined by experience?

this seems true – people do in fact define ‘good’ – ‘moral’

Moore’s argument relates to definition in experience

by the very nature of experience – we cannot expect a whole or final characterization

the concept of goodness is given – not the content

the content is given to the concept

and is thus – as far as it goes – a definition of the concept – the only kind of definition that is available

when I say we define the content of good by experience – and not the form of the concept itself – but rather its content – what I am suggesting is – by ‘experience’ – something far broader than is usually meant – and certainly not as defined by pure or simple experience – which Moore I think holds to

experience is in this context – the values and ethical principles that people do operate with

these are facts about people – moral agents – just as the concept / idea of the moral – the good – is a fact about human beings

 

03/11/84

while I think I can argue against Moore’s definition – based on an argument about goodness – still the point remains that we can’t get a fix on the moral –

my arguments are of a general epistemological kind – and this loses some force in the moral framework

but this is just where Moore and I differ fundamentally –

he sees the problem as in a sense ontological – what is the quality of goodness

this leads him to what I would call an epistemological skepticism – though this is not how he would look at it

for me the fundamental problem is how do we know what is good – that is the problem is rightly seen as primarily a problem of knowledge – a problem of knowing

the ‘what’ question – the ontological question is secondary –

it is not the problem of what is – but what can we know

so – even though – in common usage – the problem of the good is seen as the problem of what is good – this question is really – can we know what we think is good

so – we begin with the same question as Moore – but this moves immediately to the question of knowledge – do we know what we assume we know?

we do define the good

in saying that the good exists Moore is really arguing about knowledge – not its object or supposed object

in saying that we can’t define – he is saying – we can’t know

the next question is what does this tell us about ourselves – about ourselves as moral agents?

this is not a question that Moore has dealt with

how do we deal with it?

what can we say on top of what Moore has said – is there anything that can be said?

I think so

 

04/11/84

 

if we cannot define good – how can we say that it is indefinable?

the point being that indefinability becomes a defining characteristic of that concept

that is we identify it through this special characteristic

such an identification (definition) can distinguish good from other terms

and this is what is important about definition – it relates words to words – phrases to phrases – shows connections in use – and posits connections / relations that could be in use

Moore’s view of definition – as far as I can see – has nothing to do with language

his is a very meta and Kantian ‘thing in itself’ approach

 

 

one of Moore’s questions – a question any moralist must address – is the nature of the moral – what is it – is it to be analysed as an ideal or a natural- how do we analyse it – that is – what is the origin of the notion?

we can offer different explanations – idealist and naturalist

Moore has argued against naturalism – but this argument is really an argument against definition – natural or ideal

 

 

 

‘you see when I lie I tell you so,

which is not a lie –

but it’s not the truth either’

 

George Burns

 

 

05/11/84

 

the problem of ethics comes after Moore

given that we cannot define / know the good – how do we settle these questions that seem to depend on just that happening?

the possibility is that we give morality – give up these notions

this quite an absurd possibility

it is not possible for the human being to act amorally – we are for better or worse faced with – confronted with questions of value – the failure – the logical failure – of definition and knowledge of the source of value – does not mean that we can proceed without value – even if through such an analysis it has become a greater problem

so still the question remains – what does one do given the failure of definition and knowledge?

now it might be thought that it is just this problem that subjectivist theories of ethics are best equipped to deal with

the idea being that there cannot be any objectivist definition of good

surely all we are then left with is a host of individual preferences – feelings – prescriptions – and really nothing more can be said

this view has been thought to be a solution to Moore’s problem – but in fact it is not

the question of the definition of knowledge – of good – the moral – is as much an issue for your subjectivist (what does good really mean to me?) as it is to your objectivist (what is the good?)

unless of course if good in both senses is seen to be radically different

 

09/11/84

 

if we accept Moore’s indefinability of ‘good’ – or my revised view of the unknowability (and this has to be worked out in detail – what about non-apprehendability of good?) the question facing us – a question which has perplexed moral philosophers post Moore – is what do we do now – where do we go from here?

more than once the comment has been made that Moore’s argument ‘pit an end to moral philosophy’ – an end mainly in the sense of a heuristic end

the point is real – if we accept Moore’s thesis about the indefinability of good – what can we say about good – about the moral life?

I think there is a positive side to Moore’s conclusion

in that it may not be an end to moral philosophy – but a turning point

we have a conclusion

the conclusion is a conclusion in two senses – it is a conclusion to Moore’s argument – a conclusion about moral philosophy

now as a conclusion about moral philosophy it can be turned back on the subject and used as an explanatory hypothesis

or more correctly as a conclusion which can be explained by the subject

another way

we can ask – given this conclusion – what follows – that is what is left – what remains of moral philosophy?

it is in fact the whole of moral philosophy

if good cannot be defined – how are we to explain this notion – how doe we account for the word – for morality?

in a sense it is this question which subsequent moral philosophers have come to deal with

(though I think it will be shown that they have not understood this point or really dealt with it – partly because Moore himself misunderstood it)

 

 

 

I think my most radical point against Moore is that his view finally undercuts the naturalistic fallacy

the point being that if good is indefinable – it is – it cannot be seen as either natural or ideal

we have to adopt a moral skepticism

 

 

12/11/84

 

Moore argues that good is a simple

in a sense this presupposes that we know about good (i.e. – that we are not mistaken in holding that it is a simple) and that its form if not its content can be defined

 

‘good’ is a descriptive term – but of what?

this is the question = why should we hold with Moore that it is a quality

or with others that it is – e.g. – a description of behaviour – of a kind or kinds of behaviour?

if we cannot clearly identify what it is that is described – do we then hold that there is something to be described?

is good just expressive?

this was the move of the emotivists – but still the question remains

what is it that is being expressed – and why should we say that it is emotions – or whatever?

hare breaks out of this by arguing that good is not descriptive – but is rather prescriptive

 

 

but does this really avoid the problem?

can’t we still ask – must we still must ask – what it is that is prescribed (good)?

 

 

 

I think it could be argued that to say ‘x is good’ – is not to make a definite description

we can say this at least

the moral question – the problem of morality emerges once we try to make the description ‘x is good’ – definite

‘good’ is an empty description

the problem of morality is the problem of dealing with its emptiness – moral theory – the successful adoption of moral theory – is defining – making definite the description

(I suspect something like opposite happens with empirical sciences – or does it?

to be investigated}

the question is – how to make the description definite?

can it be made definite?

well the fact is that it is made definite –

some people believe their descriptions have definite reference – but how are these decisions made?

 

 

 

how are these decisions made?

we cannot make a universal statement in answer to this

what we can do is investigate – look at all possibilities

and in so doing look at various answers

this involves being able to understand the philosophical basis – and various theories that have been advanced

and possibly inventing new answers

what distinguishes a genuine answer from a pseudo answer – what that is – is the form of a proper answer?

is this a real question?

the essential crucial point is that we cannot answer the question – how are these decisions made in a philosophically independent / objective way

any answer will be a function of a moral theory – possibly – initially more than one

my point is that the philosophical problem that throws up the issue will be the same – all solutions are problem dependent

 

 

let’s say someone adopts a moral outlook – idealism – and we ask him – how did you decide what ‘good’ and other moral terms apply to?

presumably his answer to this question will be an idealist answer

that is that there will be an idealist answer to the problem – for it is only then that idealism can proceed

in this case we intuit that the word ‘good’ has meaning – and that it applies to idealist platonic like entities

 

13/11/84

the problem of morality is finding a referent to moral words

I think it can be said that moral terms refer – but have no reference – in either an ideal or natural sense

and this is the problem of morality

there is ins a sense – no ‘natural’ or given referent for moral terms

and yet we feel that there should be

(‘should’ and not ‘must’ in this context)

and to say there should be is simply to raise the problem – the same problem in the next level of discourse

 

 

Moore essentially contrasted natural and no-natural reference (in the sense of naturalism)

moral terms are not – he thought are not natural terms – therefore they must be non-natural

but I have grave doubts about this – and I thinks Moore’s own argument about definition – which I think goes to an account of reference undermines his solution

I fail to see how moral terms can be said to have any reference at all – ideal or natural – objective or subjective

but the argument I eventually wish to mount will have more to do with the nature of reference – of language – definition and moral terms

 

 

that moral terms have no reference – but should have – this is the problem of morality

(for if there was reference – clear reference – there would be no problem of ethics)

 

 

now that moral terms do not have reference is not to say anything about the nature of their reference – this simple truth shows us that if the idealist / naturalist dispute is in any sense genuine – it is not at this level that it emerges

if there is no reference – neither account of moral reference (if this is what these theories are seen to be about) neither account of moral reference is – is relevant to the issue

what I am saying is that there is no reference

we must begin with the moral fact – or this fact about the moral

and in terms of this understand ethics – interpret the ethical debate

 

 

 

I think what happen in moral philosophy is we begin with problems which appear soluble – and clear cut – and then through analysis we come to the realization that they are not soluble – and in fact it is not clear that they can be stated in a any clear non-controversial way – once this point has been arrived at – once that is it is realized that we can go no further – and we have really made no positive progress – all that is left is to describe what has happened – that is give an account of what we set out to do – how we went about – and what the result was – so finally we are left only with a description of  moral or ethical philosophizing – this all we can honestly do

 

 

“and so, if I understand you correctly, you act and you know why you act, but you don’t know why you know why you know that you know what you do?” I must say with pride that William gave me a look of admiration. “Perhaps that it. In any case this tells you why I feel so uncertain of my truth, even if I believe in it.”

 

 

- Eco. 207